10 MAY, 1993

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

          Barely a month ago, on April 12, NATO entered a new
era.  That was the day when the Atlantic Alliance began
enforcing the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia.  For the
first time in its history, the Alliance embarked on an action
that could lead it into an actual combat situation.

          What an irony!  An organisation created to deal with
the military challenge of the Cold War, and which survived
that Cold War and succeeded without firing a shot, now has to
contemplate seriously the use of force - after the Cold War
has ended, and outside of what was traditionally called the
NATO treaty area.  

          Of course, we could have stood aside.  An
institution dealing predominantly with the defence of its
member countries could have made the case that what happened
in former Yugoslavia was outside its political and
geographical mandate.  

          But NATO did not stand aside.  We wanted to react to
the United Nations' resolution because we felt that if the
positive achievements of the last few years were to made
durable, we had to make our contribution to the efforts by the
international community to stop the fighting in the heart of
Europe.  We reacted because we felt that turning our back on
the hotspots in Europe is not an answer.  Violent nationalism
in Yugoslavia may not threaten NATO territory; but left to
fester it can only expand insecurity and instability across
Europe.  If we do not want the current transition phase of
Europe to become a violent historical epoch in its own right,
we had to act. 

          NATO is a unique position to act.  After all, it is
the essential foundation on which any future Euro-Atlantic
security order will have to rest:

          The Alliance couples Europe and North America, the
two largest centres of democracy and market economy. 
Transatlantic solidarity and recognition of shared fundamental
interests between Europe and America remain the precondition
for managing security today.  Neither can prevent disorder in
Europe without the other.  NATO is still the only instrument
that enables Europe and America to consult and, where
necessary, to act together, sharing leadership and burdens. 
NATO is thus the basic model of the way in which the
industrial democracies must operate to uphold stability in a
world of multidimensional risks and limited national means.

          Second, of all international organisations the
Alliance remains the only one that can virtually guarantee the
security of its members.  Only NATO possesses the prerequisite
network of bases, equipment and infrastructure.  It also
possesses a unique array of politico-military tools for crisis

          These simple facts explain the coherence of the
Alliance even after the end of the Cold War.  It also explains
why so many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have
stated their interest in joining our Alliance one day.

          For the last three years we have prepared our
Alliance for an entirely new strategic environment.  

          In the military domain, this is reflected in the
adaptation of NATO's force posture to new security
requirements.  This adaptation is making good progress.  Based
on our Strategic Concept that we agreed at our Rome Summit in
1991, our forces are becoming more flexible and mobile.  A
Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters has been established and the
Corps should be available on target in 1995.  Our Strategic
Concept also provides for more multinational formations, even
at corps level. Thereby NATO is also promoting the military
integration of its European members and helping to lay the
basis for a European identity in security and defence.  

          A new Command Structure has been agreed, including
in the Southern Region, where, as you know, there have been
some problems in the past.  Moreover, we are currently
streamlining the armaments cooperation process within NATO,
and we are devising ways of military cooperation with non-NATO

          So for NATO, the shifts in the international system
have indeed resulted in the most fundamental transformation in
its history, a transformation that has culminated in the
adoption of two new major tasks for our Alliance.    

          First, we are projecting stability into Central and
Eastern Europe and Central Asia through close cooperation with
our former adversaries in the framework of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council.

          Second, we are making our Alliance's unique military
and political capabilities available for crisis management and

          Allow me to elaborate on these two new tasks.

          During the Cold War there was a clear fault line
running through Central Europe.  It seemed so durable that
even our vocabulary adapted to it:  "Central Europe" became
"Eastern Europe", and Central Asia was simply seen as a part
of the Soviet Union.  This fault line has disappeared.  We now
have to face the challenge not only of establishing a close
cooperation with these states in the political and economic
fields, but to help them reorganise their security policies as
well.  As the only functioning collective defence organisation
we bear a special security responsibility for these young

          Nothing could express better this responsibility
than the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, where we meet
with our cooperation partners.  If someone had predicted only
three years ago that the foreign ministers of, say, Russia,
Ukraine and Latvia would ever come together in Brussels under
my chairmanship, I would have recommended he receive medical
treatment immediately.  Today, it has become almost a regular
feature of our security dialogue.  By giving these partners a
common security anchor in our Western structures, we have
helped to prevent the formation of competing alliances in
Central and Eastern Europe.  The North Atlantic Cooperation
Council has given the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
an instrument for addressing their security concerns and for
identifying multilateral solutions.  We have supplemented
consultations within the NACC by a diverse programme of
practical cooperation activities designed to help our partners
in areas where we have special competence and expertise.

          A new and important element is that NATO will
initiate consultations with our NACC partners on peacekeeping,
leading to cooperation between the Alliance and interested
NACC members.  We will seek to share experience and expertise
in the planning of peacekeeping missions, training and
consideration of possible joint peacekeeping exercises. 
Increasingly, therefore, the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council will be able to assist NATO with its two new missions
of crisis management and projection of stability.

          The NACC has therefore proved to be a dynamic
process.  We will develop it further by making our programmes
more responsive to the individual needs of cooperation
partners.      Through the NACC the Alliance is contributing
to the emergence of a security culture in Europe, wherein
security is improved through cooperation.

          Let me now turn to the second task, crisis
management and peacekeeping.  

          The territorial defence of Western Europe is
fundamental to our security, but no longer the most urgent
call on our resources.  As projecting stability is now a major
task for the Alliance, NATO must also play a vital part in
peacekeeping.  This means that NATO's political and military
potential can be made available not only for territorial self-
defence but also to deal with the new security challenges in
Europe.  Given the instability in many parts of Europe today,
we would be foolish to leave the Alliance on the sidelines and
its potential under-utilised.  The Alliance is not only needed
as a unique source of peacekeeping capabilities; its
consultations can also serve to generate necessary political
momentum, for instance in enforcing sanctions.  

          We all would wish that diplomatic means alone would
succeed.  But diplomacy needs to be backed up with a
determination to use force if it is to be credible.  If the
international community were perceived as ruling out the use
of military force under all circumstances, any aggressor could
easily call our bluff.  As Frederick the Great used to say:
"Diplomacy without the sword is like music without
instruments".  We should heed his advice even today, when we
are dealing with crisis management.  Military force must be
clearly available through all stages of crisis management in
order to ensure that non-military approaches work.  

          For this reason, one of our main tasks right now is
to further strengthen the Alliance's coordination in
peacekeeping and to develop practical measures to enhance
NATO's contribution in this area.  We have initiated the
necessary planning for the integrated military structure in
order to ensure that the required capabilities for
peacekeeping will be available to the Alliance.  

          This task is everything but easy.  The experience in
former Yugoslavia already shows the changing nature of peace-
keeping operations.  The lines between "peacekeeping" and
"peacemaking" are becoming  increasingly blurred.  Whereas in
the past it would suffice to deploy a few hundred "blue
helmets" between two parties who had agreed not to fight,
today's environment might require far more than such a
symbolic presence.  The new tasks differ significantly from
the old ones: we may not always be able to count on the
agreement of the warring factions, and the degree of military
complexity far exceeds the capabilities of a small,
international UN force.  Wherever you deal with military
operations on a bigger scale you need trained units operating
according to agreed procedures and with standardized
equipment.  In short: you need NATO.  The United Nations are
overstretched and underfunded.  They need the support of
regional organisations in coping with the challenge of crisis
management.  This is why they overcame their initial
hesitation towards cooperating with NATO.  Now we have to
build on this new relationship.  We have already proved that
we have something to offer to the UN and that reservations
against UN-NATO cooperation belong to the past.  

          For instance, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia,
NATO is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic, the UN in
the enforcement of the embargo.  We are helping in protecting
the humanitarian efforts.  We have supplied the UNPROFOR with
elements of a headquarters from NORTHAG.  And we are finally
enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia.  We have also supplied
the UN with contingency planning as regards the implementation
of a UN peace plan.  I am quite confident that if we were
called upon, we are ready to respond positively to support
further initiatives by the United Nations Security Council.
          Do these recent developments mean that NATO is
becoming a "peacekeeping-agency" of the United Nations? 
Certainly not.  Collective defence remains the core of our
Alliance.  It is  NATO's capability to provide for the
security of its member states that creates the political power
enabling us to shape political change.  NATO's role as a major
political factor would vanish if we were unable to maintain
strong, collective defence capabilities.  The spectrum of
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions requires fewer
forces than during the Cold War but, in many respects, more
flexible forces.  So investment in defence is still the basis
of our security.  In this respect the conventional force
reductions of Allies are greater than expected.  This could
have implications for the composition and size of NATO's main
defence forces.  Collective planning in the Alliance can help
to optimise the output of reduced defence budgets, but nations
must make the appropriate effort if they, and by extension
NATO, are not to lose credibility.

          So I do not want to join those who think that
collective defence is over and collective security is the new
fashion of the day.  With the future being less predictable
than ever, no-one can say that an Ally will never again need
to request the help of the Alliance against intimidation or
threat.  And yet an effective defence cannot be improvised on
the spur of the moment.  The very coherence that NATO gives to
Western security arrangements will continue to exercise an
important deterrent function. 

          Another key task of our Alliance in the coming years
will be to maintain an active American role and presence in
Europe, and, at the same time, rebalance the Alliance in order
to increase the weight and influence of its European
dimension.  This is an essential feature of NATO's
transformation, and even a condition of its long-term future. 
The construction of an effective European security and defence
identity closely linked to the Alliance therefore remains at
the top of our political agenda.  As all European Alliance
members are now connected with the WEU in one form or another,
the WEU is now more of a truly representative European pillar
of the Alliance.  NATO has put forward proposals to ensure
transparency and complementarity in its working relations with
the WEU.  We are now discussing these with the WEU and hope to
reach agreement on an effective 'modus operandi' shortly. 
Certainly relations are becoming closer.   The WEU has moved
to Brussels a few months ago.  In the future, we will aim to
establish contacts and cooperation on a very pragmatic basis.

          What is our objective?  We want a pragmatic division
of labour with the WEU that ensures that we use our political
and military resources in the most cost-effective and
efficient way.  The organisation that can best act, and which
can achieve consensus to act, should take the lead.  Rivalry
and duplication are wasteful at best and positively counter-
productive at worst.  

          Ladies and Gentlemen, it may have become a platitude
to state that the international system has shifted and that we
require other ways and means of managing the new political
geography.  But even platitudes are true.  

          A new Euro-Atlantic security system cannot be built
overnight.  Yet we must not let the difficult security
challenges become an excuse for inaction.  Moreover, I believe
that today we have options and instruments for dealing with
these conflicts that our predecessors lacked.  Compared with
the beginning of our century, today's conditions are
undoubtedly better, our capabilities to deal with the
difficulties are much more developed and - above all - we have
institutions and instruments in place, which did not exist at
the beginning of the century.  This is especially true for the
two most successful and dynamic models of international
cooperation - NATO and the EC.  It is also true for a
reinvigorated United Nations and a reinforced CSCE.

          But for all these institutions to work requires the
political will and determination of the nations involved.  Any
alliance is only as good as the sum of its parts.  Italy has a
key role to play both as regards the organisation of the naval
embargo in the Adriatic as well as of the enforcement of the
no-fly-zone over Bosnia.  Also, Italy's current WEU presidency
has given it additional responsibility for the shaping of a
European Defence and Security Identity.  All these efforts
underline once again the importance of NATO's Mediterranean
dimension.  It is reassuring to know that the Alliance can
count on Italy to fulfil these demanding tasks.  We will do
our utmost to ensure that Italy, in turn, can count on the
Alliance:  By maintaining a proper balance of long-term
political vision, sound military strategy and a constant
process of internal reform, the Alliance will continue to
demonstrate that it is the best way of organising the security
of our Western democracies.