Russian Council on Foreign and Security Policy 20 Mar. 1996

Speech by the Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be here in Moscow and to have the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. I am now the second Secretary General of NATO to come to Moscow after the visits of the late Manfred Wörner, who was here in 1990 and in February 1992. Although Russia had just emerged as a new international entity and Russian troops were still stationed in Central Europe, Manfred Wörner's message was clear: the Cold War is over, let us establish a true partnership between Russia and NATO. In my visit here today, I can proudly say that such a partnership has already begun. The clear proof can be seen in the Balkans, a place that, historically, has been a region of deep-seated divisions, great power rivalry, and a cradle of conflict. Today, forces from NATO countries, from Russia, and from many others in and outside of Europe are joining together in an unprecedented coalition for peace. Last Friday I visited the Russian brigade in Bosnia and had intensive discussions with the Commander of the Operational Group, General Segutkin as well as Colonel Lentsov and his staff. I was impressed by the professionalism and motivation of the Russian forces and by the high degree of their integration in IFOR. For instance, they are conducting joint patrols with US forces. Relations between the Russians and the rest of IFOR are excellent. Of course, there remain many difficulties to overcome before we can talk confidently of long-term peace in the region. There is a deep mistrust and fear between the peoples of Bosnia. But the Implementation Force has done the job it was asked to do with supreme skill and professionalism and it has made the difference between war and peace in Bosnia. Long-term stability in the Balkans is in the interest of all of us. This is the first example of Russia and NATO working together in this way - I am convinced it will be the first of many. Together we demonstrate the unity of purpose of the international community. In Bosnia we can see what is possible to achieve if we work together; united we are a formidable coalition for peace. We can see that whatever the theories of European security, reality can outpace theory. In Bosnia we see an undivided Europe at work. IFOR is a model for the future.

But cooperation in Bosnia is not enough. We need a much broader cooperation between NATO and Russia - cooperation that enables us to tackle together all the problems we face together: to prevent and end regional crises and conflicts, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to devise common strategies for dealing with new security challenges, to develop together a cooperative approach to security. We share so many of the same interests and concerns that it would be folly not to be working very closely together. In all our interests we want to see a strong and democratic Russia, as a stable and reliable partner, and we want to work with you. Let us be realistic: Russia's development is of key importance and interest for the rest of Europe. If Russia develops along the path of democracy, as we all wish she will, and if we work together, there is hardly any security problem in the Euro-Atlantic area that we could not deal with. This is why an enhanced relationship with Russia is so crucial. A strong bond between NATO and Russia is essential if Europe is to become a safer place. Such a relationship is a key element in any new European security architecture. It must be developed not because of some theoretical requirements, but because such a relationship is in our mutual self-interest. To be sure, we have made quite some progress in developing a broader relationship beyond Bosnia. A consultation process between Russia and NATO is already in place and working. In recent months we have together addressed issues related to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and the CFE Treaty, among others. For our joint participation in IFOR we have agreed a special consultative mechanism. To me, this cooperation is already an acknowledgement of how much we do need one another. But we have not been able to move as rapidly as I think we could, and certainly not as rapidly as European security would require us to go. Rather, when looking back at the last two years, we have not taken full advantage of the opportunities to carry our relationship further. We now need to make up for lost time, and we are doing just that in Bosnia. And I can promise you here and now, that NATO will do its part to make it happen. And let me add that the NATO which offers Russia a genuine Partnership is a NATO which has fundamentally transformed itself over the last several years. We have a new NATO. The NATO of today is an organisation that bears very little resemblance to the one of, say, 6 years ago. And it bears even less resemblance to the caricatures of it that I still come across occasionally.

How has NATO changed? In 1990, we offered the hand of friendship to all countries of the Warsaw Pact. A year later, we created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a forum in which NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries could discuss issues of common security. In the same year, 1991, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept that put the emphasis on preventing and managing crises rather than preparing for large-scale military operations. In 1994 we invited all countries of the OSCE area into the Partnership for Peace, to cooperate with us in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. 27 countries, including Russia, have taken up this offer. Our relations with former adversaries changed from confrontation to cooperation. Our strategy changed from one of preventing war to actively shaping peace. These changes are genuine, not just words in communiques. Allies have reduced and reconfigured their armed forces, to better carry out this new mission of peacekeeping. We have made major reductions in defence expenditure. Overall, the proportion of GDP allocated to defence has fallen by nearly 30% in the last 5 years. Levels of military forces in Europe have fallen substantially. For example, U.S. forces stationed in Europe have been cut by over 60%. Readiness levels of forces have been lowered drastically. Many units which in the Cold War were trained and prepared to deploy in a matter of days have now had their deployment times extended to weeks and even months. For the first time in 200 years the possibility of war between major powers is virtually unimaginable. Look at what has happened to NATO's nuclear forces. They have been cut even more drastically - by over 80%! We have withdrawn all nuclear missiles from Europe. NATO's existing low nuclear posture is seen by Allies as sufficient for preventing war and promoting stability - both for today's Alliance as well as for one which eventually includes new members. Indeed, it is our goal, in line with the improved security climate, to further reduce nuclear forces in the context of START II. Thus, we have no plans to change the nuclear posture of the Alliance on enlargement. In short, NATO has transformed itself both politically and militarily. That it could successfully go through all these changes is due to the fact that NATO is about much more than just collective defence. It is as much about developing trust, about establishing patterns of cooperation, about managing crises collectively and about creating peaceful, stable relations among European and North American democracies.

Thus NATO Allies remain convinced that the Alliance can make a significant contribution to our common goal of building, together with the other countries of Europe, a new European security architecture on a cooperative basis. They remain convinced, based on their own experience, that the zone of peace that NATO has facilitated among its member states, is too precious an achievement to waste. They want to retain the close link to the North American democracies, for twice in this century Europe has proven incapable of resolving its differences on its own. They believe that, even without any direct threat, it is simply more efficient to organise one's security in a multinational framework, rather than on a purely national basis. And they believe that the concept of democratic security can best be promoted by way of example rather than by lecturing others: with NATO serving as a successful example of how states of such disparate national histories and different cultural traditions can work together for the common benefit. So for the NATO of today, cooperation is at the heart of our strategic vision. We are strongly committed to a genuine partnership with Russia in addressing together security challenges. There is no way that NATO can or wants to solve the security problems of Europe on its own. It would be an illusion to believe that one single institution could handle all the complex problems that beset European security today. That is why we need a framework of mutually reinforcing institutions, in which the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO combine their individual strengths for the common goal. No institution can claim a monopoly on managing European security. That is why NATO for many years has consistently sought to strengthen the OSCE, and why NATO's support for the peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia were strictly based on mandates issued by the UN Security Council. But it is a fact which we all have to face that a number of Central and East European countries seek closer ties to institutions such as NATO or the European Union. These countries do not seek such ties because they feel a threat. They would just like to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community. That is why they wish to join the European Union. And that is why they would also like to join the organisation in which democracies in the transatlantic area discuss and coordinate their defence and security policies. And I think everybody will agree that the right for true self determination, the right for each country freely to choose its alignments, is the very foundation on which the new Europe will be based. And, as I have said, this Alliance they seek to join is an Alliance firmly committed to political and military reform, an Alliance which has made a closer relationship with Russia a key part of its policy.

What we should be focussing on, Russia and NATO together, is the real security challenges facing us and how to cope with them. The key question we have to answer is: how can we learn and apply the lessons of our partnership in Bosnia? How can we make it easier for an effective partnership between Russia and NATO to act in future crises? For me, the answer is obvious: let us use the opportunity offered by Partnership for Peace. Russia joined the Partnership in June 1994. Hopes were high that it would lead to ever increasing practical cooperation between us. These hopes have not thus far been entirely fulfilled. Russia's participation in PfP to date is not at the level or intensity that could be expected from a power as important as Russia. Whatever the reasons for the hesitation and slowness in developing a joint programme of cooperation, they should not be allowed to obstruct what is in the clear security interest of both Russia and NATO. We must develop a relationship which truly works. Through PfP we can develop the habits of cooperation, which will make Russia's involvement with NATO not a novelty but a practice. Of course, to act together requires not just military cooperation and preparation through the Partnership for Peace. It also requires a close and intimate political relationship, one in which there is both trust and mutual understanding. So, in recognition of Russia's status as a major European power with global responsibilities as a member of the UN Security Council, I reiterate the Alliance's earlier proposals to develop with Russia a particular, far-reaching, cooperative relationship. We do not only want to involve Russia in the building of the new Europe, but also to reassure Russia about our intentions for a cooperative approach to European security. We need a dialogue on the future direction our relationship should take.

Let me outline how we should proceed: First, we must make the ongoing IFOR cooperation a success. Second, we should fully exploit the opportunities of the Partnership for Peace by: re-invigorating our military-to-military cooperation; establishing a permanent military liaison between Russia and NATO at NATO Headquarters in Brussels; considering a dialogue among national armaments directors; developing further cooperation in the field of disaster assistance and humanitarian aid. Third, we should enhance our scientific cooperation. Fourth, we should develop a political framework which will cement a relationship of trust between us. In this context, I would like to recall NATO's proposal of last year to develop a political framework document elaborating basic principles for security cooperation as well as permanent consultation mechanisms. In due course, the political framework we develop between us could be set out in some kind of formal agreement between NATO and Russia. The main reason why I have come here within the first months of holding this post as Secretary General of NATO is that I want to demonstrate how important I believe a close relationship with Russia is. Let me be precise about what I mean. We ought to aim for a relationship in which there is active, regular consultation between us, and in which Russia and NATO keep each other fully informed of our agenda and concerns and have the opportunity to discuss and influence them. This consultation should be full, timely and transparent so that together we can shape events and address challenges and concerns which face us, before they turn into crises. I think such a relationship is achievable. It is certainly on offer.

Ladies and Gentlemen, In the early 19th century, a messenger rushed into the office of the great Austrian statesman Count Metternich to tell him that the Russian ambassador had died. Metternich looked up and asked: "what does he have in mind?" Obviously, mutual suspicion between Russia and the West was a common feature in European politics long before the Cold War. We need to get out of this straitjacket once and for all. To heal the division of Europe - that is our goal. If NATO and Russia act together, we will succeed. We owe this to our citizens and we owe it to future generations.