"The
Vision"
Remarks
by
NATO Secretary General at the conference
"Dfense Europenne : Le concept de convergence"
Minister Flahaut,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Over the course of yesterday and today, this conference has tackled the
issue of European Defence from every conceivable angle. You looked at
the ambitions, the capabilities, and at the economic and transatlantic
prerequisites for success.
This panel -- the last panel -- is about the "vision thing".
The organisers had a reason for putting the "vision"-panel towards
the end of the conference: they wanted me and you to look at how everything
should fit together some years down the road.
This gets us into the realm of prediction -- and predictions are a hazardous
undertaking. John Maynard Keynes avoided the embarrassment of long-term
predictions with his famous phrase "in the long run, we're all dead!".
But sometimes we can't escape making predictions. And in such situations,
I cannot help but remember that American local newspaper which informed
its readers that the horoscope section had to be cancelled "due to
unforeseen circumstances".
So predictions are dangerous. But I would nevertheless suggest at least
a few ideas about the shape of Europe, of NATO, and of the transatlantic
link as I see them in the years ahead.
Let us take the view of, say, just 5 years ahead. Let us look at European
Security Defence Identity in 2005. Where will we be? With the usual caveats,
here is my scenario:
By 2005, Europe will have developed its capabilities for military and
non-military crisis management. Political and military structures will
have been established to exercise political control and strategic direction
over EU-led operations. The European Allies will make a more effective
contribution to Alliance security and to Europe's security in general.
And, because of this, transatlantic relations will be stronger.
And my three "I's" (inclusiveness of all NATO Allies, indivisibility
of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities) will have been
carved in stone -- on a monument outside the building where joint NATO-EU
Council sessions are being held.
By 2005 NATO and the EU will enjoy a close and confident relationship
at all levels. Both formal and informal exchanges between the secretariats
and the military authorities will be a matter of routine. Joint meetings
will be held, and senior officials of our respective organisations will
brief each other on a regular basis.
The non-EU NATO Allies will be closely involved in the EU's deliberations
on European security and defence policy and crisis management. In a similar
vein, mechanisms will have been put in place at NATO to accommodate those
EU nations which are not members of the Alliance.
NATO defence planning will take EU requirements into account, and the
two organisations will closely co-ordinate their activities in this area.
The EU will have access to NATO's planning capabilities. Arrangements
will be in place to enable NATO's command structure to provide Headquarter
elements and command positions for EU-led operations, and the Deputy SACEUR
will be the focal point for all ESDI-related issues. And arrangements
for the provision of NATO assets and capabilities will be well developed.
A NATO-EU security agreement governing the exchange of classified information
will be in place. And NATO-EU joint crisis management exercises will be
held to test all these arrangements and mechanisms.
By 2005, this NATO-EU link will have become the strongest addition to
our ability to shape the strategic environment for the better. Not only
will it enable us by then to make a quantum leap in managing European
security and defence, it will also begin to have beneficial effects beyond
ESDI, for instance in the two organisations' policies vis-à-vis
Russia, enlargement, or the Mediterranean, to name just a few of the strategic
interests our two organisations share.
So much for the institutions. What will our capabilities look like in
2005?
There will be at least one important difference. By 2005, the EU will
have long met its Headline Goal. This will mean that we will have a 50,000
man force available, trained and equipped, ready within 60 days notice
and sustainable in the field for at least a year. This will be a significant
change: troops ready to be deployed, properly supported at short notice
and flexible in their tasking.
By 2005, the first concrete results of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative
will have become visible. The transatlantic technology gap will remain
but, having identified the most significant shortcomings, we will have
started to rectify them.
This, then, would be a benevolent scenario for a workable ESDI. It would
be a scenario of a Europe that is capable of taking more responsibility
for maintaining security and stability on this continent. It would be
a scenario where NATO and EU are not rivals, but Partners. In short, it
would be a scenario of an enlightened Atlanticism, an Atlanticism that
can adapt to the challenges of this new century.
After so much fortune-telling, I do not want to end my remarks without
having asked the "mother of all questions": What do we have
to do now to make this benevolent scenario succeed?
First, stay the course. In the last 18 months Europe has made more progress
on ESDI than in 18 years before. From Saint-Malo to Cologne to Helsinki
a new sense of direction has become visible -- and this new sense of direction
is not confined to the EU. Indeed, all three institutions involved in
building an ESDI -- EU, WEU and NATO -- are reflecting these new political
and military imperatives. The EU's Headline Goal, the WEU's "Audit",
and NATO's new command structure and DCI: they are all converging towards
the same ends: a stronger Europe and a stronger transatlantic relationship.
This momentum must be maintained.
Second, resolve the institutional questions quickly. NATO-EU links must
be developed to ensure transparency and mutual confidence between both
organizations. The role of non-EU European Allies must also be resolved
in ways satisfactory to all. This is more than a psychological matter.
The support of, say, Turkey, Norway, or Poland for an EU-led operation
is as important politically as it could be militarily. Nor must the other
NATO Partners nations be forgotten, from Romania to Albania to Ukraine.
A key lesson of Kosovo is that we need their political and military support
as well.
Third, focus on capabilities, not just on institutions. Institutional
changes are faster to implement and certainly cheaper than capabilities.
But capabilities remain the ultimate litmus test for ESDI. Indeed, ESDI
is meaningless if the right capabilities are not delivered. As far as
I am concerned, as NATO Secretary General, I will keep on pressing on
Allied Governments to remind them of their commitments on capabilities
to make sure they deliver. Fourth, avoid unnecessary duplication. No one
questions the need for the EU to establish the structures necessary to
exercise political control and strategic direction over EU-led operations,
regardless of whether they use NATO assets and capabilities. What should
be avoided, however, is competitive structures, in particular when it
comes to defence planning. That is why NATO believes that EU member states
should make use of existing NATO defence planning procedures as much as
possible. The fact is each country has only one defence budget and one
set of armed forces.
Fifth and finally, make a sustained information effort to explain ESDI
-- on both sides of the Atlantic. We need to explain ESDI to an American
audience that is still sceptical. This will require that Europeans exert
what I may call "rhetorical discipline". An ESDI that comes
across as being just about European self-assertion will fail to win support
in the United States. In making our case for ESDI we must also underscore
the wider transatlantic rationale of this endeavour: as a means to make
Europe a more valuable Partner of the US; as a contribution to a more
mature transatlantic relationship.
Of course, the challenge of explaining ESDI is not confined to Americans.
To explain to a European electorate why European defence budgets should
not be cut further, or why they should even be increased, will be no less
difficult. But the effort must be made. And it can be made. Kosovo has
brought home even to the most ardent ESDI-sceptic that the asymmetry between
Europe and North America is not healthy. Everyone senses that a change
is overdue. This has created a unique window of opportunity to make our
case.
We must grasp this opportunity. For the first time in decades -- perhaps
for the first time in half a century -- we can see a convergence of views
about the nuts and bolts of ESDI. Philosophical questions about the desirability
of ESDI are no longer dominating our agenda. We have moved beyond that:
we are finally discussing the practical questions of implementation. This
indicates that all players know how much is at stake. And that they are
determined to get it right.
Minister Flahaut,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Making predictions may be dangerous, but can also be quite instructive.
Perhaps the most important thing one can derive from this approach is
to put things in perspective: Five years from now, many issues that right
now seem unresolvable will have been resolved. And many things that at
the current stage may seem like make-or-break issues will suddenly look
"matter of course" as we look at them with hindsight.
Thank you for your attention.
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