Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The British novelist Joyce Cary once was asked why he had volunteered
for the Balkan Wars of 1912. He replied that he had not wanted to
miss the experience of war, for he had thought that this would be
the last of all wars. Unfortunately, Mr. Cary's haste was quite unnecessary.
Even 80 years later, the experience he had so eagerly sought is still
tragically available.
The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo have made it utterly clear that
peacekeeping and conflict prevention are no longer concepts that just
apply to other regions of the world, but not to today's Europe. Nor
are they concepts that concern the UN alone. On the contrary. Europe
has to accept that this continent is still subject to the political,
economic and military pressures that can and do lead to open conflict.
Accordingly, all our institutions must prepare themselves to face
these new challenges.
NATO is preparing to meet these challenges. Over the course of the
1990s this Alliance has adapted its political and military tools to
cope with conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area. We have opted for political
and military cooperation across the continent. We engaged Russia and
Ukraine constructively. And we changed our strategy and force structures
to better respond to the challenge of peace support operations: with
more mobility, more flexibility, and more Partner involvement.
In the Kosovo campaign, all these reforms paid off, as I would like
to illustrate in the remainder of my remarks. Let me be clear: I don't
want to imply that the Kosovo conflict could serve as some template
for the future. Yet it can certainly serve as an example both of the
complexities of crisis management and of the wide variety of means
NATO has applied - and still is applying.
What where the elements of NATO's approach? Above all, the imperative
of conflict prevention. From the outset, NATO supported the international
diplomatic efforts with military pressure. With its threat of airstrikes
in the fall of 1998 the Alliance even ended an existing serious refugee
crisis. We then supported the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo,
and then the Rambouillet talks. It was only after all diplomatic means
had been exhausted that to inhibit and eventually end the violence
we had to resort to force. But even then we did not confine ourselves
to airstrikes, as may have been the public impression. From the outset,
our strategy was wider and long-term.
First, we isolated the conflict. As soon as the situation worsened
in 1998 we undertook measures to stabilise the immediate neighbourhood.
Preventive deployments in FYROM and exercises in Albania clearly demonstrated
our determination not to allow the conflict to spread. Last March
we also created a Consultative Forum with seven countries in the region.
All these steps were only possible because of our developed policy
of partnership and cooperation. Without it , we would have had to
work from scratch.
Secondly, we provided humanitarian assistance to FYROM and Albania.
Although almost unnoticed by the broader public, NATO's air campaign
was accompanied by an unprecedented humanitarian operation to provide
food and shelter for the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo.
This helped alleviate the enormous pressure being put on the very
fragile economies and political structures of our two key Partners
in the region. Again, it is doubtful whether we could have done this
without the years of cooperation with FYROM and Albania.
Thirdly, we brought Russia on board. When the air campaign began,
Russia suspended its consultations with us in the Permanent Joint
Council. But our efforts to re-engage Russia never ceased. When Russia
realised that NATO was determined to prevail, Russia became part of
the diplomatic solution - and of its military implementation through
KFOR. Consultations in the PJC resumed. Our relationship is still
not where we would like it to be. But I would maintain that our years
of dialogue have made a difference. Unlike the early 20th century,
when the Balkans were Europe's powderkeg, Kosovo saw all major powers
finally acting on the same side - the side of peace.
Fourthly, we created a robust peacekeeping force, incorporating
contributions from many of our Partner nations. KFOR, like its counterpart
SFOR in Bosnia, could only be set up as rapidly and effectively as
it was because Allies and Partners had been cooperating militarily
for years. Through KFOR, NATO and its Partners have created the secure
environment for other organisations - governmental and non-governmental
- to help with civil and economic reconstruction.
Finally, we are looking beyond the conflict region itself. All of
Southeastern Europe must be given a perspective of re-joining the
European mainstream - because the clearest lesson of the last 50 years
is that integration breeds trust, stability and prosperity. Put differently,
integration is conflict prevention in its ultimate. That is why NATO,
through its own Southeast Europe Initiative, is supporting the EU
Stability Pact for Southeast-Europe. We will explore ways to enhance
regional security cooperation. And we will help aspirant countries
from Southeastern Europe to prepare their candidacies for NATO membership.
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude.
As I said before, Kosovo should not be seen as a model for the future.
Ideally, the future should be characterised by more prevention and
less intervention. That is why we must strengthen preventive mechanisms,
from the OSCE to NATO's Partnership initiatives.
Despite all our efforts, we couldn't prevent the Kosovo conflict.
As the recent OSCE Report proved, Milosevic was intent on ethnically
cleansing Kosovo.
But we were able to stop the crisis from spreading, we reversed
the ethnic cleansing, and we are now working together with the Stability
Pact and the wider International Community to offer all of Southeastern
Europe the perspective of a brighter tomorrow. In an historically
unprecedented display of solidarity, virtually all nations of the
Euro-Atlantic area have demonstrated that they share common values,
and that they are prepared to defend these values. This is an auspicious
beginning for the Transatlantic Century, as you name it in the title
of your Conference, a century in which NATO is ready to play a central
part and make a lasting contribution to peace and stability.
Thank you.
