Kosovo:
The Real Story
The
Rt. Hon. Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
Secretary General of NATO
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am delighted to have been invited to speak to you today -- not least
because this city, and this region, are among the most beautiful in the
world.
This is my seventh speaking engagement in three days, and I've done a
lot of talking about why it is important to maintain and strengthen NATO
- common values, common security challenges, and the like. But there's
no pulling the wool over the eyes of this group. You already know the
real reason - reliable North European access to sunny weather!
There is a whole range of issues on NATO's agenda that we could usefully
discuss here today - the EU's growing role in European defence, or the
implications of the recent Russian elections. I would be happy to address
those issues in the Q&A period.
But I would like to focus my remarks today on one issue which is of critical
importance for NATO, and that is finishing the job in Kosovo.
Just two weeks ago, I went again to Kosovo, on the first anniversary
of Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign to end and reverse the
ethnic cleansing of the Albanian community. I went not only to commemorate
that important event, but also to assess for myself what came after -
the international community's campaign to bring lasting peace and security
to a small area that has, for too long, enjoyed neither.
It is particularly important to do this because we are hearing more and
more historical revisionism these days about Kosovo.
- Revisionism that wonders whether the situation was really that
bad for the Kosovar Albanians after all.
- Revisionism that suggests that there were no victims in Kosovo,
just two sides fighting for their interests.
- Revisionism that wonders whether NATO should have just stayed out
of it, and let the conflict run its course.
- Revisionism that questions whether Kosovo really mattered to the
interests of NATO's members.
Let me address each point in turn. First and foremost: for the ethnic
Albanians of Kosovo, it was that bad.
Let us not forget the situation in Kosovo as it was, just over a year
ago. By March of 1999, Serb oppression had already driven almost 400,000
people from their homes. The United Nations itself had stated clearly,
in successive Security Council Resolutions, and in the UN Secretary General's
Reports, that there was a clear threat to peace and security.
As early as September 1998 - six months before the air campaign - UN
Security Council Resolution 1198 said the Security Council - including
Russia - was:
"Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and
in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian
security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous
civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General,
the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes."
"Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian
situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe
as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and emphasising the
need to prevent this from happening"; and therefore the Council "Demanded"
... "that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia implement immediately
the following concrete measures" Item (a) of which was to "cease
all action by the security forces affecting the civil population and order
the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression."
The UN High Commission for Refugees stated clearly that a humanitarian
emergency was impending, and that some kind of response was required.
So let us not now, in retrospect, minimise what was a very serious humanitarian
situation.
My second point. The Serb military actions were no accident, nor an unintended
by-product of a legitimate operation by Yugoslavia against Albanian terrorists,
or a civil war among two, equally culpable national groups.
Let me quote from the OSCE's report on Kosovo before the air campaign:
"On the part of the Yugoslav and Serbian forces, their intent to
apply mass killing as an instrument of terror, coercion or punishment
against Kosovo Albanians was already in evidence in 1998, and was shockingly
demonstrated by incidents in January 1999 (including the Racak mass killing)
and beyond. Arbitrary killing of civilians was both a tactic in the campaign
to expel Kosovo Albanians, and an objective in itself…"
"Force expulsion carried out by Yugoslav and Serbian forces took
place on a massive scale, with evident strategic planning and in clear
violation of the laws and customs of war…"
"There is chilling evidence of the murderous targeting of children,
with the aim of terrorising and punishing adults and communities…"
"The scale on which human rights violations recur is staggering.
It has been estimated that over 90 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population
- over 1.45 million people - were displaced by the conflict by 9 June
1999 …"
These are the words of the OSCE - an independent observer. They are not
NATO's words but they are the reason NATO acted. This was ethnic cleansing
-- plain and simple. And ethnic cleansing has very real victims -- the
dead, the terrorised and the exiled.
The third revisionist theory suggests that, despite the oppression of
the Kosovo Albanians, we should have just stayed out of it -- that by
taking action, NATO made things worse.
Milosevic may well have accelerated his actions, but the nature and purpose
of his actions were already ominously clear. By March 1999 -- before the
air campaign - there were already 400,000 refugees and the international
community had plenty of evidence that Serb forces were preparing a massive
Spring offensive. Not only was the situation bad, but we knew that it
was about to get much worse. To have done nothing would have left the
full, pre-planned campaign of ethnic cleansing to go unchecked.
Indeed, it is worth taking a moment to contemplate the implications of
not taking action against Milosevic and his thugs. First, we would have
guaranteed turmoil and undermined the security balance in Southeast Europe
for years, if not decades. One million refugees would have been stranded
in neighbouring countries; the conflict would have simmered, and likely
spread; Milosevic would have turned his attention to other parts of his
shrinking country; and the entire region would have dramatically suffered
both economically and politically.
The ripple effects from the instability could, like the scattered refugees,
have spread to all the Continent. And the same slick commentators would
be telling NATO we should have acted.
That is why this conflict did, and indeed still, matters to our interests.
Kosovo is a small place, but it sits at a very strategic point -- between
Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and Christianity.
Just south of Kosovo are two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north,
new NATO members in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are small
countries struggling with the transition to democracy and market economy.
But it also had real implications for our values. If we had allowed this
ethnic cleansing to go unanswered, we would have fatally undermined the
modern Euro-Atlantic community we are trying to build, just as we enter
the 21st century. Indeed, we would have undermined the key lesson of the
Holocaust: never again.
After all these decades of working towards ethnic tolerance in our own
countries, how could we stand aside and allow nearly two million people
to be terrorised, brutalised and expelled from their homeland, for no
other reason than their ethnic origin?
The requirement and the imperative for action were therefore clear. And
for those who care to recall, the press was at the time insistently demanding
action by the international community.
So, knowing what we knew then and confirmed by what we know now, I am
proud and loud that NATO took action on Kosovo. It was not only the right
thing to do - it was the only thing to do.
After diplomacy was tried - and tried and tried, unsuccessfully, the
international community took a stand - and showed what we won't stand
for, as the new century dawns.
Today, one year after the start of the air campaign and ten months after
Kosovo's liberation, the situation is still far from perfect. As I heard
during my visit, there is still too much violence. We need more international
police officers to maintain law and order, and judges and prosecutors
to uphold it. And the international community has to come up with the
funding it has committed to help build the solid foundations of lasting
peace. These remain very daunting challenges indeed.
As a result of these challenges, I am now hearing another set of critics
arguing that Kosovo is a lost cause. These in-for-a-day experts see the
ongoing tensions in one or two flash-points in Kosovo and tell the world
that we have all made a terrible mistake. For them, the Albanian and Serb
communities of Kosovo are simply unable to overcome their "ancient
historical hatred". Some analysts even think we should recognise
their "irreconcilable differences", and cut our losses.
Once again, I must respond - because as the saying goes, "misconceptions
travel around the world while the truth is still tying its shoes".
And I believe that the truth is much more positive and telling than the
misconceptions would have us believe.
First, let us keep this situation in perspective. It has only been 10
months since the international community entered Kosovo. Dr. Kouchner,
the head of the UN mission there, has rightly said that Kosovo is emerging
from "forty years of communism, ten years of apartheid, and a year
of ethnic cleansing". To expect to create a Switzerland there in
less than a year is simply unrealistic.
But even so, I can tell you that when I went to Kosovo a few weeks ago,
I already saw the beginnings of a brighter future. First and foremost,
over one and a half million people have returned to the homes from which
they were driven, either to the woods or abroad, and are now living without
the spectre of killing, torturing, raping, looting and thuggery which
stalked Kosovo just over a year ago. That alone is huge progress.
And despite the pictures you occasionally see on the news, the overall
security situation has improved dramatically. For instance, when KFOR
arrived in Kosovo in June 1999, there was a weekly murder rate of 50.
It is now down to an average of five -- which is comparable to any large
European city of two million people.
Thirteen days ago, on March 24th, the first anniversary of the start
of the air campaign, I visited a rebuilt school in a Kosovo village called
Poklek, "ethnically cleansed" in April last year by the Serbs.
When Milosevic's paramilitaries came to Poklek, 53 local residents, including
10 children, were locked in one house and the Serbs threw in hand grenades.
They then burned the house and those in it. Virtually every building in
the village was destroyed.
The last year of the twentieth century, in the heart of Europe, two hours
flight from Paris, a few hours drive to Budapest, houses with satellite
TV - and the savagery of the Middle Ages.
But NATO drove out the Serb forces, and KFOR re-established security
in the province. Families returned to their scorched and bullet-ridden
homes. Children again began to study - inside tents. But they did so in
their native language for the first time in ten years. And with KFOR's
help, a new school for Poklek was built.
The children still walk over an hour to and from school each day. There
is no bus service, but life has begun once again.
The message to me and NATO Generals Clark and Reinhardt was simple: NATO
was their saviour. Their joy and gratitude was as humbling and exhilarating
as was the intensity of the sorrow as we honoured the photos of the 10
murdered children.
That's what KFOR is doing in Kosovo today, and that's why we need to
continue to support the KFOR mission until the local population is better
able to take care of itself.
The groundwork for Kosovo's future is now being laid. Local police and
judges are being trained. New institutions have been created, to help
the Kosovars govern themselves. The economic situation is picking up.
And the United Nations is already planning for free elections by the end
of the year.
By any measure, today's situation in almost all of Kosovo is a far cry
from the anarchy and lawlessness that many critics predicted when KFOR
deployed.
So my answer to the critics and defeatists is simple -- you have it wrong.
And if you want proof - go to Poklek school and see. We are making progress.
Things are getting better. And just for the record -- NATO doesn't give
up. The Alliance will stay as long as it takes to accomplish its mission.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Winston Churchill once said that, "the problems of victory are more
agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult".
That, in a nutshell, sums up the situation in Kosovo.
We have challenges to face in Kosovo. I am the first to admit that some
of them are very difficult. But let us be clear -- these are the challenges
of success. A success for our values. A success for the project of building
a just and peaceful Euro-Atlantic community. A success for the safety
and security of future generations.
One year after NATO planes took to very dangerous skies to stop a profound
evil, that success is the true story of Kosovo.
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