Speech
by Jaakko
Blomberg, Under-Secretary of State
for Political Affairs of Finland
Mr. Secretary-General
First of all, I would like to congratulate you for your appointment as
the Secretary General of the Alliance and I welcome Ireland into our midst.
I also thank Dr Kouchner for his strong presentation which we all should
heed.
The situation in Chechnya is a source of deep concern. We recognise Russia's
right to defend its territorial integrity and fight terrorism. But the
means it is using to achieve its goals are excessive, and suffering of
civilians is unacceptable. Moreover, we believe that Russia is in fact
undermining its own objectives. Peace and stability in the region cannot
be secured by the methods now used. We call upon Russia to observe the
international norms related to civilians in armed conflicts, to allow
effective humanitarian assistance and to seek a political settlement.
This year's important developments have given the Partnership a new dimension.
Kosovo forged solidarity and support for common values within the Euro-Atlantic
community. Many of us take part in the Nato-led KFOR-operation in Kosovo.
Another important means of translating this solidarity into a common effort
to stabilise the region as a whole is now to give active and generous
support to the Stability Pact in all its aspects, civilian and military.
In Washington the Partnership was given new prominence in a more conceptual
context. It is significant and most welcome that the new Strategic Concept
raised the Partnership to the level of Alliance's fundamental security
tasks, together with crisis management. There is no doubt that the Partnership
is crucial to the evolving new security culture of the Euro-Atlantic area.
Finland is committed to it, both in a political and practical sense.
The operation in Kosovo showed that there is an urgent need to implement
the Political-Military Framework for Nato-led PfP-operations in a dynamic
way. The purpose is to enable Partners to prepare their contributions
as well as to give Partners information and influence on operations which
is on par with their contributions in the field. Equally important, the
work begun this autumn on the various elements of Enhanced and More Operational
Partnership further improves the practical quality of Partners' contributions.
The future of NATO's civil emergency sector is of active interest to us
and we are keen to be consulted on this subject. As a practical example
of our interest in this field, may I recall that in January, Finland and
Nato will host in Helsinki an international seminar on co-operation between
civil and military organisations during nuclear accidents.
Nato-led Crisis Management Operations will remain a strong and viable
option when tackling future crises in our continent. It is important that
the ongoing development on the European Union's Security and Defence Policy
reinforces Europe's substantive ability to contribute to the security
of the continent. The option to carry out European operations using Nato
assets and capabilities, where Nato as a whole is not involved, must also
be made to work in practice. To achieve this there should be close and
pragmatic co-operation between the European Union and Nato. This requires
political will and efficient arrangements for the militarily non-Allied
EU-members in relation to Nato as well as for the countries, which are
members of the Alliance but not the EU in their relationship to the Union.
Without a good common understanding on these matters the option of EU-led
operations using Nato assets and capabilities might remain a paper option.
The arrangements worked out between the WEU and Nato is a useful toolbox
for this work. Last but not least the participation of countries that
are neither members of the EU nor Nato must be well provided for.
The crucial issue is, however, the further development of capabilities
and assets available to the Euro-Atlantic community when it decides to
intervene militarily in a crisis situation. The defence planning and PARP,
DCI and OCC as well as training and exercises all help to improve the
ability of Allies and Partners to contribute in the field. Needless to
say, the capabilities and skills needed are the same whether an operation
is Nato-led, is led by the EU using Nato assets and capabilities, or were
the Union to act on its own.
Finally, I would like to take the opportunity to inform colleagues of
the results of the European Council in Helsinki in the field of crisis
management.
The European Union, for its part, has decided to respond to the post-Kosovo
challenges. The European Council adopted progress reports on the developing
of military and non-military crisis management capability; both areas
will be further developed in parallel and in coordination. The union will
create an autonomous capacity for EU-led military crisis management operations,
available for use where Nato as a whole is not engaged; and at the same
time avoiding unnecessary duplication with efforts made by Nato, and without
implying the creation of a European army. The headline goal for the year
2003 is a crisis management capacity up to 50 000 - 60 000 troops, deployable
within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year. In Helsinki provision
was also made for the future political and military decision-making bodies
and for interim arrangements, which should be in place at the beginning
of March next year. As a matter of priority, modalities of consultation
and transparency between EU and NATO will be developed, and arrangements
for non-members' participation in EU crisis management will be defined.
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