Speech
made by the Secretary General, Chairman of the North
Atlantic Council, H.E. M. Paul-Henri Spaak, to the Washington Press Club on October
24, 1957
This is my first visit to the United States in the
capacity of Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of NATO,
and, during this visit, my first public appearance gives me the opportunity of
addressing the press of the United States. Really it is a great opportunity. I
think that the purpose of this gathering is to give to you my impressions of the
international situation, now that I have had five months experience with NATO.
I shall try to summarize my principal reflections. At the same time I would like
to indicate to you some of the subjects of my discussions during this trip. 1.
First of all, it must be remembered that NATO was created in 1949 with the main
purpose, after the Communist "coup d'etat" in Prague, to stop the Soviet
imperialism in Europe. And I would like to emphasize strongly that we have completely
succeeded. Please realize that since 1949 the Soviet made no more progress in
Europe. I admit this was in Europe only, but that was the NATO purpose, 2.
We reached this goal without having to use force. The mere existence of
NATO was sufficient. When I see that I can understand why NATO is considered by
the Soviets as public enemy No. 1.The existence and development of NATO is the
biggest defeat since the end of the war for Soviet diplomacy. And this defeat
is so much the more humiliating that it is the direct result of the Soviet's own
bad foreign policy. They themselves have made necessary that "policy of blocs"
which they so vigorously denounce. It is indeed clear that once the Nazis
had been defeated, the Western Powers not only wished to maintain their war-time
alliance with the USSR but also, within the United Nations, to pursue a foreign
policy based on the concept of universality. By their exaggerated use of
the right of veto in the Security Council and their blatant and unbridled display
of communistic imperialism in the Balkans and Central Europe, the USSR swept away
all Western illusions and made it possible to pursue the desired policy. 3.
It would be folly were the Western world to forget this, put on brakes, and thus
voluntarily re-create those conditions which made Soviet expansionism possible. Even
if, as I believe, the Russians are not systematically preparing for war, they
must not be led into temptation. Events in Hungary have shown the things of which
they are capable when they think their own interests are at stake. At the
outset a military effort at joint defense, the Atlantic alliance must on no account
sit back. Costly as it may be, it is still less so than open war. 4. However
our military effort must constantly be under review. Progress in this field is
being made very quickly. We must not hesitate to change our plans and organisation
to stay in the front line. I am sure that peace can only be maintained in a world
where the Western countries are very powerful. 5. But in spite of this success
- this very real success -it is necessary for us to do even better, A military
alliance calls for at least a co-ordinated, if not common, foreign policy on the
part of member countries. Western statesmen have long been aware of this. That
is why, at the beginning of 1956, they entrusted to three of their members, Pearson
of Canada, Martino of Italy and Lange of Norway, the task of preparing suggestions
as to how these new aims could be achieved. The report of these Three Wise
Men was a very good one. On this question of foreign policies, their conclusions
were- (Report of the Three Wise Men 50/51) These recommendations were unanimously
approved in Paris at the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1956.
These recommendations constitute a charter. The charter on which I work as Secretary
General. 6. The task of co-ordination is a difficult one. Systematic prior
consultation considered as a moral obligation seems to me to be a great novelty
in diplomatic. procedure: it indeed involves a profound upheaval in age-old traditions.
I think it possible to assert that "individual diplomacy" has
for long been the outstanding sign of national sovereignty. Now that the era of
nations appears to be giving way to that of continents, diplomacy must in its
turn adapt itself to new ways, already accepted, as valid in the economic field.
An organization such as NATO is the place in which such method should be worked
out, tried and checked. Nothing immediately spectacular can be anticipated.
What must be done is gradually to establish a practice which will, in due course,
become constant to the extent that it proves fruitful. The experience of
about six months has taught me that there is certainly something to be done in
this field and that there are reasonable grounds for success. The disarmament
conference held in London provided us with a most valuable experience. The Western
Powers represented in the Sub-Committee were called upon to make proposals which
necessarily concerned their partners in ths Atlantic Alliance. It was a natural
consequence that there should be negotiations between the Western Powers represented
at the London Conference and the other NATO member countries represented in Paris.
These negotiations took place. The NATO machine proved to be sufficiently flexible
to conduct and follow up these negotiations without causing any delay, so that
when the Western Powers at the London Conference put forward their plan at the
end of August, they were speaking not only in their own name, as individual countries,
but in the name of all the partners in the Atlantic Alliance. Events in
the Middle East have given us another opportunity to try out our new methods.
In four or five Council meetings, the developments in the Syrian situation have
been carefully studied. Very full information has been exchanged. Facts have been
examined and discussed and the general lines of a constructive policy have been
suggested I cannot say that the results obtained were absolutely perfect,
but they arc- already however sufficient to avoid a repetition of what happened
last year and also to be sure that the Middle East situation will not cause a
new crisis in the North Atlantic Alliance. Already it has been proved that
this joint policy can perfectly well be worked out and that the system of prior
consultation in all frankness and loyalty is not ah added complication but, on
the contrary, makes things easier. 7. But even if we succeed in this part
of our task it is still not enough. We must make clear the meaning of Article
2 of the Treaty. You remember, perhaps, what the Article says: "The
members will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies
and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." This
Article was already important in 1949, but it is still more so in 1957. Why?
Because I believe the struggle between Communism and the West will, in the future,
be carried on much more on economic and social grounds, than at the military level. 8.
I don't believe that it is possible, at the present time to create an Atlantic
Community like the one we succeeded in creating in Europe with the Treaty on the
Common Market. But I am sure, there are today some economic problems existing
inside the Atlantic Community, - some problems which could only be solved within
the framework of NATO. The plain, unvarnished truth is that without the
help of the United States, the countries of Europe in their present condition
no longer have any possibility of taking effective defence measures against aggression.
The military help they require must be expressed not only in terms of American
troops stationed at great expense in Europe, but also in terms of modern weapons
supplied by the United States for the use of their European allies, and which,
it must not be forgotten, are costing more and more every year. Yet it is
daily becoming more apparent that there are obvious -and wasteful structural defects
in the military defence system of the West. Enormous savings could be achieved
by standardizing military equipment and by placing its manufacture-on a rational
basis of international distribution of defence orders, and possibly better still
by common sense co-ordination of scientific research. The launching by the
Russians of an artificial satellite has just given us a sharp reminder that this
important aspect of our problems must on no account be neglected. We in the West
cannot afford to disperse our scientific efforts any longer, for only wise economies
in their use and good organization can carry us forward to our common goals. If
the United States were left to shoulder the greater part of the crushing burden
of defence alone, I fear it would grow weary. It would regard its task as far
too big and the weight too heavy to be bearable. But if it wants to share its
burden, it must have full confidence in its loyal and willing partners. Restrictive
action such as the provisions of the MacMahon Act, for instance, were no doubt
Justified when the United States enjoyed a virtual monopoly of knowledge in certain
fields, but they are outdated now that the enemy is in possession of the secrets
which were to have been jealously guarded. As things have turned out, would it
not be better to let friends into these secrets and so spare them time-consuming,
difficult and costly research work? Would it not be better to cooperate with their
scientists and technicians with a view to avoiding duplication, purposeless repetition
of the same trials and errors and, for the whole of the Western Community an enormous
waste of time and money. The challenge thrown out by Khrushchev was not
a gesture of defiance by a country of the East to one of the West, but a challenge
by the Communist World to the Free World. It must be met by a United Free World,
solidly welded together. 9. There is another problem which could and. must
be solved by the entire West, the problem of help to the under-developed countries.
I must first underline that in that field the United States is making a splendid
and generous effort. But I must also confess that their policy has not always
given the hoped for result. Why? First of all, I will say, frankly, because
people are often ungrateful. But there are also other reasons. The Russians
have, in this field, done far less, infinitely less, yet it is apparent that in
certain charters they have met with greater success. So the reason for this must
be sought, I believe that the chief reason is that they have used the label of
commerce rather than that of generosity. They have not given, they have bought
and sold, and so they avoid adverse psychological reactions. I want also to emphasize
that this effort must not be made at random. It is impossible to help everyone
effectively. This authorizes and justifies selection. It does not mean that there
should be political strings, but I believe that we must help first those who,
of their own free will, have decided to resist Communist blackmail. Even reduced
to these proportions, the problem is still immense and demands not only a clearly
conceived long-term policy, but a spirit of collective generosity, served by first-class
organization. Even reduced to these proportions, it demands more than an effort
by the United States, it demands the rationalization of the independent efforts
of the West. Europe will be able to contribute greatly to this effort on the day
that, having given up its out-moded internal barriers, it has become welded into
a single unit and has set up a vast common market, an essential condition for
its future prosperity and its effective participation in the solution of the major
problems of our times. 10. To sum up: The Atlantic Alliance founded in 1949
has prevented both the gradual conquest of Europe by Communism and the outbreak
of the Third World War, The military effort for which it calls must be maintained
and adapted to changing requirements and the new means placed at its disposal.
This military effort alone is, however, insufficient. It must be based upon a
coordinated foreign policy. Lastly, the Alliance can and must play a leading role
during the period of "peaceful coexistence", since it, in fact, but
masks large-scale economic and social competition between East and West. And,
above all, I strongly believe: There is no longer for any country of the West,
be it the most powerful, the richest, the strongest, any very important problem
which it can oreally solve alone. Only within the framework of a United
Europe and a strong North Atlantic Alliance can a lasting solution be found.

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