Secretary General's remarks
"Partnership for Peace: A Political View"
Mesdames, messieurs,
Je suis trs heureux de pouvoir m'adresser aujourd'hui vous qui
assistez cet important symposium. Bien qu'il n'en soit qu' sa
deuxime dition avec les Partenaires, cet vnement est dj
considr par beaucoup comme l'une des activits majeures du PPP.
Vous avez examin hier les moyens de rendre le Partenariat pour la
Paix plus oprationnel.
Aujourd'hui, je voudrais avant tout largir la perspective du
Partenariat pour la Paix en replaant son renforcement dans le
contexte politique plus large de la transformation de l'OTAN.
J'espre ainsi vous faire mesurer toute l'importance d'une
participation ce Partenariat pour la paix renforc.
On a dit que rformer l'OTAN tait une gageure tant l'organisation
voluait rapidement. Je crois que beaucoup d'entre nous ici partagent
ce sentiment. En effet, depuis le dbut de cette dcennie, l'OTAN
volue un rythme difficile suivre. Nous avons chang nos
politiques, nos stratgies, nos structures. Parler d'une nouvelle
OTAN aujourd'hui n'est pas pure rhtorique : d'une Alliance
orientation dfensive, essentiellement passive, l'OTAN est devenue un
instrument actif au service du changement politique en Europe.
Aujourd'hui, l'Alliance atlantique est bien des gards un agent du
changement politique. L'OTAN a un rle jouer pour favoriser la
stabilisation de l'Europe centrale et orientale, associer davantage
la Russie et l'Ukraine aux grandes volutions europennes et forger
de nouveaux liens avec ses voisins du sud de la Mditerrane. En
outre, en crant une Identit europenne de scurit et de dfense en
son sein, l'Alliance apporte une contribution importante
l'dification d'une Europe plus unie et, par consquent, d'une
relation transatlantique plus mre.
La possibilit de voir l'OTAN remplir le rle de catalyseur
politique dcoulait d'une apprciation essentielle porte par
l'Alliance au dbut des annes quatre-vingt-dix : dornavant la
coopration serait l'instrument stratgique cl pour faonner notre
environnement de scurit. Au lieu d'investir nos ressources
politiques et militaires dans la dfense contre une agression
militaire de grande ampleur, nous pourrions dsormais axer nos
efforts sur la cration des conditions permettant l'volution
pacifique long terme de notre continent.
En rsum, au lieu d'empcher la concrtisation du "pire scnario
possible", nous avions maintenant l'occasion de nous prparer au
"meilleur scnario possible" : une nouvelle architecture de scurit
euro-atlantique, dans laquelle tous les Etats auraient leur place
lgitime, dans laquelle les risques de conflit seraient rduits un
minimum, et dans laquelle nous disposerions d'instruments, si jamais
des conflits venaient quand mme clater.
Il fallait donc que l'Alliance s'efforce activement d'aider ses
anciens adversaires devenir des dmocraties stables et sres,
possdant des structures militaires places fermement sous contrle
dmocratique. Mais plus encore, elle devait s'adapter et crer des
mcanismes nouveaux pour attirer tous les pays intresss de la
rgion euro-atlantique dans un cadre gnral de coopration militaire
- afin d'affronter les dfis nouveaux de la gestion des crises et du
maintien de la paix.
L'Alliance a donc mis en place une structure et un programme
d'ouverture, en crant tout d'abord le COCONA en 1991, puis le
Partenariat pour la Paix en 1994, et le Conseil du Partenariat
Euro-Atlantique l'anne dernire. C'est galement l'anne dernire
que l'OTAN a invit trois nouveaux pays adhrer l'Alliance,
qu'elle a conclu l'Acte fondateur OTAN-Russie et qu'elle a tabli un
partenariat spcifique avec l'Ukraine. Toutes ces tapes s'inscrivent
dans l'effort plus large que dploie l'OTAN pour effacer les
anciennes lignes de division et pour crer de nouvelles lignes de
communication et de coopration.
PfP has become the flagship of our cooperation effort. It has
exceeded every expectation. Since its inception four years ago PfP
has become one of the most successful military cooperation programmes
in history. It has drawn 27 states of diverse backgrounds and
security traditions into an ever-closer network of military
cooperation. It is simply inconceivable today to talk about security
structures in Europe without mentioning PfP.
PfP's role and objectives have been clear from the outset, and they
have given the Partnership a very strong operational character.
Fundamentally, PfP is about preparing for and managing crisis. It is
about having soldiers, airman and sailors who can understand each
other. It is about interoperability and forces that can operate
together.
This "job description" of PfP may sound rather technical, and thus
rather un-political. Yet from the outset, PfP had tremendous
political implications:
- in Bosnia, PfP not only helped setting up IFOR and SFOR, thus
helping to end the violence. By helping to make such large-scale
coalition possible, PfP also helped unite many nations of different
security perceptions behind a common strategy. PfP thus helped avoid
escalation in an escalation-prone region;
- Albania, too, demonstrates the political value of PfP. By
using
PfP to help re-build the armed forces of this country, we make a
political contribution to stability in a region of endemic
instability;
- ensuring the democratic control of armed forces also has
tremendous political implications. Military forces which are
accountable to a democratic civilian government are much less likely
to be used for purposes that run counter to peace and stability. PfP
has become our "transmission belt" to disseminate NATO's ideas on
this subject. PfP thereby contributes to more healthy civil-military
relations across the continent;
- PfP has also helped prepare those three countries who were
invited to join NATO last July at our Madrid Summit. Indeed, between
now and the formal accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary in 1999, we will use PfP to involve them ever more deeply in
Alliance military planning.
All this means that the Euro-Atlantic community is growing, both in
quantity and quality. The pool of resources we can draw on in
managing crises is growing; the share of the security burden is being
spread more evenly. And the possibilities for the Alliance and its
Partners to exercise decisive influence on security developments
throughout Europe have grown.
So PfP is about far more than military cooperation. It is a
political investment in the long-term evolution of this continent.
Despite PfP's success, I believe you will all agree with me that the
potential of NATO's cooperative approaches is still not yet fully
exploited: Initial gains in interoperability through PfP greatly
facilitated the integration of non-NATO forces into IFOR and SFOR.
But there is room for improvement. Hence the continuing emphasis on
making PfP more operational.
You have already heard a great deal about how PfP can become more
operational, so I will not dwell on that subject. Let me say a few
words, however, on how important this process is.
Consider the crisis in the former Yugoslavia in 1993, when the
Alliance and its cooperation partners were reflecting on how they
might cooperate to address the problem together. Think about what we
did and did not have at that time.
We had the NACC, but PfP did not exist. The Alliance had no active
military cooperation programme with non-NATO nations. The debate on
possibly starting a modest peacekeeping exercise programme under the
NACC had just begun.
Our forces could not speak to each other, had different maps,
incompatible radios. In short, we were not prepared to cooperate in
a joint mission. Our mechanisms for political consultations were not
well-developed. Partners had no permanent political or military
representation at NATO HQ or at Mons.
In January 1994 the Partnership for Peace was established, and it
rapidly evolved from a mere concept to a major contributor to peace
and stability in Europe. It brought Allies and Partners together for
joint exercises and other activities that broadened and deepened our
cooperation and enabled us to work together.
Less than two years later we launched IFOR with the full
participation of 21 non-NATO partners. It wasn't easy or perfect,
but it has worked and it continues to work, as SFOR, to consolidate
the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Beyond Bosnia, the Partnership is becoming operational within NATO
itself. Partner officers will soon be serving in Partner Staff
Elements within NATO's command structure. They will be involved
early on in planning PfP operations and will be available to join
CJTF headquarters when called upon. They will move on to leadership
and staff positions at home, bringing to their national assignments
their own years of NATO experience.
In the future, the partnership will not only be more operational
militarily, it will also have a much stronger political dimension to
it. The EAPC offers that potential. It provides us with the means
to facilitate consultation and cooperation between the Alliance and
those Partners who participate with NATO in a peace support
operation.
If we make full use of its potential, the EAPC will also provide us
with a mechanism to discuss a wider range of problems that affect
Allies and Partners alike: civil emergency planning, international
terrorism, defence planning, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, arms control issues, and regional security, to name only
a few. The EAPC may still be a rather young creation, but it is
bound to gather momentum.
This, Ladies and Gentlemen, is a picture of the operational
Partnership that you are helping to realise. It is the picture of a
new NATO, a NATO which increasingly reflects its commitment to wider
Euro-Atlantic stability in the way it is organised - with the
Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at
its very centre. It is a NATO much better prepared to manage
Europe's long-term evolution.
We might never be fully prepared for the crisis of the future, but we
will certainly be better prepared than we have been in the past. But
perhaps most importantly, by strengthening our cooperation, by
adapting ourselves to the new challenges, and by preparing for
crisis, we are in fact reducing the chance of that crisis ever
happening. This is the real payoff. Thank you.
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