The Future of NATO in an
                           Uncertain World
                   Speech to the SACLANT Seminar 95
                  June 22, 1995 -- Norfolk, Virginia

                         Senator Sam Nunn


Introduction:  The Importance of NATO Enlargement

    Thank you, General Sheehan, for your kind introduction.  Secretary
    General Claes, NATO Military Committee Chairman Field Marshall
    Vincent, distinguished NATO ambassadors, distinguished military
    commanders, distinguished guests, I am honored to be with  you this
    morning to discuss the role of NATO in the post-Cold War period.

    The pivotal issue of NATO expansion deserves thorough and careful
    consideration has important ramifications:

   - for the future of NATO;

   - for the countries of central and eastern Europe;

   - for the future and the other countries of the former Soviet Union;
   and

   - for the future security order throughout Europe, east and west.

New Security Situation

    NATO was established primarily to protect the western democracies
    from an expansionist Soviet Union that seemed determined to spread
    its influence through subversion, political intimidation and the
    threat of military force.

    When NATO was formed in the late 1940s, Europe was faced with
    post-war devas the emergence of Soviet aggression and
    confrontation. Western consensus developed around two critical
    concepts that were decisive in winning the Cold War and in winning
    the peace:

      -      First, Germany and Japan should not be isolated but should
      be integ rated into the  community of democratic nations.

      -      Second, the western democracies should pursue together a
      policy of containment, and unite in NATO to carry out this
      policy.

Integration and containment succeeded:

      -      The Berlin Wall is down and Germany is united.

      -      Eastern Europe and the Baltics are free at last.

      -      The Soviet Empire has disintegrated and Russia is
      struggling to try to establish a market economy and some
      semblance of democracy.

    For almost half a century, NATO's military strength was our
    defensive shield against aggression by the Soviet Union, but our
    offensive sword was our free societies, our innovative and
    energetic peoples, our free market systems and our free flow of
    ideas.

    With the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a heart-pounding,
    terrain-altering set of earthquakes centered in the former Soviet
    Union and in Eastern Europe.  These seismic eventshave ended an
    international era.

    The European security environment has changed.  We have moved from
    a world of f high risk, but also high stability because of the
    danger of escalation and balance of terror, much lower risk but
    much less stability.  In a strange and even tragic scene, the world
    has been made safer for racial, ethnic, class and religious
    vengeance, savagery and civil  war.  Such tragedy has come to the
    people of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan,
    Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and many others.

    The dust has not settled.  Bosnia continues to erode NATO's
    credibility and confidence.  Yet it is clear that the overall
    security and freedom of Europe has dramatically improved.

   -  The Eastern European countries, the Baltic countries, and many of
   the countries of the former Soviet Union that have become fully
   independent, are turning westward, and are  anxious to become part
   of the European community and to join NATO as full

   -  We are no longer preoccupied with the crucial Cold War issue of
   how much wearning time  NATO would have in advance of a massive
   conventional attack westward by the Warsaw  Pact.

   -  During the Cold War, we worried about a Soviet invasion deep into
   Western Europe.  As Michael Mandelbaum points out, the current
   debacle in Chechnya indicates that Russia  today has serious trouble
   invading itself.

   -  Today, our military planners estimate that preparation for a
   Russian conventional military  attack, even against Eastern Europe,
   would take several years at a minimum  -- assuming  the resources
   could be found to rebuild the undermanned, underfunded, poorly
   trained

   - Russia itself has gone from being the center of a menacing,
   totalitarian global empire to an economically weak, psychologically
   troubled country struggling to move toward democracy and a
   market-based economy.

   - A multilateral security system is forming across Europe that
   reduces nuclear and conventional armaments and makes a surprise
   attack by Russian conventional military forces toward the west
   increasingly unlikely.

   -  I have in mind the cumulative effect of such agreements as the
   INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty, the unilateral U.S. and Soviet decisions
   to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in  Europe, the START I and
   pending START II Treaties, and the pending Chemical Weapons

   -  These mechanisms are far from perfect, several await
   ratification, and they require vigorous verification and full
   implementation.  Yet even at this stage, they significantly enhance
   warning time that today is measured in years rather than in days or
   in months.

    We are all aware of the dramatic change in the threat environment
    in Europe resulting from these changes.

   -  The immediate danger is posed by violent terrorist groups; by
   isolated rogue states, by  ethnic, religious and other types of
   sub-national passion that can flare into vicious armed  conflict.
   The lethality of any and all of these threats can be greatly
   magnified by the  proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
   weapons, as well as by the destabilizing conventional weapons.

   -  This audience is well aware that Russia currently possesses over
   20,000 nuclear weapons,  at least 40 thousand tons of chemical
   weapons, advanced biological warfare  capabilities,  hundreds of
   tons of fissile material, huge stores of conventional weapons,  plus
   thousands  of scientists and technicians skilled in manufacturing
   weapons of mass destruction.

   -  This is the first time in history that an empire has
   disintegrated while possessing such  enormous destructive
   capabilities.  Even if these capabilities are greatly  reduced, the
   know-how, the production capability, and the dangers of
   proliferation will  endure for  many years.  This is the number one
   security threat for America, for NATO and for the

   -  As we contemplate NATO enlargement, we must carefully measure its
   effect on this  proliferation threat.

   - In longer term, we cannot dismiss the possibility of a resurgent
   and threatening Russia.

    Russia not only has inherited the still dangerous remnants of the
    Soviet warmachine.  In addition, even in its currently weakened
    condition, Russia possesses great potential in human and material
    resources.  By virtue of its size and strategic location, Russia
    exerts considerable weight in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
    Meanwhile, Russia has inherited the USSR's  veto power in the UN
    Security Council and therefore has a major voice in multilateral
    decision making.  Russia will be a major factor, for better or for
    worse, across the entire spectrum of actual and potential threats.

   -  Russia can fuel regional conflicts with high technology
   conventional weapons, along with political and other material
   support.

             -     Or Russia can cooperate with us  in defusing such
             conflicts particularly by preventing the spread of Russian
             weaponry to irresponsible hands.

   -  Russia can itself emerge as a militarily aggressive power.

             -     Or Russia can assist us in averting rivalry among
             major power s that poison  the international security
             environment.

   -  Russia can pursue a confrontational course that undermines
   security and cooperation in  Europe.

             -     Or Russia can work with us to broaden and strengthen
             the emerging system of multilateral security in Europe.

Out of all this background come five fundamental points:

   -  First, preventing or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass
   destruction is the most  important and most difficult security
   challenge we face.

   -  Second, Russia is a vast reservoir of weaponry, weapons material
   and weapons know-how.  Thousands of people in Russia and throughout
   the former Soviet Union have the  knowledge, the access and strong
   economic incentives to engage in weapons traffic.

   -  Third, increased Russian isolation, paranoia or instability would
   make this security  challenge more difficult and more dangerous.

   -  Fourth, although the West cannot control events in Russia, and
   probably can assist political and economic reform there only on the
   margins, as the medical doctors say,  our first  principle should be
   DO NOT HARM.

   -  Fifth, we must avoid being so preoccupied with NATO enlargement
   that we ignore the  consequences it may have for even more important
   security purposes.

Problems With the Current Approach to NATO Enlargement

    It is against this background that I offer a few observations on
    the current approach to NATO enlargement.

    NATO's announced position is that the question of enlargement is
    not whether, but when and how.  Somehow I have missed any logical
    explanation of WHY.  I cannot speak of public opinion in other
    countries, but in  America when the enlargement debate focuses on
    issues of NATO nuclear policy, NATO troop deployments, and formal
    NATO military commitments -- played against the background of
    repercussions in Russia -- somebody had better be able to explain
    to the American people WHY, or at least WHY NOW.

    NATO was founded on a fundamental truth:  the vital interests of
    the countries of NATO were put at risk by the military power and
    political intimidation of the Soviet Union.  As President Harry
    Truman said in his memoirs:  "The [NATO] pact was a shield against
    aggression and against the fear of aggression..."  Because NATO was
    built on this fundamental truth, and discussed it openly and faced
    it truthfully wit our people, the alliance endured and prevailed.

    Today we seem to be saying different things to different people on
    the subject of NATO enlargement.

   -  To the Partnership for Peace countries, we are saying that you
   are all theoretically eligible  and if you meet NATO's entrance
   criteria (as yet no fully spelled out), you will move to  the top of
   the list.

   -  To the Russians, we are also saying that NATO enlargement is not
   threat-based and not  aimed at you.  In fact, you too can eventually
   become a member of NATO.  This raises  serious questions.

   -  Are we really going to be able to convince the East Europeans
   that we are protecting them  from their historical threats, while we
   convince the Russians that NATO's enlargement has  nothing to do
   with Russia as a potential military threat?

   -  Are we really going to be able to convince the Ukraine and the
   Baltic countries that they  are somehow more secure when NATO
   expands eastward but draws protective lines short  of their borders
   and places them in what the Russians are bound to perceive as the
   "buffer  zone?"

    In short, are we trying to bridge the unbridgeable, to explain the
    unexplain able?  are we deluding others or are we deluding
    ourselves?

    The advantage of NATO's current course toward enlargement cannot be
    ignored.  If NATO expands in the near term to take in the Visegrad
    countries, these countries would gain in self-confidence and
    stability.  It is possible that border disputes and major ethnic
    conflicts presumably would be settled before entry - for instance,
    the dispute involving the Hungarian minority in Romania.

    However, the serious disadvantages must be thought through
    carefully.

    For example, my conversation with Russian government officials,
    members of parliament across the political spectrum, and
    non-official Russian foreign policy specialists convince me that
    rapid NATO enlargement will be widely misunderstood in Russia and
    will have a serious negative impact on political and economic
    reform in that country.  There are several reasons for this:

   -  At the moment, Russian nationalism is on the rise and reformers
   are on the defensive. The Russian military establishment and the
   still huge military-industrial complex that  undergirds it are
   dispirited and resentful.

   -  The average Russian voter has trouble making ends meet, is unsure
   what the future may  hold, but is well aware that Russia has gone
   from being the seat of a global empire and the  headquarters of a
   military superpower to a vastly weakened international s

   -  Russian nationalists feed this sense of loss and uncertainty by
   proclaiming that rapid  NATO enlargement is intended to take
   advantage of a weakened Russia and will pose a grave security threat
   to the Russian people.  Russian demagogues argue that Russia must
   establish a new global empire to counter an expansionist west.  They
   smile with glee every  time NATO expansion is mentioned.

   -  Russian democrats do not see an immediate military threat from an
   enlarged  NATO but fear the reaction of the Russian people.  The
   democrats worry that alarmist messages,  however distorted, will set
   back democracy by increasing popular tolerance for authoritarianism
   and renewed military spending within Russia, and by isolating Russia

    In short, if NATO enlargement stays on its current course, reaction
    in Russi a is likely to be a sense of isolation by those committed
    to democracy and economic reform with varying degrees of paranoia,
    nationalism and demagoguery emerging from across the current
    political  spectrum.



    In the next few years, Russia will have neither the resources nor
    the where withal to respond with a conventional military build-up.
    If, however, the more nationalist and extreme political forces gain
    the upper hand, by election or otherwise, we are likely to see
    other responses that are more achievable and more dangerous to
    European stability.  For example:

   -  While Russia would take years to mount a sustained military
   threat to East it  can within weeks or months exert severe external
   and internal pressure on its immediate  neighbors to the west --
   including the Baltic countries and the Ukraine. This could set in
   motion a dangerous action-reaction cycle.

   -  Moreover, because a conventional military response from Russia in
   answer to NATO enlargement is infeasible, a nuclear response, in the
   form of a higher alert status for Russia's remaining strategic
   nuclear weapons and conceivably renewed deployment of  tactical
   nuclear weapons, is more likely. The security of NATO,
   Russia'sneighbors and  the countries of eastern Europe will not be
   enhanced if the Russian military finger moves  closer to the nuclear
   trigger.

    By forcing the pace of NATO enlargement a volatile and
    unpredictable moment in history, we could place ourselves in the
    worst of all security environments:  rapidly declining defense
    budgets, broader responsibilities, and heightened instability.  We
    will also find ourselves with increasingly difficult relations with
    the most important country in the world in terms of potential for
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

    This is the stuff that self-fulfilling prophecies and historic
    tragedies are made of.

Specific Recommendations for Alliance Policy

    Where do we go from here?  I recognized that it is much easier to
    criticize than to construct, but I do have a few suggestions.

    I suggest a two-track approach to NATO enlargement.

      -      The first track would be evolutionary and would depend on
      political and economic developments within the European countries
      who aspire to full NATO membership.  When a country becomes
      eligible for European Union membership,  it will also be eligible
      to join the Western European Union and then be prepared  for NATO
      membership, subject, of course, to NATO approval.

             -     This is a natural process connecting economic and
             security interests.

             -     We can honestly say to Russia that this process is
             not aimed at you.

      -      The second track would be threat-based.  An accelerated,
      and if necessary  immediate, expansion of NATO would depend on
      Russian behavior.  We should be  candid with the Russian
      leadership, and above all, honest with the Russian  people, by
      telling them frankly:

             -     If you respect the sovereignty of your neighbors,
             carry out y our solemn arms control commitments and other
             international obligations, and if you continue on the path
             toward democracy and economic reform, your  neighbors will
             not view you as a threat, and neither will NATO.

             -     We will watch, however, and react:

                   (1) to aggressive moves against other sovereign
                   states;

                   (2) to militarily significant violations of your
                   arms control and other legally  binding obligations
                   pertinent to the security of Europe;

                   (3) to the emergence of a non-democratic Russian
                   government that impedes  fair elections, suppresses
                   domestic freedoms, or institutes a foreign policy
                   incompatible with the existing European security
                   system.

      -      These developments would be threatening to the security of
      Europe and would  require a significant NATO responses, including
      expansion eastward.  We would be enlarging NATO based on a real
      threat.  We would not, however,  be helping to create the very
      threat we are trying to guard against.

    Finally, Partnership for Peace is a sound framework for this
    two-track approach.  Its role would be to prepare candidate
    countries and NATO itself for enlargement on either Programs of
    joint training and exercises, development of a common operational
    doctrine, and establishment of interoperable weaponry, technology
    and communications would continue,based on more realistic
    contingencies.  Tough issues such as nuclear policy and forward
    stationing of NATO troops would be discussed in a threat-based
    framework, one of which we hope would remain theoretical.

    As the Russian leaders and people make their important choices,
    they should know that Russian behavior will be a key and relevant
    factor for NATO's future.  This straight-forward approach is also
    important for our citizens, who will pay the bills and make the
    sacrifices required by expanded NATO security commitments.

    The profound historical contrast between post-World War I Germany
    and post-World War II Germany should tell us that neo-containment
    of Russia is not the answer at this critical historical juncture.
    If  future developments require the containment of Russia, it
    should be real containment, based on real threats.