Speech
by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana
I am delighted to have the honour to be here with you today. This
distinguished Association [Folk och Forsvar] is known for bringing
together prominent representatives from Swedish academic life, the
Swedish Armed Forces, government and many other walks of life. It is
a privilege to stand before a living "Who's Who" of Sweden.
This is my second visit to your country as Secretary General of NATO.
I am glad to be back here only a few months after Prime Minister
Persson visited NATO Headquarters - the first-ever such visit by a
Swedish Prime Minister.
While the timing of his visit was symbolic in itself - it came soon
after the historic NATO Summit in Madrid - our meeting underscored
the importance of NATO's relations with Sweden.
If I were asked to identify the most important feature of the new
NATO since the end of the Cold War, I would point to the permanent
presence and involvement of our Partners - including Sweden - at so
many different levels and in so many different activities of the
Alliance. The NATO of today would not be the same without your
active participation.
The close relationship between NATO and non-NATO nations is only the
most visible sign of an Alliance that has changed perhaps more than
any other international organisation. Over the course of the 1990s we
have changed our policies, our strategies, our structures. Some of
these changes were reactive, to be sure, imposed on us by a new
strategic environment. But while the Alliance underwent its own
transformation, it also helped transform European security at large.
NATO has not just reacted to history - we have shaped it. Today, we
can confidently say that the contours of a new Euro-Atlantic security
architecture are becoming visible.
It is this evolving security architecture, based on cooperation not
confrontation, that I would like to talk to you about today. In
doing so, I shall focus on the progress NATO has made in implementing
last year's key decisions. I shall touch on the role Sweden has, and
continues to play, in our common efforts to create a better tomorrow
and make Europe a safer place. And, I shall try to indicate where we
are going in the future.
First, NATO's political agenda. If NATO today is an active player in
the creation of a new security architecture, it is above all because
of one key judgement the Alliance made at the start of the 1990s:
that from now on cooperation would be the key strategic instrument
for shaping our security environment.
NATO's evolution throughout this decade has reflected this guiding
principle - with last year's Madrid Summit marking the culmination of
our efforts so far. NATO put forward an ambitious action plan to
enhance further security and stability in Europe. The key elements
of this action plan include the enlargement process, a new
partnership with Russia, a distinctive relationship with Ukraine, and
enhanced practical cooperation and political consultations with
Partner countries. They complement the roles of other institutions
such as the OSCE and the EU.
Where do we stand on these major initiatives? As regards
enlargement, just before Christmas NATO Foreign Ministers signed the
individual Accession Protocols for the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland. This paved the way for the next important step:
ratification of the Accession Protocols in the 16 NATO member states.
Once ratification is complete, we hope to welcome the three invitees
as full members of the Alliance at the time of NATO's fiftieth
anniversary in 1999.
Enlargement of NATO - like that of the EU - is part and parcel of a
new security architecture, where the new democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe are free to determine their foreign policy and
security structures for themselves. The fact that many of these
states see their future as intrinsically linked with NATO and the EU
should surprise no one. These two institutions have created a
historically unique momentum of integration.
NATO enlargement is not a one-time event, but a process. We are not
limiting enlargement to any specific geographic area. NATO will
remain open to all European democracies willing and able to assume
the obligations and responsibilities of Alliance membership. It is a
serious and solemn undertaking, bringing with it both rights and
obligations, none greater than the commitment to collective defence
that has made NATO so uniquely successful as a military Alliance.
Much intellectual effort was devoted last year to the effect of
enlargement on relations between Russia and the Alliance. It is no
exaggeration to state that this time last year the debate about
enlargement in many ways was really a debate about Russia. Indeed,
the main argument used by critics of enlargement was that it would
alienate and destabilise Russia, that it would encourage revisionist
and antidemocratic forces.
I maintained throughout that the chance to anchor a new, democratic
Russia firmly in an undivided Europe is a historic opportunity that
we must seize. What we in NATO rejected was the notion that
foregoing enlargement was the price for Russia to remain on its
reformist course.
By contrast, we believed that the Russian desire to cooperate with us
was a genuine one, just as genuine as our desire to cooperate with
Russia. History has shown how right we were. NATO's enlargement and
a solid relationship with Russia are not mutually exclusive.
The Founding Act signed last May between NATO and Russia shows how in
this new Europe, NATO and Russia are destined to cooperate. Through
the Permanent Joint Council we now have the mechanisms to do so.
Over the last months, the Permanent Joint Council has met regularly
at Ministerial as well as Ambassadorial level and quickly established
a new spirit of cooperation and confidence. Our Defence and Foreign
Ministers have met with their Russian counterparts on several
occasions and Ambassadors meet monthly. There is also a huge amount
of contact at the military level. The Russian Chief of Defence Staff
has visited both SHAPE and NATO. And we have a three-star Russian
Military Representative based permanently in Brussels. This provides
a permanent point of contact to allow the military to get to know
each other in practical day-to-day dealings.
Together with Russia, we already implemented a successful work
programme in 1997 and at last December's PJC meeting of Foreign
Ministers we endorsed a solid agenda of cooperation and consultation
for 1998.
The 1998 work programme will cover many areas, including
peacekeeping, arms control, efforts against proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, exchanges on nuclear weapons safety and
security, defence conversion, scientific cooperation, defence-related
environmental issues, and civil emergency planning and disaster
relief. Moreover, we welcome Russia's continued commitment to
contributing to SFOR operations in Bosnia.
While we are opening a new chapter in NATO-Russia relations, we are
not giving Russia a direct say in Alliance decision-making. Our
relationship with Russia will in no way overshadow our relationship
with our other Partners. It will - as specified in the Founding Act
- remain a transparent relationship. We will continue to keep our
Partners informed about PJC activities.
While NATO has embarked on its enlargement and on a new partnership
with Russia, the Alliance is, at the same time, expanding its broad
cooperative agenda with its other Partners.
Most importantly, we are enhancing the successful Partnership for
Peace Programme, first established in 1994. Through PfP, over forty
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area have improved their capacity to
undertake jointly peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian
operations.
The last few months have seen a qualitative improvement of PfP, as
Partners have become gradually more involved in the planning and
execution of PfP activities. Partner Country officers will be
working together with their Allied counterparts at various levels of
NATO's military command structure. We have also started work with
Partners on the development of a political-military framework for
NATO-led PfP operations. In short, NATO and its Partners will
together shape not only the conduct of PfP exercises but also of
future peacekeeping operations.
Few countries have been so active as Sweden in realizing the
potential of PfP. In 1997 alone, Sweden participated in 15 NATO/PfP
exercises, and hosted three of them on your territory. You took the
initiative to establish a PfP Regional Training Centre, open to all
Partners, organizing courses on PfP activities.
Sweden also plays a leading role in the Civil Emergency Planning
programme of cooperation through courses arranged by the Swedish
Rescue Services Agency. You have hosted numerous seminars on the
civil aspects of crisis management and played an instrumental role in
developing a follow-on workshop on CEP issues in Kyiv last September.
And looking ahead, I understand that your country will host a
regional course on CEP and civil-military cooperation in the autumn.
This is an impressive list of achievements.
In addition to deepening our military cooperation, we are also
enhancing political consultations between NATO and Partner countries
through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Thanks to the active
involvement of Sweden and other Partners, the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council has become fully operational in a relatively
short period of time. We have begun meaningful consultations on a
wide range of political and security-related issues, including
regional cooperation.
The opportunities for Partners to work closely with NATO have never
been greater. The menu offered by the EAPC and the enhanced PFP is
very broad. Partners are becoming involved in the whole range of
NATO activities, except of course the commitment to collective
defence which remains the exclusive privilege of Alliance members.
I know that regional cooperation is a delicate subject for the EAPC,
particularly as it refers to Baltic security and stability. But
equally it is one of the principal areas of EAPC activity and
interest. So, let me talk a little on how the Alliance sees regional
cooperation developing within the EAPC format. First of all, let me
make it quite clear that discussions on regional issues will not lead
to the creation of "regional clubs" within the EAPC, nor will they
intend to institutionalize geographical splits between, say,
countries in North-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
Rather, regional cooperation within the EAPC will be open for all to
participate. They will be conducted on an ad-hoc basis, to support
the broader framework of creating security and stability in all of
Europe. Regional cooperation within the EAPC will never become
detached from this overall framework. It complements other
stability, and security-enhancing initiatives in your region - such
as the U.S. - Baltic Cooperation Charter, signed only a few days ago
in Washington.
Looking ahead, we will use the EAPC Action Plan endorsed by EAPC
Foreign Ministers last December to develop pragmatic and realistic
approaches for the benefit of all members. This Action Plan defines
a number of subject areas where Partners and the Alliance will work
together. Let me here congratulate Sweden for your proposal to
co-host with the US a seminar on defence-related environmental
issues.
Never before has NATO's pan-European vocation been more visible.
Through the Alliance's cooperative and constructive approach, almost
all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area are now bound together in a
common Commitment to a more peaceful, stable future.
This commitment is not just rhetorical. Nowhere is it more evident
than in Bosnia, where soldiers of more than 30 countries are united
in a true coalition for peace. Together, Allies and Partners have
brought peace and hope to that shattered country. Equally
significant, the international presence in Bosnia has shown how
different international institutions, agencies and non-governmental
organisations can and do work together to a common goal. Just like
the team effort of the different military contingents within SFOR, we
are witnessing a genuine team effort of organisations in Bosnia.
With SFOR forces securing the peace on the ground, the OSCE was able
to organize the first free municipal elections in Bosnia; in the
Bosnian Federation - again with SFOR's assistance - joint police
forces are being formed under the auspices of the UN International
Police Task Force. NATO, the OSCE, the UN and countless
non-governmental organizations are true partners in peace support.
The practical experience we have gained in working together bodes
well for the future.
The success of IFOR and SFOR is the success of PFP. Partners have
been involved from the start. The benefits of common operating
procedures and
familiarity enabled us to assemble and deploy a multinational
coalition in a very short period of time. Sweden has been an
important contributor and deserves special credit for having sent an
infantry battalion to the sensitive area of Doboj, in northern
Bosnia. During my visit to the NORDPOL brigade last year, I was
deeply impressed by the Swedish contingent's dedication and
professionalism. You can be proud of your armed forces.
NATO remains committed to the full and unconditional implementation
of the Peace Agreement and to the establishment of Bosnia as a
single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. Compared to when we first
deployed two years ago, much progress has been achieved. Most
importantly, SFOR troops have put an end to Europe's bloodiest
conflict since the end of World War II. We have rebuilt large parts
of Bosnia's infrastructure and are helping with the resettlement of
refugees.
Let me give you one very personal example of how far we have come: In
the summer of 1995, I landed at Sarajevo airport in crossfire. I
spent a night at the Holiday Inn without water, without electricity,
without glass in the windows. Just getting to Sarajevo was a feat in
itself. The following year, 1996, it was difficult to land now at
Sarajevo Airport, but at least we weren't shot at. By then, IFOR had
stopped the fighting and we were able to hold a Press Conference at
the Holiday Inn. I visit Sarajevo at least once a month now. Taking
a plane there and back in a day is routine. And when I arrive, at 8
in the morning, instead of the signs of war there are rows of taxis.
We are witnessing, slow, but steady progress on many fronts. But we
are aware that, despite recent progress, peace, and the institutions
of civil society to uphold it, remain fragile.
The Peace Agreement must continue to be implemented in an environment
of general security. NATO Foreign Ministers last December asked the
NATO Military Authorities to develop options for a NATO-led military
presence in Bosnia following the end of SFOR's mandate. Until then,
SFOR will keep its forces in Bosnia at present levels. Regardless of
what form our military presence will take beyond June, let me assure
you that we will continue to consult with all members of the
international coalition in Bosnia. On behalf of NATO, I welcome
Sweden's preparedness to contribute to such a military force. This
continues your fine track record of participating in international
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. Sweden has established a
solid reputation as a nation deeply concerned about social justice
and human rights - world wide. The legacies of Raoul Wallenberg, Dag
Hammarskjold, and Olof Palme come to mind.
Sweden has made great strides in recent years to promote cooperative
ties in the Baltic region. Together with your neighbours, you are
re-opening channels of communication and trade that were artificially
cut off for more than four decades.
Forty percent of your trade today is linked to the Baltic region.
You are one of the largest foreign investors in the Baltic states and
are hence indirectly contributing to the well-being of these new
market economies, now one of the most dynamic regions in all of
Europe.
Cooperation has also means enhancing security between your
neighbours, bilaterally and multilaterally. Here, too, Sweden has
provided invaluable support for Baltic security cooperation
programmes such as the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT), the
joint Baltic Navy Squadron (BALTRON), and the Baltic Air Surveillance
Network ( BALTNET). By enhancing security and cooperation in the
Baltic region, your country contributes to security in all of Europe.
In conclusion, let me offer some thoughts on the future. I believe
that the changes in the Baltic region are indicative of the wider
changes that are occurring in Europe and beyond. They show that we
are living in a world of growing interdependence, and integration.
Our major institutions must adapt internally and externally to the
new environment to remain relevant. They must not remain closed.
Sweden, for instance, joined the EU only a few years ago. And little
over a month ago, the EU Council charted the way ahead for the next
steps towards EU enlargement, a process of particular relevance for
the Baltic States.
All of the above developments have a direct impact on how we approach
security. Here, interdependence and integration apply as well.
Simply put: managing Euro-Atlantic security remains a team effort.
It is a challenge that far exceeds the capabilities of individual
nations.
Cooperation between NATO and non-NATO nations will remain a permanent
feature of the new security architecture. Just as a workable
European security architecture without NATO is inconceivable, so is a
NATO without Partners. With the various interlocking
security-enhancing mechanisms I have described, no country or region
in Europe should feel that it is excluded.
In the future, even more Alliance activities will rely not only on
the operational support of NATO members but also on the support of
those, such as Sweden, who are not part of the Alliance. Sweden and
NATO have already done a superb job in working together. Let us
continue on this path.
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