Chatham
House, London
29
January 2001
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"ESDI
and Transatlantic Defence Cooperation"
Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary
General
at the Conference on
"The Globalisation of Defence Industry:
Policy Implications for NATO and ESDI"
Ladies
and Gentlemen,
Good morning. It is a real pleasure
to be here today. Indeed, as someone
who speaks in public quite regularly,
I have a soft spot in my heart for
Chatham House ?- because like many
of you here today, I am grateful to
Chatham House for its "rules".
They allow me to speak more frankly
than I might otherwise be able to
do -- and they have occasionally helped
me out of trouble, when I went a little
too far!
Indeed, even in the most forlorn
corners of the Euro-Atlantic area,
where nobody speaks anything but the
local language, the one English expression
all conference organisers know is
"Chatham House Rules". I
must admit, therefore, that I enjoy
the irony of discovering that today,
Chatham House itself is the only place
where its rules don't apply. "The
exception that proves the Rule",
one might say. But despite the risks
involved, I will do my best to be
as frank and as thought-provoking
as possible -- because I believe that
this conference is an excellent opportunity
to discuss openly the real challenges
we face at the beginning of a new
millennium.
I believe that the organisers of
this conference have chosen a very
timely subject for our discussion
-- because the 21st century will confront
us with an entirely new set of challenges.
Globalisation will make our societies
more creative and prosperous, but
also more vulnerable. The rapid dissemination
of technology and information offers
entirely new ways of production, but
it can also bring the spectre of more
states developing weapons of mass
destruction. And, perhaps most importantly,
regional conflicts will again and
again confront us with a cruel choice
between costly engagement and costly
indifference. And all of this means
that we have to get rid of the old
thinking, and look at better ways
of ensuring our security in a fundamentally
new world.
I know that there are a lot of experts
on defence industrial issues here
today, both on the speakers list and
in the audience but I have no intention
of getting into the details of licensing
agreements or transitional regulatory
regimes -- I happily leave that to
people who are more knowledgeable
on those issues. What I will try to
do, instead, is try to look to the
near future to analyse the impact
of the changing environment on NATO
together with NATO's response to it,
and sketch out how things could -
and should - evolve.
Today, we find ourselves at a crossroads
-- because a major evolution is taking
place in Euro-Atlantic security. A
new player is moving onto the field,
alongside, and with, NATO. As a result,
we are in the process of rebalancing
some major elements of the transatlantic
security relationship -- with burdens
being shared more equally, and new
roles and responsibilities for Europe.
We all know that the idea of a strong
and effective European security capability
has been floating around for years.
For years, European leaders have pointed
out that Europe is an economic giant,
but a military pygmy. For years, we
have heard warnings that Europe needs
to contribute more to NATO's capability.
And for years, we heard warnings that
the US and NATO might not always want
to take the lead in handling every
European crisis, and that Europe should
have some capability to take the lead
where NATO as a whole is not engaged.
Well, we heard all the warnings,
but let's be honest: nothing much
came of it. Of course, a few new structures
were created, and some attempts were
made to pool European capabilities
-- but all in all, true and effective
European security cooperation remained
a mirage for many years.
All of that changed two years ago
-- and the catalyst was Saint-Malo,
reinforced by Kosovo. The Kosovo air
campaign made it very clear to anyone
looking that we have a glaring transatlantic
capability gap. Because Europe was
deficient in many of the required
capabilities, the US had to take on
a disproportionate share of the burden.
Kosovo also showed us that we have
an interoperability problem between
the Allies. National capabilities
used in the conduct of the air campaign
were often incompatible, and our militaries
had to go to enormous lengths to overcome
these deficiencies.
More broadly, Kosovo showed us that,
as we enter the 21st Century, Europe
must play a greater role in preserving
Euro-Atlantic security. We were reminded
that in the early 90s the Balkans
deteriorated into civil war for want
of forceful action by Europe or NATO.
It was not until NATO backed the Dayton
agreement that the crisis could be
put to a halt. Put very briefly, we
now need a stronger contribution from
European nations to NATO operations,
if we are to avoid transatlantic resentment
about burden sharing. Similarly, Europe
needs to develop the capacity to take
action where NATO as a whole is not
involved, so that the Alliance is
not dragged into conflicts simply
because Europe has no capacity to
handle them on its own. The "NATO
or nothing" option is no longer
sustainable.
In sum, no-one could ignore any
longer the necessity for Europe to
get stronger. Which is why more progress
has been made in the past 2 years
than in the previous 20. From St Malo
to Nice, the EU has moved quickly
to set up the structures it needs
to take on more in the field of security.
It has defined clearly the capability
it wants to have: by 2003, the EU
should be able to deploy 60,000 troops,
with the associated air and naval
elements, within 60 days of the order
being given; and this corps size force
should be sustainable in the field
for at least 1 year.
EU nations held a capabilities commitment
conference last November, to determine
what they have now, and what they
will need to meet their goal. The
aim of this conference was to gather
commitments by EU nations to the Headline
Goal and to identify gaps. This conference
revealed that, while the EU has sufficient
numbers of troops and equipment, it
doesn't have the necessary capabilities.
From strategic lift, to satellite
communications, to command and control,
to radar jamming -- these are all
capabilities the EU does not have.
That is why, except for the smallest
contingencies, the EU will need NATO's
support for EU-led operations. Which
in turn is why our two organisations
have to be closely linked, and work
together. Duplication is in the interest
of neither NATO nor the EU. On the
contrary, complementarity between
our two organizations must be the
rule to create the right synergies.
ESDI makes sense on both sides of
the Atlantic. NATO and the EU, as
actors with common strategic interests,
should operate transparently to resolve
crises. NATO intends to play its full
part in this process. In this respect,
it has already made real progress.
From Berlin in 1996 to last month's
Ministerial in Brussels, NATO has
taken concrete steps to support, and
link into, the development of European
capacities. NATO and the EU have also
agreed on permanent arrangements on
consultation and cooperation between
themselves. For instance, the Alliance
is adapting its defence planning to
accommodate EU defence planning requirements
as well. NATO will also ensure that
the EU can have assured access to
its operational planning capabilities
and presume the availability of the
NATO assets and capabilities it needs
for EU-led operations, such as strategic
lift or satellite communications.
And the Alliance intends to identify
a range of European command options
for EU-led operations, with DSACEUR
being given European responsibilities,
acting as a link between both organisations.
All of these steps represent real
progress -- progress that is taking
place for the first time. Why? Because,
for the first time, both sides of
the Atlantic have realised that ESDI
is a mutually reinforcing process,
and will benefit all countries concerned.
But as this process goes forward,
some fundamental principles will have
to be respected, if it is to pay off.
We need to ensure that institutional
relations are established on an equal
footing, so they can co-operate on
a basis of equality and transparency.
Of course NATO and the EU will keep
their autonomy of decision. But they
will also be linked together.
We must also ensure that the non-EU
NATO members are granted satisfactory
participation in EU-led operation.
These countries are making a direct
contribution to European security
every day, in NATO, in the Balkans
and through their Article V commitment.
If ESDI is to work, it needs the support
of all European countries, not just
some -- and the NATO members most
of all. So we must ensure that the
participation issue is resolved as
it should be.
And we must ensure full coherence
in defence planning between the two
organisations. Our nations have only
one defence budget, and one set of
forces each. We have to ensure that
our armed forces are structured and
equipped for NATO and EU missions,
rather than NATO or EU missions. This
includes, of course, article 5 missions,
as well as peacekeeping operations
such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo.
As you can see, these are real challenges,
but we are making progress on all
of them. More progress will undoubtedly
be made in the near future. But there
is one more challenge we must meet
if ESDI is to succeed -- and it revolves
around capabilities. Because if we
do not resolve the challenge of capabilities,
we are simply talking about paper
armies and empty structures.
Let me, again, be very blunt. Today,
Europe simply does not have the capabilities
it needs to be a truly effective security
actor, both for NATO or EU operations.
There must be no illusions on this
matter. It would be the ultimate irresponsibility
for any government to pretend, for
political reasons, that its forces
have capabilities they do not have
-- because those illusions would not
survive first contact with an opponent.
Nor, for that matter, might the troops
themselves.
Let's face it -- Europe's defence
budgets are not exactly soaring. True,
the fall in European defence budgets
has generally been arrested. In some
cases, the trend has been reversed.
That's a step in the right direction.
But the Europeans are still deficient
in key assets and capabilities. To
meet its requirements -- to truly
become an effective security actor
-- Europe will have to find innovative
ways to improve its return on investment,
and improve its capabilities. The
harsh fact is that a European defence
dimension will not happen with present
military structures or present military
budgets.
Why is transatlantic cooperation
so essential? For three reasons. First,
because it will enhance interoperability.
Cooperative development, production
and procurement of military equipment
are fruitful ways of standardising
the equipment our forces need, so
they can work together quickly and
effectively. Today, the United States
spends more than three times what
Europe spends on research and development.
I'll let you draw your own conclusions
on the implications of that for interoperability.
Transatlantic cooperation, provided
it doesn't hinder healthy competition,
will also enhance technological innovation
-- because it will mean that technological
expertise is shared and enhanced in
a wider pool of experts; and because
it will mean more resources available
to fund research. This means, to me,
that we need to reinvigorate the technological
partnership across the Atlantic. The
recent efforts by the US Government
to loosen its restrictions on technology
export controls are a very welcome
step in the right direction.
Most of all, industrial cooperation
will mean better, more affordable
equipment for Europe, as well as for
North America. Let us be very clear:
as we enter the 21st century, complete
self-sufficiency in the development
and production of defence systems
is no longer feasible. It is simply
too expensive. Development costs are
too high, and growing too quickly
-- much more quickly than defence
budgets. By spreading the risks of
technology development, and by providing
economies of scale in production,
cooperation allows Governments to
develop and acquire systems they would
not be able to afford by going it
alone. This makes good sense for all
of our governments, which want to
improve their capabilities while controlling
their budgets.
For all these reasons -- to improve
interoperability; to ensure that the
best equipment is available at the
best price; and as an essential foundation
for a more effective Europe -- transatlantic
industrial defence cooperation has
become more than an optional bolt-on.
As we enter the 21st century, it is
a necessity. Which means our Governments
must take courageous, imaginative
decisions to make our procurement
and R and D regimes more flexible.
Clearly, they recognise the urgency
of this requirement, because they
have already begun to do so. Within
NATO, our Defence Capabilities Initiative
has identified the essential capabilities
all Allies must have for modern operations,
and Allies are working to meet those
requirements. Europeans and the US
need to be working to make defence
trade rules more flexible and pragmatic.
Within Europe, Governments are exploring
innovative ways to pool assets and
budgets to improve purchasing power.
And I personally will continue to
relentlessly pressure all of NATO
governments to make necessary investment
in defence.
All of these are steps in the right
direction, and they are having a positive
effect. But we need more. Our aim
should be to achieve a genuinely new
pattern of reciprocal transatlantic
armaments cooperation, and to achieve
it as soon as possible.
North America and Europe have much
to gain by working together to remove
obstacles to effective defence trade.
I have in mind here not only repealing
or liberalising general protectionist
legislation, but also resolving significant,
specific differences on both sides
of the Atlantic in areas such as mergers
and acquisition practices, and technology
transfer regimes.
In sum, as we enter the 21st century,
the Euro-Atlantic community -- North
America and Europe together -- has
to face some tough challenges when
it comes to improving our capability.
We need to address the capability
gap, and ensure our forces can work
together. And we have to get the best
equipment our tight defence budgets
allow. All of this is necessary, if
we are to ensure that Europe has the
capabilities necessary to meet its
aspirations, and be a stronger partner
to North America in security, but
also if we want to make sure that
NATO continues to be able to carry
out its missions effectively in the
future.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In the 21st Century, Europe and
North America are destined to work
together, on a broad range of operations,
to achieve our common strategic goals.
To meet those goals effectively, we
need to preserve and add to the military
strength of Europe and North America
-- and our ability to work together.
And we will need cooperation at all
levels between NATO and the EU --
in planning, in operations, in day-to-day
relations and at the highest political
levels. There is no other way to succeed,
and we must succeed if we want to
continue to be able to address real
challenges in the future.
To make all of this work, we need
one essential foundation: a defence
industrial marketplace that is open
and competitive, and supported by
a defence industrial base that is
innovative and robust. I encourage
you to use this conference as an opportunity
to explore new ways to meet this very
important goal.
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