[ NATO SPEECHES ]

Meeting
of the North
Atlantic
Council in
Ministerial
Session

NATO HQ
Brussels
10 Dec 1996


NATO Star

Statement

by Secretary of State Warren Christopher



Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished colleagues: I am honored to speak with you once again on behalf of the United States.

In my four years as Secretary of State, I have had the chance to address the North Atlantic Council on nine separate occasions. Because of the importance President Clinton and I attach to our partnership with Europe, and because of the central role NATO plays in assuring the security of all our nations, this has been one of the most critical responsibilities I have had. Our Allies, too, have been steadfast in their commitment to the transatlantic partnership. Time and again, you have reminded Americans how important our role in Europe continues to be. I have delivered that message to our Congress and to the American people. With their support, our Alliance has become stronger than ever.

The distance we have traveled and the achievements we have forged together in these four years should inspire confidence in all our people. Just think where we were at the beginning of 1993, think of the uncertainties the Alliance faced then and the questions we had not yet answered.

Many people wondered if America would maintain its commitment to Europe. Others questioned NATO's relevance to the post-Cold War world. We all agreed on the need to integrate Europe's new democracies, but we had agreed on no strategy to actually do it. Russia was just embarking a difficult and uncertain path toward market democracy. The war in Bosnia was at the height of its brutality.

We met all these challenges by pursuing our interests together, as 16 allies, through this great Alliance. At their 1994 summit, our leaders adopted a strategy to transform NATO and to build an undivided Europe. In 1995, NATO acted to end the war in Bosnia and assembled a peacekeeping coalition so broad that for the very first time, we could say that all of Europe is united under a common flag in a common cause. NATO's Partnership for Peace has become a permanent, unifying force in Europe. France and Spain took historic decisions to participate more fully in NATO. We have stood by democracy in Russia and offered it a special partnership with the new NATO. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have rid themselves of nuclear weapons. The OSCE has worked effectively to uphold its principles from Bosnia to the Caucasus. The EU has laid the groundwork for its own enlargement and built a stronger partnership with the United States.

Because of what we have accomplished, there is really no question today that America is staying in Europe. There is no doubt that NATO, the EU, and the OSCE work, that they have evolved, that together they provide the best hope for building a secure, democratic, integrated continent. There is a broad consensus across the Atlantic about the direction we are heading. NATO will continue to be the central guarantor of our security. NATO's European members will play a more visible role in NATO. The Alliance will soon have new members. Russia is already our partner, from the meeting rooms of Brussels to the muddy fields of Bosnia.

This week, three events symbolize our progress. At the OSCE summit in Lisbon, 55 nations adopted a comprehensive security model and approved a new approach for conventional arms control in Europe. At the Peace Implementation Conference in London, we came together to support democracy and reconstruction in Bosnia. Today we are meeting as NATO allies to advance the vision our leaders laid out at their 1994 summit.

At today's meeting, we are approving NATO's Stabilization Force for Bosnia. We are approving a major enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. We are continuing NATO's internal adaptation. We are declaring that in today's Europe, NATO has no intention, no plan, and no need to station nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members and we are affirming that no NATO nuclear forces are presently on alert. NATO is signaling its readiness to exchange liaison offices with Russia at our major military commands.

Today, we have agreed that our leaders will meet at a summit in the summer of 1997. We will consolidate our progress on the three broad goals our leaders set forth in 1994: equipping NATO for new roles and missions, reforming its internal structures, and extending its reach to new allies and partners.

We will need to continue to set ambitious goals and to tackle the hard issues head on, both at the summit and beyond. Many important challenges still lie ahead. As NATO and the EU grow, we must ensure that their doors stay open. We must work hard with our partners in Russia and Ukraine to ensure their nations take their rightful place in the new Europe. It will take time to overcome the acute economic disparities between east and west and to help the nations of the former Yugoslavia rejoin the European mainstream. We have to be vigilant in defending human rights and political freedom: As the courageous young people of Serbia have shown us, and recent developments in Belarus have demonstrated, the struggle for democracy is not over in Europe. Of course, we must continue to strengthen our transatlantic partnership, by breaking down barriers between our peoples and economies and by meeting global challenges together.

In 1999, our leaders will no doubt come together once again to mark NATO's 50th anniversary. The event should be more than a celebration of NATO's past, more than a ceremony to welcome new members. It will be the moment NATO embarks on its next 50 years. It will be time to chart a course for our New Atlantic Community well into the next century. Though much has changed since NATO was founded, America's goal will remain constant: a deeper partnership with a broader, more integrated Europe on this continent and around the world. With that goal in mind, let me take a few moments to discuss the issues on our agenda for today, the coming summit and the years ahead.

Our most immediate task today is to finalize our approval of the follow-on force for Bosnia. In just ten days, IFOR's mission will come to an end. We will then proceed to a new mission, with fewer troops and a new 18-month mandate. We can do this because IFOR has succeeded. Let us pause for a moment to consider the tremendous debt of gratitude we owe to the 60,000 men and women of IFOR. Some came from the most experienced armed forces in the world, others came from nations and armies that did not even exist a few years ago. They represent long standing allies and former adversaries. All of them proved they are equal to the task of building security in Europe under the toughest conditions. All the non-NATO countries participating in IFOR will remain in the Stabilization Force.

We have made progress thus far by taking a step-by-step approach to progress in Bosnia. We ended the war. We separated the forces. We oversaw the transfer of territory. We supervised democratic elections. Now the institutions of a unified Bosnian state are being built. Each step has taken Bosnia another step away from war. But our work is not done.

IFOR and the High Representative have succeeded admirably in laying the foundations for a normal, civil society in Bosnia. Now the parties must take a greater share of the responsibility.

They must respect freedom of the press. They must honor arms control agreements. They must assure freedom of movement and permit refugees to return home with security; a great effort will be needed from all of us to fulfill this requirement of the peace process. They must make their joint institutions function effectively. A competent and honest civil administration is essential. The OSCE is responsible for supervising and organizing municipal elections, which will take place in April. If we want the elections to succeed, and if we want to see the OSCE play a more central and capable role in Europe, we must provide our full financial and political support for its efforts.

Justice is also a precondition for lasting peace. There should be no doubt about our determination to see war criminals punished. We expect the authorities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to arrest war criminals and turn them over to the Tribunal in the Hague. But we also must see new and effective approaches to this urgent problem.

Our assistance to Bosnia will only make a difference if we insist that the parties fulfill their obligations. Reconstruction in Bosnia is not an end in itself. Fixing bridges and roads will not advance our goals unless people and goods can move freely across them. Economic aid will not lead to stable growth unless Bosnia's new institutions work effectively to take advantage of it. Reconstruction assistance is meant to support the peace process and to speed the fulfillment of Dayton's central requirement -- a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia -- and it will be conditioned on the parties' compliance with that requirement.

We must make clear to Serbia and Croatia, too, that they will rejoin the international community only as open, democratic societies. Today, we join in condemning the Serbian government's decision to ignore the results of the November 17 elections. That decision must be reversed. The people of Serbia deserve what their neighbors in central Europe have: clean elections, a free press, a normal market economy. If President Milosevic respects their will, Serbia can enjoy the legitimacy and assistance it needs. If he seeks to rule Serbia as an unreformed dictatorship, it will only increase his isolation and the suffering of his people.

The international community must continue to fulfill its responsibilities as well. We must accelerate the delivery of reconstruction aid to those parties who are fulfilling their responsibilities. Our pledges must turn into projects on the ground so that people will see the benefits of peace. But as President Clinton has said, "It is still up to the Bosnian people to take responsibility for rebuilding their country, reconciling with their neighbors, creating a democratic national government and laying the foundation for a self-sustaining peace."

The mission NATO has undertaken in Bosnia, the breadth of our coalition, and our cooperation with organizations like the OSCE make it plain that we have built a new NATO. The challenge we have faced in Bosnia is also the kind of challenge a new NATO is more likely to face in the post-Cold War world, and it shows us the potential NATO has for assuring peace and stability. For years, many people thought of this Alliance simply as a bulwark against aggression in Europe. Now we must understand that it is the most potent, effective tool for military coalition-building in the world.

That is one reason why we have launched NATO's internal adaptation. It is why we introduced the Combined Joint Task Force concept. We want to give NATO a permanent capacity to plan, to train for, and to deploy complex missions like IFOR. These reforms will also give NATO's European allies a tangible opportunity to play a more visible, responsible role in the Alliance. Our European allies have unparalleled experience in peacekeeping. They will now have the opportunity to use NATO assets for WEU-led operations.

We have made significant progress since our Berlin ministerial on NATO's internal adaptation -- on CJTF, NATO's relationship with the WEU, the development of a European Security and Defense Identity, and on command structure reform. We should complete that work between now and the summit. Our goal is to strengthen NATO's ability to act to meet new challenges, while preserving the qualities that have made it so successful, including the unified command and the transatlantic link.

We are also moving steadily forward in our effort to bring Europe's new democracies fully, finally and forever into our transatlantic community. NATO enlargement must naturally begin with the strongest candidates; otherwise, it would not begin at all. The nations we invite first should be those that demonstrate most clearly that they can meet the responsibilities NATO allies share. As President Clinton has said, we also believe the new members should be admitted no later than June, 1999, NATO's 50th anniversary.

As accession talks begin, each of us has a responsibility to make the case to our people and our parliaments that enlargement will advance our interests. The Alliance must also make clear that this process is open-ended: that NATO's first new members will not be the last. NATO should welcome the aspirations of those nations that continue to seek membership after the summit and continue our intensified dialogue and consultation with them. The prospect of enlargement has given every potential member an incentive to develop a deeper relationship with NATO, to uphold democracy at home, and to contribute to regional stability; it is in our interest to preserve that incentive for a wide group of states. NATO's new members will also have an obligation to help keep the door open to others.

We must also ensure that all of Europe's new democracies, whether they join NATO sooner, later, or not at all, have a chance to help guide Europe's future. That is why we should work with our partners to create the Atlantic Partnership Council as soon as possible. The Council will be the collective voice of the Partnership for Peace. It will give our partners a formal consultative mechanism with the Alliance and a mechanism for cooperating with each other, not just directly with NATO. It will be open to every member of the Partnership and of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which it would replace.

Most important, the Council will help us shape the future of the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership is an extraordinary success. It held 16 military exercises in 1996; 25 are scheduled for next year. It has made it possible to build the first truly European-wide military coalitions. Today we are taking it to a new level. We have agreed that the members of the Partnership should be able to participate in the full range of NATO's missions; whenever and wherever NATO acts, our partners should have a chance to stand with us. We have agreed to involve our partners in the planning, in addition to the execution, of the missions they join, as well as in the regular peacetime work of NATO's military authorities. These steps should be implemented rapidly. I believe NATO should also open a liaison office in those Partner countries that request one. And we should consider any other enhancements that the Atlantic Partnership Council may suggest.

Each of us, each of our partners, and many other nations are also members of the OSCE. It is a vital pillar of America's engagement in Europe. Its importance will grow as long as we uphold the principles it promotes: respect for human rights and an open society. Of course, the OSCE has become much more than a standard-setter: It has supported elections across Europe; it was on the ground throughout the war in Chechnya promoting dialogue and reconciliation. It is the inclusive and necessary complement to the other institutions of our New Atlantic Community. Bosnia is a case in point: We could not have secured peace there without NATO; we cannot build democracy, the key to lasting peace, without the OSCE.

At the OSCE summit, we agreed on the scope and parameters of negotiations to adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Negotiations should begin immediately in the new year. We are poised to eliminate old divisions between groups of states, to update the treaty's system of limitations and to enhance stabilizing measures and verification. Our goal is early progress. To that end, the Alliance should prepare and table a comprehensive negotiating proposal early next year.

Russia, too, should play a vital role in every institution and every undertaking of our New Atlantic Community. This is possible today because of the progress Russia has made under President Yeltsin's leadership: elections have become a fact of life; free market ideals are ascendant. It is essential because we can only build a new Europe free of tyranny, division and war if Europe's largest nation is our full partner.

We seek a fundamentally new relationship between the new Russia and the new NATO. To achieve this goal, NATO must remain firm in moving forward with its overall strategy; we must continue to avoid any suggestion of uncertainty, ambiguity, or delay. At the same time, NATO must signal its readiness to develop with Russia the details and substance of a truly cooperative relationship.

The potential of that relationship is already on display in Bosnia. Major General Montgomery Meigs, who commands the task force in which American and Russian soldiers serve in Tuzla, said it best: Today, "an attack on Russian members of Task Force Eagle is no different than an attack on U.S. troopers." Russian and NATO soldiers in Bosnia trust each other, depend on each other, defend each other. They have been sharing common tasks for the last year; they will be for the next 18 months. Our job is to establish a permanent framework that extends their spirit to other joint endeavors and keeps it thriving long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.

This relationship should be expressed in a charter between NATO and Russia. Russia and the Alliance should establish a formal framework for cooperating, consulting, training and responding to crisis together. We are not seeking a rigid, legalistic treaty, but rather a process of consultation and a regular pattern of security cooperation. There is broad agreement that such a relationship is possible and in the interest of both NATO and Russia. And we are now ready to move to a new stage on every aspect of our security strategy. We look forward to working closely with Russia to develop this vital element, so that Russia can have the voice on European security matters that it deserves and Europe needs.

I believe that Ukraine, too, can be, must be, and will be fully part of the European mainstream. Ukraine has made immense progress in overcoming a painful and difficult history. It has made clear it will do its part to help build a secure and integrated Europe. Today, we have decided to move forward to define an enhanced relationship between Ukraine and NATO. We should also encourage Ukraine to continue building close ties with all its neighbors. The new Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalion, for example, is a tangible step in erasing Europe's division. It should become an integral part of the Partnership for Peace so that it can be employed in future missions like IFOR.

In all these areas, I have often remarked that one of our great challenges is to carry forward the work that our predecessors began when they built our Alliance after World War II. They launched the transatlantic partnership and designed it to grow. We are strengthening our partnership and extending to the newly free nations of Europe what history denied them in 1945. It is not often that people have a chance to revisit the great opportunities we did not grasp in the past. We do -- and we are seizing it.

Today, we remember the achievements of Schuman, Bevin, Sforza, Pearson, Acheson, and Marshall; we do not often think about the countless obstacles, large and small, that stood in their way. Few remember the understandings they had to reach before our leaders could meet at Bretton Woods, in Washington, in Rome to launch the institutions of the post-war period. Future generations may not remember the details of our discussions here, either. But if we stay focused on what truly matters, they will remember this: This was the time we fulfilled the founding vision of NATO; this was the time we finished the half-century task of building a free and secure Europe, but this time with no divisions and no one left out. I am grateful for the opportunity to have played my part in this enterprise and I know President Clinton is determined to see it through.


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