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| Updated: 23-Nov-2000 | NATO Speeches |
Berlin,
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Speechby
Secretary General Lord Robertson,
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| Extracts |
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"The transatlantic relationship is the essence of the Alliance, and the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. Everyone agrees on that. And everyone also agrees that this relationship will remain healthy in future only if Europe takes on a fairer share of the burden for maintaining that security. Anyone who followed the American election knows that burden-sharing in peace and security was definitely a topic of debate. We also know that NATO and the United States may not always want to take the lead in addressing every security crisis in or around Europe. As Javier Solana wrote recently, "If NATO and the US want to tackle a crisis, all the better. But if the US does not engage, as we saw in the Balkans from 1991 to 1995, someone else may need to, and it is better for our overall security if we (the Europeans) can do so effectively." Europe won't have to ask the United States to do something they feel reluctant about; and the United States and NATO won't get dragged into operations simply for lack of an alternative. And we all know, finally, that a stronger European capability is also a logical evolution in Europe's development. It simply makes sense for a Europe that is as rich as the United States, and that has common goals in peace and security, to be able to back up its words more effectively with deeds. For all of these reasons, the development of European capabilities makes sense. It will make Europe a better partner for North America in preserving Euro-Atlantic security -- and ensure that no resentments about burden-sharing distract us from working together towards our common goals. Kosovo shone a harsh light on how much work remains to be done….The EU has finally heard that wake-up call. At Helsinki, it has set itself an ambitious military target. By the year 2003, it wants to have the capability to deploy about 60,000 troops, within 60 days of the order being given, and that that force should be able to remain in the field for at least one year. Now, for those of you who are not experts in military matters, let me tell you that this is a very ambitious goal…..At their pledging conference EU ministers put on the table their commitment to this Headline Goal. This was a crucial step forward. Because it reinforced the point that, for a European Security and Defence Policy to be successful, it cannot simply focus on institution-building: it must also deliver the means. NATO is supporting the development of Europe's capacities, for three simple reasons. First, because the EU's desire to be more effective is sparking real improvements in capability that can only enhance NATO's overall effectiveness. Second, because if the EU is capable of acting, it means NATO won't be the only option available to the Euro-Atlantic community in times of crisis. It won't be "NATO or nothing." And finally, because NATO has assets the EU will need to borrow for larger operations -- assets like deployable headquarters, strategic lift, or satellite intelligence. These must be available to the EU if serious European-led operations are to take place. And we all want them to be able to take place, which is why NATO will make its essential assets and capabilities available to the EU, when the Alliance is not in the lead but the EU does choose to be. In the past few weeks, substantive efforts have been made to bridge outstanding differences, and find common ground…. Most urgently, we have to ensure that all the NATO members have satisfactory arrangements for participation in EU-led operations. That is important for the new, more effective, more flexible cooperative security relationship we are trying to build. ….I am convinced that the rapid progress we are making on European defence is a good omen for the future. Because it means that Europe and North America will continue to do what they have always done in NATO: work effectively together to build security in the Euro-Atlantic area, today, and for future generations." |
It is, as always, a pleasure to be here among friends and colleagues, to discuss the serious issues of peace and security that we are facing today. And I am particularly pleased that this NATO Parliamentary Assembly is being held in Berlin -- because I believe that the history of this city is a powerful reminder of how security in the Euro-Atlantic area must be shaped as we look to the future.
Just a few days ago, on November 9th, Berlin celebrated the eleventh anniversary of a seminal moment in the history of the 20th Century. Indeed, I am sure that everyone in this room can remember exactly where they were when they turned on TV and watched the Berlin Wall first breached, then torn down.
These events signalled the beginning of the end of the division, not only of Berlin, not only of Germany, but of Europe itself. Very soon thereafter, the values that NATO countries have always held dear -- democracy, freedom, human rights -- began to be shared, more and more, like dominos, right across the continent. And as a direct result, the entire Euro-Atlantic area became dramatically more secure.
This historic transition vindicated two fundamental beliefs that had guided the Alliance through the Cold War. First, that a determined, common transatlantic approach is the best way to uphold our shared values and defend our shared interests. And second, that peace and security are best preserved if robust and effective military forces are a part of our foreign policy toolbox.
But when the Wall fell, some people called those principles into question. As the Cold War ended, they asked whether we really needed, anymore, to work together on security issues. Wasn't it time for Europe and North America to go their separate ways? And others questioned the continued need for effective military forces. After all, hadn't history ended? If there were to be no more threats to our security, couldn't we just cash in the peace dividend?
The history of the past decade has unfortunately not been kind to those predictions. Nowhere has that been more clear than in the Balkans - which are, after all, at the heart of Europe! In less than ten years, that troubled region has suffered from four wars, with hundreds of thousands of victims; massive, organized violations of human rights; flows of refugees numbering in the millions; and all of the attendant political and economic instability.
As an international community, we could not stand aside and fiddle as the Balkans burned. It would have betrayed our most basic values; and it would have harmed our long term security interests to allow the instability to spread, in the region, and potentially to our borders and even to our capitals.
So no, history did not end in 1989. Instead, one chapter of history closed, and a new one opened. And the success of the international community's efforts to bring peace to the Balkans make it clear that Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century depends on the same fundamental pillars as it did in the 20th, on strong transatlantic cooperation, with the military capability to back up our words with deeds.
In Bosnia, the war was only brought to an end when Europe and North America finally agreed on a common position. And that success depended critically on our collective capability to back up our diplomacy with robust force. Diplomacy, sanctions, unarmed observers, lightly-armed UN Peacekeepers: they were simply not enough. In the end, it took robust NATO air forces to bring the hostilities to an end -- and robust NATO-led ground forces to enforce the peace. Five years after Dayton, much work has yet to be done, as the recent election in Bosnia shows. But the winds of change are blowing in the Balkans, and without their protectors in Zagreb and Belgrade, even the most hardcore of nationalists in Bosnia are beginning to feel the breeze.
In Kosovo, the same pattern repeated itself -- but this time, the Euro-Atlantic community showed it had learned its lessons. This time, NATO was united from the beginning, in demanding an end to the violence in Kosovo -- and in warning that, if diplomacy was rejected, NATO would take action. And NATO did indeed take action, to stop the oppression of Kosovar Albanians by Serb forces, and to ensure the return home of those who had been expelled.
The momentous changes taking place in the Balkans today are a vivid vindication of these once-controversial decisions. Kosovo is more and more at peace every day. And the change of Government in Yugoslavia has even greater potential to contribute to the peace and security of the entire region.
Simply put, a black hole has been closed in South East Europe. When the people of Yugoslavia removed the Milosevic regime from office, Yugoslavia began the transition that the other countries of the region have already embraced: towards democracy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and integration into the wider Europe.
Why did the Yugoslav people revolt against Milosevic? There are many reasons. But certainly, they were tired of isolation. Tired of losing wars started in their name. Tired of economic sanctions imposed by the entire international community. Tired of knowing that while everyone else was getting a helping hand from NATO and the EU, they were cut off --because of Milosevic.
The results of the change of Government are already dramatic. First and foremost, the security climate has improved. Kosovo is no longer under any threat from Serb forces. Tensions between Serbia and Montenegro, which threatened under Milosevic to explode into violence, have eased appreciably. And President Kostunica recently attended a meeting of regional leaders -- the first time Yugoslavia has been present. Taken together, these developments will contribute substantially to the steadily increasing stability -- and therefore, to the prosperity of South East Europe.
These are auspicious beginnings. But the real movement will come only when new Serbian and Yugoslav Governments finally begin to address the core issues - facing up to the true history or the recent past, opening up Serbian society and media, positively cooperating with the international community, implementing Dayton and UNSCR 1244. Only then will we see just how far and how fast Southeast Europe can be transformed.
As the saying goes, defeat is an orphan, but success has many fathers. The Yugoslav people, the countries of the region, the diplomacy of Russia, and the roles of the OSCE and the UN -- these were all necessary ingredients.
But this success is also due to the central role NATO has played in this region -- backing up the will of the international community with effective military tools. And the success of that role has depended critically on the same two factors which have sustained the Alliance throughout its history: the capability of NATO's members to act together effectively; and their willingness to stand together, in times of difficulty. But the Kosovo campaign also showed us that we have serious work to do, if we are to retain these pillars in future.
Let me begin by addressing the question of capabilities. In Kosovo, we saw that some NATO members had to carry a disproportionate share of the burden when it came to the high-tech, sophisticated missions. Why? Because most of the other Allies simply didn't have the capability to participate at all levels. This imposes an unfair, and politically unsustainable division of labour within the Alliance. Quite simply, a "two-class NATO" will not work.
The forces of all NATO's nations need to have the equipment and the technology to work together seamlessly. And they must be appropriate for modern operations. That means they have to be able to move quickly to a crisis no matter where in Europe, adjust quickly to changing requirements, engage effectively, and then stay in the field for as long as it takes to get the job done.
Our Defence Capabilities Initiative is addressing these challenges. We have already made progress since it was put in place last April. We have identified the areas of NATO's military capabilities that need improvement. And I have been clear to our leaders that they must make the necessary investments to make it work.
This is not purely an issue of finding new money for defence. It is about getting a good return on investment. Today, the European Allies spend about 60% of what the United States spends on defence, but they have nowhere near 60% of the capability. Furthermore, this year the United States will spend about 34 billion dollars on research and development. The European Allies, together, will spend about one quarter of that. You can draw your own conclusions as to what this means for interoperability and effectiveness.
We have to do better. And despite the challenges, there are signs of progress. Today, most European defence budgets have finally stopped falling, and some are already going up. Defence industries are rationalising, to be more efficient. And the procurement policies of European nations are finally also reflecting the need for equipment tailored to crisis management. These are good signs -- because in a military operation, you only get one chance to prevail. We must give our forces the capabilities they need to do the jobs we are giving them. It is as simple as that. And that is why I am determined to ensure that DCI delivers.
The Defence Capabilities Initiative will support the other major transformation taking place in the Alliance today -- the development of Europe's capacities in defence and security.
In this audience, I don't need to spend too much time going over the rationale for a stronger European capability. I think it can be summarised very simply: it is about fairness.
The transatlantic relationship is the essence of the Alliance, and the foundation of Euro-Atlantic security. Everyone agrees on that. And everyone also agrees that this relationship will remain healthy in future only if Europe takes on a fairer share of the burden for maintaining that security. Anyone who followed the American election knows that burden-sharing in peace and security was definitely a topic of debate.
We also know that NATO and the United States may not always want to take the lead in addressing every security crisis in or around Europe. As Javier Solana wrote recently, "If NATO and the US want to tackle a crisis, all the better. But if the US does not engage, as we saw in the Balkans from 1991 to 1995, someone else may need to, and it is better for our overall security if we (the Europeans) can do so effectively." Europe won't have to ask the United States to do something they feel reluctant about; and the United States and NATO won't get dragged into operations simply for lack of an alternative.
And we all know, finally, that a stronger European capability is also a logical evolution in Europe's development. It simply makes sense for a Europe that is as rich as the United States, and that has common goals in peace and security, to be able to back up its words more effectively with deeds.
For all of these reasons, the development of European capabilities makes sense. It will make Europe a better partner for North America in preserving Euro-Atlantic security -- and ensure that no resentments about burden-sharing distract us from working together towards our common goals.
Kosovo shone a harsh light on how much work remains to be done. Even though Europe has two million soldiers in uniform, which is half a million more than the United States, it still struggled to scrape together 40,000 for the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. This represents about 2 per cent of the forces Europe has on paper -- and if you can only use 2 per cent of your forces when you really need them, then you have a problem to deal with.
The EU has finally heard that wake-up call. At Helsinki, it has set itself an ambitious military target. By the year 2003, it wants to have the capability to deploy about 60,000 troops, within 60 days of the order being given, and that that force should be able to remain in the field for at least one year.
Now, for those of you who are not experts in military matters, let me tell you that this is a very ambitious goal. If you want to be able to sustain a force of 60,000 troops in the field for at least one year, you need at least 140,000 more at home, to be able to rotate them through. And if you want them to be able to deploy in 60 days, they need to be training constantly at a high level.
Yesterday EU nations held their pledging conference where they put on the table their commitment to this Headline Goal. This was a crucial step forward. Because it reinforced the point that, for a European Security and Defence Policy to be successful, it cannot simply focus on institution-building: it must also deliver the means.
NATO is supporting the development of Europe's capacities, for three simple reasons. First, because the EU's desire to be more effective is sparking real improvements in capability that can only enhance NATO's overall effectiveness. Second, because if the EU is capable of acting, it means NATO won't be the only option available to the Euro-Atlantic community in times of crisis. It won't be "NATO or nothing." And finally, because NATO has assets the EU will need to borrow for larger operations -- assets like deployable headquarters, strategic lift, or satellite intelligence. These must be available to the EU if serious European-led operations are to take place. And we all want them to be able to take place, which is why NATO will make its essential assets and capabilities available to the EU, when the Alliance is not in the lead but the EU does choose to be.
In the past few weeks, many meetings at all levels between NATO and the EU have taken place and substantive efforts have been made to bridge outstanding differences, and find common ground.
I am certainly not suggesting that
the EU-NATO relationship is without
problems. It is not. Most urgently,
we have to ensure that all the NATO
members have satisfactory arrangements
for participation in EU-led operations.
That is important for the new, more
effective, more flexible cooperative
security relationship we are trying
to build.
But as I said, these past few weeks
have been very encouraging in this
regard. And it is not surprising.
Over the past decades, Europe and
North America have had moments of
tension in their security relationship
-- from Ostpolitik, to Euro-missiles,
to Bosnia. But we have always overcome
them. And I think former US National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
explained this relationship best in
the recent edition of "The National
Interest". He wrote: "America
and Europe together are the axis of
global stability, the locomotive of
the world's economy, and the nexus
of global intellectual capital as
well as technological innovation.
Just as important, they are both home
to the world's most successful democracies".
Brzezinski is absolutely right. That is why Europe and America have had so much success in working together to manage their ever-growing agenda: bringing long-term stability to the Balkans, continuing the process of NATO enlargement, bringing Russia and Ukraine into the European mainstream, acting against the threat of proliferation. And that is why I am convinced that the rapid progress we are making on European defence is a good omen for the future. Because it means that Europe and North America will continue to do what they have always done in NATO: work effectively together to build security in the Euro-Atlantic area, today, and for future generations.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
There is one more essential element, that we must have if NATO is to remain effective in future. I am referring, of course, to the continued support of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. As NATO's agenda gets more complex, the NATO PA plays a crucial role in explaining it to our publics. When annual budgets are determined, NATO PA members are powerful advocates for the kind of defence spending we need to maintain effective forces. And when crises hit, the NATO PA is a staunch ally to NATO, helping to build the understanding and support that the Alliance must always have from its members. For all of these roles, I say congratulations -- and thank you.
