Informal
meeting
of the NATO
Ministers
of Defence

Maastricht,
1-2 Oct. 1997

Introduction

by the Netherlands Minister of Defence,
dr.ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve

on Bosnia-Herzegowina (short and long term)

Introduction

Before we turn to the thorny issues before us, we must mourn the loss of twelve dedicated servants of peace. Gerd Wagner, deputy to High Representative Westendorp, and eleven of his colleagues from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland died on September 17th when their helicopter crashed into a remote mountainside in Bosnia. Gerd Wagner and his delegation did their utmost to help build peace. The memory of their sacrifice will strengthen us in our quest for a lasting peace in Bosnia.

Following on the remarks of Saceur, general Clark, and the chairman of the Military Committee, general Naumann, I would like to focus on three questions: SFOR, Joint Guard, and Bosnia after SFOR.

SFOR's role

To make the parties in Bosnia comply with Dayton and the results of the municipal elections, much pressure will be needed. SFOR will have to support the OSCE in organising the assembly and presidential elections in the Republika Srpska, in November and December. These elections, if successful, might help resolve the power struggle within the Republika Srpska in a way that facilitates the implementation of Dayton.

We need to make progress on the issue of war criminals, many of whom remain at large. They should be arrested by the appropriate authorities at the proper time, possibly before SFOR's time runs out.

Varied demands will be made on SFOR between now and July next year. Recent developments have shown that the well-considered and inventive use of military force in support of Dayton can be very useful. We have to make sure that our troops continue to be of adequate numbers and are provided with sufficient means to execute their tasks. The contribution of the Netherlands, 1550 military to SFOR and the UN in the former Yugoslavia, has been temporarily increased late August to 1770 in order to help safeguard the elections.

How should we continue operation Joint Guard?

NATO's Military Committee has concluded that a selection from the troop strength options cannot yet be made given the uncertainties of the situation, but perhaps later this year some limited force reductions - as envisaged in option B - may be possible.

It is doubtful, that SFOR can be substantially reduced before the end of this year without hurting the implementation of Dayton. Any decision on the continuation of operation "Joint Guard" has to be based on an assessment of the overall security and political situation in Bosnia. The political situation will remain unstable at least until the municipal election results have been completely implemented and the assembly elections in the Republika Srpska have been held. Continued SFOR support to civil implementation is indispensable. A draw down of SFOR would increase the risks and should be avoided in the near future.

There is little reason for optimism on the attitude of the parties. Further disintegration - and possibly separation - is a real risk. Some former war leaders in Bosnia are already betting who will win the next battle next year.

SFOR's mandate expires in June 1998. The fragility of the peace requires continued international military presence. Decisions on future peacekeeping should rest on the transatlantic unity which has been the key to NATO's success in Bosnia. It is important that we have a preliminary discussion today and to help prepare future decisions.

Looking at the longer term, we should consider developing other, creative ways in which the alliance can contribute to an enduring security framework in Bosnia. The alliance could, for instance, develop a stronger relationship with Bosnia's Standing Committee on Military Matters, and help to improve this potentially important institution. NATO could strengthen this central mechanism to bridge the various armed forces, reduce distrust and facilitate transparency. Other areas of assistance and cooperation could also be explored to help establish a security framework for the future. I hope the major elements of such a framework could be in place by December.


If the international reconstruction effort fails and Bosnia slides back into a state of war, the alliance's credibility and unity of purpose would be severely undermined in the eyes of the world. This would cast a lasting shadow over the enlargement and the adaptation of the alliance to the 21st century. The kind of alliance we will have after the year 2000 will not be determined by our blueprints, but by the way we carry out our current, most difficult tasks.


 [ Go to Speeches Menu ]  [ Go to Homepage ]