"Turkey
and a European Security
and Defence Identity"
Speech by NATO Secretary General,
Lord Robertson
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to address
this distinguished gathering.
Albert Einstein once said that the
most pleasing activity is to chop
wood -- because you can immediately
see the result of your work! Security
policy, by contrast, is a long-term
affair, and often the results of our
decisions reveal themselves only months
or years later. Building a European
Security and Defence Identity is a
case in point. It is a process that
takes many years to develop. So we
have to make sure the decisions we
take are the right ones. And, as I
will argue here today, we are making
the right decisions.
However, I am aware that here in
Turkey my optimism might not be shared
entirely. Some in Turkey fear that
the current evolution of ESDI might
marginalise your country. I understand
even if I do not share the cause for
your concerns.
Turkey is a member of NATO, but
not yet of the EU. Until now, through
its NATO membership, Turkey, together
with all other Allies, was at the
centre of European security management.
Now, as the EU aspires to become
a true security actor in its own right,
NATO will no longer be the only institution
managing security in Europe. The EU
is taking over many of the functions
of the WEU, and some see that as calling
into question the benefits of Turkey's
far-reaching Associate status in the
WEU.
These recent developments suggest
to some people that Turkey is suffering
a "minus" in its security
status -- and a net loss in its influence
on the evolution of European security.
These are serious concerns and they
are being taken seriously. That is
all the more so as Turkey shares its
status with the other five non-EU
European Allies -- the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Poland
-- and, to a different extent, also
with Canada.
As a consequence of all this some
are tempted to dismiss the entire
project of European Defence as unwelcome.
After all, NATO is in good shape,
so why introduce such far-reaching
policy changes? Isn't there value
in the saying that "if it ain't
broke, don't fix it"?.
In my view such an attitude would
be mistaken. First, because, as I
will explain later in my remarks,
the concerns of non-EU Allies are
being taken seriously and addressed.
But secondly and perhaps more importantly,
because the status quo has become
untenable. Indeed, "if it ain't
broke, it may be broken soon".
The recent burden-sharing debates
in the US Presidential campaign were
just one of many signs that building
a stronger European role in security
matters has become necessary to a
healthy transatlantic relationship.
That is why we should support the
creation of a European Security and
Defence identity.
If you look at the evolution of
our security arrangements from an
historical perspective, the notion
of giving the EU a security dimension
appears neither revolutionary nor
naïve. On the contrary, a sober
analysis of the issues clearly shows
that the evolution towards a stronger
EU role was inevitable.
NATO and the EU both emerged from
the specific circumstances of post-war
Europe. But despite their similar
geographic origins, and despite a
certain overlap in their memberships,
these two institutions could hardly
have been more different: regarding
their goals, their legal frameworks,
their tasks, their working methods
-- and indeed their institutional
"philosophies".
NATO was an Alliance of sovereign
states, cooperating exclusively on
security matters. The European Union
process, by contrast, acquired an
agenda that covered almost everything
but security.
During the Cold War, these two institutions
complemented each other perfectly.
NATO provided security for its members,
and thus also provided an umbrella
for European development. And the
European Union could focus on more
promising areas than security.
But both institutions had their
deficiencies. In NATO, the military
capabilities of the Allies were distributed
unevenly -- the United States was
both outspending and outperforming
most other Allies. In the EU, it was
the lack of a security dimension.
Both institutions made repeated attempts
to rectify these deficiencies. But
as long as there was a common existential
threat, it simply made sense to keep
the arrangements as they were. And
so we engaged in rituals rather than
in a real change of policy: the United
States would ritually scoff at the
Europeans for not spending more on
defence but everybody knew that the
US had no alternative but to be the
mainstay.
In a similar vein, the Europeans
would ritually chafe under what they
perceived as US dominance -- and yet
at the end of the day, all their rhetoric
about strengthening Europe's security
dimension rang hollow. Again, with
dozens of Soviet tank divisions pointing
westward, what value would such a
specific European security dimension
have added? Only North America and
Europe together could have mastered
such a challenge -- and that gave
NATO its raison d'être.
Today, however, the Cold War and
the Soviet Union are gone. There is
no longer an existential threat that
helps hide institutional deficiencies.
On the contrary, the post-Cold War
world has exposed these deficiencies
-- and rather mercilessly.
The lack of a European security
dimension was painfully demonstrated
in the early phase of the Bosnian
war. The United States argued that
they "didn't have a dog in this
fight", and stayed out. But no
European security policy was there
to fill the void. Some Europeans may
have boasted that this was the "hour
of Europe", -- but they were
premature.
Eventually, the US realised it did
have a stake in stopping the war in
Bosnia, and together Europe and North
America made the difference between
war and peace. In this sense, our
successful engagement in Bosnia was
a crucial lesson on the value of transatlantic
solidarity. But this was not the only
lesson.
The writing was on the wall for
everyone to read: not every regional
conflict would necessarily engage
the strategic interests of the United
States the same way as that of the
Europeans. So the second lesson was
that from now on we had to contemplate
scenarios where the United States
would not want to be in the lead.
In such a case, then, the Europeans
had better be able to provide some
leadership themselves.
If Bosnia reinforced the logic of
the European Allies doing more politically,
Kosovo reinforced the urgency of the
European Allies doing more militarily.
Not only did the United States carry
a disproportionate share of the burden
of the air campaign. The campaign
also showed that in such a new scenario,
the gap in US and Allied capabilities
figured even more prominently than
in the scenarios of the Cold War.
As a global power, the US had always
invested in power projection capabilities.
In the Kosovo campaign, these capabilities
came in very handy. European armed
forces, by contrast, are still largely
geared to the specific scenarios of
the Cold War. They would have made
a significant contribution to our
collective defence in case of an attack
from the East. But, to put it bluntly,
in an air campaign against a small-scale
Balkan dictator no tank formations
are required. Europeans had a lot
of capabilities they didn't need,
and too few of the capabilities they
did need.
In the end, as in Bosnia, transatlantic
solidarity prevailed again. But our
success came at a price: there was
lingering American dissatisfaction
about an unfair division of labour.
I recall a US Senator telling me on
Capitol Hill that his constituents
were increasingly fed up as the Europeans
came to "knock on Uncle Sam's
door" when there was trouble
in Europe. And on top of that there
was European dissatisfaction about
having too little political say.
The British author Samuel Johnson
once said that the thought of being
hanged in a fortnight concentrates
the mind wonderfully. Bosnia and Kosovo
did concentrate our minds wonderfully
and they still do. These crises demonstrated
the urgency of rectifying the deficiencies
of our institutional and military
landscape. They demonstrated all too
well that the solution could only
lie in a stronger security role by
the Europeans and especially by their
most integrated entity the European
Union.
Of course, we had the Western European
Union. In the immediate post-Cold
War days, this organisation served
as a convenient venue for our attempts
to shift more responsibility to the
European Allies. As a bridge between
NATO and the EU, the WEU helped us
get around the different memberships
of NATO and EU. Its flexible nature
allowed for a creative mix of "full
members", "associate members"
-- such as Turkey -- and "observers".
This allowed us to make real progress
on many thorny issues. We agreed on
procedures for NATO-WEU information-sharing,
we negotiated arrangements for the
WEU's use of NATO assets, we clarified
the role of the Deputy SACEUR as the
point man between NATO and the WEU
for WEU-led operations, and we held
exercises together. These were, and
continue to be, precious achievements.
But even as we pushed for closer
NATO-WEU relations, we always knew
that we had to aim higher. The WEU
was simply too narrow -- and bluntly
too powerless -- to bear the full
traffic of European crisis management.
That was clear to most observers.
It became obvious that if there was
to be a serious approach to European-led
crisis management, the lead role had
to go to the European Union. Since
Maastricht the 15 nation-European
Union had aspired to develop a distinct
security dimension. While some argued
that, initially, this involved slightly
more rhetoric than substance, those
who observe the European process know
that there was an inevitability in
the extension of the EU into security
and defence policy.
It was increasingly obvious that
even the revived WEU was a transitory,
and none too effective, framework.
It would not be around forever. Eventually,
another chapter would open -- the
chapter in which the EU itself finally
got serious about security and defence.
Since the Declaration from the British-French
Summit in St. Malo that new chapter
has opened - a chapter entitled the
European Security and Defence Policy.
It should be possible now for this
ESDP to finally rectify the deficiencies
that have plagued both NATO and the
EU for years: the asymmetry in the
military capabilities between the
US and Europe, and the lack of an
effective and workable European crisis
management role in cases where NATO
as a whole was not engaged.
At the EU's Helsinki Summit last
December, ambitious goals were set.
First, the establishment of a Political
and Security Committee to provide
advice to EU leaders on security issues,
as well as day-to-day political leadership
of EU-led operations. Second, the
creation of a Military Committee and
staff to provide military advice to
the Political and Security Committee,
and to carry out their directions
during potential operations.
However, going beyond at last the
purely institutional measures, the
EU set itself an ambitious "Headline
Goal" of creating, by 2003, the
means to deploy 60,000 troops within
60 days, sustainable in theatre for
at least one year. The EU has also
identified the forces and capabilities
its members have to commit in order
to meet their collective "Headline
Goal". This was a first and a
very big first indeed.
This decision is the visible evidence
that the EU is willing to go beyond
new institutional mechanisms, and
will also muster the military capabilities
to underpin them. At last the Europeans
will have military capabilities connected
to a European crisis- management structure.
The challenge now is to translate
these ambitious goals into practice.
And it is here where NATO comes into
play. After all, only in close cooperation
with NATO can such a European option
be developed successfully.
Why? Because NATO is Europe's dominant
security institution. Bosnia and Kosovo
have made that utterly clear. NATO
remains absolutely vital as the cornerstone
of European security -- in peacekeeping,
in defence diplomacy, as a framework
for cooperation, and, if necessary,
for collective defence. During its
half century of existence, it has
accumulated a high and unprecedented
level of expertise.
Moreover, the US retains key strategic
capabilities which will be indispensable
for all but the smallest European
contingencies: logistics, strategic
lift, satellite reconnaissance etc.
Even if NATO may not be in the lead,
its support might well make the difference
between success and failure.
This fundamental fact alone should
take some of the drama out of ESDP.
It reinforces the point we have been
making all along: ESDP is not about
European strategic independence, but
about a more coherent European contribution
to crisis management. It is not about
the EU somehow going it alone -- it
is about Europe doing more.
Because we have kept these fundamentals
in mind, NATO and the EU have been
able to move ahead quickly. We now
have an agreement on sharing classified
documents, so NATO and the EU can
work together on practical issues.
We have also set up several NATO-EU
Ad Hoc Working Groups to examine how
NATO could support the EU operationally
when Europe takes the lead in handling
crises. And the NATO Council has held
two meetings so far with the EU's
Interim Political and Security Committee.
This gives you an indication of how
much importance both sides of the
Atlantic attach to this project. And
of how much we want it to succeed.
What are the current challenges?
One is to create effective institutional
links between NATO and the EU. These
institutional links are important
with respect to consultation in a
crisis. But they are also important
in the area of force planning. After
all, each country in NATO and the
EU has only one set of forces and
one defence budget. So NATO and EU
defence planning must be coherent
to avoid duplication and to ensure
that our forces are structured and
equipped to conduct the full range
of missions they might be assigned.
A similar requirement applies to
operations. As the EU plans for operations,
it must be open and transparent to
NATO. This will allow non-EU Allies
to contribute, where possible, to
the planning of the operation, and
it will facilitate the participation
of non-EU Allies in the operation
itself.
Another key challenge is capabilities.
The seriousness of ESDP will be judged
largely by the extent to which it
contributes to the strengthening of
European military muscle. With the
Headline Goal, Europe has set itself
a realistic, achievable target --
but it is still pretty ambitious.
To meet it, significant improvements
will have to be made to Europe's military
capabilities in a range of areas --
from training, to recruitment, to
procurement.
To some extent, these challenges
can be met by getting a better return
on investment -- through innovative
management techniques, identification
of priorities professionalising, downsizing,
and more transnational cooperation.
But let me be very clear. Spending
more wisely will get you only so far.
In the end, EU nations must also "bite
the bullet" and spend more. And,
as you know, I have been reminding
all allies of that. I won't let them
off the hook.
Finally, -- and very importantly
to more than just Turkey is -- the
question of the participation of non-EU
Allies. Why does NATO put so much
emphasis on this question? I think
the case of Turkey demonstrates quite
convincingly why. There is both a
political and a military imperative
why non-EU NATO Allies such as Turkey
simply must be part of the game.
First, the political point. It is
a very simple and straightforward
point: we all need Turkey. Its proximity
to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the
Middle East and the Mediterranean
puts Turkey at the centre of a vital
strategic area. Indeed, I would argue
that, as a secular democracy and a
staunch NATO Ally, Turkey has never
had a greater opportunity to play
a role as an agent of positive change.
All Allies, North American or European,
NATO or EU, appreciate that.
Any attempt to deprive Turkey of
this unique role, any misguided attempt
to marginalise her, would be self-defeating
especially if a crisis affects Turkey's
security or Turkey's vital interests.
If this was attempted, the West would
act against its own vital strategic
interests. That is why Turkey must
remain a crucial part of the European
security equation.
The second point is a military one.
Even a quick glance at a list of conceivable
scenarios for EU-led crisis management
operations drives the conclusion that
virtually all these scenarios involve
Turkey, in one way or another. Simply
put: if the crisis is very serious,
NATO will be involved -- and that
includes Turkey. If the crisis is
less prone to escalation, but still
requires a significant amount of force,
then the EU may lead, but only with
the help of NATO. Again, Turkey will
also be involved. If the crisis is
at the lower end of the spectrum,
the EU may act autonomously but will
want to take into account eventual
contributions by Turkey.
In any case, Turkey needs to be
involved -- because NATO assets are
required, because Turkish contributions
are needed, or because the operation
takes place in a region close to Turkey.
In other words, the military realities
of crisis management will ensure that
Turkey will play a role commensurate
with its weight as a major security
actor.
In light of these political and
military reasons it becomes clear
why we, in our dealings with the EU,
have been playing the role of advocate
for the non-EU Allies on the participation
issue. I am confident that the EU
is now proposing arrangements with
the non-EU European Allies, including
Turkey, that will meet their security
interests.
Indeed, things are moving fast.
Over the last few weeks, the EU Presidency
has made a major effort to accommodate
the concerns of non-EU Allies, and
this has moved the debate considerably
forward.
Let me outline, briefly and bluntly,
the "success" tally of the
6 non-EU NATO nations. I believe it
is formidable.
In peace-time first,
- Permanent and regular consultation
is assured through meetings at
all levels from Ministers to experts.
- The 6 non-EU European Allies
can themselves propose meetings
and agendas.
- The scope of subjects to be
discussed covers the full range
of security, defence and crisis
management.
- Liaison officers can be appointed
by the 6 to the EU military staff.
- Others specific liaison arrangements
can be organised, in particular
for exercises.
- The force offers made by the
6 non-EU European Allies at the
Capabilities Commitments Conference
are very welcome additions to
the EU Headline Goal and will
be treated in the same way as
the force offers of EU member
states in the follow up to the
Conference.
These peace-time arrangements will
be reinforced in times of crises.
During the pre-operational phase of
a crisis,
- Consultations will be intensified
at all levels, including Ministerial.
- These consultations will in
particular cover concerns of the
6 non-EU European Allies relating
to their security interests.
- They will ensure that these
countries are kept abreast of
EU thinking on strategic military
options, the concept of operations
(which will only be adopted after
taking into consideration the
consultations with these countries),
and the operational plan.
During the operational phase of a
crisis,
- European members of NATO will
have an automatic right to participate
in EU operations where NATO assets
are used. They can also be invited
to participate in operations where
there is no recourse to NATO assets.
- All troop contributors will
have the same rights and obligations
in the Committee of Contributors,
which will be responsible for
and will play a crucial role in
the day-to-day conduct of the
operation.
No need to comment further. This
list speaks for itself.
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me conclude. A stronger European
role in crisis management is inevitable.
It is a logical step in the process
of European construction. But it is
also of crucial importance for the
Alliance itself. For it is a prerequisite
for a more balanced, fairer, transatlantic
relationship. That is why all NATO
Allies have supported the development
of a stronger European role in security
and defence. And we all have a strong
interest in seeing this project succeed.
It is after all the most momentous
rebalancing of NATO since it was founded
in 1949 - 51 years ago.
To the degree that this involves
turning the EU along with its partners
in Europe into a serious security
actor, many adjustments will have
to be made. The EU, after all, is
a "newcomer" to the complex
field of "hard" security.
But these adjustments can succeed,
provided they are developed in a spirit
of compromise. I believe this spirit
is clearly visible, and it goes beyond
security matters.
In his recent book on Turkey, "Turkish
challenge", Ambassador Öymen,
who is the next speaker here today,
characterised Turkey as the EU's "distant
relative". It is my impression
that this distance is narrowing. The
EU's Helsinki Summit not only made
decisions with regard to security.
It also elevated Turkey's status to
a candidate for EU membership.
Ambassador Öymen's book also
familiarised me with a saying by Kemal
Atatürk in which he exhorted
the Turkish people to "trust
themselves". This is as true
today as it has ever been.
Turkey has every reason to trust
itself. It has no reason at all to
fear ESDI, ESDP, or any other acronyms
created to define Europe's defence
role. Turkey was, is and will remain
a major player in the European security
equation. And so it should.
Thank you for your attention.
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