The Atlantic Treaty Association Assembly Rome 4 Nov. 1996

Address by Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO

It gives me particular pleasure to address the ATA General Assembly at a time when NATO is in such good shape. Only a few years ago, many were questioning the future of the transatlantic partnership, and indeed, of NATO itself. Some thought that with the change in the European landscape, security was no longer an issue, and others asserted that no alliance could survive without a big military threat. Both views were wrong. Today, NATO is in the midst of a remarkable transformation and, most important, all 16 Allies are on board. Internally, the Alliance is reorganising itself, streamlining its command structures, giving Europeans a greater voice and role, and retooling itself for regional crisis management. At the same time, the enlargement of the Alliance is well on track, and we are developing a new relationship with Russia. Most concretely, the Alliance has proved its enduring value in Bosnia. The IFOR operation has not only helped bring peace to a war-ravaged country, but it has demonstrated the American commitment to European security and the Alliances ability to work with Russia and 16 other non member-states. The reason NATO has thrived rather than declined is that NATO is different. Never before has an alliance been so clearly based on common values, rather than exclusively on a military threat. As the North Atlantic Treaty itself made clear already in 1949, NATO is not only about common defence against an external military threat, but also about upholding the "principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." NATO countries will therefore continue to pursue similar interests, because they have similar goals in the world. In this regard, it is worth highlighting the value of the Atlantic Treaty Association. I would like to congratulate you on your work in maintaining this invaluable network of Associations committed to preserving the common heritage and civilization of the Atlantic Community. So long as the members of the Atlantic Alliance remember that their solidarity is based on common principles and values, NATO will remain strong. Il est évident que lOTAN nest pas lunique organisation européenne de sécurité denvergure, mais une parmi plusieurs institutions complémentaires qui ont chacune un rôle de première importance à jouer. LUnion Européenne, lOSCE et lUEO, par exemple, contribuent, chacune à sa manière, au maintien de la paix et à la promotion de lintégration sur le continent. Lune des plus grandes réalisations des dernières années est le fait que lOTAN et les autres organisations aient trouvé les moyens dagir en étroite collaboration. Comme je vous expliquerai plus tard, nous attachons une grande importance aux efforts déployés pour compléter notre vision dune Europe où les diverses institutions se renforcent mutuellement. Il faudra encore relever beaucoup de défis et il importe de ne pas prendre pour acquis la vitalité actuelle de lOTAN. Dans un contexte stratégique en plein mouvement il faut que lOTAN change également pour refléter les nouvelles réalités. Je crois que nous avons progressé. Le monde continue à changer et les mois à venir seront les plus exaltants et importants dans lhistoire de lAlliance. Permettez-moi de vous esquisser létat o nous en sommes et ce qui reste à faire. LAlliance poursuit sa transformation, et en particulier dans un domaine clé, celui de son adaptation interne. Du fait que lattention se soit tellement focalisée sur le débat autour de lélargissement, nombreux sont ceux qui nont pas peru tout ce qui avait été déjà fait au sein même de lAlliance. Vous savez quen juin dernier, à la réunion de Berlin, les membres de lAlliance ont approuvé le concept de Groupes de forces interarmées multinationales (GFIM), concept qui permettra aux pays qui y sont prêts dunir leurs volontés pour entreprendre des actions en faisant appel à des moyens de lOTAN. Ces actions seraient menées dans lintérêt de lAlliance tout entière. Nous sommes tous convenus que les ressources à consacrer à la défense sont trop rares pour être gaspillées dans des doubles emplois, et que lOTAN - une alliance de grande envergure, qui fonctionne et qui a fait ses preuves - constitue le meilleur cadre pour une mise en commun de nos moyens collectifs. Les GFIM constitueront, pour lOTAN, loutil souple de gestion des crises dont elle a besoin pour protéger ses intérêts, aussi bien sur le territoire de ses membres actuels quau delà des frontières de lAlliance. Dans le même temps, la décision de Berlin rend possible la constitution de GFIM sous commandement européen, permettant à la fois de concrétiser la notion didentité européenne de défense et déviter aux pays européens de devoir réunir, à cet effet, des moyens faisant double emploi avec ceux de lOTAN. Pendant trop longtemps, le débat sur lIdentité européenne de sécurité et de défense (IESD) a tourné autour dune fausse opposition entre la défense européenne et la défense atlantique. Nous avons enfin dépassé ce débat, stérile et source de discorde: tous les Alliés reconnaissent aujourdhui que lOTAN peut les accueillir toutes deux. Lors de ces derniers mois, nous avons fait des progrès considérables en vue de finaliser les accords de répartition des moyens entre lOTAN et lUEO. Dautre part, les Alliés se sont mis daccord sur le souhait dhabiliter ladjoint européen du SACEUR de la responsabilité de développer une capacité européenne au sein de lOTAN et de préparer des opérations dirigées par lUEO. Je crois que nous serons en mesure dannoncer bientt des accords portant sur la forme des composantes de commandement européen au sein de lOTAN et sur des mécanismes efficaces de mise à disposition et de restitution des moyens de lOTAN par lUEO. Une IESD dans lOTAN est de lintérêt commun de lAmérique du Nord et de lEurope. Chacun reconnaît que les Européens doivent, relativement, accroître leur contribution à lAlliance et développer la capacité de prendre linitiative dans une crise future si on en décide. Mais nous admettons aussi que la mise en place de moyens opérationnels européens en dehors de lOTAN serait un luxe que nul dentre nous ne peut se permettre, et quen agissant de la sorte, nous transmettrions aux partenaires transatlantiques de lEurope un message erroné. Pour lEurope, lOTAN constitue lenceinte la plus appropriée à la réalisation dune ambition déjà ancienne et dune nécessité pratique: moins dépendre, sur le plan stratégique, des Etats Unis; et les efforts européens au sein de lOTAN contribuent, dans le même temps, au renforcement général de lAlliance. Nous sommes tous daccord sur ce point. La transformation interne de lAlliance inclut également une rationalisation, particulièrement souhaitable, des structures de commandement. Il y a cinq ans lOTAN a commencé à réduire et à réorganiser ses structures de commandement militaire. Depuis lors, plus de 5000 postes militaires (26%) ont été supprimés. En 1994 le nombre de grand commandements de lOTAN fut réduit de trois à deux. Le Comité militaire a entrepris, également en 1994, une Etude à long terme sur les futures structures de commandement, et poursuit cette tâche difficile. Il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Il est toujours délicat de réduire le nombre de postes de commandement, et cette difficulté est encore accrue par le fait que lOTAN pourrait bientt accueillir de nouveaux membres au sein de sa structure de commandement intégrée la France, lEspagne, et puis les nouveaux membres de lAlliance. La France et lEspagne sont déjà intégrées, avec succès, dans lIFOR et occupent des positions de commandement reflétant limportance de leurs contributions en troupes. Je pense quil serait logique quelles participent pleinement, et de manière permanente, à la nouvelle structure militaire, et nous oeuvrons activement à la réalisation de cet objectif. Quant aux nouveaux membres, ils devraient eux aussi être totalement intégrés à la structure militaire de lOTAN. Au terme de ce processus, la structure militaire de lOTAN devrait être plus souple, plus rationnelle, plus européenne, plus globale et mieux adaptée aux nouveaux défis en matière de sécurité, en Europe et alentour. Quiconque pense que la transformation de lOTAN nest pas assez rapide devrait comparer lOTAN de 1997 avec celle qui, en 1990, amorait sa phase actuelle de transformation. Enlargement is of course another important area where NATOs transformation is well underway. Enlargement should not be seen as projecting the old NATO eastwards as a bulwark against a new threat, but as allowing some of the new democracies of Europe - those who share our democratic values and are prepared and able to accept the responsibilities of membership - to join a new Alliance. Let me also make clear that enlargement will take place, and that it will be good for Europe as a whole. We all want Western Europes zone of stability and security to move eastwards as soon as reasonably possible. I am absolutely convinced that we can meet the challenge of taking in new members while developing a true partnership with those who may not join the Alliance immediately or at all. Enlargement does not, as its critics claim, come as a surprise, but as something we have prepared very carefully for years. Through Partnership for Peace and the Intensified Dialogue process, the states that want to join NATO have a much clearer picture now of what the process involves in terms of civilian and military procedures, democratic accountability, operational capabilities, ability to work alongside NATO forces, and the way in which NATO and its military structure works. For our part, NATO is getting a clearer picture of the states that wish to join the organisation. If all goes well, I expect that a decision will be taken - probably by Heads of State and Government at a NATO Summit in 1997 - to invite several Partners to begin accession negotiations. Through the same Partnership for Peace, NATO will continue to work closely with all Partner countries, who, I remind you, are already represented both at SHAPE and at NATO HQ, and many of whom are working on the ground with NATO in Bosnia. Partnership for Peace is already the most successful programme of military cooperation in Europes history, and it will be upgraded and strengthened for those partners who wish it to be. While we must and will take care to preserve NATOs current cohesion and ability to perform core functions effectively, we are already working on ways to enhance PfP. These might include not only more intensive cooperative military exercises with Partners, but also more Partner participation in NATO committees, an expanded defence planning and review process, and greater technical data exchange. All of this will help narrow the gap between full members and our close and valuable Partners. Ukraine is an important nation in different respects and therefore NATO wants to have a special relationship with this country. We are already expanding our joint activities but we want to do more, and will do more. Ukraines status as a thriving, independent country is of deep interest to the whole of Europe, because its re-emergence as a sovereign nation symbolises a real break with the confrontational past. NATO is also making good progress on elaborating a new, strong and permanent relationship with Russia, a relationship that in my view is a key to the security of all on the continent. There is no denying that Russia continues to have apprehensions about NATO enlargement. Those concerns are understandable in a historical context, and rather than dismiss them we will continue to work to dispel misconceptions. We have already proven that NATO and Russia can work together in their common interest in Bosnia, where Russian troops are operating closely and successfully with NATO. We have also had joint meetings with Russia on non-proliferation, and reached an agreement on civil emergency planning. Similar agreements are currently being considered in the fields of scientific cooperation and environment. It is now time to develop in theory what we have already proven in practice, and give a more formal shape to NATO-Russia relations. This could result in standing arrangements for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alliance. If we can get the relationship with Russia right, many of the other problems of European security will become much easier to resolve. Another key area in which NATO and Russia have a common interest is in the strengthening of the OSCE, which has performed such a valuable role in so many regions of Europe, and in particular in Bosnia. One of the OSCEs main tasks after next months Summit in Lisbon will be to launch a review of the CFE Treaty, the cornerstone of conventional arms control in Europe. Both NATO and Russia recognise the need to adapt this treaty to a Europe in which there are no more blocs, but also the need to preserve this important basis for military reassurance across the continent. NATO-Russia cooperation on arms control within the OSCE is just one clear example of how the two partners can work together for peace and security in Europe, and how NATO and other European organisations complement each other. Amidst all the well-deserved attention that is paid to NATOs outreach to the East, let us not overlook, especially here in Rome, NATOs outreach to the South. For the past 18 months, NATO has been pursuing an important Mediterranean dialogue with six countries in North Africa and the Middle East. As part of this relationship, NATO has regular bilateral meetings with these countries, both to help them understand how a security community such as NATO works, and to listen to their own security concerns. The Mediterranean region is of critical importance to all the NATO member states, and I believe we should expand our level of contacts and information exchanges with our Mediterranean partners. These ideas will be discussed by Alliance Foreign Ministers at the NAC in December. As we contine to develop ties with our Eastern Partners, we will also look to the south to promote stability and continuity along with the EU and the WEU, making the Mediterranean into an area of peace and cooperation. The last aspect of NATOs transformation I would like to discuss with you is the IFOR operation in Bosnia. What could be better testimony to NATOs new role than this operation, in which troops from Allied countries, along with those of Partner countries, as well as others, are participating in a peace enforcement? While the main accomplishment in Bosnia is that the guns have fallen silent, we should also not lose sight of the many lessons that IFOR provides for us all - that the United States is a critical actor in European security; that NATO can and, at times, must do peace enforcement missions; that Central and East European countries are capable of making indispensable contributions to European security; and that NATO and Russia can work successfully together. In many ways, Bosnia has been like a laboratory for trying and perfecting the modes of cooperation we have been developing through Partnership for Peace. But in this case our work has also had the effect of saving lives and helping to put Bosnia back together. We have accomplished a great deal, but Bosnia is still a fragile country. For this reason, I believe that the international community, including NATO, must remain engaged in Bosnia beyond the first year after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. We are now looking in NATO at what might follow IFOR. We are still looking at options. Last month, the North Atlantic Council approved, after consultations with non-NATO contributors, the start of a study on possible follow-on military support for a secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace in Bosnia beyond 1996. This week we expect to have the results of this study and we will consider the way ahead. Having visited Bosnia seven times since the IFOR mission began, I believe strongly that external pressure on the Dayton parties must be sustained. If the international community is resolute in its treatment of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, that will be the best incentive for the parties to accept that reality and work with it, not against it. NATOs involvement in Bosnia is not a sufficient condition for continued peace, but it may well be a necessary one. In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, looking at what NATO is doing in adapting its internal structures, in widening its membership, in establishing permanent cooperative relations with Partner countries, in particular Russia, in expanding our Mediterranean Dialogue and in keeping the peace in Bosnia, hardly suggests an Alliance in decline. I am convinced that we will succeed in this continued transformation for the same reasons NATO has succeeded so far. So long as NATO members continue to share the same objectives - and here the role of the ATA is critical - we will always manage to sort out the means to pursue them. In doing so, we will together help lay the basis for a new, and now wider, Atlantic Community.