Speech by the Secretary General
at the Munich Security Conference, 
                                   February 3-5, 1995 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

          Reading the newspapers in recent weeks I have
been struck by a prevailing mood of disillusion about the
ability of our institutions to cope with today's security
environment.  The continuing war in Bosnia, the events in
Chechnya and increasing instability in North Africa - not
to mention other hot spots - have contributed to a feeling
that security problems are again growing and multiplying,
and that there are no real solutions to them.  This
feeling of inadequacy is all the more striking, coming as
it does halfway through a decade which began so
promisingly and with so much optimism.

          It is obvious that where we are today in
developing a new security order is far from where we would
hope to be.  Some observers have even suggested that the
post-Cold War transition period is already over; that the
lofty ideals of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe are
unachievable, and that the old times are back.

          The Alliance has acted as a kind of lightning
rod for criticism.  Critics have again started to question
the value of the Alliance.  For example, they criticise
the Alliance because it has not singlehandedly and
decisively ended the Bosnian conflict and transformed the
security landscape of Europe into one of peace and
harmony. 

          Such critics reveal their misunderstanding of
NATO's new role in the developing security architecture. 
As a result, their policy prescriptions would require a
radical departure from the basic course we have been
pursuing since the end of the Cold War.  Instead of
accepting that crises such as the Bosnian one can only be
managed through a concerted international effort, they
demand that NATO act unilaterally, outside the
international framework.  Instead of an evolutionary
process of extending security and stability to the East
through a process of closer association of states to the
East with Western institutions, they would have us enlarge
our membership without a thought to its consequences for
the wider stability of Europe.  And instead of devoting
the time and patience to engage Russia constructively,
they work on the assumption that Russia is not only
unreformable but fundamentally unreliable as a partner.

          Of course, I can share the frustrations and
impatience of the critics when it comes to applying
pressures to resolve the Bosnian war, which by any measure
is the most brutal and senseless conflict we have seen in
Europe in decades.  The policies they offer, however, are
not policies of vision but of impatience.

          Let me make the point bluntly: You cannot judge
the value of a long-term strategic Alliance through such
short-term tactical tests.  To do so is to do the Alliance
a grave disservice.  The Alliance has a permanent role in
building stability in Europe, and without the Alliance we
cannot reliably preserve our countries' security and we
cannot confidently make progress towards a new security
order on this continent.  This is not, therefore, the time
to strike out in radically different directions.  There is
no real alternative to the course on which the Alliance is
set.  Nor is it a time for complacency.  The Alliance has
resources and potential which have not yet been fully
exploited, and we still have much more to contribute to
the building of the new Europe.  Let me set out where I
see the Alliance going as we approach the new century. 

          From the outset I want to make one thing very
clear:  the core function of our Alliance is and remains
the defence of the member countries' territorial integrity
and political independence.  But the most pressing issue
that has to be resolved urgently is Bosnia.  We must not
allow it to fester and poison relations both within and
beyond the Alliance.  Bosnia is a striking example of
where the Alliance's resources have not been exploited to
the full.  On the one hand, NATO's operational support
considerably strengthened the UN's hand in dealing with
this crisis.  Operations as complex and effective as the
no-fly zone and the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and
Gorazde could only be implemented by NATO.  In this sense,
the relationship with the UN has been a fruitful one.  

          On the other hand, Bosnia represented a new
phase in crisis management and a new experience for both
NATO and the UN. There were bound to be frictions and
problems in achieving a coherent approach, especially as
each organisation has its own distinct "culture".  By this
I mean that the UN's traditional approach to peacekeeping,
with its emphasis on impartiality, is not easily
reconcilable with NATO's emphasis on direct, effective
action.  The relationship with the UN has therefore been a
complicated one, also because of two distinct chains of
political and military command.  It is difficult for the
public to understand the dynamics of this relationship,
and much of the criticism that NATO has been facing is the
result of public confusion of the respective roles of the
UN and NATO.  Let us remember that it was the wish of the
international community to have the UN - and not NATO - in
the lead in former Yugoslavia.

          For the future, we have to do better.  The
answer does not lie in refusing to work under UN mandates,
but in ensuring that future mandates are clearly defined
and that the overall strategy pursued by the international
community is fully coherent.  This includes mandates which
are not only consistent with each other, but also respect
NATO's autonomy to implement them in an effective way.  If
these conditions are not met, the chances for the
successful use of NATO greatly diminish.  Efficiency and
credibility are NATO's most precious assets and we do not
intend to squander them.

          NATO is more than a sub-contractor of the UN; it
will keep its full independence of decision and action. 
There may even be circumstances which oblige NATO to act
on its own initiative in the absence of a UN mandate.

          Credibility is also to be preserved in our
policy of extending security and stability eastward.  The
Alliance supported the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in their brave struggle for freedom and
independence.  We now have a historic obligation to help
them consolidate their achievements and complete their
journey back to the community of nations sharing the
values of democracy, liberty, pluralism and the rule of
law - a community to which they belong.

          Partnership for Peace, our main tool to bring
these countries closer, is well on track.  In just a year
it has become a distinct feature of European cooperation,
with 24 Partners now involved with the 16 Allies in a very
wide range of activities and exercises.  The fact that
former neutrals such as Sweden and Finland (and soon also
Austria) are part of this endeavour only serves to
underline the unique role of our Alliance as an agent of
political change.

          A significant aspect of Partnership for Peace is
its in-built capacity for further evolution.  This year
will see an even greater exercise programme and the
introduction of a defence planning and review process. 
The latter will be based on the long existing NATO system
of defence planning which has played a major part in
enhancing Alliance solidarity.  This process can help
manage and organise the resources dedicated to the
Partnership for Peace in an efficient manner, and promote
interoperability among military forces.  PfP is therefore
not a stop-gap measure to avoid the tough decisions on
NATO's enlargement but a genuine, long-term framework for
building the familiarity, trust and habits of cooperation
which the Allies have developed among themselves for many
decades. 

          Still, the crucial question of enlargement has
to be faced.  We have a moral duty not to squander the
historic opportunity to anchor the new democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe firmly and permanently in the
West; and this must sooner or later mean full membership
in those institutions that epitomize more than any others
democracy and security, namely the EU and NATO.  This is
why a year ago NATO's Heads of State and Government
pledged to open the Alliance's doors to new members as
part of an evolutionary process.  Clearly, NATO will
enlarge.

          But enlargement cannot be an end in itself, it
must contribute to Europe's wider stability.  This is the
criterion by which its extent and timing should be
determined.  Enlargement must help overcome old divisions,
not create new ones.  We have thus decided to set in train
an internal study of how NATO will enlarge, the principles
to guide this process, and the implications of membership.


          I do not intend to prejudice the outcome of
these discussions.  The outcome is a matter for our 16
member countries. I would like, however, to raise some of
the essential questions which should guide our debate.  I
am fond of Nathan Cummings' apt phrase that nothing is
ever achieved if all possible objections have to be
overcome.  But the enlargement of our Alliance is too
important an issue to be handled by soundbites.  We need
clarity about our objectives and clarity about our course
of action.  We owe this not only to our Partners, but to
our own publics as well.  And our parliaments will have to
ratify all our decisions to enlarge the Alliance.

          To me, this means that any serious debate on
enlargement must answer several hard questions which thus
far have been given only scant public attention:  for
example, how can we maintain the cohesion and smooth
decision-making within an enlarged Alliance?  There is no
rule of nature that would suggest that achieving consensus
within an Alliance of 17 would be fundamentally different
from our current Alliance of 16.  But would this still
hold true once we reach a number of, say, 20 or 25?

          Another hard question is cost.  We must face the
fact that the enlargement of our Alliance will entail
financial sacrifices, both for the current as well as for
the future Allies.  The numerous military contacts that
have emerged within the Partnership for Peace have given
us a clear sense of the enormous determination many
Partner countries display in restructuring their defence
establishments to Western standards.  Yet it has also
enabled us to see the still sizeable gap between
aspirations and realities.  We must be aware that the
support to our Partners in the fulfilment of their
aspirations will not be cost-free.

          Then there is the hard question of obligations. 
What will be the consequences - in light of declining
defence budgets - of extending security guarantees to our
East?  And, no less importantly, we have to make sure that
the prospective members are aware of the obligations they
take on.  After all, NATO is a two-way street.  We must
make it clear to the prospective new members that NATO is
as much about obligations as it is about benefits.  New
members will have to contribute to Alliance security and
stability.  They will have to have their house and their
neighbourly relations in order.

          Whatever the modalities we may finally settle
on, one thing should be clear:  namely that the
enlargement debate must not be conducted in terms of a
"zero-sum game", where membership for some countries would
translate into a net loss for others.  We have to avoid
new dividing lines in Europe.  This means that we should
step up our commitment to constructively engage Russia and
Ukraine.  Expanding our Alliance must be clearly viewed as
enlarging a community of values, not as an exercise in
exclusion. 

          This brings me to the question of NATO's
relationship to Russia.  While Russia is likely to remain
in a difficult phase for a long time to come, there are at
least some parameters that can be defined for a
sustainable relationship to evolve. 

          First, we must acknowledge Russia's weight in
European security and its legitimate security interests. 
I am aware that some in the strategic community tend to
regard Russia as basically unreformable, a kind of eternal
burden for European security.  They see Chechnya as a case
in point, as the character of the Russian intervention
seems to suggest a classical imperial reflex.  Yet the
strong criticism the use of force has evoked in Russia
itself - also because the government did not prevent the
continued presence of the media in Chechnya - signals the
advent of a civil society that is unprecedented in Russian
history.  Thus, I believe that it is a bit too early to
pass the final judgement on this country.

          Clearly, we all want to see the forces of reform
in Russia succeed.  However, if we treat Russia as
irredeemably hostile, then we will initiate a
self-fulfilling prophecy.  A Western policy hostage to its
own worst-case fears will not yield any influence on
Russia's development at all.  We must engage Russia
instead with a clear determination to foster serious
security cooperation.  We need a constructive, cooperative
relationship, one that is open enough to speak our minds
and strong enough to withstand occasional differences of
view.  

          In my view, such a relationship is within our
grasp.  Russia joined the Partnership last June and has
also agreed to develop with NATO an enhanced dialogue and
cooperation in areas where it has unique and important
contributions to make.  The fact that Russia is not yet
prepared to agree on the relevant documents implementing
Partnership activities should not be over-dramatised.  Our
offer remains on the table and it is up to Russia to make
up its mind about the relationship it wants to have with
our Alliance.  Both the Individual Partnership Programme
and the enhanced dialogue and cooperation offer scope for
an evolving cooperative relationship commensurate with
Russia's interests.  I am therefore confident that Russia
will come to realise that this country is too big to be
isolated from Europe by others.  It can only isolate
itself. 

          The Russian problem is only the most visible
factor which suggests that security in Europe can only be
managed within an Atlantic framework.  But this does not
mean to say that the shape of this Atlantic framework is
cast in stone.  On the contrary, we must take account of
the changes that affect the transatlantic partnership and
adjust our Alliance accordingly.  One such change is the
drive towards European Union.  It offers the unique
opportunity to put our transatlantic relationship on a new
foundation -- to forge a new transatlantic bargain.

          I admit that support for a twin pillar concept
of NATO has often been confined to the area of rhetoric,
as many were afraid that a stronger European role on
defence would undermine the Atlantic Alliance.  Since last
year, however, we have made considerable headway in
bringing the twin pillar concept to life: with the
development of the Combined Joint Task Forces Concept,
NATO will be ready to lend its assets to the WEU in cases
where NATO chooses not to act.  Thus, by creating forces
that are "separable but not separate" from NATO, we
broaden the spectrum of suitable responses rather than
duplicate an existing mission.  A stronger European role
will thus not undermine the Alliance but provide the
amount of fair burden-sharing without which a strong US
commitment would be hard to sustain domestically.  

          This new NATO-WEU relationship must in the
longer run be followed by an equally coherent relationship
between NATO and the European Union with whom the Alliance
shares common strategic interests.  However, we must make
sure that both processes are complementary and that we
develop this broader transatlantic relationship with the
full involvement of all sides.

          A rebalanced Alliance must remain an
outward-looking instrument -- a tool to tackle the new
security challenges that lie ahead.  For our Alliance to
and an organisation worth joining, NATO must, after all,
remain effective and capable of dealing with the hard
security issues.  This brings me to our next new task --
to devise a strategy to prevent and counter proliferation.


          One does not need to join the
"threat-of-the-month club" to state that proliferation is
bound to assume an ever greater significance in the coming
years, for a number of technical and political reasons. 
Technically, the ongoing debate about "dual-use" items
indicates that the lines between civilian and military
applications of a given technology are becoming
increasingly blurred.  Politically, the behaviour of Iraq
and North Korea has emerged as a major challenge to the
non-proliferation regime, as it stands for extension this
spring.  Finally, the breakup of the Soviet Union has
added two entirely new - and totally unforeseen -
dimensions to the proliferation problem: "loose nukes"
without political control or sufficient safeguards, and
the "brain drain" of nuclear expertise to other states.

          It is moot to speculate whether these trends
will converge to produce a most disturbing security
outlook.  All we need to know for the moment is that they
might -- and that we must act now to be prepared for this
eventuality.

          This is why we have put the issue of
non-proliferation firmly on the NATO agenda.  NATO will
seek to support, not duplicate, work underway in other
international fora in devising new non- proliferation
approaches.  The upcoming NPT Review Conference in April
will be a key event.  To this end, we will use our unique
political consultation mechanisms to address the problem
"at 16", but we will also utilise the NACC and other
channels to consult and cooperate with others.  We just
had at NATO a first round of useful consultations with
Russia.  Moreover, NATO's long-standing armament
cooperation provides us with a framework to develop a
response for those cases where our attempts at preventing
proliferation have failed.  We are therefore also
examining how our defence capabilities can be improved and
how NATO's defence posture can support or influence
diplomatic efforts to block the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.

          NATO's approach to the proliferation problem is
an example of the kind of a forward-looking, pro-active
policy, that is increasingly required by us to manage
security post-Cold War.  Such a pro-active approach must
also guide our policy vis-…-vis the Southern
Mediterranean.  

          Although five Allies are situated along the
Mediterranean, the overwhelming focus on the "Central
Front", forced upon us by the military realities of the
Cold War, occasionally tempted us to overlook NATO's
Mediterranean dimension.  We are determined to follow a
policy towards our Southern neighbours based on the same
logic we apply with respect to the countries of our East:
dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation.
 
          To foster this goal, we are ready to establish a
direct dialogue, on a case-by-case basis, between the
Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries, with a
view to contributing to the strengthening of regional
stability.  The North Atlantic Council has been tasked by
Ministers to develop the details of such a dialogue and to
initiate appropriate preliminary contacts.

          Ladies and gentlemen, the agenda I have just
outlined is a long-term one, the agenda of a long-term,
strategic Alliance.  It is certainly an ambitious one. 
But I do not see any reason why it should not be
manageable, provided we avoid certain obstacles which
could drive us unwittingly apart.  The disputes over
Bosnia were the first reminder of the dangerous path we
embark upon if we try to apply quick fixes to a long-term
problem.  I am very concerned with the apparent disconnect
on key Alliance issues across the Atlantic.  If we want to
keep our successful, unique Alliance strong and effective
also for the future, we have to revitalise the
transatlantic partnership and make it fit for the new
times.  I would urge all of you to devote your full
attention to this task.

          Things would not remain confined to Bosnia. 
NATO-WEU relations could easily become bogged down in the
details of military organisation, instead of the
development of greater institutional flexibility.  And
healthy economic competition, the lifeblood of our
societies, would again be falsely equated with economic
antagonism.  If we avoid these pitfalls, however, I am
convinced that the transatlantic link will be as dynamic a
force in the future as in the past.  It was and is the
basis for all our success.

          We must never change a winning team.