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Updated: 15-Nov-2000 NATO Speeches

At the European Policy Centre Breakfast,
Brussels
14 Nov. 2000

"NATO's Challenges"

Speech by the Secretary General

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to the EPC's Policy Breakfast meeting. These Breakfasts are well known for bringing together senior experts to discuss the full range of issues facing European policy makers today, and I am certainly pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to this dialogue.

Now, I would bet that ten years ago, many people would never have guessed that a NATO Secretary General would be speaking to gatherings such as this today. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, some so-called experts also called NATO's existence into question.

Indeed, pundits across Europe and North America called for NATO's demise as well. After all, they said, what possible purpose could the Alliance still serve?

The answer soon became clear. In the fluid and unpredictable post Cold War world, we still needed a transatlantic forum for consultation and cooperation on security matters -- and NATO remains just that. We needed to engage with Russia and Ukraine, to help them through their post-communist transition. We did it. We needed to break down Cold War dividing lines, and demonstrate to former adversaries that membership in European institutions was neither a dream nor a false promise. We are doing that too, through our enlargement process.

We needed to reach out a strong hand of friendship and cooperation to Central and Eastern Europe, and lock those countries into a solid framework of trust and cooperation. Done -- through the Partnership for Peace Programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. And we still needed ways to manage crises together, when they could not be avoided. The record in Bosnia and Kosovo speaks for itself.

Today, there are no more "experts" calling for NATO to disappear, or even wondering why the Alliance has survived. It is simply obvious. NATO has successfully managed the very complicated waters of the post-Cold War period. Over the past decade, NATO has helped to build stability through cooperation, preclude problems by promoting reform, and manage crises effectively.

My job, as Secretary General, is to make sure that the Alliance remains as successful in ensuring the safety of future generations as it has until now. From my perspective, there are five challenges we have to meet to do so:

First: we have to consolidate the peace in South East Europe. To prevent crises from exploding again. To help the people of the region enjoy the peace and prosperity everyone deserves. And to be able, sooner rather than later, to draw down or even withdraw our large and expensive military presence.

We have already made enormous progress. Bosnia is getting closer and closer to standing on its own feet as a self-sustaining country. Kosovo is more secure than it has been for a decade, and has just had free municipal elections to begin its path to democracy.

And from my perspective, NATO's stand against Slobodan Milosevic was one of the main reasons that the Yugoslav people deposed him, and elected a leader who wants to live at peace with his own citizens, and his region.

But we certainly cannot rest on our laurels, pack up and go home. This is a crucial period. To use a military expression, now is the moment to "reinforce success". And we are reinforcing success, in a variety of ways. NATO-led troops in Bosnia and Kosovo are working closely with civilian authorities to maintain a secure environment, and help to build peaceful, self-sustaining societies that do not require a major international presence. The European Union, through its Stability Pact, is promoting economic and political cooperation to the countries of South East Europe, and offering its own assistance to them.

And NATO is supporting this process through our South East Europe Initiative, which promotes military cooperation and confidence-building measures among the Balkan countries.

Taken together, these efforts will go far to consolidate the major gains South East Europe has made in recent months and years. But we are going further. The Alliance is also offering the prospect of full membership in NATO to any European country, in South East Europe and elsewhere, that can meet NATO's standards of membership -- because from our perspective, enlargement helps to build wider European security.

The logic is clear. The enlargement process helps to preclude conflicts in Europe, because the mere prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to get their house in order. And they have done so. The nine countries that have formally applied to join have signed bilateral treaties with their neighbours, and worked to resolve border disputes. They have also made serious attempts to resolve minority issues, and to establish proper democratic control over militaries.

Why? Because all of the aspirants know that if they want to join NATO, they need to do their homework. They know that NATO is not a social club, but a serious security organisation. And they also know that NATO membership is of real strategic significance for them -- not just a political gesture or a consolation prize for not getting into the EU as fast as planned. In short, NATO's willingness to open its doors has brought Europe closer together, in spirit and in practice.

That is why NATO is serious about enlargement. And our second challenge is to ensure that NATO's open door policy retains its momentum. NATO's Heads of State and Government will meet in 2002 to consider further invitations. And the Alliance is now giving focused feedback to each of the nine aspirants, to help them meet NATO's political and military standards. Because from our perspective, the process of NATO enlargement itself is one of the most powerful contributors to security in the wider Europe -- and it is our challenge, as much as it is a challenge to the aspirants to keep that process going.

One country that is watching the enlargement process carefully is, of course, Russia. And in fact, Mr. Putin has asked rhetorically about eventual Russian membership in the Alliance.

Let me say very clearly - one day, that just may happen. After all, an organisation exists only to serve the interests of its members. If and when Russian membership in the Alliance serves to enhance the security of its existing members, and Russia, in the wider Europe, then why not?

But that scenario is not for today. It has not even been a decade since the Soviet Union collapsed, and we need to walk before we can run. Before we can talk seriously about membership, we need to develop a NATO-Russia relationship that is stronger, and more trusting, than the one we have today. That is the third challenge we face, if we are to build a more secure future for this continent.

After the Cold War ended, NATO was determined that we should have an organic, permanent relationship between Russia and NATO, so that consultations occur on a regular basis. We have that. That we should work on security issues together, so that we solve them most effectively -- from peacekeeping to crisis management to proliferation. We are doing that too.

This is major progress and a major contribution to European security. But we can do better. We can build a relationship that is strong enough to survive disagreements over single issues, such as enlargement or Kosovo. How? By communicating more effectively. By building, over time, a reflex of trust and cooperation between NATO and Russia that will bring us closer together.

Kosovo showed us how important that is -- and the potential for positive change, when we work together.

Kosovo also revealed our fourth major challenge as we enter the 21st century. Simply put, we need to improve NATO's military capabilities to deal with future crises.

The requirement for this is clear to all of us, and Kosovo was merely another reminder. Military capability is the heart and soul of the Alliance. To carry out all of NATO's missions -- from crisis management to peacekeeping, to Partnership and cooperation, to collective defence -- our forces must be effective, and able to work together effectively.

This means, first, that we have to make sure our forces remain interoperable, to prevent imbalances from growing within the Alliance between those countries that are investing more quickly in new technologies and capabilities, and those that are proceeding at a slower pace. Today, the European Allies spend about 60% of what the United States spends on defence, but nobody would suggest that the European members of NATO have 60% of the capability. To make it worse, the United States military will spend about 34 billion dollars this year on research and development -- and the Europeans, together, will spend about one quarter of that amount. You can draw your own conclusions about interoperability.

Having effective forces in the modern security environment also means structuring and equipping our forces for modern operations.

Today, we need forces that that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements and stay in theatre for as long as it takes to get the job done. This means that NATO's military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in the field.

And when I say "NATO's forces", I mean the forces of all the Allies. We must avoid any division of labour within NATO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers -- what a NATO official once called "a two-class NATO, with a precision class and a bleeding class". This would be politically unsustainable. We must ensure that the burdens, the costs and the risks are shared equally.

NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative is addressing these challenges. We have already made progress since the Initiative was put in place at the Washington Summit last April. We have already identified the areas of NATO's military capabilities that need improvement. And I have been very clear to our leaders that they must make the necessary investments to make it work.

This Initiative will also help us meet the fifth major challenge we have to face developing Europe's capacities as a security actor.

A Europe that acts more coherently on security matters is needed both to reflect advances in European integration and to create a more mature, more balanced transatlantic relationship. Why? Because we have finally understood that today we can no longer sustain the asymmetry we had in the Cold War.
Back then, Western Europe was focussing on political and economic integration, while North America - through NATO - provided the security umbrella. And it was a division of labour that worked well.

Today, however, the notion that the European Union would still confine itself to economic and political tasks only, while NATO alone covers the security aspects is simply no longer in line with three new realities of our post-Cold War environment. First: the European idea has progressed to the point where Europe must get serious about playing a defence role commensurate with its economic strength, this means that the time has come for Europe to develop a true Common Foreign and Security Policy -- plus the military clout to underpin it.

Second: the United States expects a fairer sharing of the security burden with its European Allies. Given the fact that the EU's economic power is roughly equal to that of the United States, it will be increasingly difficult to explain an asymmetry in capability to a US audience, in particular to a sceptical US Congress. And third: The security landscape in Europe has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Not each and every regional crisis will affect the United States the same way as it will affect the Europeans. So there can be cases where the United States may not want to take the lead -- and Europe must be prepared to do so.

These three new realities all point to one clear-cut conclusion: A new transatlantic bargain must be struck. Europe must become a more coherent security actor.

It is in the interest of both a stronger Europe and a fairer transatlantic relationship. In short, a European Security and Defence Identity has become a political necessity.

That is why the European Union and NATO are now working together to enhance European capabilities. Will this help enhance Euro?Atlantic security? Definitely. The relationship between North America and Europe will be rebalanced, and therefore healthier, over the long term, on the most fundamental issue of all: peace and security. We have to get the security relationship right. The development of European capabilities is the right way - indeed, the only way ?- to make sure we do.

We have already made real progress. The EU is developing the capacity to deploy a Corps-sized force, and to lead operations when NATO does not. NATO is preparing ways to support the EU in those circumstances. And both organizations are working hard, together, to make sure this new relationship develops as it should: in a climate of trust, and towards a deliverable improvement in Euro-Atlantic capabilities.

Are there still issues to work out? Of course. These are very early days. We need, above all, to ensure that all NATO members are participating a fully as possible in EU-led operation. Working out the details on this issue hasn't been easy - but we are making real progress already.

I am very confident that, three years from now, we'll have forgotten the long meetings and the occasional disagreements, and simply take an open, inclusive and effective NATO-EU relationship for granted -- as a normal, indeed necessary, part of the Euro-Atlantic community's security toolbox.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have outlined five major projects that I believe are central to NATO's transformation. Some of them are highly technical, others are complicated, and all of them involve acronyms that almost nobody understands anyway.
But all of these measures -- from peacekeeping to enlargement, to partnership, to European Security and Defence Identity and Defence Capabilities Initiative -- serve one very simple purpose: to continue to preserve the safety and security of our citizens. Through all these measures, we are working to preserve the sense of security that most people in NATO countries take so much for granted. They know they are free from the threat of military attack.

They know that, in an emergency, our armed forces are there, and that, if called upon, our militaries can go abroad and help bring peace to others, before conflict even approaches our shores or their homes.

This sense of safety and security is a precious thing. As we move into the 21st century, I am very confident that NATO is taking the right steps to preserve it in future.

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