[ NATO PRESS RELEASES ]

Extraordinary
Session
of the WEU
Assembly

London,
22 Feb 1996


Speech

by the Deputy Secretary General

[Excellencies,]
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to address this distinguished Assembly on a timely and important topic such as preparation of the WEU's input into the Inter-Governmental Conference. I bring you the warm greetings of Secretary General Solana, who conveys his regrets for not being able to be here today.

Europe is in a period of flux, both institutionally and in the very nature of the security problems that face us. The forthcoming Inter-Governmental Conference will be an important element in our common efforts to devise coherent and workable mechanisms for security in Europe into the next century. The processes of NATO enlargement and the reform of NATO are other such elements.

It is, of course, not appropriate for me to talk about issues that are strictly for the WEU and the EU to decide. NATO, as such, is not a party to the IGC. However, it is appropriate to touch briefly on a few key principles of the NATO-WEU relationship that should be taken into account as the EU deliberates on its future relationship with the WEU.

The forthcoming IGC discussions on the future evolution of the European security and defence identity will be of significance for all members of the Alliance. The invitation to address your Assembly is a recognition that NATO is not just a bystander in this debate. The members of the European Union as a whole - not only our European Allies - have affirmed on many occasions that a strong Alliance is in their interest. For their part, in their January 1994 Summit Declaration, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed, and I quote, that "the Alliance and the EU share common strategic interests". Therefore, in any discussion of European defence, a key consideration is how to maintain the effectiveness of the European defence which the Alliance provides.

In this regard, the decision of France to participate more fully in NATO has given us the opportunity to make real headway in building up a European component inside the Alliance, and adapting NATO structures to meet new missions and new challenges. The French decision is part of a common recognition by all Allies that the European security and defence identity must be constructed first and foremost within, and not outside, the Alliance. This is as essential for the credibility of Europe as for transatlantic cohesion.

These new developments have reduced the fear of many that the building up of Europe's capability to act in the defence field would lead to duplication and divergencies among the organisations which deal with security matters. The processes of building up Europe's capacity to assume a greater share of the burden and of strengthening and renewing the Alliance and the transatlantic bonds which it represents can and must go hand in hand.

Another positive factor is that, as a result of the many and varied contacts there have been between NATO and the WEU and the development of cooperation between us, the conditions for conducting a productive debate on matters concerning the European security and defence identity are much better today. There is now greater openness between our institutions, particularly concerning their future aspirations. The WEU has been open so far in its reflections on the Inter-Governmental Conference and the future relationship of the WEU to the European Union. We very much welcome the transparency shown by successive WEU presidencies concerning WEU thinking on the IGC. We look forward to this policy of openness remaining very much at the forefront of NATO-WEU relations during the course of the IGC deliberations.

As I have said, NATO cannot remain indifferent to developments in the IGC. The implications of this process affect many aspects of European and transatlantic security. In short, issues of legitimate interest to NATO are at stake. In this regard, I want to touch on two issues:

  • first, how we can build a reinforced European component of NATO and thus a stronger NATO overall;

  • second, the question of the need to ensure that our defence commitments and guarantees remain credible and coherent.

Let me address each of these issues in turn.

First, the question of NATO's European component. That function is currently fulfilled by the WEU. The WEU, of course, performs a dual role. The Treaty on European Union refers to the WEU as an integral part of the development of the EU and requests the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications.

To some extent, this has always been a tricky balancing role. Yet as long as all WEU members are also NATO members, no insurmountable conceptual problems should arise. I am confident that the Alliance and the WEU can make significant progress on developing together more flexible military structures that could be used for European-led coalitions. To this end, one of our key objectives within the Alliance in the period leading up to the Berlin meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in June will be the finalisation of the CJTF concept.

As the IGC gets underway, the NATO Allies will be discussing how the new realities within the Alliance, which I described earlier, can be reflected in the Alliance's structures. This will be one of our top priorities. As the Secretary General has said on this subject, "we must avoid theory and theology". Our aim should be to be able to take significant decisions on NATO's future internal reorganisation by the time of the Berlin meeting of Foreign Ministers.

NATO's internal restructuring should permit both a stronger European component within the Alliance and a consolidation of the transatlantic link. If the experience in Bosnia teaches us anything, it is that Europe and North America continue to need each other as much today as during the Cold War. Our institutional arrangements should reflect that fact.

Let me turn to the issue of defence commitments. NATO's creation has often been described as marking a decisive break in a destructive and repetitive pattern of European history: the lesson was learnt that paper commitments alone do not guarantee a nation's security, and that commitments need to be institutionalised in order to be fully credible. In the current Europe, where we thankfully do not have to face a massive threat, some people are tempted to ignore history and declare such thinking as too rigid, even outmoded. But one only has to look at the long queue of NATO membership aspirants to realise that the demand for hard security guarantees is still greater than the supply.

Security guarantees must be clear and unambiguous. And NATO's position on this matter is also very clear and unambiguous. Today, all full members of the WEU are also members of NATO. Because of the cumulative effect of the security safeguards of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, this should continue to be the case in the future. A Europe of ambiguous commitments and of dubious "backdoor guarantees" would be a Europe in which the potential for miscalculation would be very high. This can be in no one's interest.

In the meantime, there is still more work to be done in expanding our ever-closer ties and strengthening further the relations and cooperation between NATO and the WEU, on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. The Alliance attaches great importance to the dialogue that has been established through NATO-WEU Joint Council meetings as well as other mechanisms on subjects of common concern and is determined to develop this dialogue further. We will continue to support the improvement of the WEU's operational capabilities, which would strengthen the European component of our Alliance and enable the European Allies to take greater responsibility for shouldering their share of the common security and defence.

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I admit that much of what I have said may seem like well-trodden ground. But we have to remind ourselves of these basic issues from time to time - otherwise semantic imprecision creeps in and we lose sight of the fundamentals. Too often institutions are judged for the "philosophies" they represent rather than for what they are capable of achieving. The success of IFOR points to the importance of the Alliance as the central mechanism for complex, demanding, concerted actions within Europe.

So let us remind ourselves of one central fact: NATO, the WEU and the EU have the same strategic interests - shaping the security environment of the future for the better and enhancing stability and security throughout the wider Europe. Only if our respective organisations go about their business together will they achieve their goals. We at NATO are confident that by fostering common approaches to our security, the goal of a new and coherent European security architecture is not only desirable but entirely within our grasp. Thank you.


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