The European Parliament Straatsburg Oct. 2, 1996

Speech by Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary General

C'est pour moi un vrai plaisir de prendre la parole devant la Commission des affaires étrangères, de la sécurité et de la politique de défense du Parlement européen. Je voudrais vous décrire brièvement quels sont les grands problèmes auxquels l'Alliance est aujourd'hui confrontée et de quelle faon nous les abordons. Je me ferai une joie de répondre ensuite à vos questions. Depuis que le processus de réforme de l'OTAN a été engagé, en 1990, le rythme du changement est allé en s'accélérant. Les quelque neuf mois qui viennent promettent d'être la période la plus active de toutes. Dans cet espace de temps seront prises des décisions qui auront une importance stratégique capitale pour la sécurité européenne. Ce seront sans nul doute les décisions les plus fondamentales que l'Alliance aura prises depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. First, we have to take decisions on what, if anything, follows IFOR whose mandate ends in December. Over the past few months, the elections which took place on 14 September in Bosnia have been at the centre of our attention, as they are a key step in the process of building the institutions of a common state. These elections represent a major milestone on the road to peace and stability. During the next weeks, the international community must help the young republic establish the common institutions provided for in the Dayton Agreement. The first meeting of the joint Presidency that took place on Monday is a most welcome development in this respect. If the international community is unflinching and resolute in its treatment of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state, that will be the best incentive for the parties to accept that reality and work with it, not against it. I believe therefore that the international community, including NATO, must and will remain engaged in Bosnia beyond this first year after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. IFOR will remain in place and up to strength to provide support to the OSCE for the municipal elections provided that they take place before the end of the year. These are the next crucial steps in ensuring a sustainable peace in Bosnia. Looking beyond those elections, there was broad consensus among Defence Ministers in Bergen last week that our military planners should look at various options for a possible follow-on force. Whatever is decided at the political level later, our military will be ready. This brings me to my second point. NATO's intervention in Bosnia has highlighted a reality which many had forgotten: that NATO's military structure is a priceless and unique asset. Indeed, it is something we must maintain in full working order. Yet, the Alliance cannot carry out new missions with old structures. We are therefore developing a new military structure which will see us well into the new century - one which will have the participation of all the Allies and at the same time have the flexibility to involve Partner countries in crisis management operations of the future. Perhaps of greatest interest for this Committee is that, for the first time, the new structure will reflect a growing and visible European responsibility in defence and security terms. All Allies now agree that the European Security and Defence Identity should be developed inside NATO, and not outside it. Creating ESDI inside NATO means that we can make the best use of resources already devoted to defence. Through the development of separable but not separate forces within NATO, we can give practical support to our European Allies should they wish to undertake operations under the political control of the Western European Union. This new flexibility in our military structures thus fulfils the promise made at the 1994 Brussels Summit that we - NATO - would support in a practical way the longstanding ambition of our European Allies to share more equitably the burden of security in Europe and to define a renewed strategic partnership with the United States. This makes sense on both sides of the Atlantic. A stronger Europe will ensure continued US commitment to European security. And only a stronger Europe can be an effective strategic partner of the United States when it comes to managing global security challenges in the future. Troisième point. Nous devons prendre des décisions au sujet de l'ouverture de l'Alliance à de nouveaux membres. Nous sommes arrivés au moment o les stades préparatoires vont s'achever. Le processus de dialogue intensifié approche de son terme. Les Etats qui veulent adhérer à l'OTAN ont maintenant une idée beaucoup plus précise de ce qu'implique le statut de membre et de la faon dont l'Alliance fonctionne. De notre cté, nous nous faisons une idée beaucoup plus précise de ceux qui souhaitent se joindre à nous. Le processus est en bonne voie pour que la décision soit prise, probablement par les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement lors d'un sommet de l'OTAN en 1997, d'inviter plusieurs Partenaires à engager des négociations en vue de leur accession. Pourtant, avant que cette décision puisse être prise, nous devrons avoir mis en place une politique pour ceux qui n'adhéreront pas à l'Alliance ou qui pourraient y adhérer ultérieurement. C'est là le quatrième domaine fondamental dans lequel des travaux urgents sont en cours. Lun des principaux mécanismes dont nous disposons pour ce faire est le Partenariat pour la paix, grâce auquel ont déjà été créés des liens sans précédent entre l'OTAN et des pays non membres. Notre intention est d'étoffer et d'élargir substantiellement le champ du Partenariat pour tenir compte de la situation nouvelle qui existera après l'élargissement de l'OTAN. Permettez moi de souligner que l'admission de nouveaux membres dans l'OTAN n'est pas un objectif poursuivi isolément, hors de tout contexte, comme une fin en soi. Elle s'inscrit dans le cadre du processus d'intégration plus large qui se déroule dans l'Europe d'aujourd'hui. En bref, un "PfP plus" devrait donner la nécessaire assurance que la sécurité d'une OTAN élargie et celle de ses Partenaires demeurent étroitement liées. Fifthly, we are fleshing out the substance of a new - and permanent - relationship with Russia. Much good, effective cooperation has been achieved with the Russians in the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. But our cooperation should and does go beyond IFOR. Both NATO and Russia are major contributors to European security and stability, and we need a long-term relationship that reflects this fact. There are a number of imaginative, positive proposals on the table, including a formal Charter which would create standing arrangements for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alliance. But whatever the final form of our relations, the content of a Russia-NATO relationship will be substantial. I have sought in my recent discussions with both Foreign Minister Primakov and Defence Minister Rodionov to emphasise the potential that lies ready to be tapped in our relations. There is no doubt that the Russians see the strategic benefits of Russia and NATO working together. But we need to get the ball rolling; that is why I continue to urge them to respond positively to the concrete proposals NATO has already put on the table for a real partnership. I will continue to pursue this approach when I meet the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Mr Lebed, next week. We also need to enhance our relations with Europes second-largest country, Ukraine, which occupies a key strategic position. We must help this crucial country to consolidate its evolution into a stable democracy by developing an enhanced relationship with NATO. All those changes, in their totality, will result in a new NATO, reformed equally in purpose and structure. It will be an Alliance with a renewed strategic value, and fresh strategic energy, shaping and moulding European security beyond the borders of its members. But NATO cannot and should not bear the burden alone. The new NATO that I have just described will - in my view - open the way towards greater strategic coherence between the two great motors of peace and stability on this continent: NATO and the European Union. NATO and the EU working together towards the same strategic ends will have a profound effect on the evolution of European security, in particular on embracing an outward-looking, democratic and prospering Russia. Another important strategic challenge before both organisations is to help stabilise the Mediterranean region and build a peaceful, friendly, economically vibrant area to our South. The European Union must take the lead, but NATO can help by intensifying our Mediterranean dialogue. It is my profound conviction that NATO and the EU can shape the European political, economic and security landscape for a peaceful and prosperous future. Together, we have to face up to this great challenge and responsibility. That is why the results of the Intergovernmental Conference are important for NATO. And what we are doing in NATO is of direct relevance to the EU and the IGC. A new NATO will not only be prepared for a more effective European contribution, but it needs such a contribution to create a more mature transatlantic partnership. In NATO we are developing an instrument which a unifying Europe can use. But it cannot be used if there is no European unity. Ainsi, Mesdames, Messieurs les députés, l'Alliance s'achemine rapidement vers une série de décisions - sur les besoins futurs en matière de sécurité en Bosnie, sur une rénovation de la structure militaire y donnant plus de poids à la composante européenne, sur l'élargissement, sur le développement du PfP, et sur l'établissement de relations renforcées, permanentes et institutionnalisées avec la Russie. Il sagit là dune véritable révolution pour lAlliance. Le résultat sera une Alliance nouvelle parfaitement adaptée aux défis de sécurité du XXIe siècle.