MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY:
                NEW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

                KEY NOTE ADDRESS BY THE
                DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL
                   AT THE RAND SEMINAR
                     16 OCTOBER 1995



          I am very pleased to be here this morning to
make the key note remarks, on behalf of the Secretary
General, at the opening of this seminar sponsored jointly
by Rand and NATO.  I believe the seminar is a
very useful and timely one:  we need to encourage greater
Mediterranean dialogue between the countries on both of
its shores.  And we need to gather experts and interested
parties together to address dispassionately the
important issues of Mediterranean security in the
post-Cold War era.

          NATO's support for this event is an indication
of a  growing realisation that the security of Europe
cannot be divorced from countries of the southern
Mediterranean.  In a sense, NATO has always had a close
interest in the region.  There are six Mediterranean
member countries of the Alliance, and they enjoy a
security guarantee under the Washington Treaty. 
As we all know, under Article V, the Allies have  an
obligation to defend each other against armed attack, and
to restore and maintain their security. 


          For the past 40 years this obligation was seen
largely in the light of a massive Soviet threat.  Today,
we do not consider ourselves to be under threat of attack
either from the East or from other directions.  The
lifting of the Iron Curtain has changed fundamentally the
nature of European and even world politics.  And NATO is
changing with it.  We have moved from confrontation to
cooperation and partnership with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, including with Russia and the
other countries on the territory of the former Soviet
Union.  

          The most visible and substantial achievements
are certainly those in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Despite the difficulties of the transition process to
democracy and market economy of the former communist
states, a general mood of optimism prevails there, in part
because of the role NATO is playing in projecting security
to the East.

          The end of East-West confrontation has also had
its positive impact in the Mediterranean, as the tensions
resulting from that confrontation, which also affected
that area, have eased and almost disappeared.  But both
the Gulf War and the war in the former Yugoslavia
have reminded us that the issue of Mediterranean security
extends well beyond the end of the Cold War.  It is thus
quite appropriate that the Mediterranean has become a
greater focus of NATO attention.

          Since our landmark Brussels Summit in January of
last year we have sought to develop a more specific
approach towards Mediterranean security.  In December
1994, our Foreign Ministers decided to establish
contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance
and Mediterranean non-member countries.  In February of
this year, the Council decided to invite Egypt, Israel,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to discuss possible
participation in this dialogue.

          In the initial discussion we briefed the
representatives of these five countries on NATO's new
agenda and sought their views on Mediterranean security
issues.  We have since then held follow-up meetings
and are currently discussing the way ahead.  We hope that
further discussions will lead to the establishment of a
permanent dialogue with them and, let me emphasise, we
hope in time to extend the initiative to other
Mediterranean countries.

          This manifestation of NATO's increasing interest
in stability in and around the Mediterranean should not,
however, be misconstrued.  Let me state clearly that NATO
does not see Islam as a threat, and does not need to find
a new role or conjure up new threats to keep itself busy. 
The Mediterranean is not a horizontal dividing line,
separating the European North from an "arc of crisis" in
the African South.  The Mediterranean Sea links three
continents.  Quite naturally, therefore, it is a region of
tremendous cultural and religious diversity.  This
pluralism is an asset: complexity is not synonymous with
"threat" or "disorder".

           The first point, therefore, I would like to
make is that a great value of any debate about
Mediterranean security is that it should dispel the
clouds of misunderstanding, deliberate myth-making and
sheer ignorance in which much discussion of this subject
has become shrouded.  This is not easy.  The human mind
likes to simplify things, and for some it has become
tempting to project the East-West pattern of the Cold War
to other regions. 
So, the clash of ideologies of the Cold War has now
re-emerged in new academic clothes as a "clash of
civilisations."

          While these views may still be fashionable in
some quarters, reality - as so often - is already proving
them wrong.  The Atlantic Alliance itself is an example of
how diversity can mean strength and not antagonism. 
In NATO we are made up of 16 countries of diverse cultures
and different religious traditions, including one Moslem
country, which have worked together for one common mutual
benefit for more than four decades.  The real world is
much more sophisticated, much less fractured and
infinitely more capable of real cooperation than some wish
to admit.

          That brings me to the second value of a
conference such as this one.  That is, it can identify and
underline how much we have in common.  Indeed, how much
our interests coincide, rather than clash.

          We certainly believe that there is great benefit
in an intensified and expanding Mediterranean dialogue. 
You will receive tomorrow a detailed briefing on NATO's
Mediterranean initiative.  Let me just say at this
point that we undertook to develop our relationship out of
a positive belief in the mutual value of friendship across
the Mediterranean.

          Some may view sceptically the importance of
"soft" diplomacy. 
But I think it is wrong to underestimate the power of such
dialogue and its potential to stimulate and develop
constructive and deepening cooperation. 
In fact, all the major developments associated with the
end of the Cold War, from German unity to NATO's deepening
relationship with Russia, began with dialogue.  In Europe,
the examples can be multiplied.  To understand
how powerful dialogue can be as an instrument of change,
you only have to look at the development of the CSCE,
which began tentatively as a forum for discussion across a
geographically and ideologically divided Europe. 
Now it is a fully fledged organisation, building its own
capacity for conflict
prevention.

          The history of NATO's outreach to its East since
1990 is another vivid example of how dialogue can expand
and lead to something much deeper.  Since 1994, we have
seen how Partnership for Peace has fed on its own success
so that it now far exceeds all initial expectations.

          Of course, our Mediterranean initiative occurs
in the context of many other challenges facing the
Alliance - enlargement, our relationship with Russia, and
NATO-WEU relations.  Yet, there is much we can
contribute to more friendly relations in the
Mediterranean.  That is why we have initiated a
tailor-made dialogue which, drawing on successful concepts
which have been applied elsewhere, begins with initial
contacts and has the potential to grow.  Our foremost
initial aim is to make NATO as transparent and
understandable as possible to our counterparts in the
Mediterranean
region.  We have started, but our initiative still has
some way to go before we reach the degree of understanding
we would like.

          I would note that NATO's efforts are intended to
complement other initiatives, including those by the EU
and WEU.  In this regard, the Alliance has unique capacity
and expertise, particularly in underlining the
transatlantic dimension of security cooperation.  We have
a proven track record in bringing together countries of
such different security backgrounds to serve the common
interest of peace and stability.  It would thus be
paradoxical indeed if we did not try to develop our
relatons with countries in the Mediterranean who share a
common interest with us in promoting a peaceful and
friendly security environment.

          That brings me to the third positive value of
this conference.  It will allow us to put the problems and
challenges of the Mediterranean in their proper context.

          Analysts point to the many conflicts, real and
potential, which originate in or impact on the area.  Yes,
it is true that numerous conflicts reverberate throughout
the area and beyond.  The Bosnian conflict, for
example, has had a powerful impact on attitudes among the
Islamic states.  We still struggle with the aftershocks of
the Gulf War.  And we will have to find an answer to the
pressing problem of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery means.  I would note,
however, that the recent successes of the Middle East
peace process remind us that to view the the Mediterranean
region as one huge potential crisis area is unjustified.

          The steps towards a resolution of the Bosnian
conflict, which NATO is seeking to help bring about,
consitute further indication of a momentum in the right
direction. 

          So, ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude.  The
new Mediterranean initiatives and projects such as this
conference are part of a growing involvement and interest
in the Mediterranean region by NATO and other arrangements
supported by the EU and the WEU.  Greater understanding in
itself is a stimulus for a virtuous circle of increasing
contacts and a more far-reaching cooperation.  I am sure
that the next two days will prove most profitable in all
these areas and I hope I have given you a clear idea of
how important a subject we in the Alliance believe this to
be.

          The Secretary General and I very much look
forward to hearing your conclusions.