At the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 10 Nov. 2000

"Security in the Wider Europe" Speech by the Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by thanking you for asking me to your lunch time meeting. The Center for European Policy Studies is certainly well known in the policy community, and I am glad to have the opportunity to speak here today. I know that this series of CEPS lunchtime meetings has concentrated on the security of the "Wider Europe". I would like to continue on that theme, because I believe that one simply cannot explain any of NATO's policies or activities today except in the context of broader European security. Today is, in fact, a particularly relevant day to discuss this subject, because it is the anniversary of an event that we all remember clearly - the collapse of the Berlin Wall, on November 9th 1989. And when the Wall came down, so did some of the basic assumptions that had guided our security policy for forty years. During the Cold War, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe were basically on the "other side". Their problems were, by and large, not our problems. We didn't have much to fear except the one overwhelming threat of military attack -- and we were prepared for that. So we could, in a sense, bunker down and focus on matters at home. By November 10th, 1989, however, we were all of a sudden in a whole new ball game. Of course, the threat of a major regional war soon disappeared, and we are all the happier for it. But it also became clear, very quickly, that we faced new challenges. Why? Because historically, after empires collapse, bad things happen. Nations and peoples feel alone, and nervous. In an unpredictable environment, they may make fragile and dangerous security pacts with their immediate neighbours. The result is often a volatile security system, with no solid foundation or structure, and a real possibility of violent conflict. Conflict which leads to tides of refugees and asylum seekers, which spreads the tension to neighbouring countries. Conflict which spawns ethnic hatred, instability, corruption, drug running, human trafficking -- the dark shadows of our time. Conflict which can itself visit our own doorsteps, if it spreads too far. So when the Cold War ended, we stood at a crossroads. We then had to choose between two security approaches. On the one hand, we could have tried declaring victory, and simply continued with business as usual, focusing on our own issues at home. Our other option was to reach out to the rest of Europe. To offer the hand of assistance, and guidance. And yes, at the same time, to become more involved in resolving to the challenges that the newly democratic states of Central, Southern and Eastern Europe were facing. In a word, to engage. NATO went for engagement. Not out of idealism, but out of realism. Because it was in our security interests to engage. Indeed, I would suggest that there was simply no alternative but to reach out, if we were to continue to maintain our own security. Today, as we enter the 21st Century, engagement with the wider Europe is what NATO is all about. Engagement with the newly independent countries of Europe, to help them manage their transition. Engagement with Russia, to build a security bridge across Europe. Engagement in the Balkans, to prevent the worst elements of Europe's past from persisting into its future. And engagement with the other international organisations concerned with security, to take advantage of our synergies to build security more effectively. Let me address each of these elements of NATO's agenda in turn -- to explain the logic behind our deeds, and then sketch out where I believe NATO is going, as we look to the future. First and foremost, when the Soviet Union dissolved, NATO began almost immediately to build relations with the newly independent countries of Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Through our Partnership for Peace Programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Alliance is today the dynamo at the hub of a profound new set of defense relationships across the continent. Forty six countries -- NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries and even neutrals, including Switzerland which is not even in the United Nations-- now train together, talk about security issues together and even carry out peacekeeping operations together. The value of this inclusive framework is very clear. Every country in Europe has a structure through which they can enhance their security interests. No small, rigid regional alliances are necessary. No unilateral solutions are required. Through the Partnership for Peace Programme, security across Europe has been structured towards inclusion and cooperation. European countries that are choosing a new path are included in Euro-Atlantic institutions. That alone is, in my opinion, a massive change from the past, and a major contribution to the stability of the continent. But some countries want more than just Partnership -- they want membership. Indeed, since the early 1990s, many countries outside NATO have made getting into NATO one of their main policy priorities, because they want the security of membership -- and maybe also a bit of the prestige. Last year, we welcomed three former members of the Warsaw Pact as full NATO members. At the same time, we made clear that these new members would not be the last -- because from our perspective, enlargement is good for NATO's existing members, and good for wider European security. The logic is clear. The enlargement process helps to preclude conflicts in Europe, because the mere prospect of NATO membership serves as an incentive for aspirants to get their house in order. And they have done so. For instance, the nine countries that have formally applied to join have signed bilateral treaties with their neighbours, or worked to resolve border disputes. They have also made serious attempts to resolve minority issues, and to establish proper democratic control over militaries. Why? Because all of the aspirants know that if they want to join NATO, they need to do their homework. They know that NATO is not a social club, but a serious security organisation. And they also know that NATO membership is of real strategic significance to them -- not just a political gesture or a consolation prize for not getting into the EU as fast as planned. In short, NATO's willingness to open its doors has brought Europe closer together, in spirit and in practice. For all these reasons, NATO's enlargement has an inherent value as a process. As long as the aspirant countries know that the door to membership truly remains open, they will continue to reform -- and in so doing, they will contribute to stability in their own countries, and in their region. That is why NATO is serious about enlargement, and why the Alliance is giving focused feedback to each of the nine aspirants. Because from our perspective, the process of NATO enlargement itself is one of the most powerful contributors to security in the wider Europe. One country that is watching the enlargement process carefully is, of course, Russia. And in fact, President Putin has repeatedly made noises about eventual Russian membership in the Alliance. Let me say very clearly - that though this membership is not on our immediate agenda, it may just happen one day. After all, an organisation exists only to serve the interests of its members. If and when Russian membership in the Alliance serves to enhance the security of its existing members, and Russia, and wider European security, then why not? But that scenario is not for today. It has not even been a decade since the Soviet Union collapsed, and we need to walk before we can run. Before we can talk seriously about membership, we need to develop a NATO-Russia relationship that is stronger, and more trusting, than the one we have today. Now, let me stress: what we have today is still good, if one remembers the context. Not very long ago, the relationship between Russia and the West was very different. When we could not talk to Russia except in pressure-filled Summit meetings convened around disputes. When disagreements were expressed through proxy wars in far away places, or through arms races. Where each side would see its security interests in simply blocking the interests of the other. When the Cold War ended, NATO was determined these days should end. That we should have an organic, permanent relationship between Russia and NATO, so that consultations occur on a regular basis. We have that. That we should work on security issues together, so that we solve them most effectively -- from peacekeeping to crisis management to proliferation. We are doing that too. All in all, this is major progress -- far cry from the hostility of the past, and a major contribution to European security. But we can do better. We can build a relationship that is strong enough to survive disagreements over single issues, such as enlargement or Kosovo. How? By communicating more effectively. By showing Russia that all of NATO's activities are a way to enhance our co-operation. By building, over time, a reflex of trust and cooperation between NATO and Russia that will bring us closer together. There are at least three more ways in which NATO is working to build security in the wider Europe. The one that gets the most press is of course, our peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. With this group, I don't need to run through the reasons why NATO took on these operations. Both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, we had to take a stand, and stand up for our values. Slowly but surely, the principle has spread across Europe that ethnic cleansing, concentration camps and mass killings are unacceptable. But principles are fragile -- and they will not survive unless we defend them. In the Balkans, NATO has provided the muscle the international community needed to do just that. We also had to stand up for our interests. To prevent the conflict from destabilizing the countries of the region any further. To prevent the increasing outflow of refugees, even to our borders. To prevent the creation of a black hole of insecurity at the centre of Europe. For all these reasons of values and interests, NATO took a leadership role in the international community's efforts to bring peace and security to Kosovo, just as it did in Bosnia. And today, more than ever, I believe those decisions have been vindicated. Bosnia is getting closer and closer to standing on its own feet as a self-sustaining country. Kosovo is more secure than it has been for a decade, and has just had peaceful free elections to begin its path to democracy. From my perspective, NATO's stand against Slobodan Milosevic was one of the main reasons that the Yugoslav people deposed him, and elected a leader who wants to live at peace with his own citizens, and his region. Taken together, these are major changes in a region that needed them badly. I believe that we can finally see the light at the end of the tunnel for South Eastern Europe. And this success could not have been achieved without the patient, determined engagement by the entire international community. And when I say the entire international community, I mean it. This success is not NATO's alone. On the contrary -- one of the clearest lessons of the Balkan experience is that NATO must develop new relations with other international organisations, if we are to achieve our common goals effectively. In Bosnia, and in Kosovo, NATO is working hand in hand with the United Nations and the OSCE. Not just in meeting rooms in Vienna or New York or Brussels, but on the ground, where it counts. And each organisation is bringing its unique comparative advantage to bear. NATO is providing a secure environment. The UN is providing overall political direction, and helping to rebuild local institutions. The OSCE is helping to build democracy by running elections, and promoting basic standards of human rights. All three organisations are supporting each other as closely as possible -- because both the military and the civilian missions have to succeed, if Bosnia and Kosovo are eventually to stand on their own two feet again. And NATO's relations with the UN and the OSCE are not the only relationships to change as a result of Kosovo. Kosovo also revealed that we need to rebalance the relationship between Europe and North America within the Alliance. This crisis made it very clear to everyone that Europe might be an economic giant, and it might have real political influence -- but when it comes to doing the heavy lifting on issues of peace and security, Europe still isn't pulling its weight. When push comes to shove, the United States still has to carry a disproportionate share of the burden. Over time, if that imbalance is not addressed, both sides may come to resent it. That is why the European Union and NATO are now working together to enhance European capabilities. As Europe becomes more capable, the burden on North America will ease, for two reasons: first, because Europe will be able to contribute more to NATO operations; and second, because Europe will be able to take the lead in crisis management operations when NATO as a whole is not involved. This will definitely help enhance Euro-Atlantic security. The relationship between North America and Europe will remain balanced, and therefore healthier, over the long term, on the most fundamental issue of all: peace and security. We can have all the transatlantic arguments we want over bananas -- but we have to get our security relationship right. The development of European capabilities is the right way - indeed, the only way -- to make sure we do. We have already made real progress. The EU is developing the capacity to deploy a Corps-sized force, and to lead operations. NATO is preparing ways to support the EU in such circumstances. Both organizations are working hard, together, to make sure this new relationship develops in a climate of trust, and towards a deliverable improvement in Euro-Atlantic capabilities for the mutual benefit of both NATO and the EU. Are there still issues to work out? Of course. These are still very early days. We need, above all to ensure that no NATO member feels left out of European security as a result of these new arrangements. But we are addressing this challenge, and I believe that in three years, we will look back on this period as one looks back on any birth: a little messy, a little painful, but definitely worth it. Ladies and Gentlemen, The fall of the Berlin Wall was, by any definition, a seminal moment in Euro-Atlantic history. It marked the beginning of the end of the division of Europe - but it was only a beginning. The true divisions of Europe were political, and cultural, and military -- divisions that are only now being overcome. And from my perspective, NATO's broad agenda of Partnership and of co?operative crisis management has been, is, and will remain a powerful motor to bring the wider Europe closer and closer together, for the safety of future generations.