Defence Week Conference Brussels, Belgium 31 Jan. 2000

"Rebalancing NATO for a Strong Future" Remarks by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson Admirals, Generals, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honor to be here today. The Defence Week Conferences always attract very knowledgeable and influential participants, and this year is no exception. Indeed, this is an extremely impressive gathering. Many of NATO's leaders, past and present, military and civilian, are here, along with senior members of Governments, and captains of industry. I must say that I approached this gathering with some concern. I have always followed General William Sherman's philosophy that a good leader should always give the impression he knows more than his audience. Considering the expertise and experience in this room today, I think I will find that very difficult. I thought that I might then fall back on General de Gaulle's philosophy that a good leader says nothing, but as I am Scotsman, that would be impossible. Let me begin very cautiously, then, by saying "thank you" to the people in this room that have worked in the service of NATO, in the military or civilian worlds. I took up the position of Secretary General just a few months ago, but I took the helm of an organization that is as dynamic and as relevant to European security as it has ever been. That success is due to many of the people in this room today. And we mustn't underestimate what has been accomplished over the past decade in transforming the Alliance. I am sure that all of us remember how NATO's existence was called into question in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed. Some experts and pundits across Europe and North America called for NATO's demise as well. After all, they said, what possible purpose could the Alliance serve? The answer soon became clear. Although the Soviet Union was gone, the need for defence and the need to manage security crises in Europe remained. In the fluid and unpredictable post Cold War world, we still needed a transatlantic forum for consultation and cooperation on security matters. Moreover, we needed to engage with Russia and Ukraine -- to help them through their post-communist transition, rather than abandon them to it. We needed to break down Cold War dividing lines, and demonstrate to former adversaries that membership in European institutions was neither a dream nor a false promise. We needed to reach out a strong hand of friendship and cooperation to Central and Eastern Europe, and lock those countries into a solid framework of trust and cooperation. NATO was the answer to all those requirements. In many ways, it was the only answer. Today, there are no more "experts" calling for NATO to disappear, or wondering why the Alliance has survived. It is simply obvious. As we enter the 21st century, NATO is at the very hub of Euro-Atlantic security. We have taken in three new members, and are preparing for further invitations. We have built solid institutions for cooperation with Russia and Ukraine. The Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have provided a framework within which every country in Europe can work together to solve security challenges. We have taken on two major missions in the Balkans, to help bring peace and lasting stability to an area that has, for too long, enjoyed neither. And the Alliance remains the principal forum in which Europe and North America preserve our common security interests, and uphold our common values. This is an agenda that speaks for itself. My job, as Secretary General, is to make sure this agenda succeeds. I intend to do just that. But I have another job as well -- to help prepare the Alliance for the future. Here, too, I have something of a guiding principle. I'm sure the representatives of industry gathered here today will be slightly relieved that it is not from another General, but from a prominent management guru by the name of Peter Drucker. Mr. Drucker has quite accurately said that the question facing the decision-maker is not what this organization should do tomorrow. It is :" what do we have to do today to be ready for an uncertain future?" From my perspective, there are two things in particular we have to do to prepare NATO for an uncertain future. First, we have to ensure that each and every one of the Allies continues to make the necessary investments in appropriate military capabilities and technologies. And second, we have to support and guide the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. Let me begin by addressing improvements to our defence capabilities. The requirement for this is clear to all of us, and Kosovo was merely another reminder. Military capability is the heart and soul of the Alliance. To carry out all of NATO's missions -- from crisis management, to peacekeeping, to Partnership and cooperation, to collective defence -- our forces must be effective, and able to work together effectively. This means, first, that we have to make sure our forces remain interoperable. Imbalances are growing within the Alliance, between those countries that are investing more quickly in new technologies and capabilities, and those that are proceeding at a slower pace. This is increasingly posing challenges to interoperability, as some Allies move to higher-tech command, control, communications and intelligence equipment, or C3I as the experts call it . C3I is, of course, the core of any operation, let alone combined and joint operations. So we need to ensure that we take advantage of technology to enhance our teamwork, rather than letting technology get between us. Having effective forces in the modern security environment also means structuring and equipping our forces for modern operations. The days of planning for massive armoured clashes in the Fulda Gap are behind us. Today, we need forces that that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in theatre for as long as it takes to get the job done. This means that NATO's military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theatre. And when I say "NATO's forces", I mean the forces of all the Allies. We must avoid any division of labour within NATO, whereby the high-tech Allies provide the logistics, the smart bombs and the intelligence, and the lower-tech Allies provide the soldiers -- what a NATO official once called "a two-class NATO, with a precision class and a bleeding class". This would be politically unsustainable. Similarly, we should avoid falling into a division of labor whereby the European Allies alone handle the smaller challenges, and the United States only engages in the high-end collective defence missions. For the long-term health of NATO, the burdens, costs and the risks must be shared, and shared equally. The purpose of the Defence Capabilities Initiative is to address these challenges in a way that ensures a more balanced Alliance. We have identified 58 specific areas of NATO's military capabilities that need improvement. We have made progress in ensuring that correcting these shortfalls will be a focus of our force planning process. And I have been very clear to Allied leaders that they must make the necessary investments to make it work. Building real military capabilities takes time, but action is already underway. Let me stress that this is not purely an issue of finding new money for defence. It is about getting a good return on investment -- literally "getting more bang for the buck". Today, the European Allies spend about 60% of what the United States spends on defence, but nobody would suggest that the European Allies have 60% of the capability. We need to improve that return on investment, through innovative management techniques, identification of priorities, and courageous decisions. And if that doesn't free up enough resources, than, yes, we will have to come up with more money as well. I have been highlighting this message in my visits to NATO capitals and I will follow up with Prime Ministers or Presidents, if I must. Let me be clear -- I am committed to ensuring that DCI delivers, and I'm going to be a thorn in some national flesh until it does. The Defence Capabilities Initiative will support the other major transformation taking place in the Alliance today -- the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. Over the past few months in particular, I have heard concern expressed about the European defence initiative. Some analysts and pundits have suggested that ESDI shouldn't happen. Others claim it just won't happen. And a few doomsayers suggest that if it does develop, an effective European capability will mean the end of the Alliance as we know it. This is nonsense, pure and simple. Let me make four simple points. First point: ESDI makes sense, on both sides of the Atlantic. For years, the United States - particularly the U.S. Congress - has been urging the European Allies to do more on defence. "Burden-sharing," it has been called. But until now, little had happened to improve European defence capabilities. The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European Allies had become on U.S. military capabilities. From precision-guided weapons and all-weather aircraft to ground troops that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there with adequate logistical support, the European Allies did not have enough of the right stuff. On paper, Europe has 2 million men and women under arms - more than the United States. But despite those 2 million soldiers, it was a struggle to come up with 40,000 troops to deploy as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Something is wrong, and Europe knows it. The Defence Capabilities Initiative is working on the NATO side to fix this; but the European Security and Defence Identity, by marshalling the political will and clout of the European Union, is just as important in addressing the capabilities gap. So ESDI makes sense for both Europe and North America: A stronger Europe will be capable of responding to many more contingencies without being unduly dependent on the United States. If the North American Allies do not want to get involved in addressing some purely European security challenges, the European Allies will still have the option of addressing these challenges on their own. But when the all Allies act together, they will be even stronger. So more Europe does not mean less U.S., but a stronger and more flexible NATO. My second point is addressed to those who scoff at Europe's capability to develop in the security field. Simply put: Europe is taking action. It is true that Europe has, in the past, made various attempts to develop a security "identity" -- attempts which, for the most part, accomplished very little. Today, however, things are fundamentally different. There is a very clear, agreed blueprint within the European Union on how to get from here to there. Over the past year, the members of the European Union have taken a number of steps to make ESDI work. They have named my predecessor, Javier Solana, as the High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy. They are in the process of creating a political and security council at the EU, to provide political guidance on security issues, with a supporting military staff. They have completed the WEU audit of the military assets and capabilities they have at present. And, most significantly, at the recent Helsinki Summit, the EU agreed to put itself to the test. It agreed on a Headline Goal: to have, in three years' time, the capability to deploy a force of 60,000 trained rapid reaction troops, available within 60 days of the order, and able to be sustained in theatre for at least a year. This is an ambitious goal - particularly when one considers the need to have a further 60,000 troops ready to fill in behind as part of a 6-month roll-over. But experience shows that once the EU sets a serious target, it never fails to deliver. The introduction of the Euro is a case in point: In 1992 at Maastricht, the EU set the target of Monetary Union - and many analysts predicted it would never happen. Today, as NATO Secretary General, I am paid every month in Euros. If the EU could meet those monetary targets, it can meet this military one. And let's remember that it is in NATO's interest for the EU to meet this target. So NATO has taken practical steps to provide material support to European-led operations. Our new command structure allows for European-led operations using NATO capabilities and assets. The NATO force planning process is taking European requirements into account. And as I mentioned, the Defence Capabilities Initiative is improving military capabilities overall. So NATO has also taken steps to make ESDI a reality. I intend to hold Europe to its side of the bargain, and put pressure on the EU to live up to its Headline Goal. So far, so good. ESDI makes sense, and it is on track. But we must not be complacent. So my third point is this: to achieve its full potential, ESDI must still be managed carefully. In this respect, there are a few challenges ahead that must be handled properly. We must, for instance, ensure that the question of participation of non EU-European Allies in EU-led operations is resolved in ways that are satisfactory to all. This is not just a cosmetic matter. The support of Turkey, Norway or Poland for an EU-led operation is as important politically as it could be militarily. This is especially true if the EU wants to use NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. We must also ensure that there is as much transparency and cooperation between NATO and the EU as possible. Again, the reasons are simple. Each of our member states has only one defence budget, and one set of forces. We must ensure that defence planning in both organizations is absolutely coherent, so that our forces are structured and equipped to carry out EU and NATO operations -- not "either/or". I am confident that in the end, it will not be theological arguments, but common sense that will prevail. No one can afford wasteful duplication. These are real concerns, but I have every reason to believe that they will be managed successfully. Why? Because, unlike in the past, we have injected a healthy dose of realism into this debate. This realism tells us that European strategic independence is simply not feasible. The US retains key strategic capabilities which are indispensable for all but the smallest contingencies: logistics, strategic lift, satellite reconnaissance etc. ESDI is thus not about Europe "going it alone", but about Europe doing more. There is no reason to fear "decoupling", because for the foreseeable future, a decoupled Europe simply can't work . But even more importantly, nobody wants a decoupled Europe. Even the most ardent proponent of Europe understands that an ESDI that undermines the transatlantic relationship would be a losing proposition. Bosnia and Kosovo have made utterly clear that NATO remains Europe's pre-eminent security institution. For Europe to undermine this institution - either deliberately or by accident -- would be self-defeating. The fear that individual EU members could somehow "hi-jack" ESDI in order to marginalise NATO or the US is misplaced. ESDI is about adding more military options to our menu when responding to crises, not reducing them. And so my fourth and final point: the transatlantic relationship is, and will remain, solid. Despite disagreements and occasional heated rhetoric, which are normal in vibrant democracies, North America and Europe share unbreakable bonds -- common values, common interests, and decades of mutual trust and confidence. New institutional relationships will do nothing to change that. As French President Jacques Chirac recently said, "NATO is the center-piece of security in Europe." If the President of one of the toughest pro-European countries makes this case, who am I to disagree? So let us move forward with confidence and proceed with building ESDI in an atmosphere of mutual support and openness. That alone will do much to ensure that ESDI delivers in the best possible way. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have outlined two major projects that I believe are central to NATO's transformation. They are highly technical, and very complicated, and consist of acronyms that too few people understand anyway. But DCI, ESDI, and the rest of NATO's agenda serve a very simple purpose -- to continue to preserve .the safety and security of our citizens. Through all of these measures, we are working to preserve the sense of security that most people in NATO countries take so much for granted. They know they are free from the threat of military attack. They know that, in an emergency, our armed forces are there, and that, if called upon, our militaries can go abroad and help bring peace to others, before conflict - or its fall-out - even approaches our shores or their homes. This sense of safety and security is a precious thing -- and NATO's job is to preserve it. As we move into the 21st century, I am very confident that we have the tools, the people, and the vision, to do the job.