NATO HQ

12 April 1999

Audio file
(.MP3/11.0 MB)

Nous venons de terminer une runion trs importante des Ministres des Affaires trangres allis, que nous avons entirement consacre l'examen de la situation au Kosovo.

La crise du Kosovo constitue une tape dcisive dans la dfinition de notre vision d'une nouvelle Europe au sein de laquelle les droits de l'homme, les valeurs dmocratiques et l'tat de droit prvaudront.

Aujourd'hui, nous avons valu la situation au Kosovo et les progrs que nous avons faits dans la conduite de l'opration "Force Allie". Tous les pays de l'OTAN ont exprim leur indignation face au nettoyage ethnique entrepris par les forces de scurit yougoslaves au Kosovo et aux expulsions forces d'une grande partie de la population.

Nous avons rappel notre dtermination mettre un terme ces pratiques barbares. Le dpeuplement systmatique du Kosovo ne pourra perdurer. Le nettoyage ethnique sera stopp et la paix sera finalement rtablie au Kosovo. Nos oprations ariennes se poursuivront aussi longtemps que ncessaire, jusqu' ce que nous ayons russi convaincre le Prsident Milosevic d'accepter nos objectifs.

Let me briefly remind you of these objectives:

• the first: a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;

• the second: the withdrawal from Kosovo of the Yugoslav army, the military, the police and the paramilitary forces;

• third: the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

• the fourth: the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and all the displaced persons;

• the fifth: the credible assurance of Milosevic's willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords towards a political solution for Kosovo in conformity with International Law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Let me say that our air operations are taking a heavy toll of President Milosevic's army and security forces. We are tightening the screw on those forces in Kosovo which are responsible for repressing civilians. Our operations are effective. They are being carried out according to the moral and professional standards that you would expect from NATO. We have lost no pilots and we have kept collateral damage to a minimum.

We have the political will and the resources to maintain our military pressure until Milosevic backs down. But once again, I would like to stress that NATO is not at war with Yugoslavia. Our quarrel is not with the Yugoslav people but with a government and a military force that are abusing their people in violation of all accepted norms of human rights.

I'd like to state also that the Allies, the Ministries, condemn the immoral use of refugees by Belgrade as a means of destabilizing other countries in the region. We are determined that this tactic shall not succeed - and it has not succeeded.

As you know, we have held consultations with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We have assured these countries that we will respond to any challenges by Yugoslavia to their security stemming from the presence of NATO forces and their activities on their territories.

At the same time as you know we have mobilized our military resources to assist the international humanitarian relief operations in the region. NATO forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have constructed emergency accommodation for refugees and have provided substantial care for them. NATO troops as you know are also being deployed to Albania to support the humanitarian efforts there and to assist the Albanian authorities in providing a secure environment for them.

But as we deal with one humanitarian challenge, we are also aware that there is another - dramatic - the one inside Kosovo itself. We are deeply concerned at the fate of all the displaced people there in Kosovo who as you know are facing hunger and exhaustion. This is another major humanitarian crisis in the making and we are urgently considering whether there are ways in which we might be able to help.

It is Milosevic who has caused this humanitarian crisis. He planned it and started to carry it out well before NATO took the decision to act. However, NATO has been in the forefront of international efforts to solve this humanitarian crisis. NATO is not only trying to stop Milosevic's brutality. We have also taken care of his victims. We will not forget these inhumane acts. Milosevic and his commanders will be held accountable for their actions.

Today we also expressed concern regarding once again the situation in Montenegro. We have reaffirmed our support for President Djukanovic. And I would like to stress again that any move against him and his government will have grave consequences for President Milosevic.

Let me finally say that it is important that at this point we begin to look beyond the crisis in Kosovo. The countries of the Former Yugoslavia and their neighbours must be brought into the European mainstream.

They must be able to enjoy the same peace, the same security, the same prosperity as the other countries of Europe.

The years of confrontation must come to an end in this part of Europe, in southeastern Europe, or there will be no future for its peoples.

Today we confirmed that we will play a full part in a comprehensive approach to stabilize this region. Such an approach which should address the political, economic, security and humanitarian aspects must involve a number of institutions but let me say that NATO will have its role to play. There are as you know already several initiatives from the EU and also from individual Allies. We will see how we can use the resources of our Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the model of the Partnership for Peace to make NATO's contribution.

A democratic Yugoslavia - whose people have a normal relationship with their neighbours in the Balkans - will have an important place in this vision.

So let me just finish by saying the message from this meeting today is clear: Milosevic is losing and he knows he is losing.

NATO is united. We have justice and right on our side. We will prevail. That is the message from the meeting today of all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the Allied countries.

You said Milosevic must ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military police and paramilitary forces. The word "all" is not used in there as it has been in the past; and secondly, he must agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence - the words "NATO-led" are missing from that one.

Does this indicate a shifting of the ground on your position?

Secretary General: No, no, no. The position is the same, the manner in which they have formulated the five conditions is the same that has been repeatedly reported by Ministers and Leaders of the Alliance for many weeks but they should not be mistaken; the philosophy of the four points and in particular the two you have mentioned are clear, troops may ???? and as far as the second point that you have raised, I would like to say the NATO countries, which without any doubt will be the most important contributors to any force deployed in Kosovo, will not be prepared to be deployed with any other scheme than the scheme in which they are prepared to work and that is the scheme of NATO. The label may be something different but the scheme really on the ground for the countries that would be the most important contributors, no doubt about that, which are part of NATO, that will not affect any other scheme of deployment, the channel of command is structured and they know very well and it has worked well also in Bosnia. Remember that in Bosnia the force which is employed now in Bosnia is called SFOR, it doesn't have the NATO name but as you know very well, the commanding structure whereby the majority of the countries deploy their forces is a NATO structure.

James Robins (BBC): Secretary General, if I could follow up those points specifically, are you saying to us that President Milosevic must still withdraw his entire military police and paramilitary forces, there is no place for any of his security forces to remain in Kosovo? And on the point you've just touched on, can we assume from the wording about agreeing the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence, that it would be possible that the NATO component of such a force would not necessarily be in the majority and that NATO soldiers, as has happened occasionally in the past, would find themselves under the command of other soldiers who were not from the Alliance?

Secretary General: OK. The points that I have mentioned, the five points, as you remember, have also ??????? on the basis of the Rambouillet Accord. You remember very well the content of the Rambouillet Accord about the withdrawal of troops. We are going beyond that point because we think that if we want to guarantee the return of refugees the situation on the ground must be such that the refugees will have the guarantee, the security, that they can return. I would like to underline very much, very strongly, that reversal of the situation, the return of refugees is a basic commitment of the international community.

The second thing that you mentioned about troops, I cannot imagine a situation in which the NATO countries which are in theory and in practice the countries that can deploy the most important contributions probably to that force will be in a minority, I cannot imagine that. I can imagine a situation like the SFOR in Bosnia in which at a point you will remember more than 30 countries had forces deployed in Bosnia, I can imagine that with countries that belong to the ??PC or to the PFPS scheme, countries that belong to the European geographic context and other countries that may be prepared to do it as we did in Bosnia but that is a scheme, don't misinterpret what is said there. As I said before, the NATO countries that will be without a doubt the most important contributors would like to deploy their forces through the mechanism they have and the mechanism they have is the command structure of NATO.

Patricia Kelly, CNN: Secretary General, on your security guarantees for the surrounding country, especially Albania which has allowed NATO to more or less take over its air space, its ports, are those security guarantees NATO is offering the same as NATO nations enjoy under article 5 first of all; and secondly, can you be absolutely clear that if NATO troops go into Kosovo at any time, there will be no dual-key command?

Secretary General: On the first question, of course the security guarantee will be exactly the same as the guarantee that the NATO countries do have but the difference will be very slight. Any problem that those countries may have stemming from the presence of NATO troops on the ground will be taken with the utmost concern by the Alliance and therefore the response will be very strong and very rapid but of course, they are not members of NATO and article 5 would not apply to them but very close to that.

On the question about dual-key, I think the experiences we have had already about this mechanism in the history of NATO in this new phase that goes to 1990/1995 and even before with the experience in Bosnia, do not suggest that a sort of dual-key is an efficient manner of working but let me take some time - a few days - before I answer in a more precise manner that question. At this point, that is what I think and I think that is what the countries that belong to the Alliance think with me.

Christian Unteanu, Romania: Vous avez parl, M. le Secrtaire gnral, d'une approche comprhensive de la situation des Balkans. Qu'est-ce que a veut dire exactement, et quel sera le rle exact de l'OTAN dans ce nouveau type de situation ou de solution politique?

Secretary General: Je viens de dire que la proccupation est pour la stabilit de la rgion, c'est une priorit pour tous les pays de l'Alliance et pour tous les pays de l'Europe, de l'Union. Comme vous savez, la runion - le Conseil des ministres de l'Union europenne - il y a quelques jours, il y a trois, quatre jours, ont dcid de prparer un plan de stabilit pour la rgion. Je crois que c'est une ide trs, trs positive, trs crative, mais nous pensons que l'OTAN peut aussi aider ce processus. Il y a des composants conomiques, des composants de commerce, etc, mais il y a un composant aussi de la scurit, et je crois que l'OTAN peut contribuer d'une manire trs importante et de faon trs significative travers des programmes que nous avons : partnariat pour la paix, etc, partnariat pour .....force et je crois que l'occasion....au Sommet Washington qui aura lieu dans quelques jours il y aura une initiative probablement pour faire en sorte pour crer un programme de stabilisation du point de vue de scurit dans la rgion, c'est...............je crois que c'est trs positif pour considrer une programme sur la rgion qui va au del de la crise aujourd'hui. Je crois que nous aurons............sicle avec un programme cratif, important .........conomique, politique, commerce, etc., mais aussi du point de vue de la scurit.

Question: M. Solana, vous demandez M. Milosevic de travailler et de....volont de travailler sur base de l'Accord de Rambouillet. Qu'est-ce qu'il faut changer dans cet accord s'il faut changer quelque chose et est-ce qu'il y aura des nouvelles ngociations encore une fois propos d'une solution politique?

Secretary General: Oui, l'accord de Rambouillet , c'est un accord sign par la partie Kosovar mais aprs les vnements des dernires semaines je crois que l'accord de Rambouillet ne sera pas l'accord final, mais je crois que nous devons utiliser - ou les ngociateurs devront utiliser - l'accord de Rambouillet ...le dbut ....ngociations ultrieures.

Bill Drozdiak (Washington Post): Mr. Secretary, given the kinds of atrocities and terrible things that have happened in Kosovo, it seems almost unthinkable that the Kosovar Albanians if and when they are allowed to return to their homes, would be able to live or be willing to live in a Serbian state. From what you are saying today, you are reaffirming that autonomy within Serbia still remains the goal of the NATO Allies. If you are asking for the removal of all Serb troops and forces, however, that seems to call into question Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo. How do you square that contradiction?

Secretary General: I'd like to square that in the following manner: I think the most important concern we should have at this moment is to guarantee the return of refugees, that should be the most important commitment that the international community should have at this point so the whole emphasis should be placed on the possibility - not only the possibility - the guarantee, the commitment -that it will be a reversal of the situation.

In order to achieve that, there is no question that from the very beginning the forces will have to be withdrawn and the negotiators will have to work out whatever is the scheme - and whether scheme will be NATO, the Contact Group, I don't know what - but the scheme that is achieved at the end may take some time to be achieved, to be terminated but in that period of time, if we want to begin to reverse the situation and to allow the refugees to return, two things have to take place - the withdrawal of the troops and the implementation or the employment of an international troop that guarantees the security of these people.

Nick Mackie (Deutsche Welle): Two clarifications please. Reading the statement regarding commandos and regarding President Slobadan Milosevic himself, are you saying that you will support any calls from the International Court to indict President Slobadan Milosevic and his commanders as war criminals?

Secretary General: This is an obvious question, it has an obvious reason, everybody has the obligation to comply with the International Tribunal.

Nick Mackie: And the second clarification is on the word "permissive". There is a lot of talk about when the environment is permissive then forces can be deployed to help refugees return. Can you help us clarify the word "permissive". Do you necessarily have to have a formal cease-fire in place before troops can move in to help the return of refugees?

Secretary General: Why don't you help me a little bit and don't ask me to qualify the word "permissive"? I think you understand what I mean.

Antoine Guillau, TF1: M. le Secretaire general est-ce que vous pouvez dire quel role vous voyez pour la Russie dans cette resolution politique ou diplomatique de la crise, que la Russie doit jour un role important et par ailleurs est-ce que l'OTAN n'est pas en train de se transformer au fil des jours en force humanitaire egalement.

Secretary General: Une partie de votre question implique bien la Russie. La rle de la Russie notre avis sera trs important. Nous croyons - pas seulement moi-mme - mais nous croyons que la rle de la Russie doit tre important. Comme vous savez demain Secrtaire Albright rencontrera Oslo avec Ministre Ivanov. Ca sera suivi par d'autres rencontres avec des ministres de l'Alliance et je crois que a sera possible dans quelques jours une reunion des ministres des affaires trangres des G8 aura lieu donc pour incorporer la Russie la solution du conflit. Tous les Allis sont dtermins faire tous les efforts pour avoir la Russie avec nous, mais cela dpendera de nous et aussi dpendera tout fait de la Russie.

L'OTAN a accept d'avoir des missions nouvelles, qui ont beaucoup de vecteurs, de composants...la composants d'tablir la scurit, la stabilit de la rgion, c'est tout fait important et tout d'abord le premier, mais ensuite si'il y a des.... humanitaires, nous serons aussi prt aider, comme nous sommes en train de faire ici Macdoine et aussi en Albanie, mais avant aussi en Bosnie. Ca ne sera pas la premire fois que nous avons des engagements de caractre humanitaires, nous avons dj fait en Bosnie et des autres occasions. L'OTAN est prt dans la dimension, dans les limitations que nous avons aider, mais c'est vrai qu'il y a des organisations plus prt pour aider la question humanitaire - les nations unies etc.

Christopher: Mr. Secretary General, when you say that you support the return of the refugees to Kosovo, do you mean the return of the refugees immediately to their home towns in Kosovo or do you mean just back across the line into Kosovo territory? For instance, would you mean that immediately the people from Podujevo, north of Pristina, should be allowed to go back to Podujevo as an example?

Secretary General: They should be allowed to return to their homes but the international community has to make an effort, an important effort, to rebuild the houses and in the example you have given probably nobody will be able to return to that particular house because it has been destroyed so NATO and the international community have to put forward a programme so that these people can go to their homes and find a house or have to construct a house but the first and most important thing is they can return to their country.

Christopher: And to their home villages? I have the feeling that it will take time.

Secretary General: Sure, it will take time, no question about that.

Christopher: We are not talking about a situation where they would go into, say, an enclave in Kosovo and maybe some day in the future return?

Secretary General: No, no. Although, as you have said very intelligently, it may take time because the recuperation and the construction of the houses and all the towns will take time, this is the commitment that the international community has taken. That will not be the responsibility of NATO alone, it will also be the responsibility of some other institutions, of a scheme of the UN or World Bank etc. We will need probably immediately a donors' (?) conference to obtain the necessary forces so that a change in Kosovo from the humanitarian point of view and from the economic point of view can take place but this would not be a responsibility of NATO.

Christopher: But it would be all of Kosovo?

Secretary General: That is our wish, that everybody who wants to return could return. We cannot accept a change by force, of what de facto is a change of border by force.

Dominique Thierry, Radio France Internationale: Une clarification, M. le Secrtaire gnral, sur la force internationale qui assurerait la scurit pour le retour des refugis au Kosovo, n'y est il pas un changement cette force et pourra-t-elle intervenir avant la signature d'un accord politique et est-ce qu'un mandat de l'ONU sera ncessaire?

Secretary General: A ce moment je ne peux pas rpondre de manire prcise votre question. Je crois que a sera ncessaire de dployer les troupes ds que possible pour faire ...pour commencer le retour des refugis et la manire plus rapide que possible mais tre plus prcis ce moment a sera difficile....voir comment les choses se deroulent sur le terrain et des points de vue politiques aussi mais la disposition d'esprit c'est de le faire de la manire le plus rapide. Le mandat sera je ne sais pas si ca sera le mandat de l'ONU, vous savez il y a beaucoup de pays qui ........le mandat de l'ONU pour fermer les cadres de tous les processus de paix au Kosovo, c'est une question nouvelle, mais ....je crois que M. Annan a fait une dclaration trs positive.......................que les diffrents pays de l'OTAN, je crois que c'est une signal trs positive de la volont des nations unies de faire un effort pour aider avec nous de rsoudre le problme.

Carlos: Secretary General, if Mr. Milosevic does meet the five conditions, do you think he could be able to remain in power or do you think he soon leave anyway?

Secretary General: It is not for me to answer that question. There are other institutions and in particular the people of Serbia have to answer that question.

Pavel Bouda, Czech TV: Secretary General, we are now three weeks almost into the air campaign. Do you think that the prospects for a settlement of the Kosovo crisis are today better than three weeks ago when the operation Allied Force" started?

Secretary General: The question, if I understand it properly, was if we are today closer to solving profoundly the crisis in Kosovo than three weeks ago. The answer is yes, to solve profoundly the crisis in Kosovo, not superficially, profoundly, yes.