At The Instituto De Defesa Nacional Portugal 12 March 1999

"Lessons learned from Bosnia" Speech by Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be here at the National Defence Institute of Portugal. The institute is well--known for its advanced studies of defence issues, and this conference on "Portugal and Peace Operations in Bosnia" will, I am sure, add to that very deserved reputation. Over the last two days, you have heard of Portugal's contribution to peace operations in Bosnia. It is, indeed, a noteworthy contribution. Portugal is playing an essential role in keeping the peace in that troubled country. Your armed forces have done so since the first UN missions began in the former Yugoslavia. From then until now - from the time of Operation Sharp Guard to today's Stabilisation Force in Bosnia - your forces have carried out their mission effectively, diligently, professionally. I would also like to thank your country for making available the Political Advisor to COMSFOR since 1998, Mr Sampaio, who is doing an excellent job. The National Defence Institute has chosen a fitting time to look at the lessons of Bosnia. For the mission of peacekeeping and crisis management has become an important part of the adaptation of the Alliance to today's security needs. This new mission will be accorded a prominent place in the Alliance's revised Strategic Concept, which we will unveil at the April Summit in Washington. Hence, the lessons learned in Bosnia become ever more pertinent - both in the Alliance's current agenda and in the way we think and prepare in future for peacekeeping and crisis management. What are these lessons? Let me suggest seven that in my view are most important, and then outline how they have influenced NATO's own adaptation and evolution. The first lesson of Bosnia is perhaps the most difficult to learn - that, in today's Europe, even local conflicts can be an international problem. In fact, with the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts now pose the greatest challenge to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. They do not affect only the warring parties themselves. They also threaten stability far beyond their point of origin. They threaten to draw in other countries. They cause large, potentially destabilising, floods of people. And they result in violations of human rights from which we cannot, nor should not, avert our eyes. This does not mean that we have to get involved in each and every regional conflict. Nor does it suggest that defence of our own national territories is no longer relevant. But there will be cases where indifference towards a regional conflict can become more costly, over the long term, than engagement. Bosnia was such a case. In applying military tools in Bosnia, we learned the second lesson - the need for military flexibility. Our forces, our headquarters and our logistics have to be geared towards deploying rapidly into a crisis area, and then potentially staying in theatre for extended periods. Furthermore, security challenges are now less well defined than in the past. For example, a peacekeeping operation can quickly deteriorate into something more dangerous. Or we may be called upon to conduct humanitarian operations where the needs of civilians must be met, even if a peace agreement has not been fully achieved. We must therefore be ready and able to conduct a wide range of peace support operations. We are adapting our forces and procedures to deal with such challenges. Today's NATO forces are lighter, more flexible, more mobile, and more versatile than ever before. The Washington Summit will continue the adaptation of NATO's forces. By the Summit, we will have a new, more flexible command structure. We will unveil new measures to enhance communication and interoperability between Allies when deployed on missions. And we will continue to develop ways to facilitate early involvement by Partner countries in the planning stages of possible joint operations. This brings me directly to the third lesson: that crisis management requires the broadest possible coalition of contributing nations. The burden of crisis management cannot be handled by the Allies alone. We all have a stake in the stability of our continent. Bosnia demonstrated how effectively a broad coalition can bring results. The multinational IFOR Force was able to deploy quickly and effectively because Allies and Partner countries had already gained experience working together in the Partnership for Peace programme. And the contribution of non-NATO countries is both important and desirable. Nineteen have joined the Allies in Bosnia in helping to keep the peace. This includes countries from the Mediterranean, with whom NATO has initiated a Dialogue aimed at bringing the Southern rim closer to our Alliance. And the SFOR really is a joint operation. Today, during a single day, I can fly to several different places in the former Yugoslavia and meet with multinational troops working along the same harmonized procedures under the NATO/SFOR flag. The long-term value of such cooperation is undeniable. That is why, at the Washington Summit, we will further enhance the mechanisms of consultation and cooperation with Partners. We will give Partners a greater role in planning potential NATO-led operations. We will unveil measures to deepen practical cooperation on the ground. And we will offer Partners ways to come even closer to the Alliance. One of these Partners is Russia. Which brings us to the fourth lesson of Bosnia - that Russia must be engaged. Working together, NATO and Russia can bring enormous resources to bear on solving crises in Europe. And by developing common positions, we minimise the risk of divergence in the international response to a crisis. This may be difficult at times. But we must not shy away from the challenge. Russia's constructive engagement will contribute to a coherent, Europe-wide approach to peacekeeping and crisis management, and thereby to greater stability and security in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The fifth lesson of Bosnia is the need for effective cooperation between institutions. Only through this can we dispose of the full range of crisis management tools - political, economic and military. Only by working together can our institutions maximise their separate competences and effectiveness. This comprehensive approach is necessary not just to help end a conflict. It is also necessary to consolidate the peace that follows. Close cooperation between the military and civilian sides is essential for long-term stability, reconstruction and reconciliation. This coordination should start as soon as possible to ensure the maximum efficiency, in particular to move from one stage to the other. For example, we have to think about how to manage the transition between military action to bring peace and the police responsibility to maintain law and order. The military cannot be expected to perform both functions. Nor are they trained to do so. Again, NATO has taken this lesson to heart. In Bosnia, we are working closely with all major international and non-governmental organisations and bodies - the Office of the High Representative, the UN, the OSCE, the UN, the EU, the WEU. The keyword here is synergy, not hierarchy. And I can tell you from my many trips to Bosnia - such mutual reinforcement contributes to the common effort to build peace. A sixth lesson is that Europe must play a more visible role in maintaining peace and stability on its own continent. After all, the United States may not always wish to take the lead in European crisis management. And Europe itself wants to play a security role more in line with its economic and political stature. The Allies who are members of the European Union are committed by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties to pursue the development of a common foreign and security policy. At the same time, NATO is strengthening the European dimension of the Alliance. For instance, our new command structure will be able to support peacekeeping and crisis management operations undertaken by the Western European Union. Arrangements have been developed for the WEU to borrow NATO assets and capabilities for such operations. And we are testing the necessary NATO-WEU consultation procedures that would govern such practical support. This is how we are building the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. It will become in time another important instrument for crisis management in Europe. And as we take all these steps to improve our capacity to manage conflict, we must keep in mind a seventh lesson learned from the Bosnia experience. Resolute action can bring results. Before NATO took action in Bosnia, experts on all sides warned of the risks. They warned that air-strikes would not encourage the parties to negotiate - instead the air campaign directly led to Dayton. They warned that NATO military action would cause a definitive rupture in relations with Russia - but today, Russian forces are serving in SFOR and the NATO-Russia relationship has never been stronger. The experts warned that the Implementation Force would suffer unacceptable casualties - but not one soldier in the mission has been killed by hostile action. And they warned that the military force would be compelled to stay in Bosnia forever - but today's Stabilisation Force is about half the size of the original Implementation Force; and more reductions are planned as the security situation continues to improve. Today, Bosnia is on the path to reconstruction. There is a multi-ethnic government. Refugees are returning home. There is common currency, a common licence plate. The economy is slowly picking up. And there is hope. But it all depends on the will of the parties to Dayton and the people of Bosnia to build a brighter future. What we have learned is that resolute action on the part of the international community does not stop at peace enforcement alone. It also means determination to hold the parties to their word in implementing all aspects of the peace settlement. These are the lessons learned from Bosnia. There might be other ones. I don't claim to be exhaustive - this is simply my vision. Besides, this is not a theoretical exercise. These lessons need above all to be applied. Today, we face a conflict in Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis is very different to Bosnia. However some of the lessons learned in Bosnia apply. First the international community realizes that military force does have a role to place in backing up diplomacy and averting a humanitarian crisis. We have used our new mechanisms - the Euro-atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russia Joint Council - to consult with our Partners on the crisis and to help underpin a common approach. We have also used the Partnership for Peace programme and related measures to help stabilise Kosovo's neighbours, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1). We are working more closely than ever with the OSCE by supporting the Kosovo Verification Mission. We have received considerable cooperation from one of our Partners in basing a NATO-led extraction force, as well as the elements of a Kosovo implementation force in the event of a peace settlement. Europeans are taking a leading role in both operations. Furthermore, a number of Partners have expressed a readiness to contribute troops to a peace implementation force. All this underlines the real value of our new relationships based on cooperation. It is a lesson that we have well and truly learned. Ladies and gentlemen, The Washington Summit is only a month away. It will take full account of the experiences of a Europe - and an Alliance - in deep transformation. This means learning the lessons of the past decade, especially those from our crisis management and peacekeeping experiences. Yes, we have adapted our military forces, and developed new and more comprehensive diplomatic tools of partnership and cooperation. But all of this preparation fades away if we overlook the essential lesson: the best way to ensure peace is still to have the courage of our convictions - and the courage to act. Thank you for your attention.