Gen Joulwan: Thank you very much, Secretary General. I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to you and to the Council for the decision today to approve the activation order for the Stabilisation Force for Bosnia. I thought it might be useful, to add to what the Secretary General has said, to use the charts that Ive used with you now for nearly a year to give a wrap-up to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR. As the Secretary General said, its D+362 days, and quite a bit has been accomplished in that year.
Ive gone through these phases with you before, but its also very important to note where SFOR is different from IFOR: in the entry phase and the implementation phase, we went in very heavy, with troops that not only separated the forces but ensured that their weapons were placed in storage areas. We went in with a very robust force and then scaled down from a heavy force to a much lighter force as we got to the end of our mission. We are now at mission completion, so what the SFOR is going to confront is much different than what the IFOR did a year ago.
To show you what I was talking about, not only did IFOR do all of that, but it really has performed a very special accomplishment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 365 days ago, much of this would have been red you couldnt move on roads, there were mines, bridges were out, railroads didnt work. 365 days later, in addition to doing all of that, in addition to separating the forces, we now have nearly 60 bridges. Everywhere you see a green dot is where a bridge has been placed in Bosnia to allow freedom of movement. The roads are now open. We now have a railroad system that runs from north to south all the way to Ploce, and from Zvornik to Tuzla all the way into Croatia. This is significant for the country. This is what the IFOR has accomplished. Elections have been held using these routes that have been opened. So Bosnia-Herzegovina is now linked to Europe and linked to the rest of the world.
Thats what were going to build on. Were going to build on the accomplishments of the Implementation Force and its what were going to call Operation JOINT GUARD, or the Stabilisation Force. That will be conducted in four phases. We will transition the force in. That is going to go on between the 20th of December and early February 1997, and at D+45 we hope to have set the SFOR. We will then go into what we call stabilisation and our number one aim here: not separating the force, but preventing a Spring offensive, preventing hostilities. These will be the primary and principal military tasks that SFOR will be asked to do.
I have been directed by the Council to make six-month assessments and report back to the Council on the conditions at the time, and if those conditions are met what we hope to see in about a year is a drawdown to a deterrent force, a smaller force, and handing over much of the task to what we hope to be growing civilian control and agencies that will be executing their civilian missions. Then at 18 months, the mission will be completed and three or four weeks after mission completion in June of 1998, we will withdraw all of the Stabilisation Force. That is the overall concept.
Let me show you this last chart. What that looks like is as its shown here Stabilisation Force for 18 months; we will have phase one (45 days stabilisation) for about a year; these assessments will be made; and then we will go into a deterrent phase; then we will have mission completion in June of 98. These assessments that I make will determine the political guidance I will receive from the Council. The command and control for this force is now in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a multinational headquarters of 25 nations that include some of our partners, and that force will assume command of SFOR at 1100Z, 20 December 1996. Were very excited about it. I again express my gratitude to all the nations that have joined this force NATO and non-NATO in trying to bring peace to Bosnia and create a better world for their children and for their grandchildren. Thank you very much.
Q: (Reuter) Mr. Secretary General, Id like to ask you two quick questions aside from this. Are France and the United States even close to settling their dispute over the command of southern NATO forces? And do you expect any kind of concrete agreement with Minister Rodionov tomorrow on exchanges of officers or other things that would draw the prospect closer of a Russia-NATO charter before the Summit in July?
SECGEN: Let me start with the first question. As far as AFSOUTH is concerned, this has not been a question of debate today. Its true that the internal structure of the Alliance has been on the table, but what I can tell you is that both the intervention of Minister Millon and the intervention of Secretary Perry have been very constructive and I am sure that, as they both have said, we will find a solution that will allow the military structure to be approved in due time and to be a military command structure which is the best for the Alliance. Let me insist once again: in the Alliance we take decisions just about every day. Some of them are very difficult, and we try to do it at the end of the day with a good consensus.
Of course, not everybody can obtain 100 percent of their aspirations, otherwise a consensus would be impossible. But we do it in such a way that every day every country feels comfortable in the Alliance. The second question about Minister Rodionovs visit. As you know, we are working now on the establishment of military liaison between the NATO and Russian headquarters. I do hope that during the presence of Minister Rodionov here we will move this dossier forward. Thats what I hope. A final decision will probably not be taken, but without any doubt I think that we will move this dossier forward. In any case, we will talk with him not only about this question but also about Bosnia. As you know, they will participate in SFOR and we would like also to comment on this issue with General Rodionov.
Q: (Washington Post) Mr. Secretary General, General Shalikashvili yesterday in Sarajevo issued a call for a specially-trained police force to be sent in, to avoid having SFOR saddled with the task of hunting down war criminals. Was this issue discussed today, and is a consensus emerging among the Ministers that perhaps this is a good idea? For General Joulwan: you are going to be going in with 31,000 troops, half the size of before. Are you confident that you are not going to be perhaps overwhelmed by some of these tasks which, even if you condense them into nice charts like that, could be rather complicated?
SECGEN: As you know, the mission of SFOR is very clear. But what General Shalikashvili suggested yesterday in Sarajevo is something that I share. I wouldnt dare to say there is a consensus around that position yet, but I am almost certain we will be able to help work out something of that nature. I found General Shalikashvilis remarks yesterday positive. It is not the first time that weve talked about this issue, and not the first time we think about that possibility. It is not something that has been debated formally, but I consider it a good idea
GEN JOULWAN: On the question about the 31,000. That 31,000 number was based on an assessment that was done of what we thought the threat levels would be. We do now have the former warring factions with their heavy weapons in cantonment areas. We have them separated. The troops have been for the most part demobilised to a great extent. Does this mean that Bosnia-Herzegovina is no longer a dangerous place? No. It is. And this assessment that Ive talked about if conditions change, I will not hesitate to come back with a request for more troops. Right now 31,000 is sufficient to do the job, but we will continue to make assessments.
And let me also make it very clear, what I have discussed with the Council and which they have approved: we will concentrate on our principal military tasks; those are the ones I talked about in trying to prevent another Spring offensive or hostilities. We will be very limited in what we can provide to civilian agencies. We will try to provide this secure environment, but it will be very difficult to provide the type of support we were able to with 60,000. But for our principal military tasks, we are ready to do that.
One last point: the Council has given in the OPLAN 10406, Operation JOINT GUARD, very robust rules of engagement that our soldiers can protect themselves if threatened or fired upon. So I would hope that the answer to your question would lie in the parties themselves. We have given them a year to be able to set the conditions for peace for their country and for their children. Its up to them, and we would put the onus on them to ensure that this peaceful trend continues and to work with the civilian agencies in rebuilding their institutions. The military can provide the secure environment; it cannot provide the peace. That peace must be provided by the people themselves.
Q: (Belgian Radio) For the Secretary General. Belgium will severely reduce its presence in SFOR. More particularly, it intends to withdraw from the so-called Beluga Battalion that it has led in IFOR. Are you disappointed about the Belgian decision?
SECGEN: Let me very clearly say that I am not. You have to remember that Belgium is probably the only country that in 1996 has been deployed with troops in both theatres in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia. So the effort that your country has made has been very, very important and we appreciate it very much. Therefore we do understand very well that a moment may come in which they want to continue the effort theyre going to continue in Eastern Slavonia and reduce a little bit to the level they understand is appropriate in Bosnia. I only have praise for your country.
Q: (AP) General Joulwan, in the mission of SFOR, have the rules in any way changed with regard to war criminals, or is it exactly the same as the IFOR mission?
GEN JOULWAN: My instructions are the same. Let me just say that all of us deplore that war criminals have not been brought to justice, and we think their place is in The Hague. I would turn to the Secretary General for the political side of this, but its very clear what my instructions are, and that if we come in contact with them we will detain them and turn them over to the proper authorities. We have put out in a very proactive way that that is part of the mission that we have, and well continue to follow that guidance.
SECGEN: I have little to add. As far as the guidance is concerned, there is no change. But as you know very well from the London Conference from some of the questions we were talking about a while ago, approaching war criminals is not necessarily through IFOR, but they have a clear mandate. It can be done, and it will be done. I am sure that those who should be in front of the Tribunal will be.
Q: (CNN) Youve been saying that for a year now, and so have most of your colleagues within the Council that you expect to see these war criminals in The Hague, you hope theyre going to be there, you hope the parties are going to hand them over. But at the same time, youve been making a mockery out of IFOR by not giving them the mandate to go after these people. How can you reconcile the two positions: first of all that you think and hope youre going to get these people, but youre not letting your military actively go after them? And secondly, how do you expect a police force which is traditionally more lightly-armed than a heavily-armed IFOR or SFOR force to go after war criminals who are heavily protected?
SECGEN: I can reconcile that in an easy manner. IFOR is not a police force, therefore its not going to be chasing war criminals. That is something that is very clear in the Council, and the countries have given that mission in a very clear and well-defined manner. We are prepared to guarantee a secure environment for other forces of a police nature who are prepared to do it. But as I said before, and will keep on saying, it was in the OPLAN of IFOR first, it will be in the OPLAN now: this is not a mission that IFOR is going to take. Lets get that very clear: we are not a police force.
Q: (CNN) How are you going to get the war criminals to The Hague?
SECGEN: Ive said very clearly how we can help that to be produced. First, the responsibility without any doubt lies with the parties and I want you to read again what we said in Paris in the international community and in London. There are the mechanisms to do it, and Im sure that before the end of the year those who have to be before the Tribunal will be.
Q: Id like to know about costs the costs of IFOR and of SFOR.
SECGEN: Thats very difficult to answer in a simple figure. As you know, the cost of IFOR is supported by the countries, and the cost of SFOR will also be supported by the countries. I cannot give a figure by heart now, I dont know if General Joulwan can.
GEN JOULWAN: I cant give the total figure for the nations, but I will say that the Council has allocated some funds -- you saw much of that work that was done on the bridges, on the roads, and some of the reconstruction for freedom of movement. We can get you that number, but it was a substantial amount of money provided by the Council for that effort.
Q: (AFP) Id like to know when we can have the exact composition of SFOR, with the number of troops that each country will provide to the force.
GEN JOULWAN: We can provide that to you. We are in the final stages of that now, and by the 20th I assure you will have it. We will get that to you.
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