NATO's
Partnerships
Speech
by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO
at the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria
Mr. President (of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria),
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It's good to be back here. The subject --
NATO's Partnerships -- is a timely one indeed.
Partnership has become a central focus of NATO's
policy and structure, and things are moving
unbelievably fast in this area.
Why has NATO opted for such a policy of Partnership?
Why are the 19 NATO members cooperating with
over 30 other nations through a variety of different
mechanisms?
The answer is simple: because cooperation
is the key to Euro-Atlantic security. In today's
ever more interdependent world, and in particular
on a continent as small and as densely populated
as Europe, security cannot be achieved in isolation.
For NATO, this means supporting its neighbours
in their transition to stable democracies, in
their defence reform, and in their aspirations
for ever closer integration and, eventually,
membership.
But Partnership is not just a one way street.
It is not just about NATO helping Partners,
it is also about Partners helping NATO. The
new security challenges, such as regional conflicts,
simply cannot be handled by just a few nations.
Successful crisis management requires a larger
coalition of nations -- nations that all have
a stake in upholding security and stability
of this continent, nations that all contribute
a real share to common peace support operations.
NATO alone cannot achieve what NATO can with
its Partner countries. In short, Partnership
is a two-way street.
NATO's policy of Partnership has followed
this logic ever since the London Summit in 1990,
when the Alliance offered the "hand of
friendship" to their former Cold War adversaries.
The initial aim of this policy was a modest
one: We simply wanted to send a signal to our
Eastern neighbours that we no longer regarded
them as enemies. But very soon we realised that
we should -- and could -- do more: we had to
help Central and Eastern European nations to
cope with their daunting challenges of transition.
The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council -- "the Nac-See" --, in November
1991 was a major step in this direction. It
gave our outreach policy a visible structure
-- a structure to communicate our ideas about
multinational cooperation, about the need for
sound civil-military relations and democratic
control of armed forces, and the importance
of transparency in defence budgeting.
The NACC was ground-breaking in many ways.
But it still focussed on dialogue and cooperation
with everyone around the table. What was lacking
was the possibility of each Partner having specific,
tailored programmes of cooperation with NATO.
Such a programme would respond better to Partners'
individual needs. And such a programme was launched
in January 1994 -- the Partnership for Peace.
It was offered to all OSCE nations able and
willing to contribute to real cooperation in
military and defence-related fields.
A major part of the co-operative effort under
PfP is to prepare Partner countries to be able
to deploy forces alongside Allied ones in possible
crisis management, peacekeeping, and humanitarian
operations. In this way, we would expand the
pool of trained peacekeeping forces able to
work closely together in the field. And there
can be no doubt that we have come a long way
in achieving this aim. Today, PfP has become
a flagship of military cooperation, a cooperation
that ranges from North America to Central Asia.
Joint crisis management requires, however,
more than interoperable forces. Partners who
actively contribute to a NATO-led operation
also want to have a say in its oversight. Thus,
a political "roof" was needed to complement
the more operational development of the Partnership.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),
launched in May 1997, responded to this need
by giving Partners a more visible political
link with NATO. It provides a political umbrella
for the military co-operation in PfP. For example,
regarding Bosnia and now Kosovo, meetings of
the EAPC bring together the troop-contributing
nations for consultations on a regular basis.
This provides the important political dimension
to the close military co-operation already taking
place on the ground within SFOR and KFOR.
However, NATO's concept of partnership extends
beyond the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC.
For example, in 1997 the Alliance also established
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
and the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). Both
frameworks were designed to take account of
the unique role and weight of these two countries,
and to reflect this in special bilateral links
with NATO.
Nor should dialogue and cooperation stop at
Central and Eastern Europe. In 1994, we initiated
a Dialogue with several nations of the Mediterranean
region to promote transparency and help build
confidence between the Alliance and our neighbours
to the South.
NATO's initiatives of partnership and dialogue
follow a distinct logic. In a geographical sense,
they link NATO with its entire Euro-Atlantic
neighbourhood. In a political sense, they support
the notion of co-operative security, by offering
any European state the chance to participate
in a broader security framework. Today, even
neutral states like Ireland, Switzerland and
Moldova are active and valued partners in Euro-Atlantic
security management. And in a military-operational
sense, they increase the pool of trained, interoperable
forces and capabilities for future crisis management
and peacekeeping.
All these initiatives show that our approach
to security is inclusive, not exclusive. But
if anything has demonstrated the real value
of Partnership beyond any doubt it has been
Bosnia and Kosovo. In both SFOR and KFOR we
are deploying large-scale, multinational peace-keeping
forces comprising soldiers from many Partner
countries working side-by-side with their counterparts
from NATO-nations. And what we can say without
fear of contradiction is that, without Partnership
for Peace, we could never have put together
such unique coalitions for peace so swiftly
and effectively. And this only reinforces us
in our belief that we must move further along
this path.
The Way Ahead for NATO's Partnerships
The story of NATO's Partnerships is a success
story. As our cooperative mechanisms have evolved
over the course of one decade, the opportunities
for Partners to influence and shape this evolution
has constantly increased. We are a long way
from the early days of PfP, when NATO would
offer a menu of activities from which Partner
countries could choose. Today, Partners know
that it is they who decide how far and how deep
co-operation can and should go. It is they who
share the responsibility for the future of these
endeavours. That is why they have remained interested
-- and active.
Of course, active participation of Partners
remains the precondition for the continued success
of our initiatives. So let me briefly outline
some of the key challenges that lie ahead.
First, we need to move forward with defence
reform. The reasons for this should be obvious.
A military that is transparent, democratically
controlled and fully accountable is part and
parcel of any mature democracy. And a military
that adopts modern management techniques will
spend scarce resources more efficiently will
be less of a burden for the overall economy.
Defence reform is therefore indispensable.
First and foremost, defence reform is about
meeting your national defence and security needs,
it is a national interest. Secondly, it is about
strengthening your Partnership with the Alliance
through PfP. And thirdly, it is about prospective
membership and your ability to contribute to
the security of the Alliance.
This brings me directly to the second priority,
using the opportunities of the Membership Action
Plan to their fullest extent. Nine Partner countries,
including Bulgaria, have made it clear that
they want to go beyond Partnership -- they want
to join NATO. And NATO, in turn, has made it
clear that their aspirations are legitimate
-- and that the door to the Alliance remains
open. The MAP is proof that the door to NATO
is truly open as we help aspirants to better
prepare themselves for future membership.
The challenge now is to meet the ambitious
reform targets the aspirant nations have set
for themselves. In this respect, Bulgaria has
clearly indicated that it is ready to meet the
challenge of reform. Bulgaria has put on track
a comprehensive programme for the restructuring
and modernization of its armed forces in the
period up to 2004. These ambitious plans set
the right priorities. But they can succeed only
if enough resources are provided.
You all know that NATO's Heads of State and
Government will review the enlargement process
at their next Summit meeting which will be held
no later than 2002. Clearly, any decision on
the "who" and "when" of
the next round of enlargement will be based
on many factors. The Alliance will enlarge again
when NATO is ready, when those nations aspiring
to membership are ready, and when their membership
will contribute to security and stability in
Europe as a whole. In other words, entry into
NATO is not automatic and the decision to invite
new members will still be, in the end, a political
one as well. But a country's performance in
the MAP will be an important part of this overall
assessment -- as an indication of an aspirant's
ability to both understand and undertake the
measures necessary to make it an ever better
candidate for membership. NATO wants countries
that can generate security -- not merely consume
it.
Third, we should advance the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. In the three years of its
existence the EAPC has already has demonstrated
its value as a forum for consultation and cooperation
in many areas critically important to European
security: regional issues, arms control, peacekeeping,
defence economic issues, civil emergency planning,
and scientific and environmental issues. In
addition, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre has played a very important
role in alleviating the refugee crisis caused
by Milosevic last year.
All in all, that is an impressive list for
such a young forum. But there is still much
untapped potential. We should use the EAPC's
flexibility to explore innovative ways of addressing
security challenges. Nor should we shy away
from addressing some of those conflicts which
others believe are hopelessly "frozen".
It is precisely the open nature of the EAPC
that distinguishes it from other fora - and
this openness could serve us well in tackling
these challenges. Bulgaria has always been an
active and constructive Partner in the EAPC,
and I am pleased to say that it is continuing
to play this role.
A dynamic EAPC and PfP will also be instrumental
in pursuing a fourth major challenge that lies
ahead: bringing stability and prosperity to
Southeastern Europe. From the very start of
our engagement in the Kosovo crisis one thing
was clear: that we would have to address the
problems in a broader fashion. That is why we
created a Southeast-Europe Initiative, to complement
the objectives of the EU Stability Pact. And
yet again, Bulgaria has been one of the most
active participants contributing constructively
to problem solutions.
Finally, we must re-invigorate NATO-Russia
relations. Some have argued that because Russia
is weak, it can be ignored. Others have argued
that because Russia is difficult, it should
be sidelined. But that would be a perilous strategy.
Because no other nation's development can affect
European security more than the development
of Russia. We want Russia's transformation to
succeed. That is why the key is engagement,
not disengagement. And that is why NATO has
persistently opted for a strong relationship
with Russia.
In the Kosovo crisis, NATO and Russia disagreed.
And you all know what happened: Russia walked
out on us. Today, our cooperation is picking
up momentum again. But we should not just get
back to status quo before Kosovo. We should
go much further. We should achieve a relationship
where disagreement in one area does lead to
a breakdown of our entire cooperation.
The NATO-Russia Council should be seen as
a forum where differences can be aired. It should
not merely be a consultative body for use in
fair weather. Such a "crisis-resilient"
relationship would not only befit the strategic
importance of Russia and NATO. It would be a
strategic advantage for all of Europe. And,
in my view, such a relationship can be achieved.
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude.
One the most obvious characteristics of today's
security environment is the fact that practice
is constantly ahead of theory. Whenever theory
told us we couldn't do something, we had already
done it!
This phenomenon has been particularly visible
with NATO's policy of partnership and cooperation.
For example, in early 1994, after observing
one of the first PfP exercises, a British journalist
heavily criticised PfP as being a showpiece.
In his view, the entire set-up of the exercise
was unrealistic: American and Central European
soldiers working together as peacekeepers in
Europe -- what an absurd notion!
Well, less then two years later, IFOR deployed
into Bosnia. With troops from NATO, including
a sizeable American contingent, and with contributions
from many Partner nations, including Bulgaria.
While some were debating the theory of cooperation,
the realities on the ground were already forcing
NATO and non-NATO nations closer together. While
some were wondering whether a more operational
Partnership would be feasible, the reality in
the Balkans already gave us the answer: not
only is it feasible, but indispensable.
Today, theory has caught up with reality.
A common culture is emerging. We could see this
most clearly during our Kosovo operation. Despite
the political risks and economic hardships this
entailed, our Partners supported our policy,
Bulgaria among the foremost. This support enabled
us to prevail. It demonstrated that our Partnership
initiatives have truly re-shaped Europe: not
only have we created a closer military community,
but indeed a community of shared values.
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