At the invitation of the Aspen Institute, Berlin 1 Feb. 1999

NATO: A Strategy for the 21st Century Secretary General's Wallenberg lecture The Aspen Institute, Berlin Mr Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honoured to have been invited by the Aspen Institute in Berlin to deliver the Wallenberg Lecture today. The Aspen Institute epitomises the transatlantic community in all its many aspects - political, economic, cultural. So I can think of no better occasion than this to talk about the cornerstone of this transatlantic community: NATO. The Atlantic Alliance is in good shape. The Washington Summit in April will demonstrate this clearly. It will not just be a 50th birthday party - champagne and all. The Summit will map NATO's way ahead into the new Century. Nothing could better illustrate this than the welcoming of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as our three new Allies at the Washington Summit. Their accession, and the wish of so many other nations to join the Alliance, demonstrate the enduring attractiveness of NATO. NATO has been successful because at each moment in its history it developed the right political and military strategy to deal with the problems at hand. When the Cold War was at its coldest, we had the solid defence that prevented aggression or political intimidation. When there were new opportunities for political change, through dtente and arms control, we were able to seize them. The strategy of defence and dialogue, which Germany helped to shape, enabled us to remain responsive to change. So when the security environment was turned upside down after 1989, NATO was off to a quick start in helping to build the new European security structures on the rubble of the cold war. Today, all of Germany's neighbours are friends and Allies. There is no better vindication of Germany's traditionally strong political and military commitment to NATO. It is one of those assets that allow Germany to look to the next century with great confidence. But can we afford to enter the 21st century without having addressed the unresolved challenges ofthis 20th century? Should we speak of a united Europe when parts of this Europe remain at war? The sad truth is: massive human rights violations are being committed on our doorstep. The Kosovo crisis may be regional in origin - yet its negative implications are being felt across the entire Euro-Atlantic area. We have seen as much in Bosnia. At first, we didn't have a common strategy. The result was friction among NATO Allies, among EU Partners, and between Russia and the West. Once we had agreed a common strategy, we ended the war. Once engaged, we created the basis for long-term reconstruction. In the end, we realised that indifference proved more costly than engagement. If the situation today in Bosnia is better, it is not least because we did the right thing. Kosovo is different from Bosnia in many respects. Yet the challenge it poses to the International Community and to NATO is ultimately the same. To look the other way or to get engaged. The Contact Group has taken a stand. Last Friday it presented a plan which offers a way forward. The objectives are clear: negotiations on substantial autonomy for Kosovo. So are the timelines: negotiations starting by February 6, agreement a week or at most two weeks later. This is a good plan. We must make it work. That is why NATO is ready to back it with military force if required. We won't let the parties off the hook. We must not lose the momentum. The conflict in Kosovo provides us with an example of the kind of security challenges that we are likely to face after the end of the Cold War. It underlines a need for the right instruments and approaches for effective crisis management. The Alliance is responding to this need. We are currently engaged in developing our capabilities for crisis management, while preserving the Alliance's traditional core function of collective defence. A revised Strategic Concept will be a central feature of the Washington Summit in April. What are the key ingredients for successful crisis management? Let me mention the most important ones. Number one: a strong transatlantic link. Here in Berlin, and especially here at the Aspen Institute, one doesn't have to dwell at length on the importance of a strong transatlantic relationship. It remains the most successful example of a community of shared values, interests, and of pragmatic problem-solving. North America and Europe have all the ingredients for a successful security policy in the modern age: a strong commitment to democratic values, a penchant for economic innovation and competition, generosity towards less fortunate neighbours, and effective military tools to cope with new challenges. This is a formidable combination. We want to keep it that way. But like the world around it the transatlantic community itself is subject to change. Exactly a month ago, the "Euro" entered the scene. It is bound to change the way we Europeans think about Europe, including European security. But it will also raise American expectations in Europe's capacity and political will to contribute more to security and stability in Europe and beyond. I believe that a Europe more capable of coherent political and, if need be, military action is a precondition for the long-term health of the transatlantic bond. In my opinion, we have never before had a better basis for such a new relationship. The project of an enhanced European Security and Defence Identity was born here in Berlin in the Spring of 1996. And the recent British and French initiatives demonstrate a new willingness to move beyond the status quo. Germany, which currently holds the Presidency of the EU and WEU, has a special responsibility to nurture this new-found momentum. The NATO and EU Summits in Washington and Cologne offer a unique opportunity to demonstrate that a stronger European role in security and defence is more than just an idea whose time has come; but that it is indeed becoming a reality. NATO is ready for a stronger European role. Our new command structure allows for European-led operations. Just this week, we will begin to test these new arrangements, in close co-ordination with the WEU. But let me also add that building a stronger European personality in security and defence is not confined to NATO and the WEU alone. In the longer term, we will also have to think about developing NATO's relations with the European Union. A second major ingredient for successful crisis management is cooperation. Cooperation with other institutions, with Partner countries, with Russia. NATO's actions in Bosnia have shown clearly that successful crisis management lies in working closely with other organisations. Crisis management today and in the future means peace-building. It means reconstruction, reconciliation. It means long-term engagement by the international community. That is why the United Nations, the OSCE, the Contact Group, the European Union must all be part of the effort. This logic extends also to cooperation with Partner nations. If Europe is to develop into a common security space, every nation must make its contribution. That is why our cooperative mechanisms, such as the Partnership for Peace, continue to evolve, developing the operational tools for joint crisis management. If we want to manage the challenges of the 21st century, we need to have Russia on board - a stable, democratic, self-confident Russia, a Russia that can make a major contribution to European security. Russia's weight and importance must rest on its ability to contribute to common solutions. The recent decisions of the Contact Group are a good example in this regard. This is the responsibility of a UN Security Council member. And this is also the logic that guides the NATO-Russia relationship. Cooperation in crisis management, in short, is no longer just an option. It has become a major part of NATO's evolving strategy for the 21st century. To be effective in crisis situations diplomacy needs to be backed up by military instruments. For NATO, this means striking a new balance between the traditional mission of collective defence and its new mission of crisis management. Any new balance, however, must preserve our unique military competence. To ensure this, the Washington Summit will launch an initiative to improve the interoperability of Allied forces, their sustainability and logistics. We will also increase our efforts to prevent and protect ourselves against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The security of the Euro-Atlantic area remains subject to a wide variety of unpredictable risks. And these will not necessarily diminish as we enter the next century. In both Bosnia and now Kosovo, we have seen that developments outside the NATO area can affect Allied security. NATO does act beyond Allied territory - like in Bosnia. But in all fairness it should not be labeled a "global policeman". Each NATO action must be agreed by all 16 - soon all 19 - Allies. This strict requirement for consensus involving governments and parliaments is a tough standard to meet - and it will always serve as a useful guard against reckless action. Most importantly, whenever or wherever NATO acts, it will do so in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the UN Charter. All NATO Allies are members of the United Nations. We all share a vital interest in upholding an international system of norms and rules. At the same time Kosovo clearly revealed a dilemma: the urgent need to avert a humanitarian disaster and to halt the violence had to be judged against the international norm of state sovereignty and non-interference. Over time, international law may evolve to the point where such dilemmas no longer occur. But at this moment in time, when we have to make urgent decisions, we need a compass. To me, it is clear what that compass should be: a security policy that takes as its point of reference the needs of man and humanity. I am proud to head an Alliance that doesn't resort to the use of force lightly. But I am equally proud to head an alliance that has the moral strength to take the hard decisions to avert a humanitarian disaster and stop the bloodshed; an alliance that lends the diplomatic push for a political solution in Kosovo the necessary muscle. I know that these decisions did not come lightly to the German Government and Parliament either. And I want to acknowledge the solidarity shown by our German Allies with respect and gratitude. Ladies and Gentlemen, NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary in good shape because we have met the challenge of change. We have met this challenge because we did not duck the debate about NATO's future role and strategy for enhancing security and stability across Europe. This ability to tackle hard questions honestly and squarely - without taboos - will remain a trademark of our Alliance. In this time of rapid change, no nation and no organisation can claim a monopoly on wisdom. The Washington Summit and the revised Strategic Concept will thus not be end points, but guideposts. The search for the right strategy, for the right mix of political and military instruments, will continue. And it is exactly this capacity to seek out what is best for our countries' and our continent's security that will ensure that NATO will remain our key transatlantic security institution for the next 50 years.