Speech
by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana
Ladies and Gentlemen,
First of all, I would like to thank the Antwerp Business School for
the kind invitation to address its Annual Conference.
It is a pleasure for me to have the opportunity to meet with a
different audience from the audiences I generally address which are
dealing with security-related issues. However, the business world you
belong to is not so far away from the security one. On the contrary,
economic prosperity and security are inextricably linked.
For example, the recovery of Western Europe after the Second World
War, and the subsequent process of European integration, was made
possible among other reasons because of the underlying security
provided by the Atlantic Alliance. Our economies could flourish
because there was a security umbrella to protect them from
international instability. During that period, while economics and
security were linked, the balance tilted very much in favour of
military issues.
The Cold War is now thankfully over, and with it this preponderance
of military issues. In our new age of interdependence and growing
integration, we have a unique opportunity to apply a broader approach
to security, an approach in which we also can re-cast the
relationship between economics and military matters.
The key to this new, broader approach is captured in the term
architecture. It rests on the premise that only different
institutions working together will make the full range of instruments
available to deal with new security challenges: political, economic,
and military instruments.
To have this broader spectrum of instruments available is indeed a
precondition for successful crisis management. Let me illustrate my
point:
When the war erupted in Bosnia at the beginning of this decade, some
held out hope that the economic leverage of the European Union could
induce the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to refrain from violence.
After all, the European Union had substantial trade and economic
links with the former Yugoslavia, and it provided a considerable
amount of aid. If man were primarily an economic animal, then the
war in the former Yugoslavia should not have happened: it was in
no-one's economic self-interest.
Yet it did happen. And it was only the joint application of economic
and military pressure that got the parties back to their senses. So
the conclusion can only be that economic and military security remain
two complementary elements in a broader definition of post-Cold War
security. Our challenge is to build a durable institutional
framework in which this broader definition of security is fully
reflected: a true security architecture.
We have come a long way in creating such an architecture. In Bosnia
today we can see how different institutions can work together towards
shared strategic objectives: stability and prosperity for the
Balkans. Without the UN, the parties would not know clearly that the
International Community supports the peace efforts; without NATO and
its Partners, there would be no peace; without the OSCE, there would
be no free elections; and without the EU there would be no economic
reconstruction. Bosnia is thus a real-life example of an emerging
European security architecture.
I think it is fair to say that the success of the Bosnian operation
owes a lot to NATO. But NATO's role goes beyond Bosnia. NATO can
help create a new security architecture in more ways than acting as a
fire brigade in a crisis. Indeed, I would argue that NATO's main
purpose is to create the conditions of long-term European peace and
stability.
Over the past years, NATO has changed from a largely passive,
defence-oriented Alliance into an active instrument of political
change in Europe. The Alliance has developed close relationships
with virtually every country in the Euro-Atlantic area, with not
less than 44 countries participating, countries as diverse as Austria
and Uzbekistan, involved in more than 1,000 different activities such
as exercises, seminars ... These initiatives span the Euro-Atlantic
space from Vancouver to Vladivostok - an achievement unprecedented in
European history.
As in Bosnia, all institutions are working in their respective fields
to meet together the new security challenges of our world. For
instance, the European Union is also playing a leading role. High on
its agenda are the introduction of the Euro, its opening towards
eastern Europe, the development of a common foreign and security
policy in Europe, its relations with Russia. All these items show
the deep convergence of strategic interests between the European
Union and NATO as far as the new security order in Europe is
concerned.
Let me now turn to how the Alliance has undergone its own
transformation, while helping to transform European security at
large. Indeed, I tend to describe NATO today as a catalyst - a
catalyst of wide-ranging political and military change across the
entire Euro-Atlantic area.
Rather than explaining each and every aspect of NATO's new agenda,
let me describe four areas in which NATO is already acting as a
catalyst. Together, they show how the new NATO is contributing to a
new security architecture, based on a broad concept of security.
The first area: rejuvenating the transatlantic link.
NATO, today as yesterday, is based on the recognition that Europe's
security and stability are indivisible from North America's security
and stability. In an age of interdependence, Europe and America need
to tackle challenges together. To act in isolation would seriously
overtax each other's capabilities.
Bosnia taught us an important lesson in this regard. As long as the
United States and the European Allies were unable to agree on a
common course of action, progress was impossible. The moment they
agreed, a combined diplomatic and military course of action was
forged to bring hostilities to an end. It proved that the
transatlantic community can create an irresistible momentum as long
as it stands together. We have seen that a united Alliance can
noticeably change the security dynamics across the Euro-Atlantic area
- and for the better.
But to demonstrate unity in Bosnia it is not sufficient. The end of
the Soviet threat and the dynamics of European integration are going
to affect the transatlantic relationship in ways far deeper than many
of us may be ready to admit. If the transatlantic relationship is to
remain healthy in the longer term, a new bargain must include a
Europe willing and able to shoulder more responsibility.
NATO has indeed begun to implement this new bargain. It is within
NATO where the real, operational future of a European Security and
Defence Identity is now taking shape. With a new command structure,
and stronger relations between NATO and the WEU, the stage is set for
Europe to play a security role more in line with its economic
strength. Only with a strong, integrated and outward looking Europe
will the US be able to play a more balanced role in the world. Only
a united Europe, with clear policies, will be able to provide the
global partner the US needs in the international arena.
These decisions and initiatives constitute elements of the new
bargain between North America and Europe. Together, they constitute
the new parameters of burden-sharing for the next century. Together,
they demonstrate that this Alliance remains responsive to the
security needs on both sides of the Atlantic.
Second area: deepening our cooperation and managing NATO's
enlargement.
As Bosnia demonstrates most clearly, the end of the Cold War has our
security focus from the defence against a massive threat to the
prevention and management of regional conflicts. Crisis management,
however, requires multinational cooperation that goes beyond NATO's
current Allies. Accordingly, the Alliance has created mechanisms of
cooperation which allow all interested states within the
Euro-Atlantic area to engage in the preparation of joint peace
support operations.
These initiatives I've mentioned earlier allow Partner countries to
familiarise themselves ever more intensively with NATO's structures.
Within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the body we have
created for this purpose, they can consult even more extensively with
the Allies. Never before has NATO's pan-European vocation been more
visible. Through the Alliance's cooperative approach, almost all
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area are now bound together in a
common commitment to a more peaceful, stable future.
To fully overcome Europe's divisions, however, also requires our
major institutions to admit new members. An open Europe cannot be
built on closed institutions. That is why NATO, just like the
European Union, has to face the challenge of enlargement. By
enlarging NATO, we are enlarging the zone of security enjoyed by only
half of Europe in the past fifty years. To admit new countries will
certainly inspire confidence in their further development, including
their economic development.
Last July, at our Madrid Summit, we invited the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. They should join as full
members in April next year, at NATO's 50th anniversary. One major
focus in the months ahead is, of course, the ratification of the
accession of the three invitees by national Allied Parliaments.
Canada and Denmark have already set the pace. Getting NATO
enlargement right is crucial for the Alliance as well as for European
security at large. What is at stake is not only the credibility of
NATO as a cohesive Alliance. The successful accession of the first
three invitees will also be an incentive for future aspirants to
continue on the course of reform.
There should be no doubt as to the commitment of the three invitees.
They fully understand the obligations and responsibilities that will
be theirs upon entering the Alliance. And they have shown that they
are fully prepared to meet these requirements. That is why I am
confident that our parliaments will ratify the accession. This will
be an overwhelming vote of confidence in the new members - and in our
Alliance as a whole.
NATO's enlargement is a process, not a one-time event. The first new
members will not be the last. This message of the open door has been
understood. Those countries which have not been invited have already
made it clear that they will continue to press their case and to do
all that is necessary to join. The powerful incentives for further
reform, which the prospect of NATO membership has created, will
therefore remain. Indeed, without the commitment of NATO - and the
European Union - to open up, we would not have seen the many
bilateral treaties that have been signed across Central and Eastern
Europe.
Let me now turn to the third area: the Alliance's new relationship
with Russia.
It has long been my view that NATO and Russia are destined to
cooperate. We both share an interest in building a peaceful and
democratic Europe; and we both share an interest in responding more
effectively to new security challenges such as instability, nuclear
proliferation or civil emergencies.
With the new NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in Paris in May 1997,
and with the Permanent Joint NATO-Russia Council we now have a solid
basis for our future relationship.
The Permanent Joint Council is barely eight months old, yet it is
already working at a high pace. We have monthly meetings of
Ambassadors, we had several meetings of Foreign and Defence
Ministers, and we have agreed an ambitious work programme. The PJC
works because both NATO and Russia want it to work and know that they
have a mutual interest in cooperating.
This new political relationship between NATO and Russia has finally
cleared the way for a closer military relationship. This means that
the superb cooperation we have achieved in IFOR and SFOR must now be
extended across the full spectrum of security-related issues.
We are setting up military liaison missions between NATO and Russia,
starting at the highest levels first - NATO Headquarters, SHAPE,
SACLANT, our military headquarters, and equivalent locations in
Russia. We already have meetings of the NATO Military Committee and
the new Russian military representative at NATO. We are developing
cooperation between NATO and Russia on defence-related environmental
issues. We have opened the new NATO Science for Peace Programme to
some 1,500 Russian scientists. And we have already had
exploratory meetings on armaments-related cooperation.
These are just a few examples of the concrete work we hope to
undertake with Russia in the future, so that Russia be part of the
new security architecture we are building in Europe.
The fourth area: building peace in Bosnia.
I have already touched upon Bosnia many times in this speech. How
could it be otherwise ? We have to create in Bosnia the conditions
for a self-sustaining peace that does not require a continued
international military presence. That point will be reached when all
parties realise that their stakes in peace are higher than their
possible gains in war. It is a real challenge for us.
1998 is a decisive year for the political future of Bosnia. This is
the year when the politics of war must finally be replaced by the
politics of peace. This is also the year in which the return of
refugees and displaced persons should take place on a larger scale.
We are moving in the right direction in building peace in Bosnia.
Successful action against war criminals has been undertaken; a new
government has taken office in Republika Srpska, with its capital far
from the Pale hardliners; refugees continue to return from overseas;
a common currency is in circulation; common licence plates have come
into effect; and fresh concepts are in the air - Sarajevo has to
become an Open City; a weapons amnesty programme to curb the number
of illegal weapons in private hands - to name but two.
These are encouraging signs. They demonstrate that our perseverance
is paying off. There is already agreement in NATO and among other
troop-contributing nations and international organisations that a
follow-on force is needed in Bosnia. The precise options of such a
force are now under discussion and I hope that by tomorrow we will
take a final decision. But whatever the exact option we settle on,
we will stay the course.
Staying the course, maintaining our unique cohesion, will not only
benefit Bosnia. It will also enable us to provide our wider
cooperative policies and initiatives with the direction and momentum
they need to move ahead. This is true for the NATO-Russia
relationship, for our cooperation with our Partners. It is no less
true for those initiatives which, for lack of time, I could not touch
upon this evening: our distinct relationship with Ukraine and our
dialogue with countries from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.
All these initiatives are held together by a NATO with a strong sense
of unity and purpose - by a NATO which has moved from keeping the
peace to actually shaping it.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
To state that security and economics are interrelated is not new.
Indeed, when NATO was formed in 1949, the Alliance was seen very much
as an Atlantic community designed to promote what the Treaty of
Washington describes as the wellbeing of its peoples. The Treaty
specifically commits allied governments to eliminate conflict in
their international economic policies and to encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them.
Of course, these words were written at the time when the Cold War was
still in its early days. Subsequently, virtually all of NATO's
attention and efforts had to be focussed on collective defence and
deterrence, while economic cooperation was taken on by the European
Community and others.
Today, we are able to return to that larger, and more all-embracing
concept of security that inspired NATO's Founding Fathers. Together
with the EU, the OSCE and other key players, NATO can make a
contribution to create a peaceful and stable future for the
continent. NATO is not the only contributor. As you know, the
European Union plays a leading role too, and the future single
currency, the Euro, should be a key factor in the building of the
Europe of the 21st century.
All of us are striving to succeed in getting our continent rid of all
the painful moments it has gone through in the past century. As you
have seen, NATO is not the last one to play its part. NATO has
evolved to lead the change. To be a new NATO for a new Europe.
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