Norwegian Atlantic Treaty Association Oslo 9th May 1996

Speech by the Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here in Oslo to speak to you. I welcome the chance to address the Norwegian Atlantic Treaty Association which is one of the most active and successful within the Alliance. I pay tribute to your commitment to our Alliance and your work in keeping the Norwegian public informed on security issues at a time of great change. I am also personally grateful to you for providing me with this chance to speak at the Nobel Institute. The award of the Nobel Institute of the Peace Prize reminds us constantly that it is engagement, not words, that leads to peace. It is only by constantly working towards better relationships between countries that we can hope to achieve real and lasting peace. This brings me directly to the theme of my remarks today: how the Alliance is facing up to the challenge of making an enduring peace in Europe in totally different circumstances from those in which NATO operated for over forty years. The end of the Cold War came suddenly. In retrospect, the Alliance reacted with vision, foresight and determination. For decades we in the West safeguarded our security and demonstrated through our determination to defend ourselves collectively, that we would never be intimidated or blackmailed by force of arms. Over those decades the economic success and democratic values of our Western societies gave the peoples of the East both an example and the hope of a better way of life. It is now evident that the Soviet regime had been skating on thin ice for some time. The civil and economic infrastructure was too fragile and weak to bear the weight of the Soviet military system. The ice did not just crack, it fragmented. The result was that we in the West were faced not with the challenge of safeguarding our territory, but of building a new security system. There was no blueprint. The end of the Cold War meant that we were all in new and unfamiliar waters. There was no map and not even a compass to point the way. The bipolar security world - East versus West - had disappeared. Countries of Central and Eastern Europe quickly began to reorientate themselves towards NATO and the European Union, both of which were the landmarks which had stood so long as symbols of hope.

At that crucial time, the Alliance took some very important decisions about the future of the new security environment. The first concerned the emergence of new risks. Yes, the Alliance believed that there would be a peace dividend and we quickly moved to realise it. NATO Allies agreed to reduce and restructure their military forces. But, no, the Alliance did not believe that a peace dividend meant that the problems of European security had been totally resolved. We were moving definitively into a more positive era but we were not moving, unfortunately, into an age in which Europe would be permanently stable, and security could take care of itself. In Bosnia, we see how the ancient antagonisms can erupt to threaten the wider peace. A second key judgement that NATO made at the end of the Cold War concerned the importance of creating a new European security architecture. NATO decided that it should help take the lead in building an effective institutional framework in which institutions contributing to European security - NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, etc. - could support and reinforce each other. The rationale for a broad view of European security remains clear-cut. Security is more than just military security. It is an encompassing concept, and security is indivisible. No one institution can address and solve all of European economic, environmental or security problems. No one institution can satisfy all the requirements of a Europe growing together. Real stability, over the long term, can only be achieved through an effective system of mutually reinforcing institutions in which each country can find its own place and have its say. Yet each institution, each with its own characteristics, should be part of a wider framework which can help keep Europe on the rails and moving in the right direction. So, for these reasons, NATO has been developing close working contacts with the Western European Union, the OSCE, the UN and other organisations concerned with security in Europe. And I believe very strongly that this network must be strengthened further. When it comes to action or facing hard security challenges, NATO remains unique in its capabilities as an institution. Nonetheless, others have to play their part in building an all-round sense of security.

A third key judgement made by the Alliance at the end of the Cold War was that cooperation, and not confrontation, would be the key strategic instrument for shaping our security environment. This judgement has been vindicated many times over. Indeed, this has proved such an important dynamic in NATO's approach to security that I wish to focus particularly on it in my remarks today. Let us look first at what the Alliance has been doing to build new relationships and new attitudes. In 1991, we established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which was the first major initiative to establish a permanent link between NATO and the newly emerging democracies to the East. Since then, the Cooperation Council has met regularly at Foreign Ministers level, at Defence Ministers level and at Military Chiefs level. There is also a regular flow of expertise and exchange of experience on a whole range of security-related matters. This has helped the countries deal with problems of adjustment and of reorganisation and, particularly, of establishing democratically accountable military forces. As I'm sure these countries will tell you, the support and encouragement of NATO have been important to the progress they have made. Whereas six years ago several of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had no independent existence, many are now established democracies with their own clear identity, their own voice and their own policies. The continued independence of those countries is a key element of our vision of peace in Europe. The success of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council gave birth to the Partnership for Peace. This is now the most intensive programme of military to military cooperation ever conceived. There are 16 Allies and 27 other countries involved in Partnership for Peace. They come from all points of the compass and from a range of security traditions. It is truly pan-European in scope. Included in PfP are several traditionally neutral countries, such as Sweden and Finland, and a number of other countries, such as Slovenia and Malta, who have been attracted to PfP as a mechanism which allows them effectively to participate in the security architecture and prepare their forces for peacekeeping operations. If we look particularly at the Northern part of Europe, PfP is the only forum where the military forces of all the Nordic countries are engaged, coming together regularly to train and exercise. Indeed, there is considerable potential within PfP for in Bosnia where the NATO-led Implementation Force is giving a real chance of peace to that war-stricken land. This is the first Spring in four years without a major military offensive. It is the first Spring in which the delicate green shoots of hope have the chance to ripen and grow.

The IFOR is built around the experience, expertise and military structures of the Alliance. But what is so remarkable is that our military structure has demonstrated the flexibility to undertake a mission it was not originally designed for, and that it has managed to integrate so many non-Allies so effectively. In my visits to Bosnia, I must say, I have been impressed and inspired by what I saw. Take, for example, the Nordic Brigade, in which Norway participates. This brings together the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic countries and Poland in a unique demonstration of practical cooperation. Elsewhere in the same region of Bosnia, Americans and Russians are side by side, frequently going out on joint patrols together. These examples can be multiplied. What they show is a new dynamic, a new mentality at work in Europe. Never before has there been such an intensive or extensive spirit of cooperation on this continent. And never before, when the conflicts in the Balkans have arisen, have so many countries been on the same side - the side of peace. IFOR is the model of an undivided Europe at work; it is a model for the future. Inevitably, the result of NATO's interaction with its Partners in PfP and IFOR will be to create a greater pool of interoperable military forces, which can serve in future operations. It has also hastened the process of familiarisation with NATO for those countries who wish to join. Having made such great strides to democratise their societies and liberalise their economies, Central and Eastern European countries are now looking, with increasing impatience, to membership of NATO and the EU in order to consolidate and strengthen their reforms. They reason that once inside these institutions, they will achieve, for the first time in their histories, a sense of confidence in their destiny and a sense of belonging. They wish to be given the same chance - an Atlantic chance - that Western Europe was given when it, too, faced the problems of reconstruction after the Second World War. These are powerful arguments. They are arguments to which NATO cannot turn a deaf ear. Indeed, it is entirely natural that as Europe grows together, so will the successful institutions of Western Europe expand to embrace those who share the same values. NATO has made steady progress towards enlargement. This year we are involved in an exploratory dialogue with those who wish to join. In December, our Foreign Ministers will decide the next step - which will be a step forward. The process of enlargement can therefore be described as already underway.

Yet, while we respond to the legitimate expectations of Central Europeans to join the Alliance, we cannot be deaf to the concerns of Russia. When President Yeltsin visited Oslo a few weeks ago, he made his opposition to NATO enlargement very clear indeed. Since then, I have had the chance to discuss NATO enlargement in depth with Mr. Yeltsin in Moscow. I came away from my visit to Russia with no doubt about the depth of Russian anxieties about new countries joining the Alliance. Yet, I also came away convinced that these anxieties are based on a profound misunderstanding about NATO and our intentions towards Russia. I believe it is possible to allay those fears and remove the misunderstandings. The best way to do so is to engage in an honest and reasoned dialogue. They should not be left in any doubt about one point: NATO enlargement will happen. A new Europe can only be built on the principle of free choice, not spheres of interest. The new democracies see practical benefit from joining the successful institutions of Western Europe and it is inevitable that, as part of their adaptation to the new realities of Europe, NATO and the EU will accept members from the East. For over four decades political and military cooperation in NATO has resulted in a degree of transparency and trust that has created a historically unique zone of stability among its members. It is our goal to extend this zone of stability by giving our neighbours an opportunity to become part of this unique security culture. Moreover, those who join will be full members with all the benefits and obligations that membership implies. NATO is not interested in semi-detached members, and we are not considering ideas for political but not military membership of NATO. Yet the fact that enlargement will happen, should not mean that what NATO gains, Russia loses. Russia has no reason to fear NATO enlargement. In trying to persuade Russia of the fact, my first and foremost point is: NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia.

NATO today sees cooperation as the key instrument of security and has dismantled the forward military posture that characterised it in the Cold War. Our forces have been reduced by 30%; US forces in Europe reduced by 60%; nuclear weapons by 80%. We have no - I repeat no - nuclear missiles on European soil. Moreover, we have not the slightest intention of reversing that trend. Second point: we are committed to a close relationship with Russia. We have offered a close, indeed permanent, consultative mechanism between us in which there would be the maximum of transparency and the closest possible cooperation. We still await a response. Again, this is an offer of a genuine partnership with Russia, which recognizes the importance of its potential contribution to European security. My third point: those who join the Alliance must also be committed to a good, constructive relationship with Russia as all NATO members are. My guess is that they will be much better disposed towards Russia after they join, than before. This is not as improbable as it may sound. When Mr. Yeltsin was here, he praised the relationship between Russia and Norway as a very positive one. The fact that Norway has always been a strong and highly committed member of NATO did not, I hope, escape his attention. Norway shows very clearly that it is possible to be a member of NATO and a friend of Russia. In a sense, it is because Norway is a member of the Alliance, and is part of a wider protective framework that gives it the confidence to develop a close and constructive bilateral relationship with Russia. The same is likely to happen with the new countries who join. Once they can relax about their own security, they can be more outward looking, more positive about renewing and developing their contacts with Russia. The desire to bring Russia closer to us, not isolate her, goes hand in hand with the process of enlargement.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me conclude. In my intervention, I have focussed on the importance and the achievements of NATO in positioning itself to deal with the new security challenges. But NATO does not operate within a vacuum. With other institutions we are striving to create a real framework for peace - a security architecture which can address the whole range of issues and satisfy the aspirations for security and prosperity of all Europeans, not just some. The purpose of the security architecture is to create the conditions of peace and security within which Europe can evolve and prosper. NATO has a key role within it in continuing to safeguard security, but also to work with others to promote security far beyond our borders. We see cooperation as a new motivating force in relations between European states. We have therefore established closer and closer ties with other countries through Partnership for Peace. In IFOR in Bosnia, we see that such cooperation has created dynamic and new opportunities. Looking beyond Bosnia, several of our Partners are on the way to joining the Alliance and I believe that we have strong arguments for persuading Russia that it, too, has much to gain from closer ties with NATO. So Europe is growing together. The dividing lines and fault lines of the past are disappearing. All this is possible because the Alliance remains an effective instrument of peace today as it was in the past. Because the transatlantic link is the cornerstone of our security. And because the Allies remain totally committed to the vision of a Europe whole and free. We are on the way to achieving that vision.