At the NAC Meeting 16 Dec. 1997

Intervention by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. Knut Vollebk Bosnia/SFOR Mr. Chairman, When the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was given an 18 month long mandate we all hoped it would suffice for the implementation of the Dayton accords. Today we are faced with the need for a continued military presence in order to bolster the efforts of the civilian agencies, and to ensure that the peace process is brought to a successful completion. The responsibility for the slow progress rests with the parties themselves. They have yet to prove that they are fully committed to the signatures they put on the Dayton Accords two years ago in Paris. This includes their obligation to bring suspected war criminals to trial. We have made important progress during the past six months. The decision of the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC) in Sintra to increase the pressure on the parties has produced results. But much remains to be done before we can hope for lasting peace in Bosnia. We must maintain the pressure. The recent PIC meeting in Bonn was important in this respect. All aspects of Dayton must be implemented. We must also be realistic. The peace process will not be complete six months from now. What has already been invested must not be lost through premature withdrawal. A continued international military presence on a credible level is a crucial component in the peace process. The military operations in Bosnia is perhaps the greatest challenge this Alliance has ever faced. So far it has been an undisputed success. Now we have to look beyond the end-date for SFOR. The Alliance has a defined long-term interest in stability and a secure environment in Bosnia. We must live up to our commitment to the Bosnian people. We welcome the tasking to the military authorities to develop a range of options for a future NATO-led military presence in Bosnia, following the end of SFOR's mandate. Though this will, formally speaking, not commit the Alliance to a continued role in Bosnia, I think we must admit that today nobody can replace NATO. Norway is prepared to stay on. As we prepare for the post-SFOR operation I think it is essential to focus on what needs to be done before NATO can conclude its military involvement. Previously we have spoken in general terms of an exit strategy. Now we should discuss in very concrete terms what requirements we need to meet, rather than focus on artificial exit dates which, as experience has shown, are rarely compatible with conditions on the ground. NATO's effort in itself will not be enough unless accompanied by robust civilian implementation. SACEUR has stressed the need to address the capability gap between SFOR and the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF). We will of course be willing to look at ways of addressing this. So far the various proposals for an armed international police force have not been convincing. We need to ask if such an armed police force will be more effective than today's system, and whether or not there are contributors to such a force. The IPTF has a crucial role in the effort to establish a democratic and effective civilian law enforcement system in Bosnia. The capabilities of the IPTF need to be enhanced. In order to contribute to this, my Government will provide 400 000 dollars to the IPTF's efforts to reform and restructure the local police, bringing our total contribution for 1997 to more than 1 million dollars. We will make further contributions next year. In addition to increased financial support, we aim to provide more police officers with special qualifications, including trainers, to the IPTF. In Bosnia we have seen the dire consequences on the civil society of a large number of anti-personnel landmines. They also constitute a threat to SFOR troops securing the peace in this country. That is one reason why the Ottawa convention is important. Norway has contributed considerable funds for mine clearance in Bonsia and will continue those efforts. Work related to anti-personnel landmines on the part of the Alliance is also required. We fully support the ongoing analysis by NATO's military authorities. This work should proceed without delay. However, we also believe a parallel legal and political analysis is needed. Internal and external adaptation With agreement on the new command structure, yet another key element has been added to the restructured Alliance. Although transformation will to a certain extent remain an ongoing process, we are coming closer to stating that the new NATO has been established. It will be a guarantor of future Euro-Atlantic security. We have been able to carry through this wide-ranging process without affecting our cohesion and solidarity. In particular I welcome Spain's intention to fully integrate into NATO's new command structure. We hope to see France there too as soon as possible. I appreciate France's pragmatic and flexible approach to the adoption of the new command structure at fifteen. A NATO without full French participation is less complete and less able to play its role in European security. The internal restructuring has been vital to prepare NATO for full integration of the new members. The fact that later today we will sign the accession protocols proves that we have succeeded. As we prepare to welcome the new members we should not forget the principle of NATO's open door as nailed down in the Madrid Declaration. We are pleased with the arrangements which are being implemented to maintain and intensify our contacts with candidate countries and other partners. We are committed to assessing the situation again in 1999. This does not mean that the next round of invitations should automatically be issued then. The main focus in the time to come should be to facilitate the integration of the three new members. Our point of departure when we begin to discuss the next phase of the enlargment process, must be the statement from the Madrid Summit and the perspective on future membership we then gave a number of partners, including the Baltic countries. We must now make all elements of the new Alliance work. The Founding Act with Russia is historic. Co-operation in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is off to a good start. Russia seems committed to working together with us, not least because only this way can they influence European security. But it will take time, and we will have to be flexible and patient in order to ensure that this body really works. We must reject Russian interference in internal matters. But we should not be nervous of discussing sensitive issues. Only by making Russia a real partner can we make her co-responsible for European security. We should be ambitious for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as a forum for co-operation with the partners. We should capitalize on the good start by ensuring that the Council addresses their concerns. Regional co-operation as a supplement to the wider framework, is one way of doing this. The partners themselves must share the responsibility for making the EAPC a success. Ensuring that Ukraine and in particular Russia take an active part in the activities of the forum is perhaps the greatest challenge. This being said, the most important task ahead of us is to ensure that the new NATO retains the most important qualities of the old NATO, the collective defense and close transatlantic ties. Without a strong Article 5 capability the new NATO will not be able to carry out the many new missions we face. The terms of reference for the review of the strategic concept confirms this commitment. I note the report on the resource implications of enlargement. To the extent necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance, we should be prepared to meet the extra requirements this implies.