Garmisch 14 Sept. 2000

"Crisis Management: A New Role for NATO" Speech by the Secretary General at the Marshall Center Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be here today, for two reasons. First, because the Marshall Center is one of the most respected institutes in all of Europe. I was unable to come here this past spring, but I did not miss the opportunity to address the Seminar this time around. And second, because -- let's face it - it would take an awfully good reason to pass up an invitation to Bavaria as Octoberfest is about to begin! In fact, in such beautiful surroundings, and with Octoberfest getting underway in just two days, its hard even to imagine the kind of conflicts we are discussing in this course. But of course the real world is still out there, and in the real world, there are still crises that must be managed. There are still ethnic disputes that are being settled by violence. Disagreements over borders are still escalating to open warfare. Ancient historical scores are still being settled, not by historians, but by terrorists and paramilitaries. And whole populations of innocent civilians are increasingly the victims: the victims of terror, of rape, of expulsion from their homes, of expulsion from their countries -- or simply of mass execution. All of these horrors manifested themselves in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. And in both cases, NATO has played a central role in the international campaign to bring the conflicts to an end, and to build lasting stability. Ten years ago, all of this would have seemed almost inconceivable. For its first forty years, the Alliance focused almost exclusively on collective defence. And in that whole time, NATO never fired a shot except in training. But suddenly, just a few years after the Cold War ended, NATO used its air power to bring the Bosnian War to an end, and then deployed a major and robust force, IFOR, into Bosnia-Herzegovina to implement the Dayton peace agreement. From my perspective, this was a seminal moment in NATO's Post Cold War evolution. It was in Bosnia-Herzegovina that NATO actively took on the role of crisis management. And since then, that decision has had major effects right across NATO's broad agenda: from our relations with other institutions, to relations with Partners, including Russia, to our own internal adaptation, both politically and militarily. Clearly, the first major change from previous policy was simply the decision to take on the mission. And it was a decision that required a lot of soul-searching in Allied capitals. Many members were initially very reluctant to give up on what had been a winning formula - collective defence and nothing more - and instead embark on a new path. But in the end, circumstances made it impossible to avoid taking this new direction. Our values were at stake, because to do nothing in the face of the horrors of Sarajevo and Srebernica, when we had the power to do so, would have been to abandon our principles. And our interests were at stake, because this conflict in the centre of Europe was burning out of control with no end in sight. Simply put, NATO had no real choice but to act. This led, first and foremost, to a radical change in NATO's relations with other institutions -- and NATO wasn't the only organisation to have to adjust. Just after the Cold War ended all the international organisations involved in peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area had to rethink their vocations, and their relations with each other, because of the war in Yugoslavia. The United Nations, for example, had to adjust to the realisation that traditional blue-helmet peacekeeping alone wasn't going to bring a successful resolution to that ongoing civil war. The UN therefore called on NATO for support -- the first time in history his had happened. The UN first asked NATO to help enforce a naval embargo. Then, as events deteriorated, NATO was asked to support UNPROFOR directly -- first through close air support, then by preparing for an emergency extraction of UN forces, then finally through robust action to end the war and enforce the Dayton accords. These kinds of requests would have been inconceivable before Bosnia-Herzegovina forced the international community into new ways of doing business. The same is true for the co-operation that has since taken place on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, between not only NATO and the UN, but also the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and a variety of other organisations. All of these bodies work hand in hand, every day, to ensure peace and stability and to support international standards of stability, democracy, human rights, the rule of law. This practical co-operation among organisations is a major change from the past, but it is something we now take for granted. The same can be said for NATO's deepening relationships with its Partners through the Partnership for Peace - relationships which have also been tested through co-operation in crisis management. When NATO first began to enter into bilateral security relationships with non-NATO countries, the primary goal was political -- to build bridges where none had existed before, and to support western standards of democratic control of armed forces. But PfP also has a very practical vocation. It has served to improve the ability of NATO and Partner forces to work together in real world operations. Through PfP, the Alliance seeks to improve co-operation by promoting interoperability of command and control systems; and by supporting and participating in multinational peacekeeping training exercises; and even by teaching English to officers from Partner countries. These co-operative activities have very practical benefits -- the most concrete of which is that, when crises hit, Partners can work together with NATO members to manage them. The advantages are clear on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as they are in Kosovo. More than twenty non-NATO countries are participating, under NATO command, in such operations. The military and political support they provide is absolutely vital. But NATO-led PfP operations have a clear political benefit to our Partners as well. They provide a means for nations to learn from NATO how to improve military capabilities. They allow nations to demonstrate their commitment to European values. They help nations to enhance their credentials as contributors to security, rather than consumers. And they help build a more stable and secure Euro/Atlantic area, which benefits all of us. So from my perspective, crisis management operations have had a very positive effect on our Partnerships, both for NATO and for the Partners. And the experience of Bosnia and Kosovo has demonstrated that our Partners are ready to take on a bigger role in crisis management. That is why the Alliance is in the process of adapting PfP, so that the Partners can have a greater say in the design and command of future NATO-led PfP operations. This will serve to bring NATO and non-NATO countries even closer together and further enhance consultation and co-operation right across the Euro-Atlantic area. There is one Partnership, in particular, that was forged in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- a Partnership which still has considerable potential for growth. I am referring, of course, to NATO's relationship with Russia. The Bosnian war forced both Russia and NATO to radically recast their relationship from what it had been just a few years before. Of course, as soon as the Cold War ended both NATO and Russia wanted to begin to build a more trusting and co-operative relationship - but the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina forced everyone's hand. First, Russia, as a Security Council Member, granted NATO the mandate for military operations in an area outside NATO's own territory. This was, in itself, a major step in a new direction. An even bigger step in the right direction was Russia's decision to join the Implementation Force in Bosnia, alongside NATO forces. I still remember the newspaper photographs of the American IFOR officer shaking the hand of the Russian IFOR officer as their troops met up for the first time in the field. And in this case, a picture really was worth a thousand words. It told us that mistrust could be overcome. That co-operation was not only possible, but inevitable. And it made it clear that while some politicians might bicker, the people on the ground simply rolled up their sleeves and got the job done. The working relationship between NATO and Russia in the field in Bosnia-Herzegovina laid an essential foundation for the political relationship that soon followed. In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act, and set up a Permanent Joint Council, where both sides can and do discuss security issues of common concern, and work on common ways to address them. Now, I don't want to paint too rosy a picture of how crises have helped NATO and Russia grow together. Kosovo appeared to poke a hole in that theory, when Russia suspended her relations with NATO to protest against the air campaign. We in NATO found that reaction disappointing -- after all, the most important time to talk is during crises! But I think that this incident did have a value, in that it helped us to understand how far we have to go in building a relationship that is strong enough to withstand that kind of disagreement. We have already made an impressive start. Russia has re-engaged with the alliance across the range of our previous activities. Russian troops are part of KFOR, the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. And I am confident that we can overcome the mistrust we saw during the Kosovo crisis, and move to a substantively new level of co-operation. Let me mention two other major elements of NATO's agenda that have been shaped by crisis -- and these are somewhat more self- evident. The first is the ongoing adaptation of NATO's forces. I am sure it comes as a surprise to no one here that NATO's forces needed to be substantially re-tooled once the Cold War came to an end. By 1992, we no longer had any need for huge numbers of static headquarters. We didn't need the amount of personnel we had before. And we didn't need huge amounts of heavy armour for a tank battle in the Central Plains of Germany. So we knew what we didn't need. Bosnia-Herzegovina began to show what we do need, in the post-Cold War environment. We need forces for crisis management. Forces that are light and mobile, to go to conflicts before they come to us. Forces that can hit hard when they get there, to handle the full range of contingencies. Forces that can stay in the field as long as it takes for stability to take root in societies devastated by civil war. That adaptation began very quickly after the Cold War ended -- and it continues today. NATO's headquarters have been reduced in number from 65 to 20 -- and we have developed mobile and deployable headquarters. Our forces are smaller in number, but they are increasingly made up of professional soldiers. And NATO's members are working to adapt their personnel, equipment and doctrine to 21st century requirements. If Bosnia-Herzegovina showed us the general direction that adaptation needed to take, the Kosovo crisis shone a powerful light on NATO's military strengths and efficiencies -- and the gaps in them -- showing us just how much more work we have to do. Put simply, it is a lot. The Kosovo air campaign proved that NATO's new Defence Capabilities Initiative, already in the works in 1998, is indeed an essential program for the evolution of NATO's military forces. Through DCI all of NATO members have pledged to put new energy into restructuring their forces and acquiring the equipment and capabilities necessary for modern operations. The Kosovo crisis also boosted the other major element of NATO'S internal transformation: the ongoing efforts to support the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. The Kosovo crisis made it impossible to avoid some rather uncomfortable truths. It made it abundantly clear that Europe's military capacities were not up to the requirements of an operation as demanding as the Kosovo air campaign nor as challenging as sustaining a force of some 45,000 troops in the field for any extended period of time. We saw that the United States is still bearing a disproportionate share of the burden within NATO operations -- and that this imbalance is, if anything, growing. In short, it demonstrated that NATO was off balance, and that changes had to be made to keep this imbalance from damaging NATO as a whole. I am sure that most of you are familiar with what followed. The EU has taken major steps, in a very short period, to improve its capacities as a security actor. The EU is establishing political and military staffs to advise on security issues. And it has set itself the goal of being able to deploy a force of some 60,000 troops sustainable for 1 year, by 2003. Indeed, in just a few weeks, there will be a pledging conference which should put meat on the bones of this Headline Goal. NATO is supporting this endeavour fully, for one very good reason. A stronger Europe means a stronger NATO. A stronger Europe will be able to assume a larger share of the burden within NATO operations, which will go a long way to answering transatlantic concerns about burden sharing, and it will also be able to act alone when NATO chooses not to be engaged. All in all, a win-win situation. And again, a very positive evolution triggered, at least in part, by a crisis. Ladies and Gentlemen, In the Chinese language, the written symbol for "crisis" has two parts. The first part means "danger"; the second part means "opportunity". The Bosnian and Kosovo crises certainly posed real dangers for the Euro-Atlantic community -- dangers to our security, dangers to our values, dangers to the credibility of our institutions. And most of all, danger to the people who live there. But I believe that we have responded to these dangers by taking advantage of the opportunities they opened up. In the Balkans, we have helped to lay the groundwork for a new era of peace, security, and democracy. We have built a new relationship with Russia on our peacekeeping co-operation. We have deepened our political partnerships with almost every country in Europe through our multinational operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and through our peacekeeping training. We have taken a hard look at NATO's own military capabilities, and taken steps to make improvements where they are necessary. And Europe has taken steps to make a stronger contribution, and bear a larger share of the burdens of Euro-Atlantic security. These are major adaptations. Indeed, one can state very clearly that crisis management has played an enormous role forcing the adaptation of NATO, and this, in turn, has helped make NATO better equipped for crisis management in the future. Thank you.