SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER: "NATO AND THE WEU ARE TWO VIABLE
BUILDING BLOCKS IN OUR BROADER EFFORT TO CREATE A NEW
EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ORDER."
-----------------------------------------------------------------


PARIS: The Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), Mr. Manfred Woerner, said on Monday that:  
"We must seize the opportunity provided by the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty and the NATO Summit next January to forge a
new transatlantic bargain." Addressing the Western European Union
(WEU) Assembly, he said that this transatlantic bargain would
consist of two elements: 

          "First, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to act as
the primary forum for consultation and joint action to respond to
new security challenges, wherever they originate.

          "Second, we Europeans must show more willingness to
take security responsibilities in those crises which affect first
and foremost European interests."

          Mr. Woerner described NATO and the WEU as "two viable
building blocks in our broader effort to create a new
Euro-Atlantic security order...At the core of our efforts lies
the question of how to re-balance the Alliance so that Europe
assumes a greater share of responsibility for security in Europe
and beyond. It is essential that on both sides of the Atlantic a
greater European role is not regarded as a threat but as a
precondition of NATO's longer-term vitality." The Secretary
General stressed that "the WEU has an important role to play
in this regard, and I see it as one of our greatest
accomplishments that we have established a close working
relationship between our organisations. We are working to improve
it further. In the long run, our overall objective is to develop
structures that allow us to work efficiently together but also to
enable the forces of European Allies to operate under WEU
auspices when it is agreed that NATO should not
be involved." He pointed out that "We now have to create
practical, operationally sound arrangements in this respect. For
example, we are currently looking at the concept of Combined
Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and other contingency
operations."

          Mr. Woerner added however that "It must remain clear
that the central forum for consultation on issues affecting the
security of our member states remains NATO."  At the same time,
"common WEU stances will be increasingly introduced into Alliance
consultations. They must, however, remain flexible positions,
open for discussion and possible modification in the mutual
security interest. If we would give priority to a policy of "fait
accompli" over negotiated compromise, we would put the
transatlantic relationship at risk. What in the short-term might
look like European self-assertion would in the longer term be
revealed for what it really was: Europe acting against its
self-interest."

          "Moreover, it would be an illusion to believe that we
could neatly categorize security challenges into "American" and
"European". The degree of involvement of either side may vary,
depending on the nature of the crisis and on the interests at
stake, but at its core it will remain a joint effort.

          The Secretary General looked ahead to the NATO Summit
in January: "Our forthcoming NATO Summit should take the
necessary decisions to give clear guidance for our cooperation.
This Summit, to which the WEU will undoubtedly make its distinct
contribution, will be central, not only in laying the groundwork
for the future relationship between our organisations, but also
in defining a new transatlantic bargain between equal partners."

          He also told his audience that NATO is currently
"discussing new ways of making our Partners more capable of
interacting with NATO member states in a broad range of
multinational missions such as peacekeeping and crisis
management. For example, the recent proposal by the United
States, entitled "Partnership for Peace", envisages a
network of bilateral arrangements between individual Partner
countries and the Alliance."

          The Secretary General stressed: "This initiative, which
has been favourably received in the Alliance, is not an
alternative to membership. It will be open to all cooperation
partners and possibly to other states in Europe which may be
interested. But the extent of cooperation would be largely up to
the partner countries themselves and depend on their individual
requirements. This would lead to a flexible network of
cooperative links within Europe and across the Atlantic, in which
nodbody would be excluded.
     

          The full text of Mr. Woerner's speech follows:








       Speech by the Secretary General at the WEU Assembly,
                         29 November 1993


Ladies and Gentlemen,

          The Cold War was an abnormal state of affairs, but an
excellent compass.  As much as we may have argued over the right
strategy or specific force deployments, we did so within clear
demarcation lines.

          Today, our security environment is no longer dominated
by the Cold War.  That does not mean that we are entirely free to
choose.  But more than ever before, the degree of our security
will be the direct result of our actions -- or non-actions. 
Regarding the transatlantic relationship, this means that it will
largely be what we want to make of it.

          It would be folly to assume, that the transatlantic
relationship should continue unaffected by the end of the Cold
War.  But it is up to us to determine how much these changes
matter in the end.  We must therefore seize the opportunity
provided by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the
NATO Summit next January to forge a new transatlantic bargain.  

          What could such a transatlantic bargain look like? 
Basically, I see two essential elements:  

          First, the Atlantic Alliance must continue to act as
the primary forum for consultation and joint action to respond to
new security challenges, wherever they originate.  

          Second, we Europeans, must show more willingness to
take security responsibilities in those crises which affect first
and foremost European interests.  

          I believe that both parts of this bargain are within
our reach.  We have made substantial progress.  Both NATO and WEU
have already proven their relevance for the security and
stability in the new Europe:

     -    In ex-Yugoslavia, for the first time in its history,
NATO has acted outside the territory of its member states in
support of a peacekeeping mission and under a direct mandate from
the United Nations.  

     -    The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in the two
years of its existence, has steadily broadened its basis for
projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe, most
recently by making peacekeeping a major part of its work; 
          

     -    The WEU has also entered a new phase in its evolution
through its role in enforcing the embargo in the Adriatic and on
the Danube;

     -    Only a month ago, the WEU participated in the first
meeting of our Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group, alongside
representatives of the UN, UNPROFOR, and the EC Presidency;

     -    The Eurocorps has been made available to both NATO and
WEU in a way satisfactory to both organisations;

     -    The WEU's Forum of Consultation has provided an
additional layer of dialogue with countries in Central and
Eastern Europe, complementing our efforts in the NACC and those
of the CSCE;

          NATO and the WEU are thus two viable building blocks in
our broader effort to create a new Euro-Atlantic security order. 
But Yugoslavia reminds us that such a new security order is still
a distant goal.  Our organisations will have to act on the
lessons of this terrible conflict and resolve to do better.  To
my mind there are seven or eight particularly important lessons
to be learned, some of which are obvious:

     -    The first lesson is that crisis prevention is always
preferable to crisis management.  The preventive deployment
in Macedonia is a good example of anticipating a crisis instead
of reacting only after it has erupted.  We should also be able to
respond to the situation in the Kosovo;

     -    Second, political solutions and diplomatic efforts will
only work if backed by the necessary military power and the
credible resolve to use it against an aggressor;

     -    Third, if you cannot or do not want to help the victim
of aggression, enable him to help himself;

     -    Fourth, the purpose of intervention is not necessarily
to win a war, but to influence the behaviour of the party
concerned.  We need to have limited military options for limited
political or diplomatic objectives.  It is wrong to think only in
categories of all or nothing;

     -    Fifth, threaten only if you are determined to implement
the threat;

     -    Sixth, define the strategic objectives of your actions
as early and as clearly as possible;

     -    Seventh, avoid situations in which your own troops
become hostages;

     -    Finally, the most important lesson is, of course:  that
no international organisation can work efficiently without the
political will and unity of its member nations.  This is true as
much for the United Nations as for the European Union, the WEU,
or NATO.

          If we observe these lessons, we can help prevent future
Yugoslavias.  Even more so since our institutions have
considerable potential which has yet to be fully realised.  With
the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the stage is now
set for a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European
Union.  The role of the WEU as the bridge between NATO and the
European Union is thus all the more highlighted by this important
event.  

          Our forthcoming NATO Summit should take the necessary
decisions to give clear guidance for our cooperation.  The Summit
will also serve as an important opportunity to further enhance
the development of a European Security and Defence Identity and
to reaffirm the transatlantic link.  This Summit, to which the
WEU will undoubtedly make its distinct contribution, will be
central, not only in laying the groundwork for the future
relationship between our organisations, but also in defining a
new transatlantic bargain between equal partners.

          At the core of our efforts lies the question of how to
re-balance the Alliance so that Europe assumes a greater share of
responsibility for security in Europe and beyond.  It is
essential that on both sides of the Atlantic a greater European
role is not regarded as a threat but as a precondition of NATO's
longer-term vitality.  The WEU has an important role to play in
this regard, and I see it as one of our greatest accomplishments
that we have established a close working relationship between our
organisations.  We are working to improve it further.  In the
long run, our overall objective is to develop structures that
allow us to work efficiently together but also to enable the
forces of European Allies to operate under WEU auspices when it
is agreed that NATO should not be involved. 


          We now have to create practical, operationally sound
arrangements in this respect.  For example, we are currently
looking at the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces for
peacekeeping and other contingency operations.  This concept
would provide the Alliance with mobile, multinational,
tri-service headquarters, which could be detached from existing
command structures for operations under WEU auspices.  It could
therefore meet the Alliance's new crisis management requirements 
and provide the basis for "separable but not separate" forces to
accommodate the needs of the emerging European Security and
Defence Identity.  A competing military structure in Western
Europe is neither necessary nor possible.  No-one can afford
such duplication in times of shrinking defence budgets.  It could
only be built up at the expense of existing structures.  I
believe that this view is now widely accepted.

          It should be said that the concept of Combined Joint
Task Forces is yet another indication of the flexibility of our
integrated military structure.  Events of the past year have
clearly demonstrated how well this structure can adapt to the
changing security environment.  I firmly believe that, given the
scope and complexity of operations required in former Yugoslavia,
effective multi-national involvement would have been even more
difficult without NATO and its integrated structure.  Moreover,
the unity of command and control which it secures, its
responsiveness to a changing political and military situation,
and its visible demonstration of Allied solidarity makes NATO's
integrated structure an indispensable element of our security,
regardless of new arrangements outside or within it.

          By the same token, it must remain clear that the
central forum for consultation on issues affecting the security
of our member states remains NATO.  This is not an artificial
requirement.  Logic simply dictates such an approach, especially
since the task forces I have referred to would still have to draw
on supporting NATO assets.  Clearly, common WEU stances will be
increasingly introduced into Alliance consultations.  They must,
however, remain flexible positions, open for discussion and
possible modification in the mutual security interest.  If we
would give priority to a policy of "fait accompli" over
negotiated compromise, we would put the transatlantic
relationship at risk.  What in the short-term might look like
European self-assertion would in the longer term be revealed for
what it really was: Europe acting against its self-interest.

          Moreover, it would be an illusion to believe that we
could neatly categorize security challenges into "American" and
"European".  The degree of involvement of either side may vary,
depending on the nature of the crisis and on the interests at
stake, but at its core it will remain a joint effort.  

          Our experience in Yugoslavia has been a case in point. 
It has highlighted the magnitude today's crisis management
challenges can assume, and the importance of sharing leadership
and responsibility in dealing with European security.  So Europe
and North America remain dependent on one another, and our
security arrangements must reflect this interdependence.  What
matters is that our military structures be shaped to suit the
evolving "variable geometry" in crisis management efforts.  This
includes, of course, future contributions by non-NATO members,
for example in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council framework.

          We are currently discussing new ways of making our
Partners more capable of interacting with NATO member states in a
broad range of multinational missions such as peacekeeping and
crisis management.  For example, the recent proposal by the
United States, entitled "Partnership for Peace", envisages a 
network of bilateral arrangements between individual Partner
countries and the Alliance.  

          This initiative, which has been favourably received in
the Alliance, is not an alternative to membership.  It will be
open to all cooperation partners and possibly to other states in
Europe which may be interested.  But the extent of cooperation
would be largely up to the partner countries themselves and
depend on their individual requirements.  This would lead to a
flexible network of cooperative links within Europe and across
the Atlantic, in which nobody would be excluded or isolated.  

          De meme, il doit etre bien clair que l'instance
centrale o— sont prises les decisions ayant une incidence sur la
securite de nos Etats membres reste l'OTAN. Il ne s'agit pas
d'une exigence artificielle. C'est tout simplement la logique qui
dicte une telle ligne de conduite, d'autant que les forces
operationnelles que je mentionnais tout a l'heure devraient
toujours etre constituees a partir des moyens mis a disposition
par l'OTAN. Il est evident que les prises de position communes de
l'UEO trouveront de plus en plus place dans les consultations de
l'Alliance. Il faut cependant que ces positions restent souples,
ouvertes a la discussion et qu'il soit possible de les modifier
en fonction de l'interet que nous portons mutuellement a la
securite. Si nous donnions a la politique du fait accompli la
priorite sur la negociation et le compromis, nous risquerions de
mettre les liens transatlantiques en peril. Ce qui, a court
terme, pourrait passer pour une affirmation de l'identite
europeenne ne se revelerait etre, a long terme, que ce qu'elle
aurait ete en realite : a savoir, une manifestation de l'Europe
agissant contre son propre interet. 

          En outre, ce serait une illusion de croire que nous
pourrions classer soigneusement les defis qui se posent sur le
plan de la securite en deux categories : "americains" d'une part
et "europeens" de l'autre. Le role de chaque partie peut varier -
selon la nature de la crise et selon les interets en jeu - mais,
pour l'essentiel, il s'agira toujours d'un effort commun.

          Notre experience en Yougoslavie constitue un cas
typique. Il a mis en lumiere l'ampleur des defis que peut poser
aujourd'hui la gestion des crises et a souligne qu'il importe de
partager leadership et responsabilites lorsqu'il s'agit de la
securite europeenne. Ainsi, l'Europe et l'Amerique du Nord
restent dependantes l'une de l'autre, et notre dispositif de
securite doit concretiser cette interdependance. Ce qui compte
est de faconner nos structures militaires de maniere qu'elles
s'adaptent a la nouvelle "geometrie variable" dans la gestion des
crises. Cela implique, naturellement, la contribution future de
pays non membres de l'OTAN, par exemple dans le cadre du Conseil
de cooperation nord-atlantique.

          A l'heure actuelle, nous cherchons comment donner a nos
Partenaires de nouveaux moyens de mieux agir avec les Etats
membres de l'OTAN, dans toute une gamme de missions
multinationales concernant notamment le maintien de la paix et la
gestion des crises. C'est ainsi que, dans leur recente
proposition intitulee "Partenariat pour la paix", les Etats-Unis
envisagent un reseau d'arrangements bilateraux entre les divers
Partenaires de la cooperation et l'Alliance.

          Cette initiative, qui a recu un accueil favorable de
l'Alliance, n'est pas un succedane de l'adhesion. Elle sera
proposee a tous les Partenaires de la cooperation et,
eventuellement, aux autres Etats europeens qui seraient
interesses. L'ampleur de la cooperation dependrait toutefois
largement des pays partenaires eux-memes et serait fonction des
besoins de chacun. On aboutirait ainsi a tout un reseau de liens
de cooperation souples au sein meme de l'Europe et par dela
l'Atlantique, dans lequel nul ne serait exclu ou isole.

          Dans le meme temps, il y a encore a faire, s'agissant
des relations entre les Allies, et en particulier des liens entre
l'OTAN et l'UEO pour lesquels il faut notamment :

     -    definir plus avant les imperatifs structurels concrets
d'une formule "separable mais non separee";

     -    renforcer les liens entre la Cellule de planification
de l'UEO et le SHAPE;

     -    preciser les besoins de l'UEO, afin de pouvoir en tenir
compte dans le processus de planification des forces de l'OTAN;

     -    enfin, mettre au point des positions compatibles sur
l'elargissement futur de nos deux organisations. Comme certains
pays de l'Association europeenne de libre echange vont sans doute
adherer prochainement a l'Union europeenne et que les nouvelles
democraties d'Europe centrale et orientale ont hƒte de voir les
liens se renforcer, l'OTAN et l'UEO sont toutes deux appelees a
elaborer une strategie politique qui permette de prendre en
compte ces nouvelles demandes. Je pense que l'ouverture
progressive de nos institutions a de nouveaux membres est pour
nous un devoir historique. C'est egalement une occasion sans
precedent de renforcer la communaute des democraties. Cependant,
nous devons, dans nos demarches, etre conscients des implications
qui en decoulent pour les autres organisations multinationales.

          Ladies and Gentlemen, I said in the beginning that the
Cold War has forced a certain discipline on us.  We knew that
much was at stake and we proceeded carefully so as not to weaken
transatlantic relations.  

          There are some who believe that in a post-Cold War
world a loosening of our transatlantic ties would no longer make
much of a difference.  Let us not succumb to these views.  The
success story of European integration owes much to the
transatlantic framework that NATO provides.  If we lose sight of
this essential interrelationship, if we take a casual approach to
our future, we could quickly find ourselves in the worst of all
possible worlds:  without a sound trans-atlantic relationship and
without a dynamic European integration process.  This would be
damaging not only for Western Europe and North America.  It would
also gravely affect the political and economic transition of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, countries which urgently
look for links to the political, economic and military
institutions of the West for security and stability.

          Ladies and Gentlemen, the transatlantic relationship is
the most stable geopolitical asset on this globe.  It brings
together the world's two principal centres of democracy and
liberalism.  These are also the two regions with the greatest
global outreach and sense of global responsibility.  How could we
hope to achieve a more stable world in the absence of their
strategic cooperation?

          Lasting links require institutional anchoring beyond
economic interdependence.  NATO provides this political and
military anchor.  In times of increasing economic competition,
these links assume special relevance.

          Finally, how could North America and Europe ever hope
to deal with the new challenges, if not in common?  The
challenges far exceed the capabilities of any single nation. 
They must be faced collectively - or we will not succeed in
facing them at all.

          The essential precondition for further successful
security cooperation between the Atlantic democracies is a
greater European role.  This is the key to NATO's future.  Smooth
and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the WEU must be our
main objective in the months ahead.  Not only is this the key to
a new transatlantic bargain; it is also essential in projecting
stability to our partners in Central and Eastern Europe and in
providing the foundation for security in an undivided Europe.