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| Updated: 23-May-2000 | NATO Speeches |
Brussels23 May 2000 |
"Europe's new defence era"Speech by the Secretary General at the 5th Forum Europe Defence Industries ConferenceLadies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to be able to open this conference, because from my perspective, the dialogue between industry and governments is as important today as it has ever been. NATO's forces are engaged in more missions than ever, carrying out operations vital to our collective interests and values. NATO's continuing effectiveness depends on the military capability of its forces -- and that means, very simply, that we need a strong and efficient defence industry, which provides the equipment our forces need. Governments need to communicate clearly with industry as the priorities change, to ensure that industry can adjust appropriately. The political landscape is rarely static. As you all know, the landscape has changed. As we enter the 21st century,
the world of European defence is witnessing a seismic shift. After many
years of talking about it, Europe is getting serious about the capabilities
it needs as a security actor. New capabilities are being identified. New
structures are being created. New relationships are to be forged between
Europe and North America. And all of this has serious and important implications
for the defence industry. The need for progress in European capabilities is very clear, and the Kosovo operation has shown us very clearly where we have work to do. First, we have to improve the military capabilities of most NATO members. During the air campaign, one ally had to carry a disproportionate share of the burden simply because the others didn't have the military capability to participate at all levels. We also saw increasing difficulties in command-and-control, because the systems used by some Allies were more advanced than those of the rest. In a military alliance, interoperability is an essential prerequisite for the effective delivery of military muscle. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, or DCI, is designed to address these imbalances. When I took the job of NATO Secretary General, I made it clear that improving NATO's defence capabilities would be my top priority. Seven months into the job, I am even more convinced that this is the right focus. The Defence Capabilities Initiative is the means we chose to address the shortfalls. Fifty eight areas for the improvement of specific capabilities have been identified by NATO nations and, for the Allies involved in NATO's collective defence planning process, almost all of these will be taken forward by specific Force Goals. We have made some progress in meeting our targets, but we will need a lot more before we can claim success. I have been quite forthright with NATO's members on the importance of implementing this initiative, and I will be following up with Defence Ministers before their June ministerial meeting. The Defence Capabilities Initiative will support another major enterprise that gained new impetus from the Kosovo campaign - the promotion of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), meaning the strengthening of European defence. Kosovo revealed that, 10 years after the Cold War ended, Europe still has significant weaknesses when it comes to defence. As we enter the 21st century, the European Allies cannot make the contribution they wish to make to NATO operations, and Europe is unable to take on even small to medium-scale operations when NATO, as an organisation, is not engaged. This weakness is not only a challenge for Europe's wish to develop a common foreign and security policy. It also has serious implications for the future of the transatlantic security relationship. Imagine if ESDI was not being developed. Imagine a situation in which a richer and more unified Europe was unable or unwilling to take on greater defence responsibilities. Where Europe continued to make strong statements, but had to rely on the United States to back up those words with deeds. How long could this unequal security relationship endure? Who imagines that this imbalance is sustainable for the long term? ESDI is good for the transatlantic relationship -- because it means that Europe will be a stronger partner for North America in maintaining security. Where NATO takes the lead, Europe will carry a fairer share of the burden. Where NATO, as an organization, is not engaged, Europe will have the capacity to take the lead. This means that North America won't have to become directly involved, through NATO, in every security crisis in the neighborhood simply for want of an alternative. Within NATO, we are already making real progress in helping to deliver ESDI. The Alliance has taken practical steps to provide material support to European-led operations. Our new command structure allows for European-led operations using NATO capabilities and assets. The NATO force planning process can take European requirements into account. And, as I already mentioned, our Defence Capabilities Initiative is improving military capabilities overall. At the same time, Europe is improving its own capacities as a security actor. By establishing decision-making structures and setting ambitious targets for military capability, Europe is taking major steps forward. The EU has set itself an ambitious "headline" goal. Both NATO and the EU are engaged on a path to improve defence capability in a mutually reinforcing way. To achieve this governments will have to spend smarter, and where necessary, they will have to spend more. Why? Because in the real world, capabilities cost. And there will be costs associated with meeting the headline goal and fulfilling the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Investment will be needed in key areas, such as command, control and information systems, airlift and enhanced precision strike capabilities. In other words, Europe's policy goals will have to be matched by Europe's defence budgets.
That may mean reprioritisation, to ensure money is spent on equipment that is essential for modern operations. It may mean investing more in research and development, to ensure that our forces keep up with advances in technology. It could also mean efficiency measures, including privatising certain tasks that are done now by the military. But one thing is clear: to get the result we need - governments will have to spend their defence budgets more wisely -- take courageous decisions, and probably spend more. For NATO and the European Union to get the improvements they need, this same approach -- taking courageous, imaginative decisions -- must be applied in another vital area: defence industrial cooperation. The logic is clear -- defence industrial cooperation is a key part of the evolution of Euro-Atlantic security for two reasons -- one practical, one political. The practical reason is obvious: our forces need the best equipment we can provide. The defence industry on which we rely needs to be as efficient and modern as possible, and competition is at the heart of an efficient industry. We need competition, but we must guard against monopoly as a result of successive competitions. The size of the market and the investment in R+D for new technologies argues for transatlantic co-operation. The creation of national "fortresses" when it comes to procurement will not serve to improve optimally the capabilities of our forces. Transatlantic cooperation is clearly in the interests of both NATO and Europe, for very practical reasons. Let me know move to the political reason: The role of defence industry is no less important to Euro-Atlantic political relations -- and let me be blunt. We all understand why nations, or groups of nations, have tended to support their own defence industries. There have always been reasons, be they military or political. But transatlantic defence cooperation, where it occurs -- and it does - also sends a very powerful political signal. It shows that the two sides of the Atlantic are truly security partners. That they trust each other enough to depend on each other. The creation of fortresses on either side of the Atlantic would be severely detrimental to transatlantic political relations, and to the culture of mutual trust and cooperation we have built up over so many decades. For both of these reasons -- political and practical -- our Governments must take courageous, decisions to make both our procurement and our R+D regimes more flexible. As part of this, we should take action on both sides of the Atlantic to reform the mechanisms of transatlantic armaments cooperation. North America and Europe have much to gain by working together to remove the obstacles to effective defence trade. I have in mind here not only amending current legislation, but also resolving significant, specific differences on both sides of the Atlantic in areas such as mergers and acquisition practices and, crucially, technology transfer regimes. Some commentators view the present wave of European consolidation as a precursor to a new pattern of transatlantic joint ventures and partnering, leading in time to consolidation into truly transatlantic defence companies. I hope so. These are encouraging developments for a rejuvenated transatlantic technology and defence trade partnership. It needs to go further and faster. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic must do more to make sure that such cooperation can proceed in a dynamic fashion. In this regard, there are some encouraging signs. These include the initiatives of former Deputy US Secretary John Hamre and his Under-Secretary for acquisition, Jacques Gansler, to streamline the Pentagon's own procedures for defence trade. They include the US / UK accord on defence armaments cooperation signed by Secretary Cohen and Minister Hoon at the Wehrkunde Conference, which the US indicated could provide a model for similar agreements with other NATO allies. We have to make progress here if we want the improvement of our capabilities to succeed fully.
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