NAC Meeting 8 Dec. 1998

Address by the honourable Lloyd Axworthy minister of foreign affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting As we prepare to enter our second 50 years as an Alliance, we face a different world with different security challenges than in 1949 or even 1989. The extent to which each of our lives is connected is unprecedented. At the same time, conflict has largely turned inward, with ruinous effects on societies. Ninety percent of casualties in these conflicts are civilian, mostly women and children. Too often they are direct targets, not incidental, and too often, they are victims of the alarming spread of small arms. The increase of crime, drugs and terrorism brings new dangers on our streets. The Tokyo subway and the World Trade Centre incidents are evidence of the terrorist dangers each of us can face inside our own borders. While the old interstate security threats persist, this changing environment puts the security of ordinary citizens more directly at risk. To be stronger and more relevant, the Alliance must adapt to these new realities. Bosnia/Kosovo NATO's roles in Bosnia and the Kosovo crisis are evidence of the Alliance's efforts. Politically, much remains to be done in Bosnia. Since the elections this fall, political positions have polarized and there are new signs of stagnation in the process of reconciliation. Our High Representative, Carlos Westendorp, deserves and needs our support. Our priority should be to ensure that Bosnians play their own central role in rebuilding their country, and that a culture of dependency does not take root. We must be active in the coming months to ensure we are not simply monitoring a stagnant process but facilitating durable political solutions. Madame Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal, is registering an impressive list of convictions. The arrest of General Krstic by SFOR [Stabilization Force] last week was particularly gratifying. We congratulate the Allies whose forces have helped make this possible. We have made significant progress to mitigate the devastating effect of landmines in the region, especially through new partnerships with each other. Through a joint initiative providing insurance to deminers, Canada and Norway have been able to nearly double the number of deminers working in Bosnia. The Slovenia Trust Fund, an innovative mechanism established by the United States, is effectively doubling contributions from partner countries like Canada to Bosnian demining efforts. Unfortunately, we have not seen the number of returns of refugees and displaced persons we had hoped for this summer. This will require continued SFOR involvement. Canada remains fully committed to SFOR and to contributing the forces necessary to help create a self-sustaining peace. At the same time, we look forward to an examination of options for reductions over the coming months. We would like to see a clear strategy for gradual SFOR disengagement and the handing over of responsibilities to local institutions. In Kosovo, NATO's actions helped to end the cycle of violence and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. They also demonstrated how humanitarian concerns are providing the impetus for collective action. Canada strongly supported the Alliance's efforts. Our aircraft stand ready to take part in operations if necessary. We are planning our contribution to the Kosovo Extraction Force. Initial efforts in support of peace in Kosovo have been successful. However, as the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] Kosovo Verification Mission deploys, the Alliance must remain vigilant. There is no room for complacency. We must continue to pressure both parties to take meaningful steps toward a peaceful, negotiated resolution. The absence of a political package is increasingly worrisome. The spring thaw could very well bring renewed full-scale hostilities. We must bring all the pressure we can on Belgrade. Those of us with influence on the Albanian factions should take all steps possible to close down the flow of donations and arms. Weapons of Mass Destruction NATO's actions in the Balkans show the Alliance's willingness and capacity to adapt to new security challenges. Perhaps the greatest challenge that we face is the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. The impact of these weapons is indisputable. Yet the non-proliferation regime we have constructed to counter this threat is in jeopardy. The dangers come from several sources: Iraq, Libya and Sudan remain risks in developing chemical and biological weapons. Illicit transfers of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon grade materials or know- how pose a very real threat to us all. The security, storage and disposition of nuclear materials from dismantled weapons systems is also a growing concern. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear arms - the most feared weapons of mass destruction - has re-emerged with frightening clarity. The nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan increase the risk of nuclear war and put new strains on the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, new rationales are emerging for retaining nuclear weapons, impeding disarmament efforts and fuelling the claims of proliferators. NATO must be part of the answer to these problems. This will require new initiatives, new approaches and new thinking. For that reason, we welcome the initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction proposed by the United States for the Summit. We support the U.S. proposal that Allies enhance their efforts to share information. This will require a policy framework and we, therefore, propose the Alliance reinvigorate the Joint Committee on Proliferation. In particular, we would like to see senior foreign affairs and defence policy officials join in a single, technically well-supported group to examine the nuclear, chemical and biological challenges we will face and recommend actions we can undertake together in response. This would ensure that we proceed on the basis of a common understanding of the seriousness of the security threats we face. It would also allow us to assess where the dangers originate. We can also work together to deny chemical and biological weapons and facilities to prospective opponents. Training and equipping our forces to operate in chemical and biological environments will help ensure NATO's ability to manage crises and deter the use of these weapons by potential adversaries. Finally, we need to discuss thoroughly the changing realities we face as an Alliance and the most sensible and effective responses to them. We no longer face the overwhelming conventional threat once posed by the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and its 350 000 soldiers in East Germany. This has implications for Alliance strategies. Now more than ever, any discussion of using Alliance nuclear capabilities - even in retaliation - raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns. In Canada's view, this discussion has no foregone conclusions. However, undertaking a comprehensive dialogue now would demonstrate to our publics and to others that we take seriously the need to update the Alliance and its responses to the new dynamics of a changed world. Strategic Concept Canada would like to see the Alliance adopt a strategic vision that addresses all of these nuclear, biological and chemical weapons concerns constructively. We need to address the evident tension between what NATO Allies say about proliferation and what we do about disarmament. Over seventy percent of Canadians support NATO and Canada's membership in the Alliance but 93 percent of Canadians expect Canada and its Allies to take the lead in working to eliminate nuclear weapons. Later this week, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the Canadian House of Commons will table recommendations on "The Nuclear Challenge." The Government of Canada will consider its recommendations carefully. There are many audiences both inside and outside the Alliance that will weigh every word of the revised Strategic Concept. In drafting the revised Concept, therefore, we need to "see ourselves as others see us" and ensure that we do not send messages that we do not intend. We should be circumspect about the political value we place on NATO nuclear forces, lest we furnish arguments proliferators can use to try to justify their own nuclear programs. For this reason, I want to share some thoughts about the messages the revised Strategic Concept should express. First, it should be clear that the Alliance exists to provide security for its members and for the Euro-Atlantic region - not against anyone, especially not against Russia. To that end, it should reaffirm commitments to collective defence of its members and to promoting security, preventing and managing conflict and ensuring stability in the Euro-Atlantic area - through its own resources and in partnership with other European states. In doing so, we should make clear that we are an Alliance of values, committed to act in promotion of those values, taking into account international law, humanitarian imperatives and political realities. Second, it should define NATO's relations with other institutions that comprise the international security framework. NATO can make a decisive difference in difficult situations. We need to recognize, as the Treaty already does, the central role and responsibility of the United Nations. Third, it should underline the very significant progress made in disarmament since 1991 and make a commitment to doing more. Special attention should be paid to recording reductions made in strategic weapons and the elimination of whole classes of weapons from Europe. At the same time, we must affirm our intention to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime, especially to respond to the specific threats I have referred to, and to develop further arms control and disarmament measures. Fourth, it should underline that as a consequence of a changed security environment, nuclear weapons are far less important to Alliance strategy than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s. Enlargement Along with the review of the Strategic Concept, the issue of enlargement will be a preoccupation in the coming months. We wish to see the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland take their places at the table in the Council as soon as possible - before the Washington Summit. We, therefore, urge the responsible authorities among the invitees and within NATO to take the necessary measures to achieve this goal. For Canada, the further enlargement of the Alliance represents the fulfilment of a political pledge made to the countries of central and eastern Europe when the Alliance was founded. The enlargement process has a political importance and cannot be based solely on the ability of prospective members to contribute to Alliance military resources. It seems inevitable that there will be no consensus on inviting new members at the Washington Summit. We support many of the ideas offered as a "Madrid Plus" package for aspiring countries. Beyond this, we should agree at the Summit on a political road map and decision-making timetable for further enlargement. This will be a constant item on our agenda in the years ahead. I believe we will have to decide on another round of enlargement as early as 2001. Conclusion Canada wants the Alliance to enter its second 50 years stronger and more relevant than ever. In preparing for the Washington Summit, we should bear in mind that it is our values and our success as democracies that hold us together as allies. They will also make it possible for us to surmount the challenges of the future. The Washington Summit will mark an important and very public milestone for the Alliance in this process. I hope our meetings this week will contribute to the Summit's success.