NATO Speech to the Polish Euro-Atlantic Associations University of Warsaw 18 Apr. 1996

Speech by the Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first of all thank you for your kind welcome. In a few weeks time you will be celebrating the 205th anniversary of the first Polish Constitution, an important document of modern European history. Through many previous periods of Polish history the cruel realities of European power politics had reduced this document to a mere hope - a symbol of a people that was denied its legitimate aspirations. Today, as Poland is once again a free, sovereign and independent country, the Polish people can rightly celebrate this anniversary. It represents Poland's historic commitment to the protection of human and civil rights. The document that brought NATO into being, the Washington Treaty, is of course a different contract. In comparison with the first Polish Constitution, it is a mere youngster. Yet it also has great long-term significance. It is a founding document for the security of a Euro-Atlantic community of nations. Such a community was the guiding vision that inspired the drafters in 1949. Accordingly, they did not define NATO's purpose solely as one of protecting its members in military terms. The ambition from the start was both simpler and broader: in the words of the Treaty, "to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." And the Atlantic Alliance was never what alliances always were in the past, a mere alliance of convenience against a specific threat. Of course, there was a Soviet threat. It was a reality that one could not ignore, just as one could not ignore the division of Europe into two ideologically opposed camps. Consequently, the initial broad definition of NATO's purpose was narrowed down under the weight of the circumstances: just as the term "Europe" came to be associated with its Western part only, so NATO became associated with a military security organisation dealing exclusively with a single, massive threat.

But the Alliance was never content with the status quo. We worked not to keep things as they were, but to change them. We sought to remove the causes of the confrontation and bring to an end the division of Europe. For there could be no long-term and lasting stability or well-being in Europe as long as the continent was divided. Yet while all our attempts at political dialogue, reconciliation, arms control and confidence-building helped to alleviate the division, we in the West could not overcome it alone. It was up to you, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, who, through your courageous stance, set in motion that fascinating - and fortunate - chain of events that has brought us to where we are today: a Europe whose borders are defined by values rather than by spheres of interest. Just as the term "Europe" is now regaining its true, comprehensive meaning, so NATO can now return to its original, broader ambition of becoming an instrument for our well-being and stability: it can move from safeguarding security to promoting it. Nowhere has this new role of NATO become more visible than in Bosnia. Indeed, the international force assembled to implement the Peace Accords is a true "coalition for peace". For the first time in the Alliance's 47-year history, the Allies have been joined by other nations - 17 of them, including Poland, and including even countries from beyond Europe. Together, we are helping to implement the hard-won peace, and thus enable the reconstruction of a viable and peaceful civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have passed a number of significant milestones in overseeing and ensuring that the parties respect what they have agreed to - namely, the separation of forces and their withdrawal into clearly defined areas. The Implementation Force is also helping to create a safe environment and climate of confidence which are needed for peace to take root in Bosnia. Poland is a part of IFOR, and its contribution is widely appreciated. Just recently I had the opportunity and pleasure to visit the Polish mechanised battalion. Let me tell you how impressed I was with what I saw. Its integration in the Nordic Brigade is an example of how Allies and Partners, countries of Central Europe, NATO and the EU can demonstrate operationally their commitment to a common cause. In a way, IFOR at large and the Nordic Brigade within it are models for developing the kind of cooperative Europe to which we aspire.

IFOR did not come about by accident. Without the preparation in the Partnership for Peace it could not have been orchestrated so quickly and effectively. Indeed, one could say that "Operation Joint Endeavour" represents the strongest possible endorsement of PfP. The Partnership has put a premium on practical cooperation to develop the capability for Partners and Allies alike to work together jointly in a range of peacekeeping-type operations. From the very beginning of PfP, Poland has been one of the most active Partners. It has hosted the very first PfP exercise in 1994 and has participated in nine exercises last year. It is represented both at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and in the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons. It will remain at the forefront of intensifying the Partnership further, to reflect the lessons of Bosnia and to ensure its effectiveness as a means of preparing forces for future contingency operations. In particular, we must see to it that our unique experience gained in IFOR will not dissipate once we move out of Bosnia. The mechanisms for further enhancing PfP are already in place. For example, the Planning and Review Process, in which Poland plays an active part, will help us manage our scarce defence resources more efficiently and improve the interoperability with NATO forces. But we can go even further. In particular, we must strengthen the political-military dimension of PfP, with an emphasis on the democratic control of military forces, for we believe that no democracy can be stable or firmly rooted unless its military is democratically accountable and under proper civilian control. As Poland has recently made significant strides in resolving this complex problem, it should be a strong contributor in this area. If we use PfP opportunities to the full, the Partnership can act as a catalyst for a common "culture" of security cooperation which has never before existed in Europe. IFOR and the Partnership for Peace are the most vivid examples of a growing consciousness not to repeat the mistakes made in Europe's past. As such PfP is an encouraging sign of the tremendous strides Europe has made since the end of the Cold War. Yet Europe has not yet fully escaped its past. The killing fields of Srebrenica have brought home to us all what havoc xenophobic nationalism and intolerance are capable of wreaking.

This spirit of intolerance is not confined to the Balkans alone, and it is not confined to violent conflicts. Disregard for the values a new Europe must be built upon can have many expressions: in the way minorities are treated, or in the way opportunities for reconciliation with neighbours are being deliberately rejected or carelessly missed. But intolerance is also visible in any talk of "spheres of interest", or "buffer zones". As long as the idea that each country is free to choose its future is not yet fully accepted everywhere, Europe's division cannot fully heal. Nowhere have these old ideas and myths been lingering more persistently than in the debate about NATO's enlargement. Let me therefore say a few words on this issue. My first and foremost point is this: NATO enlargement will happen. The free choice of alignment must be the very basis on which any post-Yalta Europe must be built. It is also in our fundamental security interest to ensure that the new democracies continue to develop in a positive direction and participate in all aspects of the construction of Europe. For over four decades political and military cooperation in NATO has resulted in a degree of transparency and trust that has created a historically unique zone of stability among its members. It should be our goal to extend this zone of stability by giving our neighbours an opportunity to become part of this unique security culture. My second point: Those who join will be full members with all the benefits and obligations that membership implies. NATO is not interested in semi-detached members, and we are certainly not interested in ideas for political but not military membership of NATO. All those who join will be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, and all those who join will have to be capable of fulfilling their obligations on behalf of others. Does this suggest an undue emphasis on military aspects of enlargement? I do not think so. Whether through NATO, through the EU or other frameworks, what we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, civic space. I deliberately include our military arrangements into this definition of "civic space". The postwar experience in Western Europe suggests that political and economic progress and security integration are closely linked. Once their security is taken care of, countries can devote themselves with more confidence to their longer-term evolution. And a responsible military, firmly embedded in our democratic societies and under civil control, is part and parcel of that civic space, as are military structures that are transparent, defensive, and multinational. These are eminently political achievements we want to preserve and extend.

My third point about enlargement: we need to get it right. So before we can identify specific candidates for membership, we need to conduct a dialogue with interested parties. This dialogue is currently taking place and will keep us busy for the remainder of this year. Indeed, there is a lot to be discussed. We have to explain the roles and responsibilities of membership, its costs as well as its benefits. The current NATO Allies must thoroughly assess how new members will impact on the political and military structures of the Alliance. And those aspiring to become members must carefully consider the implications NATO membership will have for them: how it will affect their political and military environment and how they see themselves contributing to our overall security. In my view, this is a matter that must not be confined to expert circles, but to a broader public debate. So NATO's enlargement is on track. Those who still argue that the EU should enlarge, for it is a "political" association, whereas NATO should not, for it is a "military" one, have not grasped the true significance of what Europe is about. Our idea of Europe is not limited to economic well-being but reflects a broader set of values -- values which unite us with the democracies of North America. After 1945, when Western Europe was given another chance, it was given an Atlantic chance. The same chance, not a lesser imitation of it, should now be given to the new democracies to NATO's East. Such an Atlantic Europe is a Europe without the Cold War dividing lines. It is a Europe in which a democratic Russia has its rightful place. In our own interest we want to see a strong and democratic Russia, as a stable and reliable partner. If Russia develops along the path of democracy as we all wish she will, and if we work together, there is hardly any security problem in the Euro-Atlantic area that we could not deal with. A strong bond between NATO and Russia will have to be a key element of the new European security order. The beginning of such a close NATO/Russia relationship is already well underway. Russia is part of the IFOR coalition in Bosnia, and the cooperation on the ground between NATO and Russian forces is excellent. But cooperation in Bosnia is not enough. We have proposed to Russia a relationship that would allow us to tackle a far wider set of issues: to prevent and end regional crises and conflicts; to prevent nuclear proliferation; to devise common strategies for dealing with new security challenges; and to develop together a cooperative approach to European security.

Russia is still hesitating whether to take up the offer. She has not yet fully found her new role in this new Europe. Perhaps it would be unrealistic to expect such a major process of adjustment to happen within only a few years. But our goal is clear: it is to pursue a NATO-Russia relationship which permits both sides to tackle pragmatically the problems we face in common. We will continue this pursuit. It would be a historical mistake to create new dividing lines in Europe or otherwise isolate Russia. We want to work closely with Russia because a healthy and cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia can and must be a key foundation of security in post-Cold War Europe. Ladies and Gentlemen, As long as we were locked into the straitjacket of the Cold War, NATO could only deal with the potential effects rather than the causes of conflict. Today, we can pursue a broader, more proactive approach - one that seeks to shape events as much as to protect ourselves from their consequences. This approach can only be successful, however, with a NATO that transcends itself -- a NATO with new missions, with new Partners, and ultimately, with new members.