NATO Speech 3rd-4th Feb 1996

Secretary-General's Speech at the Wehrkunde Conference Munich 3rd-4th February 1996 It used to be the case during the Cold War that the Secretary General of NATO could attend this prestigious Wehrkunde Conference and deliver a basically similar message year in and year out. The given issues might change from time to time, but the security environment within which NATO pursued its mission of keeping the peace in Europe remained constant for 40 years. Obviously, this is no longer the case. Ever since the end of the Cold War in 1989, NATO has been confronted with new challenges almost every year. We have gone from committing ourselves in 1992 to the theoretical possibility of peacekeeping missions outside NATO's geographical area, to the launching today in Bosnia of the largest ground-scale operation in Europe since World War II. We have gone from embracing dialogue with former adversaries in 1991 to establishing, in the Partnership for Peace, the beginnings of the first truly pan-European security system since the Concert of Europe. Altogether, this has been a tumultuous period, one in which our hopes of creating an enduring security order for a democratic and undivided Europe were often confounded by the grim reality of warfare in Europe's midst. It has been a period of highs and lows, of creative thinking and institution-building, and of much rhetorical flourish. However, the time of talk and transition is now coming to an end. 1996 is the year in which practice replaces theory. 1996 is the year in which the Alliance moves towards enlargement while solidifying a special relationship with Russia, and restructures itself to accommodate greater European defence responsibilities while renewing the transatlantic link. In other words, 1996 is the year in which the pieces of the new European security architecture we have been patiently assembling can begin to come together. And it is in Bosnia where these pieces are truly coming together. There, NATO is leading an unprecedented international coalition for peace which includes Russia, our partners from Central and Eastern Europe, neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden, and even non-European nations such as Jordan, Malaysia, and Morocco. IFOR is thus the first concrete expression of an integrated and cooperative approach to security in the new Europe. With so much at stake, it is clear that the IFOR mission must succeed. This is not just to validate our theories about the future European security architecture, but most of all because it is in Bosnia where our post-Cold War vision of a new and better Europe has been most challenged. For it is a sad fact that while we were busy proclaiming the arrival of a new era of peace and cooperation, the parties in the Balkans were threatening to drag us back into a dark age of ethnic conflict and balance-of-power rivalries. It took the international community several years, but we finally realised that a total commitment to bring peace to Bosnia was required if we wanted to achieve stability in the wider Europe. Having just returned a few weeks ago from a visit to Bosnia, I can say that the challenges facing IFOR are truly immense. Leaders of the various parties spoke to me of how difficult it is for their peoples to envisage yesterday's enemy as tomorrow's friend, neighbour and fellow citizen. But at the same time I came away from that visit fundamentally optimistic about the prospects for IFOR's success. There is respect for the power at IFOR's disposal, which was so effectively demonstrated during last year's NATO air strikes. There is appreciation for the fair and even-handed treatment of the parties by our forces. There is above all the tremendous psychological impact on the Bosnian people of such a tangible demonstration of the united will of the international community. Indeed, it was clear to me that leaders in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo are keenly aware that IFOR represents, symbolically, the transatlantic community to which they, too, wish to belong. They understand that their hopes of joining in this widening security framework, and of benefitting from Europe's growing pattern of economic integration, depend completely upon their respect for the Dayton Agreement, both now and beyond IFOR's mission. They know that the international community expects and indeed demands a peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia, a consolidation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the long-term survival of an independent Bosnian state. Because those leaders will be held accountable for their actions for years to come, I am confident that their stake in IFOR's success is at least as large as our own. However, I am keenly aware that, as one observer has put it, Dayton will amount to little more than the most expensive cease-fire in history if efforts to achieve national reconciliation and reconstruction do not succeed. These two efforts are closely linked: the peoples of Bosnia have to see that opting for peaceful coexistence will be accompanied by a tangible improvement in their ruined surroundings and economic circumstances. That is why the task of the High Representative, Carl Bildt, is so crucial to the long-term prospects for peace in Bosnia. It is an extremely demanding task. For as Mr. Bildt recently told the North Atlantic Council: building a bridge across a river is not the same as building new confidence and reconciliation among people who have fought each other for the past four years and more. That is why we have assured him that NATO and IFOR will do their utmost to help facilitate the work of the civilian reconstruction agencies in Bosnia. In the same spirit, IFOR will also support the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. I believe strongly that war crimes must be investigated and criminals brought to justice; without such accountability, true and lasting reconciliation in Bosnia will prove elusive. And I pledge that NATO will help in that process within its capabilities. Indeed, we are already responding to requests from the Tribunal for assistance in securing access to evidence and providing information for the investigators. Of course, our first priority remains to carry out our mandate on the military side and ensure that the parties comply with the terms of the Dayton Accord. In this respect, IFOR's mission thus far has gone remarkably well, especially with the separation of forces achieved two weeks ago at D+30. Yesterday, which was D+45, we reached at midnight one of the most important milestones of our entire mission: the complete withdrawal of each party's forces from areas which are to be transferred to another party. If compliance is confirmed, it will mean that the new and permanent map of Bosnia created by the Dayton Accords is beginning to take shape. Transatlantic Link If there is one lesson in the positive turnaround in events in Bosnia over the past six months, it is that the active involvement of the United States in European security affairs continues to make the crucial difference between success and failure. Indeed, the IFOR operation is a resounding confirmation of the value of the transatlantic link and of NATO. Speaking very frankly, one of the major reasons why the international community was unable to halt the conflict in former Yugoslavia for several years was because Allies were divided across the Atlantic on how best to bring it to an end. The Europeans were engaged on the ground but reluctant to support peace enforcement. The United States favoured a more robust approach, but only through the use of air power. Meanwhile, the parties to the conflict were able to exploit Allied differences to suit their own purposes, and thereby continue the war. Throughout this period, NATO's obituary was written more than once -- certainly not for the first time in the Alliance's history! It was said that the United States no longer saw active engagement in Europe as a vital interest. It was said that the Europeans had proven themselves incapable of handling a major European crisis by themselves. In my view, however, the crisis NATO faced over Bosnia was never really a question of US interest or European capabilities, but rather of backbone and collective will. Both the United States and its European Allies had a strategic interest in halting the Bosnian conflict, and they possessed collectively the means of bringing this about. But it was not until the fall of Zepa and Srebrenica last summer that Allied governments on both sides of the Atlantic determined to pursue the more robust approach called for by the US and several of its leading European Allies. It is easy for us today to bemoan the earlier lack of Allied cohesion and determination, but I think the important thing in Bosnia is not how the story began but how we are now going to shape the future. After all, history teaches that democracies are slow to react to challenges, and reluctant to reach immediately for the sword -- and that is by and large to their credit. But history also teaches that the democracies are an irresistible force when they are at last moved to unity and to action, as NATO is proving today in Bosnia. What we ought to do now is rather to learn from both our early difficulties and subsequent achievements in Bosnia to ensure that the Alliance can meet similar challenges down the road. What we have to remember is that NATO is a peacekeeping instrument par excellence; when its European and North American members decide to consult politically and then act jointly at an early stage in a crisis, it is likely that conflict such as we witnessed in Bosnia can be halted before it gets out of hand. And so the number one lesson of the past few years is this: working separately and at crossed purposes, the US and its European Allies can accomplish little; working together, in NATO, there is little that they cannot achieve. Beyond this, I would mention three areas where we can improve NATO's ability to respond to Bosnia-type contingencies in the future. First, we can enhance our operational flexibility to respond to crises through implementing the CJTF concept. Second, we can expand the base of peacekeeping know-how and capabilities by continuing to develop the Partnership for Peace programme. Thirdly, and speaking strictly on a personal basis, I believe that an enhanced institutional relationship between NATO and the European Union could add significantly to achieving a comprehensive crisis management strategy. NATO and the EU have common strategic interests. European and North American leaders acknowledged this in our Brussels Summit communiqu two years ago. But we have yet to give that statement its proper expression. Clearly, a NATO-EU relationship will not evolve overnight. Yet as both institutions contemplate their future enlargement, such a relationship would yield benefits far beyond the immediate or ad hoc needs of crisis management. Enlargement This brings me to my next issue, enlargement. It does not require a leap of imagination to predict that effective practical cooperation, upon which IFOR depends, will give further momentum to both the Partnership for Peace and the enlargement process itself. Indeed, one could say that "Operation Joint Endeavour" is the most ambitious PfP exercise ever conceived. It will serve to enhance knowledge and experience of NATO among PfP members, including those who wish to take on the responsibilities of Alliance membership. Their capacity for interoperability with NATO forces will doubtless improve as a result of this experience, and they will be keen to match NATO operating standards. Yet the enlargement of NATO is far from being about interoperability alone. It is a process designed to enhance stability by overcoming past divisions, based on principles of cooperation, dialogue and partnership. The enlargement of NATO has to be seen in the broader context of European-wide integration. This year will see an intensified individual dialogue with Partners interested in joining the Alliance. This dialogue will help further define the steps that these countries must take in preparing for NATO membership. At the same time, we in the Alliance will continue our own preparations to ensure that NATO itself can adjust to enlargement. Partnership with Russia The relationship we develop with Russia is a key element of the development of a cooperative security structure for the whole of Europe. The participation of a Russian brigade in IFOR and the good cooperation established on the ground between Russian and NATO forces shows that it is possible for NATO and Russia to work side by side as equals in meeting the real security challenges facing the new Europe. But this is not all. NATO and Russia have also worked together on issues related to the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materiel. There is no reason why this joint cooperation and consultation cannot go further to address wider issues of European security. Yet, frankly speaking, we have lost time over the past year in establishing a political framework for a workable, long-term relationship with Russia. Some have suggested that perhaps we should expect less from this relationship, or even that we should choose between NATO's future enlargement and its partnership with Russia. I reject this attitude. NATO-Russian relations are not an electrical switch, either "On" or "Off". We want our relationship to be permanently "On". We sincerely believe that it would be a historical mistake to create new dividing lines in Europe or otherwise isolate Russia. We want to work closely with Russia because a healthy and cooperative partnership between NATO and Russia can and must be the foundation of security in post-Cold War Europe. Our goal is to pursue a NATO-Russia relationship not governed by theory or theology, but one which permits both sides to tackle pragmatically the problems we face in common. We will continue this pursuit. The door is open. I remain optimistic that 1996, the year in which we together bring peace to Bosnia, will also be the year in which we embed the NATO-Russian relationship deeply into the new structure of security in Europe. I pledge myself personally to achieving this goal, and look forward to Russia's positive response. Adapting NATO's Structures Finally, 1996 will also be a year of change for NATO internally. We cannot fulfil our new missions with old structures. The demands of crisis management and peacekeeping, as well as the pressure of reduced defence spending in Allied capitals, require a more streamlined and flexible organisation. As was agreed at the NATO Summit in 1994, we also need to create structures which permit the European Allies to assume greater defence responsibilities - principally the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces. The willingness of France to participate more fully in NATO, which was confirmed by President Chirac in Washington this week, has given us the opportunity to make real headway in adapting NATO structures to meet new missions and new challenges. For the French decision is part of a common recognition by all Allies that the European security and defence identity must be constructed first and foremost within, and not outside, the Alliance. This is as essential for the credibility of Europe as for transatlantic cohesion. The processes of building up Europe's capacity to assume a greater share of the burden and of strengthening and renewing the Alliance and the transatlantic bonds which it represents can and must go hand in hand. The work of giving expression to these new realities within the Alliance's structures should now be one of our top priorities to which we must all devote our best energies and creativity. Again, we must avoid theory and theology. The immediate period ahead will be one of "deepening" the Alliance, which will be a valuable prelude to its widening. Our aim should be to be able to take significant decisions on NATO's internal reorganisation by the time Alliance Foreign Ministers meet this June in Berlin. As our discussions on restructuring the Alliance go forward, one thing must remain clear: the principles of the existing integrated military structure should remain the basis upon which any new structures are built. Without the decades of operating under a single command, without the unique planning and logistics capabilities of NATO's integrated miliary structure, an operation of the complexity and magnitude of IFOR could not have been achieved. So let us not "throw out the baby with the bathwater" as we proceed to make the changes required of NATO in this new era. At the end of the day, NATO's internal restructuring should permit both a stronger European pillar within the Alliance and a consolidation of the transatlantic link. I am convinced that these two principles are not incompatible; indeed, as the experience in Bosnia demonstrates, NATO can fulfil its great potential on behalf of security in the wider Europe only when its two pillars are working together harmoniously and contributing in equal measure. Such is the recipe for success not only in Bosnia in 1996, but for European peace and prosperity in the decades to come. Thank you.