Conference on dismantlement and destruction of chemical nuclear and conventional weapons Bonn - 20 May 1996

Dinner Speech by the Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends, I would like to start by thanking you all for coming to this conference. It is gratifying to see such a large turn-out and I appreciate the strong presence from Russia. I wish to express my gratitude to the generosity and support of our German hosts who have made available the Petersberg as a venue for this event. It is a perfect location. I wish to thank in particular Foreign Minister Kinkel for his personal support and commitment to this conference and to the wider cause of disarmament in general. And I also wish to thank the Ministry for Higher Education and Research of North-Rhine- Westphalia for its co-sponsorship of this event. The subject of this conference - the safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons - is of key importance to the security of all the countries represented here. Expertise and experience in this area are not confined to one country or one organisation. We can all benefit from each other. By addressing the technical questions of destruction and dismantlement, we can contribute towards the wider goal of countering proliferation of such weapons. Certainly, as we look to the future, there is a growing probability of the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons to some of the most unstable regions in the world. These weapons are being sought in order to achieve regional superiority or in order to intimidate. The result could only be severe regional instability, and no one would remain unaffected by such a development. Within the Alliance we have long recognised the importance of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the very least, under the Washington Treaty, we have an obligation to defend each other against threats to our security and territorial integrity. It is inevitable that as the risk of proliferation grows, so the Alliance, as a security organisation, should take an increasing interest in countering this danger to its members.

I believe that this danger is growing. Approximately two dozen countries, some of them not very far away, have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, while in some cases, the capability already exists. Many countries are also gaining the capability to build surface-to-air missiles as a delivery system. By early next century, these capabilities are likely to have advanced significantly, particularly if abetted by the purchase or illicit transfer of weapons, delivery systems, and related technologies. Yet we do not see this as a risk to the Allies alone. The proliferation of such weapons will affect international security and stability generally. Nor do we believe that the solution to this problem is for the Allies to find alone. While there is much that we can do on the military and defence side to protect ourselves against both the threat of use and the use of weapons of mass destruction, we believe that the best solution is to work with others to limit and even reverse the current trend. For that reason, since the NATO Summit of January 1994, we have increased our political and diplomatic efforts considerably. One result has been the success in getting the NPT extended indefinitely in 1995. The Allies consulted and coordinated extensively both within NATO and in the UN fora to achieve this. We are very much aware that proliferation also poses risks to NATO's Partners with whom we have close and warm relations. Therefore, as part of its non-proliferation efforts, the Alliance consults regularly with its Cooperation Partners in the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The aim of these consultations is to foster a mutual understanding of the proliferation problem and to develop a common approach in response. NATO's Political Committee has met on several occasions with Partners to discuss the problems of disarmament. So, the more we can cooperate, the more successful we are all likely to be in ensuring the security of our populations into the next century.

If we can reduce the leakage of material and know- how, if we can solve the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, we can do much to prevent proliferation. So, this is a key issue and, may I say, a key conference. I am pleased that NATO helped to make this event possible, through our staff support, under the able direction of Dr. Cadiou, the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs. I do not intend this evening to make a speech entirely on the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear and other weapons. I do not want to proliferate the speeches on proliferation. The programme was designed to stimulate debate and exchange information on that subject. I would like instead to share some views on the evolution of security in general. In the past few months I have visited most NATO nations and 13 Partner countries. And I have four times visited Bosnia to see, at first hand, how the Implementation Force was progressing. Within a short but intense visit programme, it has been possible to gain, not just a snapshot, but a clear picture of the direction in which we are heading in security terms. I have a very strong sense that the direction is very positive, indeed. What struck me most is the indisputable fact that more than ever in the past, European security is seen as indivisible. In other words, Europe is not divided, and there is a genuine common interest in working together to find solutions to problems. Cooperation between states is seen not just to be in the common economic interest, but to be in the common strategic interest, too. This is a new and historically significant fact on this continent. Within a very short period, there has been a profound shift in attitudes - certainly not just in relation to the Cold War, but also perhaps in relation to the previous two centuries of European history. Notions such as the balance of power, spheres of interest and containment have given way to the realisation that security and stability can be safeguarded by creating both the habits and the institutional framework for permanent cooperation between states.

Certainly, everywhere I have visited in the past few months, there is a strong commitment to strengthen ties and intensify cooperation. The Alliance has been in the forefront of this process. Beginning in 1991, when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was established, and especially since 1994, when Partnership for Peace was launched, NATO has been engaged in pushing back the boundaries of the old confrontational order and opening up the possibilities for a new cooperative order. The Alliance was in the forefront, but it was not alone. Nor should it have been. The European Union with its extensive agreements with countries to the East; the Western European Union with its Associate Partners; the OSCE with its mandate as a pan-European security organisation - these are all complementary initiatives, and all part of a deliberate attempt to create both the bones and the muscles of an entirely different type of security system in Europe. A Europe which is growing naturally together will not easily draw apart, as it has done far too often in the past. I am convinced that the time and resources we have spent on developing common approaches to security are well invested. The result can be found in Bosnia, where we can see the practical outcome of our cooperation in very concrete, specific terms. Military forces of the 16 NATO nations are implementing, side-by-side with 16 non-NATO countries, the military aspects of the Peace Agreement negotiated in Dayton and signed in Paris. The main point about the IFOR is that it is getting results. Within the deadlines set out in the military annex of the Agreement, IFOR succeeded in separating forces, and bringing a secure environment to Bosnia. IFOR is now working to ensure that forces of the parties are returned to barracks or demobilised. Today, one-third of the way through its one-year mandate, IFOR is in a phase we call "the transition to peace". In this period, the aim is to ensure that the transition from conflict to peace is fully completed and that free elections can take place under a new constitution for a new government.

I have been impressed and inspired by the level of military efficiency and the spirit of practical cooperation shown on the ground. I have often mentioned the Nordic Brigade, where Scandinavian, Baltic and Polish soldiers form one unit. There is also the highly significant example of Americans and Russians patrolling and operating together. Yet IFOR is equally a tremendous and entirely unprecedented political achievement. It represents the strongest collective political commitment yet seen to contain and resolve a conflict which affects us all in Europe. Yes, there are still challenges to the peace process. So long as indicted war criminals remain at large, mistrust will continue. So long as there is a greater inclination towards confrontation rather than reconciliation, then the economic and political reconstruction of the country will be delayed. However, I am hopeful. The success of IFOR means there is a real chance for peace and economic development in Bosnia. Slowly, step by step, the people of Bosnia are realising this fact and responding to this real opportunity. I believe that we - that is, all of us - will succeed in Bosnia, as well as succeed equally in the wider aim of creating a better sense of security for everyone in Europe. The reason why I am optimistic can be seen at this conference today. This gathering of representatives from sixteen nations which are key to the security of Europe is proof of a new sense of unity and purpose that exists among Europeans and North Americans, whether tackling the problems of Bosnia or ensuring the safe and secure dismantlement of the massive weapons stocks from the Cold War. Today we have an historic opportunity to create a new approach to security. Together we shall succeed. Thank you.