Günther Altenburg examines how NATO has dealt with crises in its history and considers how this impacts the current debate over modernising the Alliance.

Marc Grossman sets out Washington's vision for NATO in advance of the Alliance's Prague Summit.

General Klaus Naumann warns that NATO is in danger of outliving its utility, unless urgent steps are taken to revitalise the Alliance.

Guillaume Parmentier argues that NATO needs to focus on its military capabilities and to become a more equal partnership between the United States and the other Allies.

Crime and punishment
Christopher Bennett reviews two recent books examining the effectiveness of war crimes tribunals.

Anton Tus: an officer and a diplomat

The vulnerability of interconnected society

Paul Fritch assesses the prospects of the new NATO-Russia Council.

Should NATO’s new function be counter-terrorism?
Daniel S. Hamilton versus Sir Timothy Garden

Publications may be reproduced, after permission has been obtained from the editor, provided mention is made of NATO Review and signed articles are reproduced with the author's name.
“NATO, the cornerstone of our foreign policy, has not been adapted to changed strategic and political relationships... Unless the North Atlantic group of nations develops a clearer purpose it will be doomed.”

“The Atlantic Alliance is in the early stages of what could be a terminal illness. The Alliance has been in trouble plenty of times before, but this is the worst yet.”

“NATO is in deep, enduring crisis and may not even reach the end of the decade.”

Anyone thinking that these statements were made after 11 September 2001, should think again. For these quotes are more than three decades apart. The first, a complaint by Henry Kissinger, dates back to 1961; the second, from The Economist, saw NATO going down the drain in 1982; and Christoph Bertram, former director of the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies, made his gloomy prognosis in 1994.

None of these and other dire predictions ever came true. Why? Because the Cassandras made a mistake quite common in thinking about the Atlantic Alliance: they mistook intra-Alliance disagreements for a sign of Alliance fatigue. Accordingly, they elevated legitimate debate about the future course of the Alliance into fundamental disagreements over its value. That value, however, was never seriously called into question. As NATO is gearing up to face a new major challenge — terrorism — it is useful to bear this fundamental fact in mind. Debates over NATO policy and strategy are not unwelcome disturbances, but constitute the very essence of the Alliance.

Military dilemmas: few means, diverging ends

In retrospect, the history of NATO might well be characterised as success disguised as perpetual crisis. From the outset, the notion of a permanent Alliance between North America and Europe seemed implausible. Indeed, at the signing ceremony of the Washington Treaty in April 1949 the US press quipped that the ceremony may be “more spectacular than the act itself”. This captured the spirit of the day. And the State Department band seemed to reinforce it when they played George Gershwin’s I Got Plenty of Nothing.

Gershwin’s tune appeared to characterise NATO’s military dimension. Starting with the ambitious Lisbon force goals of 1952, which were never met, Allies seemed to have adopted a habit of forever failing to meet the requirements they set for themselves. For many sceptical observers, NATO’s inability to match means and ends represented an endemic failure of the Alliance. The same verdict was cast on NATO’s military strategy. As the Alliance’s military strategy was a compromise between conflicting Allied interests and limited military means, each reform was preceded by painful debate. For example, when the United States in 1961 advocated a shift from the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation to a “flexible response”, Allies debated for no less than seven years before the changes were finally approved. Even then, this new strategy remained open to transatlantic differences in interpretation. It was not surprising that NATO’s strategy, according to many defence experts, remained in permanent crisis.

Still, NATO’s military dimension worked. For despite different interpretations and disagreement over strategies and their proper implementation, the Alliance managed to do what counted most: to convey the message that North America and Western Europe considered themselves to be one single security space. This message, far more then any specific strategy...
The history of NATO might well be characterised as success disguised as perpetual crisis

Political dilemmas: solidarity without subordination

The transatlantic link, the essence of NATO, was also subject to permanent criticism. From the beginning, US analysts repeatedly warned that if the European Allies failed to increase their defence spending or otherwise help re-balance the transatlantic security burden, they risked losing the support of the United States, and the Alliance would unravel. The European Allies, in turn, repeatedly charged the United States with arrogantly trying to dominate NATO, both politically and militarily. And they scoffed at US ambivalence regarding European integration: rhetorically, the United States supported a stronger Europe, yet whenever it came to granting Europe more responsibility, the United States preferred the old-fashioned way of leading alone. So deep were the frictions that France left the military structure in 1966, causing a major crisis in NATO.

Yet even then, life went on. NATO relocated from France to Belgium. And while France left the integrated military structure, it retained other military links that would prevent estrangement from the military cultures of the other Allies. In any case, France’s role as an active NATO member remained unaffected. The loss of NATO’s strategic direction, which France’s departure from the integrated military command had become to symbolise, was overcome as well. The 1967 Harmel Report, named after the Belgian foreign minister who chaired it, championed a dual formula of deterrence and détente, thus bridging the differences that had emerged among Allies over the opportunities and pitfalls of reaching out to Warsaw Pact countries.

The new phase of the Cold War that erupted after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 heralded another transatlantic dispute. Views on the Soviet threat grew further apart, as the United States seemed ready for a more confrontational policy, while Europeans were anxious to save what was left of détente. Yet despite difficulties in the transatlantic relationship, the Alliance mastered what in retrospect was one of its most severe crises ever: the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. This decision, taken in response to a relentless Soviet build-up of similar weapons, had an effect that was initially unforeseen: behind the backdrop of a heightened sense of insecurity and fear of war, it galvanised public opinion and led to historically unprecedented opposition. For a democratic Alliance dependent on public support, this constituted a true crisis. Yet NATO stood firm, knowing well that this issue had now become a contest of will between NATO and the Soviet Union in which the Alliance had to prevail. And it did. Even its offer of a “zero-solution” on INF deployments — the proposal not to deploy in return for the removal of similar Soviet weapons — which was initially ridiculed by defence experts and peace movements alike, was accepted by Moscow.

In retrospect, NATO’s INF decision could be interpreted as a prelude to the end of the Cold War. Even while the Allies had meanwhile been moving on to the next controversy over US plans for a space-based missile defence, the transatlantic link had demonstrated remarkable resilience. When the Cold War ended — not without considerable intra-Alliance squabbles over the question of whether Mikhail Gorbachev was a genuine reformer — the Alliance could look back with a sense of achievement. It managed to craft a new, sensible approach to conventional arms control, and it adopted a thoughtful policy to facilitate German unification while reassuring Moscow.

Post-Cold War dilemma: indifference or engagement

The end of the Cold War ushered the Alliance into a new period of uncertainty, with many observers arguing that the end of NATO was now a foregone conclusion. In the absence of the Soviet threat, the Alliance was bound to go into terminal decline. But the critics had it wrong again. The Alliance was still needed in the emerging post-Cold War Europe — not simply as a collective defence organisation, but as a security manager in the broadest sense. What was needed at the end of the Cold War was a comprehensive political-military framework to facilitate Europe’s major transition to a continent “whole and free”.

www.nato.int/review

-3-
Within a few years, NATO played its newly assigned role as a framework for change. It created a set of policies that helped Europe to cope with the challenges of transformation. To be sure, Allies continued to disagree about the degree of reform. Some preferred to see NATO as a passive hedge against the return of some kind of a Soviet threat. Others wanted the Alliance to play a more active role in reaching out to former adversaries. As time went on, however, the case for an activist policy became stronger. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were clamouring for closer ties, pointing to a strategic need for the Alliance to draw these countries closer and to help them in facing the daunting challenges of post-communist transition.

But should such outreach also entail an eventual invitation to join NATO? On this issue, too, the Alliance acted in line with its typical pattern: an initial controversial debate, followed by an emerging consensus and then by a road map to implement that consensus. In 1997, after several years of painstaking preparation, NATO invited three former members of the Warsaw Pact to join, as part of a gradual process that would lead to further invitations at a later stage. That way, the enlargement process would leave open the option for future invitations, while giving aspiring countries time to prepare for membership. Russia would require a privileged relationship — a fact that was never in dispute, even if Allies initially disagreed about the scope and depth of such a relationship. As a result, NATO played a key part in overcoming Europe’s division.

The greatest post-Cold War challenge turned out to be the wars of Yugoslav dissolution. Initially, the NATO Allies had adopted a cautious approach vis-à-vis the conflicts in Southeastern Europe. They did not see any concrete strategic interests at stake and were uncertain as to the consequences of a direct military engagement. As a result, NATO’s involvement remained limited, confined to supporting other institutional actors, such as the United Nations, without a distinct role of its own. As the wars of Yugoslav dissolution dragged on, however, this minimalist role appeared increasingly unsustainable. Frictions grew, particularly between the United States and the other Allies, over what constituted a proper course of action. In 1994, The New York Times characterised the transatlantic disagreements as the worst since the 1956 Suez crisis, echoing a widespread sentiment that an Alliance that had withstood Soviet pressure was about to be split by a handful of Balkan warlords. The time for debate was running out.

Yet NATO surmounted the Balkan challenge, just as it had overcome previous ones. Allies finally agreed on a tougher line, acted on it, and ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia). In early 1996, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, supported by many Partner countries, deployed to Bosnia. NATO had written itself into the history books — and the text books. Only NATO, with its well-established political and military arrangements, could have done it. The initial disagreements among Allies about how to deal with regional conflicts faded into the distance. By virtue of its actions, NATO had established itself as Europe’s pre-eminent peacekeeper. And, along the way, NATO had also answered a question that had been debated for ages among Allies: whether the Alliance could act “out-of-area”, that is outside its traditional collective-defence perimeter. It could.

With its commitment to underpin a peace agreement for Bosnia, NATO had made the cause of stability in Southeastern Europe its own. In this way, when the Kosovo crisis erupted, the Alliance had virtually no choice but to get involved. After all diplomatic means had been exhausted, NATO launched an air campaign to force Belgrade to abort its policy of ethnic cleansing. Again, the penchant to see NATO in crisis clouded the public perception. Legitimate criticism of how the campaign was conducted — too great a US and too small a European contribution — dominated the public image so much that the most important issue almost got lost in the debate. NATO prevailed in that conflict and, in so doing, stopped and reversed the largest ethnic cleansing campaign since the Second World War.

NATO’s Balkan learning curve was steep. When the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* threatened to be engulfed in a civil war, the Allied response was quick. The rapid deployment of a NATO force prevented major conflagration and helped put the country on a reformist course. This conflict-prevention mission proceeded without major intra-Alliance debates. The lesson that engagement should win over indifference had been assimilated. Moreover, the fact that this mission was closely coordinated with the European Union indicated that another question that had haunted the Alliance for decades might soon be resolved as well: whether a distinct European Security and Defence Policy would be to the detriment of NATO. The building of institutional links between the European Union and NATO reflected an emerging consensus that NATO could not only afford but should actively seek a stronger, more coherent European contribution.

The new challenge: terrorism
What does this brief history of NATO’s “crises” suggest for the Alliance’s chances to play a meaningful role in combating terrorism? The answer is two-fold. First,
NATO will successfully develop new strategies and policies to deal with this new strategic challenge. That challenge has manifested itself in ways far too dramatic to be ignored by the world’s most powerful military Alliance. Indeed, the contours of such a new NATO approach have already become visible: a new relationship with Russia, a new military concept for the defence against terrorism, and a stronger emphasis on dealing with the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Second, despite these changes, NATO will not be able to shed its image of an Alliance in crisis. As in the past, critics will mistake debate for disagreement. They will interpret controversy not as a necessary precondition for change and adaptation, but as prelude to disaster. There is not much the Allies can do about that, except, perhaps, avoid inflammatory rhetoric in dealing with each other. Judging the Alliance by yardsticks so ambitious as to invite failure should be left to the outside critics.

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
The eleventh of September was a day of great tragedy. But could it also have been the day NATO met its future? Invoking Article 5 for the first time, NATO demonstrated that its members are united and determined to defeat the new security challenges posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The individual and collective actions of NATO Allies in response to 11 September came as no surprise to us. Throughout its history, NATO has always been ready to meet new threats and seize new opportunities. That is why the Alliance still matters and why NATO remains the key to the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area.

On 11 September, we were reminded how dangerous our world still is. The events of that day and the days immediately following also demonstrated how important our Allies are in helping to defeat the new threats that face us. The Alliance derives its strength from our shared purpose in defending our people and our values. NATO is not less important to our security after 11 September. It is more important.

NATO ministers agreed last December to intensify common efforts to meet the threats posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery that all Allies face. And they have followed up with further pledges in meetings in Reykjavik, in Rome, and in Brussels in May and June. When President Bush meets with Allied leaders in Prague, he will join Allies as they approve an action plan aimed at enhancing NATO’s ability to deal with new threats. This agenda, which can be summarised as “New capabilities, new members, new relationships”, will take the Alliance in new directions even as it reflects the enduring values and common goals set out in its founding charter, the 1949 Washington Treaty — to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of our people, live in peace with all peoples and governments, and promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic area.

**New capabilities**

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance has taken steps to revise its doctrine and improve its command and force structures to counter what threatens our Alliance today. The 1999 Strategic Concept defined these new threats explicitly, noting that: “New risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability were becoming clearer — oppression, ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the global spread of weapons technology and terrorism.” But we have more to do. The events of 11 September show that the threats to Allies and to our Alliance can come from anywhere, at any time. Now more than ever, NATO needs to be able at short notice to deploy balanced, flexible, well-armed forces capable of conducting sustained operations across a range of military options.

Marc Grossman sets out Washington’s vision for NATO in advance of the Alliance’s Prague Summit.
In order to fight effectively alongside the United States, European forces need more capability such as strategic lift, modern precision-strike capability, and combat service support. Unless the disparity is substantially narrowed, our NATO Allies will find it increasingly difficult to play their part in countering the threats that now face us all.

At the Prague Summit, NATO must begin to redress this imbalance by ensuring a comprehensive improvement in European military capabilities. We need to sharpen the focus of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the high-level programme launched in 1999 to boost Alliance capabilities. Effective European forces can be created by identifying key shortfall areas and agreeing to pool appropriate resources. This is similar to what Allies which are also members of the European Union are doing to meet the so-called “headline goal” of deploying EU-led forces in cases where NATO has decided not to become involved. Other capability requirements can be addressed through country specialisation according to an agreed division of labour. We are confident that these goals can be accomplished. As Secretary for Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted during his 7 June press conference following the NATO defence ministers’ meeting: “There isn’t a doubt in my mind... that the publics of NATO countries would willingly provide a relatively small fraction of our gross domestic products to provide the kinds of investments that will enable the NATO countries, individually and collectively, to contribute to peace and stability in the world.”

NATO also needs the means to defend its forces and members against new kinds of attacks. This means developing effective defence against weapons of mass destruction fielded either by rogue states or terrorist groups or by some sinister combination of the two. With NATO foreign and defence ministers recognising the importance of action to address the capabilities issue, we look forward to a comprehensive package of recommendations for the endorsement of heads of state and government at the Prague Summit.

New members
Our second goal for Prague is to continue the process of building a united Euro-Atlantic community by extending membership to those democratic European countries which have demonstrated their determination and ability to defend the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The process of enlarging the Alliance to bring in Europe’s new democracies, which was launched at NATO’s Madrid Summit in 1997, has brought us closer to completing the vision of NATO’s founders of a free and united Europe. But here, too, there is more work to be done.

President Bush has affirmed his belief in NATO membership for “all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings”. He has made clear to Allies and aspirants his belief that: “We have acted cautiously; now the time has come to act decisively.” We have been working closely with Allies and the nine aspirant countries that have been participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to strengthen their preparations. A team led by US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns visited these nine aspirant countries earlier this year to reinforce the importance of addressing key reform priorities in the months before the Prague Summit. Our team came away from its meetings impressed by the commitment of the aspirants to meeting their MAP goals and advancing reforms, even while recognising that they all have serious work ahead. We have told the aspirants that the United States has made no decision on which countries to support for membership, and we have urged them to accelerate their reforms between now and the Prague Summit.

The Washington Treaty makes clear that states invited to join NATO should be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This is the standard that will be applied as we approach decisions at the Prague Summit. The Vilnius Group of candidate countries, meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, last October, declared its shared intention to “fully support the war against terrorism” and “act as Allies of the United States”. And they have delivered, reinforcing our belief that a larger NATO will be a stronger Alliance.

Some have asked in the aftermath of 11 September whether enlargement should remain a priority. The President’s answer is “yes”. The events of 11 September have reinforced the importance of closer cooperation and integration between the United States and all the democracies of Europe. If we are to meet new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values and are able to act effectively with us.
demand is there. In the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Senate Appropriations Committee on 24 April: “Why do we need NATO? Why doesn’t it go away? The answer [is] obvious: everybody wants to join the club. It must be doing something right... They want to be part of a political and security organisation that is anchored in its relationship with North America.” More than ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries are still interested in joining NATO — not leaving it. NATO’s door must remain open to them.

**New relationships**

Our third goal for the Prague Summit is aimed at advancing two other core principles of the Alliance, namely those of living in peace with all peoples and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. As we work to complete the vision of a united Europe — from which Winston Churchill once observed: “No nation should be permanently outcast” — we must continue to reach out and expand cooperation and integration with all NATO Partners.

NATO and Russia have taken steps to give new impetus and direction to their extensive cooperation in the aftermath of 11 September. President Bush’s vision is of a Russia “fully reformed, fully democratic, and closely bound to the rest of Europe”, which is able to build partnerships with Europe’s great institutions, including NATO. As President Bush observed at the founding meeting of the new NATO-Russia Council in Rome on 28 May: “The NATO-Russia Council offers Russia a path toward forming an alliance with the Alliance. It offers all our nations a way to strengthen our common security, and it offers the world the prospect of a more hopeful century.”

The focus of the NATO-Russia Council will be on practical, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share a common purpose and a common goal. It will change the way NATO and Russia do business, help build trust and understanding, and deepen this key relationship. The new body will not, however, give Russia the ability to veto NATO actions in any area. It is not a back door to NATO membership. It will not infringe on NATO prerogatives. But the new body gives Russia the opportunity to work together with NATO and lay the basis for increased cooperation in the future.

While forging new links with Russia, our cooperative vision for NATO embraces all of NATO’s Partners, including countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Mediterranean Dialogue Partners and Ukraine. We are particularly determined to focus at the Prague Summit on NATO’s Partner activities with the countries of Central Asia that have played such constructive roles in the war against terrorism. The Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have been successful vehicles for integration, but we believe that much more can be done to expand cooperation between NATO and these countries. Through the Partnership for Peace, NATO can help build reformed, stable, democratic societies in the Caucasus and Central Asia. We need to make sure Partnership for Peace programmes and resources are tailored to their needs, so that they can develop the forces and training they need to meet common threats and strengthen stability.

Fifty-three years after its creation, NATO remains the core of the US commitment to Europe and the bedrock of our security. NATO has kept peace in Europe for more than half a century. NATO continues to provide conventional and nuclear defence for Allies, and it is the nexus of cooperation with the Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and Ukraine. No other organisation comes close to fulfilling these roles. Together with our Allies, we have much work ahead, but also an historic opportunity to achieve our goals of defending, integrating, and stabilising the Euro-Atlantic area and continuing to strengthen this greatest of alliances. We need no convincing of NATO’s importance. We remain committed to its continued success.

The goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace is fast becoming a reality for the first time in Europe’s history. As we look back on the emerging consensus of the past months and look forward to NATO’s Prague Summit, we see an Alliance confident in its enduring sense of purpose and committed to ensuring that it remains as capable of meeting the new challenges we face as it has those of the past.
Crunch time for the Alliance

General Klaus Naumann warns that NATO is in danger of outliving its utility, unless urgent steps are taken to revitalise the Alliance.

NATO is in urgent need of revitalisation. Its credibility is at stake. Shortfalls in Allied capabilities have been brought into sharp focus by the US-led operations in Afghanistan and the lack of a clear role for NATO is raising serious questions about its continued relevance. This crisis of confidence is exacerbated by a transatlantic rift manifest in several areas. Unless the November meeting of Allied leaders in Prague, originally billed as the "enlargement summit", is truly turned into a "transformation summit", NATO will have outlived its utility and will fade away. Steps were taken to pave the way for such transformation at the recent meetings of Allied foreign and defence ministers. It remains to be seen whether rhetoric will translate into action. Is the United States truly committed to NATO as a military alliance, or is it merely regarded as a useful political instrument? And will the European Allies demonstrate their commitment to closing the capabilities gap?

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 realised our worst fears. A threshold was crossed when suicide hijackers turned civilian aircraft into weapons of mass disruption and deliberately targeted a densely populated area. The response of the Allies was swift and resolute. The very next day, they invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding charter, declaring that the attack against all Allies. This meant that, under the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, the Allies could take action against those behind the attack. The pledge to support the United States came with no geographical limits: de facto, NATO became a global alliance.

The significance of the Allied solidarity expressed on 12 September 2001 is undeniable. Since then, however, NATO has failed to match words with deeds. While individual Allies are contributing to the US-led operations in Afghanistan, NATO has been unable to offer much more than political support. Nor has the US Administration asked for much more, implying that they do not need, or do not wish to use, NATO.

Worse still, some US officials — influenced by a flawed perception of NATO’s performance in the Kosovo air campaign, which they denounce as “war fighting by committee” — believe that NATO is not capable of acting effectively in such a crisis. Others deny that NATO has any relevance for future crises and, when asked about NATO’s purpose, answer flatly: “Keep the illusion alive.” A third group appears to think that, over time, closer cooperation between Russia and the United States will result in bilateral decision-making, leaving European Allies out of the loop.

Should such perceptions become the prevailing view in Washington, this would almost inevitably mean NATO’s demise. The European Allies cannot afford this to happen. Europe still faces risks, which are increasingly of a global nature. But Europe does not have the global capabilities required to meet global challenges and therefore remains dependent on the United States, and NATO, for its security and stability.

Diverging perceptions

The problem is the apparent transatlantic divergence in perceptions of NATO. European Allies see NATO as a collective-defence and crisis-management organisation, whereas the United States, its most powerful and indeed indispensable member, no longer looks at the Alliance as the military instrument of choice to use in conflict and war. Instead, NATO is regarded as a useful political instrument and collective-security arrangement through which to stabilise Europe and achieve the vision that originally led to the founding of NATO in 1949, a Europe “whole and free”.

General Naumann when chairman of NATO’s Military Committee (© NATO)

General Naumann was chairman of NATO’s Military Committee between February 1996 and May 1999. He retired from the military in 1999 and is currently, among other things, vice president of the German Atlantic Association.
Consequently, in the run-up to the Prague Summit, the United States has been promoting a rather ambitious enlargement of the Alliance, which is likely to absorb most of NATO’s energy, as well as the strengthening of NATO’s relations with Russia. Some conceptual work on a military doctrine for combating terrorism is also being proposed, though I am sure most would agree that it will be equally, if not more, important to identify ways and means to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism.

If NATO were to become an essentially political organisation and no longer be used in a crisis, its defence guarantee would look hollow. This would not only be disastrous for Europe but a severe blow to US national interests as well. The United States would risk losing control of one of its opposing coastlines and relinquishing one of its most powerful instruments of political influence on Europe.

To prevent this from happening, the United States and its Allies must find ways to revitalise NATO. This must go beyond further enlargement and new cooperative arrangements with Russia. NATO can no longer remain the regional defence alliance it used to be. It must become a global alliance, ready to defend its member countries’ interests wherever they are at risk and able to act as the core of future ad hoc coalitions of the willing. NATO must adapt its command and force structures accordingly and acquire the capabilities necessary to meet new requirements.

The Prague Summit in November is the venue for the necessary decisions to be taken. Initiatives taken at the recent meetings of NATO’s foreign ministers, in Reykjavik in May, and defence ministers, in Brussels in June, have to some extent paved the way for such a transformation.

Adapting structures

As part of its adaptation, NATO’s headquarters in Brussels should be modernised to improve the organisation’s ability to run crisis-management operations. Some have argued that this requires the merger of the International Staff and the International Military Staff, but I am not convinced. On the one hand, headquarters staff has to contend with the political control of crisis management and, on the other, the political control of the integrated military command structure and the forces transferred by nations to serve under NATO authority. Dealing with the multifaceted issues related to these two tasks within one staff is likely to be very time-consuming — and time is of the essence in crisis management. Moreover, NATO has not fared badly in the way it has handled consensus shaping so far.

Deployability and mobility should be the guiding principles for the adaptation of NATO’s command structure. The flexibility and sustainability offered by two strategic-level commands and the regional commands should be preserved, provided that the regional commands can be made deployable. More importantly, a minimum of two Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) should be established. The justification for three levels of command in the European Command was questionable during discussion in 1997 and 1998 and remains so today, at least in the Northern Region, where the sub-regional commands could be used to form the nucleus of one of the two CJTFs. In the Southern Region, it would be advisable to retain the sub-regional commands but to make them fully deployable. This should be accompanied by a reduction of the number of Combined Air Operations Centres and a decision to make them all deployable.

The CJTFs are the link to the force structure. They would provide the framework for organising the new capabilities which the Alliance so badly needs by enabling the pooling of assets and the establishment of
multinational component forces. In acquiring such new capabilities, NATO would overcome the main reason it was not initially called on in the war against terror. This will obviously not close the capabilities gap between the United States and its Allies, but it will help to narrow it. These steps will not come for free but they will not require as drastic an increase in European defence budgets as we have seen in the United States.

Modernising capabilities

NATO needs to identify key areas for modernisation and select those capabilities which are crucial for the operational readiness of the two CJTFs and which restore interoperability. A key lesson needs to be drawn from experience gained in implementing the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the high-level programme to boost Alliance capabilities launched at the 1999 Washington Summit: setting too many priorities means that there are effectively no priorities. The 58 items identified for priority action diluted the focus of the DCI, making it too easy for nations to find excuses for not coming up with the essential goods. This lesson appears to have been learned, judging by the Allied defence ministers’ recent decision to have recommendations for a new capabilities initiative prepared in time for the Prague Summit, focused on a small number of capabilities essential for the full range of missions and based on firm national commitments and target dates.

However, while it is necessary to prioritise and focus on what is feasible and affordable in the shorter term, European Allies must understand that this will just be the beginning of a modernisation process that could well extend beyond the end of this decade. It would only be the first step in a programme to improve European defence capabilities. Such a programme would kill two birds with one stone: allowing NATO to acquire much-needed new capabilities and enabling the European Union to succeed in implementing the “headline goal” it set itself at Helsinki in December 1999, namely to develop a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force by 2003, which would be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. The European Allies should not be expected to copy the US force structure but rather to complement US capabilities and, in this way, enhance NATO’s strategic flexibility and sustainability. The United States also needs to play its part by agreeing to the transfer of technology which will be essential to improving capabilities.

One key area of modernisation, which would be ripe for implementation decisions at the Prague Summit, is that of command, control, communications and computing, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4 ISR). This is the skeleton or grid around which all other capabilities necessary to implement the revolution in military affairs could be built. NATO should concentrate on interoperable C4 and improved ISR which are the prerequisites for battle management. Military commanders need to be able to command and control their forces and communicate with them in a sophisticated and secure way, using systems that are interoperable, and they need to know what is happening around them. Improving capabilities in this area will also facilitate the two paths open to the Alliance in its pursuit of strengthened capabilities: namely the component force approach and the pooling approach.

Improvements in C4 should be focused on providing the two CJTFs with the necessary capabilities. If possible, NATO should try to acquire a broadband command and control (C2) system, the only technology that can cope with tomorrow’s amount of data. To this end, rather than launching NATO-owned satellites, which will cost a huge amount and generate more capability than NATO will ever need, NATO should lease commercial broadband services.

Improvements to ISR would be best achieved by following NATO’s proven Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) model, which surveys and controls air space. A small NATO-owned and operated Alliance Ground Surveillance component force should be established equipped, for the time being and as an interim solution, with JSTARS aircraft, the only fully operational system on the market.

At the same time, NATO should commit itself to establish, by the end of the decade, a state-of-the-art, commonly owned ISR component force. This should consist of an appropriate mix of manned aircraft and unmanned systems, such as the Predator, as well as some helicopters if needed. The interim JSTARS, upgraded by a co-developed radar, could well serve as the manned element of such a component force.

Improvements in C4 and ISR are key to all modernisation. If they do not take place, most other steps would be rather meaningless. But they must be complemented by the acquisition of stand-off precision-guided weapons and by low-to-no-cost decisions to pool existing or planned national capabilities, which will allow unnecessary overhead costs to be avoided in areas such as air-to-air refuelling, air transport, sea transport, air defence or disaster-relief forces. The latter should be able to be deployed throughout the NATO treaty area as needed.

Decisions taken along these lines at Prague, compiled in a programme to improve European
defence capabilities, would be important steps, which are feasible and affordable, towards modernising capabilities and the implementation of the revolution in military affairs. Such a programme of improvements could initially be funded through streamlining and reducing some rather inflated programmes, such as the Air Command and Control System (ACCS). European Allies would also need to commit themselves to increase their defence budget, over the next ten years or so, to the level they have sought to impose on countries applying for NATO membership, namely two per cent of gross domestic product.

These are just first steps, which will go some way towards NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s call for “capabilities, capabilities and capabilities”. But they will have to be complemented by further adaptation after the Prague Summit, once NATO has had time to think through and digest the implications of the transformation to a truly global alliance for Alliance strategy. This may lead to a revised Strategic Concept or an umbrella paper, similar to the 1967 Harmel Report, outlining NATO’s strategic direction. In my view, we have entered a period in which the old strategy is no longer seen as viable and valid, but a new one is not yet in place. It will likely take years to agree a new strategy, which will need to reconcile the non-military efforts to prevent conflict with a modified deterrence strategy aimed more at denial than punishment, and with new efforts to enhance protection and defence including new multilateral arms-control and confidence-building initiatives. Such a new or modified strategy would require a global dimension to address global threats.

It is imperative that the Prague Summit sets in motion a transformation of NATO to ensure that the Alliance is prepared for the unexpected and the unthinkable. This will help restore the transatlantic link and reaffirm the indispensable role of the Alliance for the security of all its member states. There could be no better message of assurance for Americans and Europeans alike in these times of unprecedented uncertainty and multifaceted risks. The Europeans also urgently need to start putting their money where their mouth is in terms of improving their defence capabilities. This will demonstrate their commitment to narrow the capabilities gap, help win political influence and provide the United States with Allies ready, willing and able to participate fully in future operations to protect common interests.
Tranforming the alliance

Rejuvenating the Alliance

Guillaume Parmentier argues that NATO needs to focus on its military capabilities and to become a more equal partnership between the United States and the other Allies.

In the wake of the attacks against the United States on 11 September and the subsequent war on terror, the debate over where NATO is headed has once again been brought into sharp focus. While one country, the United States, dominated the Alliance’s military structure for more than 50 years for good strategic reasons, the situation is very different today.

Indeed, the time has now come for Europe and the United States to share the risks and responsibilities of providing security. If this fails to happen and the Alliance is not fundamentally reformed, the United States may choose to conduct future operations alone, bypassing NATO and, in this way, undermining the institution.

NATO demonstrated by its actions in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that it remained the central institution for providing security in Europe for most of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the campaign against al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan seems to have added voice to the chorus of criticism originally expressed at the time of the Kosovo campaign concerning US unilateralism. This is because the United States chose to put together an ad hoc coalition to fight the campaign, rather than to make the most of Alliance resources, even though NATO had taken the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, its collective-defence provision, in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks.

The extent of the crisis within the Alliance precipitated by the US action in Afghanistan should not be exaggerated. The events of 11 September were, after all, a direct attack on US territory, and the fact that the campaign was largely a US affair reflected this. Moreover, the campaign itself took place a long way from Western Europe in conditions for which the European Allies were ill-equipped to contribute and for which the United States possessed unrivalled capabilities. Nevertheless, the US decision effectively to go it alone has reinforced an impression that the United States is increasingly indifferent to NATO and led to fears that the Alliance is being marginalised.

Existential question

This sentiment first came to the fore during the Kosovo campaign when it became clear that “multinational” planning of operations was nothing of the sort. Indeed, Operation Allied Force was planned not at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) but at the US Command in Europe. The then Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark reached his decisions with the help of a small group of officers, almost all of whom came from the US Command. Multinational approval came post facto from NATO’s Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council. This state of affairs had been accepted by Europeans during the Cold War because of the overriding need to keep the United States engaged in Europe to the greatest extent possible. However, given that intervention in the former Yugoslavia was not about the defence of Alliance territory, the lack of multinational planning is difficult to justify.

For many Europeans, the basic US attitude towards NATO appears problematic. It seems unclear whether NATO is the institution of choice for the United States or whether the country generally prefers to form ad hoc coalitions and to turn to NATO only when its leaders find it convenient to do so. This turn of events is very different to the situation in the early 1990s. At that time, the United States advocated using NATO for all crisis-management operations, while France favoured...
the formation of ad hoc coalitions. The discovery by both countries that NATO was, in fact, a multilateral organisation — with all the controls that that entails — has led them largely to reverse their earlier positions.

One area in need of reform is the link between NATO’s political and military arms. At present, the distance between the two, which is the result of Cold War developments, is too great. Here, the Kosovo campaign was extremely revealing. While the North Atlantic Council does act as a multilateral body, it is focused on political issues. All Allies willing to share the risks associated with a military action should also have a direct say in and control over operations. Moreover, this is necessary to ensure that the Alliance’s military concerns are properly heard by its political authorities.

According to the Washington Treaty, while the North Atlantic Council is the Alliance’s only political authority, the Military Committee was conceived as the senior authority for all military matters. The Chairman of the Military Committee was originally expected to liaise between the two bodies. He was at the pinnacle of the Alliance’s military hierarchy, which ensured a truly multilateral approach to military matters. However, the decision to establish a supreme command, entrusted to a US officer, double-hatting as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the US Commander in Europe (USCOMEUR), not only placed that officer above all others, including the national representatives on the Military Committee, but also made him responsible for two lines of command, those of the United States and of NATO. Moreover, the potential conflict of interest is accentuated by the fact that USCOMEUR is responsible for a wider geographical area than SACEUR. For all these reasons, the Alliance’s real military leader can act largely outside multilateral political supervision.

The Military Committee alone has real legitimacy in military matters, since it represents all member states. It enables political decisions to be translated into military terms, and ensures that political leaders are made aware of the concerns of the military. By delegating powers to its chairman, it could again entrust to him the role of liaising with the North Atlantic Council. The need to renew the relationship between the North Atlantic Council and the commands via the Military Committee is all the more vital because NATO is no longer narrowly focused on defending the territory and national integrity of its members. The emergence of new missions and the demonstrated will to share risks and responsibilities make multilateral political control more essential than ever. To achieve this, relations between the North Atlantic Council and military structures must be re-established within a hierarchical framework that gives primacy to the political authority as befits democratic countries. Such a reform would give the North Atlantic Council added trust in NATO’s military side and, in the process, leave the Military Committee sufficient room for manoeuvre to take charge of military operations.

Two possible directions

NATO today is at a crossroads with, in my view, two paths open to it. The first, the line of least resistance, is a political option which would lead to the gentle decline of the Alliance. The second, my preferred path, requires a remilitarisation of the Alliance to maximise the competitive advantages and unique attributes that NATO already possesses.

If Allies are not careful and if the United States no longer considers NATO the institution of choice for political and military engagement in Europe, the Alliance risks becoming merely a forum for discussion and a source of useful and interesting analysis, much like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or, in the security field, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Within such a forum, European security issues would be examined at a political level. However, NATO would gradually lose its unique and specific character as a military organisation and become a talking shop at risk of losing influence to the OSCE, or even the European Union.

The danger of moving down this first path becomes greater the more and the quicker that the Alliance enlarges. This is because many countries aspiring to join NATO have poorly equipped militaries with the result that their practical contribution to overall Alliance capabilities is likely to be minimal.

The alternative path requires focusing on the attributes that NATO already possesses. The Alliance has no competitor among other organisations in a number of fields, such as command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4 ISR); the monopoly of the language of international communications; and multinational procedures in military matters. It also has the ability to share assets, both joint assets and national assets assigned to NATO. In future, therefore, the Alliance should concentrate on its

www.nato.int/review

-14-

summer 2002
To shape NATO into an effective multilateral military instrument at the service of its members, two reforms are now essential. Firstly, the geographic division of commands has to be abandoned in favour of a functional division. Secondly, it is necessary to cater for the development of a European defence policy.

The geographic breakdown of commands was the natural response to the threat faced by the Allies during the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War, as the nature of the threat has changed, the geographical division is more difficult to justify. Worse still, it hinders the rapid mobilisation of assets coming under different chains of command. To resolve these difficulties, the command structures have to be made more flexible. The Allied Command Atlantic could mutate towards control of “sea-air” missions, and SHAPE towards control of “air-land” missions. The first command could be entrusted to an American, since the United States possesses clear superiority in this field, while a European could have operational command of the second, as Europeans are naturally better equipped in Europe. Placing a European in charge would also enable better integration of European defence within NATO.

During the Cold War, the shared desire of all NATO’s European members was to ensure maximum engagement of the United States in any conflict. On the one hand, the United States alone possessed a sufficient deterrent capability against the Soviet Union. On the other, it was the least directly threatened as a result of its geography. Europeans, by contrast, could not choose whether they became involved in a potential conflict. Rather than risk US isolationism, NATO’s European members sought to anchor the United States in Europe and oblige it to make good its political and moral commitments by giving it the highest military responsibility in the Alliance.

More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, it is time that these attitudes changed and that Europeans took greater responsibility for their own security. There is, however, a veritable gulf in capabilities between those possessed by the United States and the European Allies. Moreover, the gap between defence spending on the two sides of the Atlantic continues to widen. To meet this ever-growing budgetary and capabilities gap, therefore, the European Allies will rapidly have to intensify cooperation among themselves.

Crisis-management missions and the necessary internal modifications to carry these out effectively.

The construction of a European security and defence identity cannot, however, be envisaged separately from the reform of NATO. Given the need to share risks and responsibilities, it is, above all, in the interest of the Alliance to strengthen the European identity within it. All the more so as the existence of a coordinated European position would greatly facilitate political cohesion. Critically, the European Union must be able to use NATO assets in the event that the United States chooses not to participate in an operation. As long as SACEUR remains an American, it will be necessary for his European deputy to exercise full responsibilities for European-led operations. To this end, the peacetime responsibilities of the deputy SACEUR must be increased. A military leader cannot take control of an organisation as complex as NATO in a time of crisis without having exercised actual day-to-day command in peace.

Better cooperation among European Allies would also make it possible to combine the needs of an existing organisation, with its structures and arrangements, with those of coalitions of the willing. Furthermore, such coalitions could, on the model of the Partnership for Peace programme, include countries which are not members of the Alliance, such as Russia, thereby helping the latter to intensify its current rapprochement with NATO. In this respect, it is worth bearing in mind how much the experience of joint participation in crisis-management operations in the Balkans has contributed to improving relations between NATO and Russia.

The NATO-Russia relationship has also improved markedly in the wake of the attacks of 11 September. The creation of a NATO-Russia Council in May is a major step in the right direction and it will be important to deepen relations without giving Russia a veto over future NATO action. However, cooperation should be extended beyond politics into the military sphere, including planning. From this point of view, frequent and repeated joint exercises are an absolute must.

However paradoxical it may seem, the future of NATO lies not in its politicisation but in its militarisation. The scope of Alliance activity cannot be limited simply to general political discussion of major European security issues. On the contrary, NATO will only be able to demonstrate how indispensable it is to Euro-Atlantic security, if its member states invest in its military capabilities and make the most of these capabilities in real crisis situations. The challenge for NATO today is to ensure that an enlarged Alliance retains its military capabilities and does not waste away into a mere discussion forum.
Should NATO’s new function be counter-terrorism?

Daniel S. Hamilton VERSUS Sir Timothy Garden

Daniel S. Hamilton is professor and director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He most recently served as deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, US special coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, and as associate director of the policy planning staff for two secretaries of state.

Sir Timothy Garden is visiting professor at the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College London. He was previously director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House. As a career air force pilot, he became a three-star air marshall and was assistant chief of the UK defence staff responsible for long-term planning for all three services.

Dear Tim,

I look forward to our exchange, because I believe it is time for an open and honest debate about NATO’s future roles and missions.

Our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself is within reach. Decisions this autumn by the European Union and NATO to extend further their respective memberships could help secure stability and democracy from the Baltics to the Black Sea. The NATO-Russia Council and broader Russian cooperation with the West offer tremendous new opportunities.

We will continue to face challenges to our security in Europe and US engagement on the continent remains essential. The Balkans are still problematic, although there is progress. Russia’s integration into the West is a challenge for a generation or more. Improving the European Union’s ability to act quickly and effectively in crises abroad while incorporating new democratic members is critical. NATO’s door must remain open beyond the Prague Summit. But, on balance, we are on the right track.

We can be proud of these accomplishments. But we cannot be complacent. Today our greatest unmet strategic challenge lies beyond the European continent.

The danger is not just terrorism, but anti-Western terrorism linked to weapons of mass destruction. It is an existential threat to both America and Europe.

The United States may be the primary target today, but al Qaida also planned major operations in Europe. In fact, as my friend Simon Serfaty has noted, this age of catastrophic terrorism is an assault on the very idea of Europe — that is, the efforts by survivors of war, in the aftermath of war, to work together to prevent such massive human tragedy from happening again. Failing to deal with this challenge would mean abdicating this historic vision and leaving Americans and Europeans at the mercy of ruthless extremists intent not on changing our societies but on destroying them.

There is a greater probability today that millions of Americans and Europeans could be killed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction than by new conflicts in the Balkans or a Russian invasion. The likelihood is also higher today than during the Cold War. We are not yet equipped to deal with this challenge. Our Alliance is best prepared to deal with less likely threats and least prepared to deal with our greatest threats.

Addressing this threat is the strategic challenge of our time. It requires a multi-dimensional strategy that
relies not just on military force but also on new forms of diplomatic, financial, economic, intelligence, customs and police cooperation. It means aligning national homeland-defence strategies with Alliance doctrine and civil-military emergency planning in defence of our “NATO homeland”. It means new forms of cooperation between the European Union and NATO. It means strengthening international norms against terrorism. It means extending Nunn-Lugar programmes to safeguard mass-destruction weapons, materials and know-how. It means a determined transatlantic strategy to the vast region known as the Greater Middle East. It means working to develop economies and promote democracy to ameliorate conditions that create fertile ground for terrorists. It means increasing our foreign assistance. It means nation building.

This is a daunting set of challenges. Is it a bridge too far? Is this an exaggerated American response to what thus far has been a narrow, if horrific, set of attacks on the United States? My answer is no. The need for such a strategy existed on 10 September and in the last years of the Clinton Administration we sought to equip the Alliance with new tools to deal with weapons of mass destruction. But the sense of urgency among Allies was lacking.

The attacks of 11 September did not change our vulnerability to catastrophic terrorism, but rather our understanding of it. It was a horrific wake-up call. How many more thousands or millions of Americans or Europeans will have to die before we get our act together?

This comprehensive strategy is not for NATO alone, but NATO must become an important component of a broader effort. Senator Richard Lugar has put it succinctly: “In a world in which terrorist ‘Article 5’ attacks on our countries can be planned in Germany, financed in Asia, and carried out in the United States, old distinctions between ‘in’ and ‘out of area’ become meaningless... If ‘Article 5’ threats to our security can come from beyond Europe, NATO must be able to act beyond Europe to meet them if it is going to fulfil its classic mission today.”

If we fail to defend our societies from a major terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance will have failed in its most fundamental task. It will be marginalised and our security will be further diminished. Such failure is certain to have negative consequences for NATO’s role in Europe as well.

Meeting the challenge of terrorism joined to weapons of mass destruction must be a focal point of the Prague Summit. Invitations to new members and a revitalised NATO-Russia partnership will be important elements of the agenda. But a bigger NATO must also be a better NATO committed to the campaign against terrorism.

Yours,
Dan

Dear Dan,

I just wish that all you hope for were possible. Time has moved on since NATO members had a common view of a common threat. The end of the Cold War was a great victory for the Alliance; but nostalgic dreams of the old and new members working together with a common perspective are unfortunately bound to end in disappointment. NATO has done well to continue to find useful roles for itself through the turbulent decade of the 1990s.

The Balkans have been a success story for NATO after an uncertain start by the major players on either side of the Atlantic. However, the experience of the Kosovo air campaign has shaped both American and European thinking about the future. The US irritation at having to provide 80 per cent of the useful capability, but also needing to negotiate a consensus with 18 other nations on operational method, has coloured subsequent thinking. I am afraid that Kosovo will go down in history as NATO’s first and last war.

In the middle of the Kosovo campaign, the Alliance celebrated its 50th birthday, launched a new strategic concept and made lots of promises. The most important of these was the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The European NATO members recognised their capability shortcomings and promised to do better in very specific ways. Nothing much has happened apart from further cuts in capability in the subsequent three years. In another attempt to do better, France and the United Kingdom launched an initiative to provide a modest, deployable European force. This at first alarmed those who saw it as being done at the expense of NATO. Now it alarms virtually everyone because no new capabilities, which NATO might call upon, are in early prospect.

The terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001 were certainly a wake-up call to the Western world. Our modern societies provide new vulnerabilities that allow a small but dedicated enemy to reap large-scale destruction for low cost. The initial response by the US government to this appalling attack was measured and correct. NATO amazed itself by the speed with which the invocation of Article 5 was agreed. However, that speed and consensus for support was in retrospect another milestone in NATO’s transition to impotence. President Bush was doubtless grateful
for such unprecedented action, as he was when other friendly regions pledged support. But, when it came to real operations in Afghanistan, where was NATO?

The United States, burned by the experience of Kosovo, chose to call on Allies on a bilateral basis where they had something useful to offer. After the regime change in Afghanistan, there is no common view among Alliance members about the best means to tackle the longer-term threat of international terrorism. The Europeans, with considerable counter-terrorist experience, know that there are no simple short-term military answers. As you say, we need a multi-dimensional strategy that relies not just on military force but also on new forms of diplomatic, financial, economic, intelligence, customs and police cooperation. NATO is not the forum for such intricate and complex approaches.

Fortunately, Europe does have the beginnings of a supranational approach to these new security problems. The European Union provides the mechanism for shared justice and home affairs approaches. Despite the difficulties of pooling counter-terrorist intelligence, even between agencies within a nation, the European Union has much more prospect of achieving useful cooperation than NATO. Tackling the long-term causes of terrorism through conflict-prevention measures and overseas aid has been a strength of Europe, which currently spends three times as much as the United States on such activities. Only in the field of military capability does the European Union continue to fail, and NATO has had little success in moves to rectify this weakness.

If NATO decides to make the war on terrorism its focus, the transatlantic divide on both strategy and tactics will deepen. Better that we accept that NATO has a niche utility for some years to come. It makes it easier for military coalitions to form when needed. It provides reassurance to the new member nations, and a forum for grandiose gestures to old enemies. We are all comfortable with its continuing existence; but it would be foolish to think that its members would be prepared to sign a blank cheque to underwrite a US view of how to tackle terrorism. NATO was appropriate in an age of mutual deterrence. For today's global problems, which extend into many other areas than terrorism, the European Union and the United States need to cooperate and do so through a strengthened United Nations, rather than a regional military alliance.

Yours,
Tim

Dear Tim,

We agree that America and Europe, together with others and within many networks and institutions, must wage a broad multi-dimensional campaign against terrorism. Where we part company is that I believe that one of these institutions must be NATO. I am not saying that the campaign must be waged by NATO alone. I am saying that it should be waged by NATO as well. I am not saying that military force should be the first line of our defence. I am saying that military force and Alliance cooperation must be an integral part of that defence.

Your objection is not that this is undesirable, but that it is unachievable — mainly because unilateralist Americans don’t like wars by committee and insular Europeans are incapable of fighting alongside their US Ally. Let me address those points.

We share frustration with the Bush Administration's initial rejection of Allied offers of assistance in Afghanistan. What a blunder! The broader benefits of joint participation would have been enormous and would have exceeded whatever mutual adjustments might have been necessary. The rejection also weakened NATO in the eyes of the American public and in the Congress. This could come back to haunt the Administration during Senate ratification of NATO enlargement. At least some in the Administration seem to have recognised this, and they have welcomed subsequent Allied assistance.

We also share frustration with European sluggishness in improving capabilities. But just because European forces cannot do everything doesn’t mean they cannot do anything. Instead of rejigging old initiatives, we should seize the opportunity provided by 11 September to tailor European forces to new challenges. An elite NATO strike force capable of expeditionary missions and high-intensity conflict could be a priority of such an effort. One can start small but build over time.

Confronting the terrorist-WMD threat doesn’t only mean projecting force. It also means better security at home. To my mind, Article 5 means we have a “NATO Homeland” and we should plan our respective homeland security efforts with the transatlantic dimension in mind. NATO is moving ahead with a minimalist effort; it could be much stronger. We both agree that any such effort must rely first and foremost on cooperation in a wide range of other areas.

Historically, US defences have been built around power projection, not territorial security. European forces have been oriented the other way. In this new era, each of us must do more precisely in the area in which the other
has capability and experience. This presents potential synergies.

You argue that we should be content to have NATO, including US forces, focus on sustaining the peace in Europe. I don’t believe we can insulate our role in Europe from our role beyond Europe, particularly since European peace could be shattered by threats emanating from the Greater Middle East. If the US presence in Europe is not related to our most urgent unmet security challenge, and if our European Allies tell us they are now, through the European Union, able to manage European security, a growing number of Americans will ask why major US combat formations should be based on the European continent at all.

Our leaders face a simple choice at Prague. They can either refocus the greatest alliance in history on the strategic challenge of our time, or they can preside over its demise. You are right to wonder whether current governments are ready for — or even want — such a partnership. Our greatest difference is that I believe the first choice is still possible, whereas you believe the second choice has already been made.

Yours,
Dan

Dear Dan,

I am afraid that the way you characterise the debate shows how painful such a discussion would be within NATO, set as it always is on achieving consensus. It may be true that the United States doesn’t like fighting wars by committee — who does? But it is not true that: “European Allies are incapable of fighting alongside their US Allies”. Indeed the difference in view about the nature of the war on terrorism makes it much more difficult for the United States to accommodate the views of its NATO Allies. In Europe, this is not now seen as a question of “fighting alongside”, but more one of being prepared to be subordinate to the wishes of the United States, and certainly not questioning the overall strategy.

The fact that we share frustration over the US Administration’s failure to engage NATO from the start in its war on terrorism does not change the facts. NATO is both weaker and less relevant as a result. An elite NATO strike force may be seen as a priority in the United States, but who decides where and when it strikes? The United States can isolate Iran with Iraq and North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”; but has NATO analysed this concept and signed up to it? Many Europeans (and some Americans) think that there has been a major strategic error in rejecting Iran, which could be very helpful in a number of ways. Would this NATO strike force be available to help Israel put down Palestinians? These are just a couple of examples of the wide differences across the Atlantic on approaches to international relations.

Yes, countering terrorism is about taking measures to protect the homeland. Indeed, I would argue that the United States has taken this aspect of defence more seriously than European governments. On the other hand, there is much more to be done in North America after so long without a large-scale terrorist threat. But homeland security is about police work, intelligence gathering, border guards, emergency services and internal government coordination. Despite the use of NATO AWACs after 11 September, I doubt that the United States would welcome greater NATO involvement in these internal matters, any more than other national governments would. The military dimension is important, but relatively minor in this important security area.

I do not fully agree with your view that: “Historically, US defences have been built around power projection, not territorial security. European forces have been oriented the other way.” It depends what period of history and which European nations you are looking at. But it is a fair assessment of the state of the military capabilities on each side of the Atlantic today. I see little hope for your aspiration for synergy: that the United States will look to Europe for help over territorial defence, while Europe follows America in the pursuit of high-cost, high-technology power projection, which it does not believe will solve the problems of the disenchanted have-nots of the world.

So what does this mean for Prague? The choices are not simple. Too great an effort at refocusing the Alliance in a new and divisive direction will put one more nail in the coffin. Doubtless, leaders will sign up to some grand statement that means different things to each of them. This will be a cause for more disappointments and further disillusionment on both sides of the Atlantic. Why not use Prague to celebrate the real post-Cold War achievements of NATO in the Balkans? Draw on this experience to show how NATO can use its military expertise to address some of the long-term causes of terrorism through stabilising anarchic regions. But, if NATO is to be a stick for the United States to beat the Europeans into submitting to an American view of the world, then the Alliance really is doomed.

Yours,
Tim
Dear Tim,

Transatlantic differences are nothing new. NATO’s founders did not have a common vision of how to deal with the Soviet Union when the Alliance was born. Allies had regular rows over how to deal with Moscow during the Cold War, and differences over the Balkans nearly destroyed the Alliance after the Cold War. For those who worry about NATO in disarray, the old quip still applies: “When has NATO ever truly been in array?” The test of allies is not the absence of differences, but the ability to manage them in ways that pull our respective strengths and perspectives together and point them in a common direction. No one says this is easy. But neither was winning the Cold War, intervening in the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, or securing the peace thereafter.

I agree that this will not work if the Bush Administration sees NATO as a stick to beat Allies into compliance with its view of the world. I agree that some in the Administration have lost sight of this today. I agree that if we continue to talk past each other, then not only NATO but also our entire transatlantic partnership will be less effective.

But I do not agree that the way we get the Alliance relationship back on track is to celebrate a nostalgic view of NATO’s past. If that is all the Prague Summit is about, then our leaders should just stay home. Prague must be about meeting future threats, not savouring past glories. Those threats are posed by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. Fortunately, I believe there is more common ground than you suggest. Ministers have already agreed that NATO must be ready to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad against our populations, territory, infrastructure and forces, particularly where these involve chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. Perhaps most importantly, they have agreed that NATO should be ready to deploy its forces “as and where required” to carry out such missions.

These are important first steps. But we can, and must, do more — together. Tough? Yes. Impossible? No.

Yours,

Dan

Dear Dan,

Like NATO’s members, we agree on so much, but arrive at such different conclusions. I said in our first exchange that nostalgic dreams were bound to end in disappointment. But that does not mean that we should ignore the Alliance’s recent experience. From the Balkans, we know what NATO does well. Such stabilising tasks have not gone away. Indeed, they have assumed even greater importance. Failed states are the breeding grounds for terrorism. NATO can help to bring order and the rule of law.

There remains a different transatlantic appreciation of the nature of the threat. You reflect the degree of alarm about the long-term terrorist threat, which is felt so strongly in the United States. Europe is certainly concerned, as it has been for many years. But too narrow a focus on this one potential problem risks unbalancing our overall approach to security.

The current US Administration seems to be set on waging its war on terrorism by attacking distant countries in pre-emptive mode. A series of military adventures in Iraq, Iran and beyond may in the end increase the threat of terrorism, and at the same time damage democracy in our own societies. Europe sees the current strategic situation as needing a much more complex approach. Making NATO act like Roman legions tasked with enforcing a Western empire will not appeal.

Perhaps we should not worry too much about the difficulties of Prague. Our diplomats will do their usual magnificent work. The next round of members will be reassured. Russia will feel important and wanted. The Europeans will feel that they have been able to put their moderating influence on the Americans. And most importantly, the United States will feel that it remains in charge of global security policy. Something for everyone: business as usual.

Yours,

Tim

For the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, consult http://www.sais-jhu.edu. Additional information can also be found on Timothy Garden’s foreign and security policy site at http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk
The death of Joseph Luns marks the final passing of that generation of European political leaders that built the Atlantic Alliance and launched the process of European integration after the Second World War. The uninitiated sometimes mistook him for Charles de Gaulle for the two men were of similar height and both had long, narrow faces with protruding aquiline noses. But Luns had none of the General’s nationalism nor his suspicion of the United States. He was both a committed European and an Atlanticist in an age when many European intellectuals believed that a strong US-led Alliance would inevitably weaken European political union.

Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert Luns was born in Rotterdam in 1911. He studied law at the universities of Leyden and Amsterdam and political economy at the London School of Economics and the University of Berlin. After his studies, he joined the Dutch foreign ministry and spent part of the Second World War with the Netherlands government in exile in London. He stayed on as ambassador at the Court of St James after the war, from where he moved to the United Nations in New York.

In 1952, Luns became joint foreign minister of the Netherlands in the wake of an electoral tie between the Labour Party and the Catholic People’s Party, to which he belonged. Four years later, he took sole charge of the Netherlands foreign ministry where he remained until 1971, the year he moved to NATO as secretary general. His 19 years as foreign minister is a record in modern European politics. During this period, Luns was “present at the creation” of the European Economic Community — signing the Treaty of Rome for his country — and an early champion of close European integration, for which he was awarded the Charlemagne Prize in 1967. He also managed to build an unrivalled network of political friendships and contacts on both sides of the Atlantic which came in useful when he switched from being a minister and politician to an international civil servant at the helm of the Atlantic Alliance.

Luns was a natural choice to succeed the Italian, Manlio Brosio, as NATO secretary general. He not only had all the necessary political experience but also a keen interest in military affairs since the time of his military service in the Netherlands navy in the early 1930s. He specialised insignalling — not a bad skill to have later as NATO secretary general each week having to steer debates in the North Atlantic Council towards consensus — and published several articles on naval tactics. During his thirteen years as secretary general, Luns could never resist an opportunity to escape from his office at NATO headquarters in Brussels to join NATO’s soldiers and sailors on exercise, especially at sea.

Being secretary general of NATO in the 1970s and early 1980s was undoubtedly a less hectic job than it is today. The Alliance of the Cold War had fewer members (15 instead of 19, although Spain did come in as the 16th member in 1982) and a mission that was focused on collective defence. Deterring the Soviet Union was in many respects an easier task than deploying forces to help sort out the problems of the Balkans, engaging Russia as a friend rather than an adversary, deciding on enlargement or devising strategies to combat international terrorism. Nor was there any clear desire of the Europeans to play a greater role in an Alliance traditionally dominated by the United States — although Luns tirelessly pushed European governments to spend more on defence. Nonetheless, the job at NATO was far from a sinecure. Luns took on with success the task inaugurated by the Harmel Report in the 1967 of turning NATO into a more political organisation, working for détente as much as upholding military deterrence. Under his stewardship, NATO embraced the Helsinki process of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe and began talks with the Warsaw Pact on conventional force reductions in Europe.

Jamie Shea is director of NATO’s Office of Information and Press.
The end of Luns’s long tenure at NATO was dominated by the Euro-missile saga, when in 1979 the Alliance decided to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet Union’s SS20s. This decision prompted massive street protests by peace movements on both sides of the Atlantic. Several governments, particularly those in Germany and the Netherlands, came under severe domestic pressure. Luns had the difficult job of rallying support for the missile deployments, while convincing public opinion of NATO’s sincerity in seeking a “zero-zero” solution through arms-control negotiations. He was helped in this by the robust support of statesmen such as François Mitterrand in France and Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl in Germany. When Luns retired in 1984, the first Cruise and Pershings had been deployed. It took another three years before arms control negotiations finally brought about their removal.

Luns will be remembered at NATO as a colourful character with a regal bearing and an acute sense of humour, which at times could be disarmingly clownish. At lengthy meetings he would sometimes wear his bedroom slippers. Asked how many people worked at NATO, he famously replied: “About half of them”. Not one for complex dossiers or technical details in his later years, he would use his inexhaustible reserve of jokes and stories to charm NATO ambassadors into submission. His Anglophilia was manifest in a British racing green Rolls Royce in which he would majestically tour Brussels. Never reluctant to call a spade a spade, Luns was not bound by the modern culture of political correctness. He publicly criticised the United States for its decision to produce the neutron bomb and for not putting the case for arms control with sufficient vigour. This did not stop the United States awarding him the Medal of Freedom shortly before his retirement.

After leaving NATO, Luns chose to stay in Belgium. An inveterate conservative, he found his own country, the Netherlands, too “progressive” and “permissive”. This did not stop him, however, slipping across the border frequently to appear as a commentator on Dutch TV talk shows.

Luns’s continuing attachment to the Alliance was manifest in regular return visits to NATO headquarters where he regaled former colleagues with croissants and anecdotes. Nearly 20 years of retirement gave him ample opportunity to reflect on NATO’s transformation into a pan-European peacekeeping and cooperative security organisation, extending Alliance membership to former members of the Warsaw Pact and even the creation of a joint NATO-Russia Council. As someone who will always be identified with the NATO of the Cold War, one wonders what he made of it all.

Joseph Luns, Dutch statesman and former NATO secretary general, died on July 17 2002 age 90. He was married to Baroness Elisabeth van Heemstra and is survived by a son and a daughter.
almost exactly ten years ago, television pictures from Bosnia and Herzegovina of emaciated men cowering behind barbed wire and surrounded by armed guards conjured up images of the Holocaust and generated outrage throughout the world. In response, with human rights' activists demanding that something be done, the UN Security Council set up a "commission of experts" in October 1992 to gather evidence of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Already at the time, one man stood out as responsible for the carnage and atrocities that characterised the wars of Yugoslavia's dissolution: Slobodan Milosevic.

The then Serbian president was dubbed the "Butcher of the Balkans" by Western media soon after the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and named a war criminal by the then US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in December 1992. Nevertheless, Milosevic remained in power for the next eight years, continuing to fan the flames of conflict until his ouster in October 2000 after elections he tried to pervert. Moreover, not until NATO intervened in Bosnia with a two-week air campaign in August and September 1995 was the killing halted. Meanwhile, in February 1993, the UN Security Council passed a resolution setting up, in The Hague, an "international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991", now normally referred to as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Despite meagre initial resources and lukewarm support in the early years, not to mention the hostility of many of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY has evolved into a formidable institution with more than 1,200 employees and an annual budget greater than US $100 million. The ultimate catch, Milosevic himself, was transferred to The Hague on 28 June 2001. He has been on trial for crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war and genocide since February of this year, conducting his own blustering defence in front of a court whose authority he refuses to recognise. The Milosevic trial clearly makes for great theatre. The visitors' gallery is usually packed and journalists covering it have become accustomed to having entertaining copy fall in their laps. It is also a legal first. Never before has a sitting head of state been indicted by an international court, arrested and placed on trial. And it has already set precedents for the future activities of an International Criminal Court. However, to what extent do war crimes trials at the ICTY contribute to catharsis for the many victims, both living and dead, of the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution? How much do they help and how much do they hinder the peace processes underway in the former Yugoslavia? And what, if anything, do they contribute to reconciliation and the rebuilding of trust among rival communities?

Two recent publications — The Key to My Neighbour's House: Seeking justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (Picador USA, New York, 2001) by Elizabeth Neuffer and Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The politics of war crimes tribunals (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000) by Gary Bass — seek to answer these questions and are likely to be the first of an avalanche of books on this subject. The former is a journalist's account of the experience of ordinary people in both Bosnia and Rwanda seeking justice at the end of the conflicts and willing to testify in front of an international court about their ordeal. The latter is a scholarly examination of war crimes tribunals from St Helena, following the Napoleonic Wars, through Leipzig and Constantinople following the First World War, Nuremberg following the Second World War to The Hague today.

Neuffer, an award-winning reporter with the Boston Globe, covered the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda for more than half a decade. In Bosnia, she painstakingly pieced together the stories of three Bosnians, including Hasan Nuhanovic, a UN interpreter in Srebrenica, eastern Bosnia, whose position helped him survive the massacres in which his parents perished and his brother disappeared. In Rwanda, she did the same for Anonciata Kavaruganda, a Hutu, whose husband...
Joseph, head of the country’s supreme court, was hauled away from their home in Kigali, the Rwandan capital, by Hutu soldiers to be killed as United Nations peacekeepers looked on. And she recounted the story of witness JJ, a Tutsi repeatedly gang-raped by Hutu militiamen, whose testimony helped secure the first conviction for genocide after a trial in an international court, in which rape was defined as an act of genocide for the first time.

All the stories, like countless more in both Bosnia and Rwanda, are powerful, heart-rending accounts of man’s inhumanity to man. But even now, seven years on, the events of July 1995 in Srebrenica, where possibly as many as 8,000 Muslim men and boys were summarily executed, retain special ability to shock. The horror of the slaughter, reconstructed by eyewitness descriptions of mass-grave excavations, the indifference and deceit of those responsible, whom Neuffer tracked down and interviewed, and the sense of international betrayal, as experienced by Nuhanovic, make for compelling, if upsetting reading. It is difficult not to shed a tear when a frantic Nuhanovic bids his mother, father and brother, farewell, fearful that he would never see them again.

While the United Nations as a whole comes out badly in Neuffer’s book, certain UN employees emerge with much credit. Among them is Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the judge who presided over the first trial. One of McDonald’s preoccupations was whether her work and the work of the tribunal would make any difference where it counted, namely in Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was largely as a result of McDonald’s efforts, that the ICTY launched in 1999 an outreach programme to help explain its work among the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Many of the Bosnians and Rwandans who feature in Neuffer’s book, however, have mixed feelings about international justice and, in particular, the pace at which it operates. Indeed, Kavaruganda took the unprecedented step of suing the United Nations for failing to protect her husband and other witnesses now desire to move beyond war crimes trials to a truth commission.

Most frustrating for McDonald was the absence of big-name indictees to try and, specifically, the failure to apprehend the former Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who remain at liberty to this day. She left the ICTY in November 1999 at a time when neither they nor Slobodan Milosevic, who had been indicted six months earlier, were in custody, telling The Washington Post that: “Their liberty makes a mockery of the pledge to would-be tyrants that they will be indicted, arrested and made to answer for their alleged criminal acts and violations of human rights.”

Although Neuffer’s book was completed after Milosevic’s transfer to The Hague, it was largely researched and written before that momentous event. As a result, it reflects the frustrations of the early years of the ICTY’s operations. The first hardback edition of Bass’s book Stay the Hand of Vengeance was completed before Milosevic’s transfer to The Hague and does not, therefore, mention it at all. The paperback edition, by contrast, contains an afterword examining the circumstances of Milosevic’s indictment, the nature of his arrest and transfer to The Hague and its significance.

An awesome piece of research, Stay the Hand of Vengeance chronicles the principled belief that war criminals must be put on trial and the ways in which liberal states have dealt with this issue in the aftermath of war during the past two hundred years. The book is, in effect, a critical look at the failings of war crimes tribunals and as such leaves the reader under no illusions of the magnitude of the task ahead at the ICTY.

Bass bases his analysis of the politics of war crimes trials on the following five propositions. Firstly, only liberal states with legalist traditions support genuine war crimes tribunals. Secondly, even liberal states do not tend to push for war crimes tribunals if so doing would put their own soldiers at risk. Thirdly, liberal campaigns for international justice are distinctly self-serving with far greater outrage at war crimes committed against their own citizens than against foreigners. Fourthly, liberal states are most likely to support a war crimes tribunal if public, and not just elite, opinion is outraged by the war crimes in question. And fifthly, non-state pressure groups can be effective in pushing for a tribunal, by shaming liberal states into action and providing expertise.

Ironically, Milosevic is a beneficiary of liberal states’ legalism. This is because legalism has given him the opportunity to denounce the ICTY and obliges his prosecutors to work to the highest possible standards, painstakingly gathering evidence, to build the case against him. Moreover, the fact that he and other senior war crimes suspects were not apprehended earlier or remain at liberty is clearly linked to the risk involved in their arrest. Since Milosevic’s alleged crimes were committed against Albanians, Croats and
Muslims, and not Westerners, Western countries were understandably reluctant to endanger the lives of their soldiers to bring him to trial. That said, popular outrage in the West at what took place in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo during the 1990s led to the creation of the ICTY and sustains support for the trials that take place there. Moreover, activist non-governmental organisations are maintaining pressure on Western governments to ensure that the ICTY is properly resourced and that more war crimes suspects are brought to justice.

The Milosevic trial is clearly a landmark, but, Bass points out, there have been similar landmarks before that came and went. Moreover, the line between success and failure of war crimes trials has historically been razor thin. Indeed, it is sobering to read how close the Nuremberg trials, which most war crimes tribunal advocates view as the ultimate triumph of law over vengeance, came to not taking place. While Moscow was eager to execute large numbers of Nazis after victory, London, too, called for the summary execution of top Axis leaders, until overruled by Washington. And even in Washington, opinion was divided. Henry Morgenthau Jr., the treasury secretary, pushed for severe retribution — including up to 2,500 summary executions, reparations, population transfers and Germany’s pastoralisation — and Henry Stimson, the war secretary, urged war crimes trials because of the United States’ own domestic respect for due process.

While Stimson won the internal debate, it was the idea of Germany’s pastoralisation that most Americans objected to, not the way in which defeated Nazis were to be dealt with. Moreover, Stimson was concerned with prosecuting Nazi Germany for waging an aggressive war, not with the Holocaust. While today, the Nuremberg trials are primarily remembered for punishing crimes against humanity — and this is certainly their greatest legacy — the issue was of secondary importance at the time.

In a similar vein, the ICTY’s troubled birth and difficult early years may be to its long-term advantage. Indeed, on the back of the Milosevic trial, war crimes tribunal advocates are already claiming, among other things, that the ICTY will help deter future war crimes, rehabilitate Serbia, remove the stain of collective guilt by individualising responsibility and establish a true record of events. Bass refuses to get carried away and advocates war crimes tribunals only because they are the “least-bad option”. Poignantly, he dedicates his book to the “people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Too late.”

Information on the publisher Picador, USA can be found at http://www.picadorusa.com and Princetown University Press at http://pup.princeton.edu
Anton Tus: an officer and a diplomat

Anton Tus became the first Croatian ambassador to NATO after Croatia joined the Partnership for Peace in May 2000. A professional soldier, he was head of the Yugoslav Airforce until he resigned in June 1991. In September 1991, he became the first chief of staff of the Croatian Armed Forces, building them from scratch and leading the defence of Croatia during the 1991-92 war. A retired five-star general, he aims to guide Croatia into NATO.

NATO REVIEW: Why does Croatia aspire to join NATO?
ANTON TUS: NATO membership is in Croatia's national interest. NATO, and NATO alone, offers my country the highest possible level of security, defence of the country’s independence, territorial integrity, national and state identity. Here, it is worth pointing out that ten years ago, the fact that Croatia was a member of both the United Nations and the predecessor of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe failed to protect us from aggression and war. In addition, NATO today is the critical security and defence organisation in the Euro-Atlantic area and together with Russia and other Partners the basis for peace and security in the northern hemisphere. NATO membership can also help speed completion of democratic and economic reform within Croatia and, in this way, help the country enter the European Union. The alternative to NATO membership is far from ideal. It would mean less security, increased defence expenditure, an absence of allies and greater isolation.

NATO REVIEW: How can Croatia offer the Alliance?
ANTON TUS: A stable and democratic Croatia can contribute to the stability of its surrounding region and the whole of Southeastern Europe. Geographically, my country links Central Europe and the Mediterranean as well as Western and Southeastern Europe. For NATO, that means improved communications between its centre and its southern wing, as well as direct access by land, sea and air to the three NATO missions in the former Yugoslavia. Croatia can play an important role in the stabilisation and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And it can contribute to the control of its unstable eastern borders and the campaign against terrorism. Our meaningful military and non-military experience of war can be useful in the preparation of special units and teams for various military and non-military tasks. I wish especially to stress that Croatia would also bring its many national values and characteristics to NATO.

NATO REVIEW: What has Croatia benefited from the Partnership for Peace?
ANTON TUS: Croatia joined the Partnership for Peace in May 2000, just over four months after a coalition of democratic parties came to power in elections. This step was recognition by NATO of the democratic changes and progress that had already taken place in Croatia. From that moment, Croatia has benefited from intense political and moral support of members of both NATO and the European Union. My country is preparing and pushing through important constitutional changes, new laws and key reforms to strengthen our system of parliamentary democracy and build a market economy. Croatia entered the World Trade Organisation and began the process of stabilisation and association with the European Union. In February 2001, Croatia opened its mission at NATO and this, combined with the high fulfilment of the Partnership goals, enabled us to move to a phase of intensified dialogue on membership issues in May 2001. Croatia used this phase intensively to pass laws for major defence and military reform. NATO assured itself of Croatia's determination to become a member of the Alliance and her intention to make up for missed opportunities to become a stable, democratic and economically prosperous country. In this way, membership of the Partnership for Peace helped Croatia to be invited into the Membership Action Plan in May of this year. In September, Croatia will present its first annual programme.

NATO REVIEW: What does joining the Membership Action Plan mean for Croatia?
ANTON TUS: By joining the MAP, Croatia has formally become a candidate for NATO membership. This brings with it many obligations, including annual planning cycles and implementation of numerous goals and tasks in all areas of state and society, not only the defence field. Through the MAP, we intend to reorganise our armed forces. This includes their further professionalisation
and modernisation to create the necessary compatibility and interoperability with NATO standards. With the benefit of several annual MAP cycles, Croatia should be able to meet the necessary standards and values for entry into NATO. We are very much hoping that Croatia will be invited to join the Alliance at the next summit after Prague.

NR: What are the key security challenges facing Croatia?
AT: In common with all European countries, Croatia faces general security challenges emanating from the crisis triangle of the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus and southern Mediterranean, including conflict, the disruption of energy supplies, the development of terrorism and mass migration. Croatia also faces its own special security challenges emanating from its eastern borders. In addition to terrorism, organised crime and mass migration, extremist nationalism and fundamentalism may yet rear their ugly heads. As the Balkans become more stable and democracy begins to take hold, we no longer anticipate a return to war. As a result, terrorism and internal social problems linked to high levels of unemployment and inadequate economic growth are today’s greatest security challenges.

NR: What are the obstacles to military reform?
AT: The aim of military reform is to provide for the security needs of a country at an economically acceptable price. The ideal is the creation of small, highly qualified, mobile, technically equipped and capable armed forces ready to deal with a wide range of tasks. To arrive at such a force, it will be necessary to restructure and technically modernise today’s armed forces. The greatest obstacle to the rapid implementation of the necessary reforms is the lack of the necessary financial resources. The second problem is the difficulty of laying off some 10,000 employees at a time of high unemployment. This is a difficult moral issue since the individuals in question are in the main those who defended Croatia in war. The way forward is probably in the gradual reduction of the armed forces and foreign financial and technical assistance. Early political opposition to reform has died away following the passing of constitutional changes and a new law about defence and the armed forces.

NR: How confident are you that war crimes were not committed during operations Flash and Storm in 1995?
AT: Human suffering as well as the destruction of property and cultural monuments takes place in every conflict. Only a detailed investigation can determine whether crimes took place and whether particular incidents were war crimes, ordinary crimes or accidents resulting from human or technical error. When unarmed civilians, prisoners of war, the wounded, journalists, medical workers and Red Cross representatives are deliberately killed in war but outside combat, these are clearly war crimes. Where such acts occurred, they must be investigated and those responsible must be prosecuted. That said, most civilians and civilian buildings on the Serb side that were hit during these operations were hit because civilians and military personnel were together and civilian buildings were being used for military purposes. A characteristic of these and similar operations is the increase in the number of ordinary crimes committed by looters and sometimes by displaced persons returning to their burned-out houses and destroyed villages. This is difficult to control in battle.

NR: How important are war crimes trials to post-war reconstruction in Southeastern Europe and will Croatia continue cooperating with the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague?
AT: The disintegration of the multinational Yugoslav federation was inevitable. At the time, in the beginning of the 1990s, the proponents of Greater Serbian nationalism decided to use this event to realise the centuries-old dream of creating a Greater Serbia with all Serbs living in one state. This required the annexation to Serbia of a major part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a third of Croatia. Under the circumstances of the time, such a goal could only have been achieved by war. As a result, in 1991, Serbia and Montenegro, together with the Yugoslav Army, launched both an aggressive war and the most brutal conflict to take place in Europe at the end of the 20th century. However, the project failed. Moreover, the very notion of “Greater Serbia” and with it all other aggressive nationalisms, were defeated in the final stages of the war. The prosecution of war criminals is an important step towards establishing truth and achieving justice. Every victim of every crime has a name and a surname, as does the individual who committed the crime. Collective guilt does not exist. An entire people bears no responsibility for the criminal acts of their ethnic kin. As a result, I believe that with time it will be possible to build better relations between peoples and among the new democracies in the former Yugoslavia on the basis of the recognition of war crimes. Croatia has been working constructively with The Hague Tribunal since the change in regime and intends to maintain this cooperation. Indeed, with the agreement of The Hague Tribunal, Croatia has opened various criminal investigations that may eventually lead to trials in Croatian courts.
NR: What prospects for the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and how can Croatia contribute to the peace process?

AT: Croatia is a signatory of the Dayton Peace Agreement and considers itself responsible for its implementation. Since Bosnia and Herzegovina is both our neighbour and a country in which Croats live as a constituent people, Croatia has a vested interest in its development and prosperity. This autumn, it will be seven years since the Dayton Peace Agreement came into force. While there has been progress during this time, we cannot be happy with the time it is taking to build a self-sustaining, stable and democratic country. Recently, the constitutionality of all three peoples throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally recognised. This is a positive step and should help speed the return of displaced and refugees to Republika Srpska. The prospects of the peace agreement are positive since it has ensured both peace and the integrity of the Bosnian state. In the years to come, citizens and democratic institutions, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina's state-level institutions, will have to play an ever-greater role and this should bring a new quality and quicker development of this country and its society. Croatia will continue to help in Bosnia and Herzegovina's reconstruction and development and the return of displaced and refugees. Together with Bosnia and Herzegovina we will work to resolve the many outstanding security issues such as control of our common border and development of air traffic, as well as the battle with terrorism and organised crime. Economic relations should develop to the benefit of both sides. Croatia will lobby for the creation of conditions for the successful Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NR: Having spent much of your career in the Yugoslav People’s Army, you know many senior military figures in Belgrade personally. How useful a precedent is Croatia’s recent development for that of Serbia and what are the prospects for a closer relationship between Belgrade and NATO?

AT: The defeat of the Greater Serbian programme of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian military command led to the recent democratic changes in Serbia. This has significantly stabilised the political and security situation throughout the region. New democratic opportunities are emerging and Serbia and Montenegro have started their journey towards Europe. I am convinced that the recent democratic changes in Croatia contributed to this. Moreover, our bilateral relations with Serbia and Montenegro reflect the growing stability in the region. Today we no longer speak of the normalisation of relations between our countries, but of the development of good neighbourly relations. The prospects for closer cooperation between Belgrade and NATO are only now opening. Belgrade’s recent decision to begin preparing for NATO’s Partnership for Peace is a first and a meaningful step. Now we have to expect the depoliticisation of the army and the creation of civilian control over the armed forces, in order to fulfill the democratic conditions for entering the Partnership for Peace. Croatia will support Serbia and Montenegro getting into the Partnership for Peace.

NR: Can you envisage a time when Croatia and Serbia work together within a NATO framework? How far is that day away?

AT: I expect that our neighbours Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that is Serbia and Montenegro, will enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme at the end of this year or the beginning of next and will, in this way, work together with Croatia in a NATO framework. Croatia will hopefully become a member of NATO in a few years. I am not, however, convinced that Serbia will choose to follow this path.
A CD-ROM designed by a German officer and English teachers from Bulgaria and Lithuania to help peacekeepers improve their English is proving so successful that the British Council has bought several hundred copies and distributed them to military academies in more than 20 countries to promote the learning of English.

The CD-ROM, entitled Tactical English for Land Forces in Peace-Support Operations, was designed specifically to help non-native speakers of English prepare for NATO-led operations like those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* where the language of communication between militaries is English. It is an equally effective tool for peacekeepers preparing for UN missions.

"Experience of peace-support operations has shown how important it is for officers to have a good command of the English language," says Lieutenant-Colonel Bernhard Klotz, a German officer based at the Joint Headquarters Centre in Heidelberg, Germany, who conceived and oversaw the project. "The idea behind the CD-ROM is to practise as many skills as possible — speaking, reading, writing and understanding — through interactive exercises which keep officers curious by testing their knowledge of the missions they are likely to be involved in."

Students can research questions by reading relevant sections of the CD-ROM before answering multiple-choice tests, which are automatically marked by computer. Reading is made easy by a glossary of difficult words. Students are also able to listen to the way in which a native speaker says something and then repeat the same sentence, comparing pronunciation with the benefit of a computer-generated printout.

In 1999, Lt-Col Klotz prepared a tailored English-language programme for officers involved in peace-support operations with a textbook and accompanying cassettes, 1,500 of which were produced. The CD-ROM was developed because of the expense involved in mailing out packages of books and cassettes and because many more soldiers would be able to make use of it, if placed on a military headquarters’ internal computer network.

Lt-Col Klotz prepared the book with the help of English teachers from Lithuania’s Public Service Language Centre because a Lithuanian publisher had won the printing contract. He worked with a Bulgarian teacher of English from the country’s National Defence Academy to produce the CD-ROM because a Bulgarian software company won the tender to manufacture the CD-ROMs.

The CD-ROM has proved especially popular with officers from Partner countries, who have generally had less opportunity to learn English in the course of their education than officers from NATO member states, as they prepare to deploy in the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. It can be used both by individuals and groups and does not require a teacher. Moreover, it is preferable to distance learning over the internet since there are no telephone-connection costs to pay.

The British Council bought 500 CD-ROMs and distributed them to military academies in 23 countries where it has an advisory role for the teaching of English to encourage and assist soldiers learning English. "It’s a nice compliment that the British Council is using a CD-ROM produced by a German officer," says Lt-Col Klotz.

Austria, Canada, France and Switzerland have also made bulk purchases of the CD-ROM to assist officers in their militaries improve their English. In the case of Austria, learning English is now a formal part of the curriculum and the Military Academy in Wiener-Neustadt, south of Vienna, bought both 25 CD-ROMs and 500 packages of books and cassettes.

Each year, about 90 English teachers receive training in Heidelberg in using the CD-ROM effectively, among other things, each of whom goes on to train on average another 40 officers. “In this way, we are able to reach a broad range of officers," Lt-Col Klotz says.

Lt-Col Klotz will move to the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, in August, where he will teach military tactics. Since teaching at the Baltic Defence College takes place entirely in English, prospective students would do well to go through the CD-ROM before enrolling.

---

*Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
The vulnerability of interconnected society

The events of 11 September 2001 have added a sense of urgency to a NATO Science project seeking to address the challenges posed by the increasing vulnerability of today's interconnected society. Launched six months before the fateful day, it comes under the auspices of the Alliance's Committee on Challenges to Modern Society (CCMS).

In a less connected world, the impact of the terrorist attacks would have been smaller. Apart from the psychological shock, the physical and economic effects beyond the local community and businesses would have been limited. But in today's interconnected world, the shock waves of the collapse of New York's twin towers reverberated throughout the global economic system.

"The terrorist attacks of 11 September brought our society's vulnerability to non-traditional threats into sharp focus," explains project leader Tor-Petter Johnsen of the Norwegian Research Council. "It also demonstrated how the unthinkable can happen."

In many ways, the world has never been as vulnerable as it is today because of increasing interconnectivity. New and changing manifestations of vulnerability arise from a more open global community, more complex technological systems, increased dependency on electronic information and communications systems, intertwined food-production and delivery systems, interconnected and increasingly dense transportation systems.

The loss for an extended period — whether though terrorist attack, sabotage or technical failure — of a few key mainstays and functions could result in wide-scale disruption.

Critical infrastructures, whose incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defence or economic security of the nation, include telecommunication networks, energy pipelines and grids, water supply systems, transport networks, banking and financial services, government services and emergency services.

Underpinning these infrastructures are telecommunication and information systems. The increasing integration of such systems makes it vital to prepare for the possibility of technical failure as well as to ensure information security and protect against disinformation. The increasing use of information and communications technology has also altered the meaning of national borders in the context of national security and preparedness.

The all-pervasiveness of information technology in today's society and its consequences for societal vulnerability originally spurred Johnsen, who is Norway's representative on the CCMS, to propose this project. "But as the project has got underway," he says "participants have increasingly come to see interconnectivity as a problem in itself."

A key focus has been the risks posed by globalisation and the emergence of single sources of food and technology. Without built-in redundancy or back-up, major disruption could result from the contamination or destruction of one or two vital components, or a breakdown in lines of distribution. Interconnectivity makes it possible for a small, dedicated enemy to cause large-scale destruction at low cost. It also poses a dual threat, since it can either be used to amplify the effect of malicious attack or it can facilitate major disruption should vital components be targeted.

"On the other hand, we must not forget the positive side of interconnectivity," Johnsen says. "We are better able to help each other because of interconnectivity. Many companies and businesses hit by the terrorist attacks on New York were able to get back online and back in business quite quickly, thanks to back-ups and links with clients, which made it possible to re-route tasks and restore the information flow."
Preserving security and protecting society from a broad spectrum of challenges requires cooperation and coordination between different agencies in many areas, at both the national and international level. This is being demonstrated by the US-led campaign against terrorism, which involves not only military cooperation but also diplomatic, financial, economic, intelligence, customs and police cooperation.

The range of challenges is so broad that responsibility cuts across many different ministries. In many countries, initiatives are under way to review or initiate new organisational structures. In Norway, for example, parliament is considering a proposal to centralise responsibility for national safety and preparedness. In the United States, an Office for Homeland Security has been created.

The CCMS project, launched in March 2001, aims to identify common challenges, to take stock of initiatives being taken in different countries, and define areas where greater international cooperation could be useful. Norway has taken the lead on the project, which also involves Denmark, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The blurring of the traditional split between military and civilian threats makes NATO and the CCMS an opportune arena for addressing the need for an integrated approach. The Committee provides a unique forum for sharing knowledge and experiences on technical, scientific and policy aspects of social and environmental matters, both in the civilian and military sectors.

Addressing non-traditional threats to security is one of five key objectives guiding work under the CCMS. Other objectives include reducing the environmental impact of military activities; conducting regional studies including cross-border activities; preventing conflicts in relation to scarcity of resources; and addressing emerging risks to the environment and society that could cause economic, cultural and political instability. Work is based on decentralised activities involving participation in pilot studies, projects, workshops and seminars, funded nationally.
At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses."

Rome Summit Declaration, 28 May 2002

The logic of the new relationship between the NATO Allies and Russia lies in the simple statement above, which opens the declaration made at this May's Rome Summit. The 20 heads of state and government who approved that document gathered not as rivals or adversaries, but as equal partners in a new NATO-Russia Council, united in common cause against the security threats of our age. This was unprecedented.

In the period since the Summit, further NATO-Russia meetings have been held at all levels — defence ministers, ambassadors, political advisers, and experts. Four new working groups have been created, and a range of expert meetings convened to transform the political message of Rome into practical cooperation in key areas. These include, among others, the struggle against terrorism, efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, crisis management and civil-emergency planning. And while we all continue to grapple with the rules and procedures of this entirely new structure, the political will that has too often in the past been missing from the NATO-Russia dialogue is evident at all levels.

We are still in the very early stages of this ambitious undertaking, but the prospects for a genuinely new quality in NATO-Russia relations are bright.

Can NATO and Russia become true partners in standing up to the threats of the modern age? Perhaps, after the terrorist attacks of last autumn, the question should be, can the Allies and Russia afford to delay that partnership any longer, to ignore a large and growing number of common interests in favour of outdated stereotypes? The planes that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 did not only claim lives and property. They struck at our peace of mind, our sense of security and our way of life. They delivered a message, loud and clear, that the threats of today (and tomorrow) are not the threats of yesterday, and that we can no longer feel secure behind tanks, missiles and walls. And that message resonated as loudly in Moscow as in Brussels, London or New York.

When the Alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on 12 September 2001, declaring that the attack on the United States had been an attack on all Allies, we sent a strong message of resolve to the terrorists. But we sent an equally strong message to our Russian partners.

For years, we had maintained that: "NATO and Russia share common interests," and "NATO is not directed against Russia." For years, Russia's political leaders had joined us in these statements, but then returned home to perpetuate the stereotype of a hostile, aggressive Alliance, bent on "encircling" and marginalising Russia. In 1999, when differences over the Kosovo crisis erupted in a formal disruption of the NATO-Russia dialogue, this image of NATO as a threat found receptive audiences in Russia's public and elites. Yet on 12 September 2001, when NATO — for the first time in its 53-year history — declared itself to be under attack, the enemy was not the “red menace” to the east, but terrorism (also identified as the number one security threat in Russia's own national security concept). Moreover, the specific culprits — the al-Qaida network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan — had long been accused by Russia of aiding and radicalising rebel groups in Chechnya and fomenting instability along Russia's southern rim. The notion of “common interests” had never been clearer, on either side.

While the common struggle against terrorism was a decisive catalyst for the new spirit of cooperation between the Allies and Russia, it clearly is not our only shared interest. Regional instability, proliferation, transnational crime, mass migration, trafficking in...
arms and human beings — the list goes on and on. All of these modern-day challenges threaten the Allies and Russia alike. With her nuclear arsenal, her 11 time zones, her 150 million citizens, and her borders stretching from the Caucasus through Central Asia to the Far East, today’s Russia is as vital to the security of the NATO Allies as was the Soviet Union at any point during the Cold War. The difference is that today’s security challenges can only be met cooperatively — that in the words of our heads of state and government: “Unprecedented new threats and challenges demand increasingly united responses.”

Where we were once threatened by the Soviet Union’s military might, we are threatened today by the prospect that the Russian Federation might become weak or isolated; that central authorities might lose control over nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or materials; that scientists in Russia’s far-flung regions might turn out of desperation to states or groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction for steady, well-paid employment; that regional instability, both within Russia’s borders and beyond, might provide fertile ground for international terrorist groups and criminal organisations.

This principle is not entirely new, and neither are the ideas contained in the Rome Summit Declaration. The path we are travelling today was, to a large extent, set forth in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed by heads of state and government of NATO Allies and Russia in May 1997. And where we have had to join forces, we have often done so effectively.

For almost seven years, thousands of Allied and Russian soldiers and officers have served side by side, under a unified command, in the common mission of bringing peace and stability to the Balkans. This was no small accomplishment. And when, in August 2000, the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk, crippled by a misfired torpedo during a live-fire exercise, sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea, taking the lives of all its 118 crewmen, the Allies’ response was rapid and heartfelt. Ad hoc assistance by individual Allies in the rescue efforts gave new impetus to the search for more formal NATO-Russia cooperation in search and rescue at sea. And, of course, we were able to use the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the precursor to the NATO-Russia Council, to exchange views on a wide variety of security issues.

What was missing from the NATO-Russia dialogue, however, was a true sense of shared purpose and a sense of urgency. While we did come together on individual issues or projects, often important ones, such as our shared efforts in the Balkans, such cooperation was the exception, rather than the rule, and generally required extraordinary effort. Both sides continued to view each other instinctively with suspicion, and our consultative structures reflected that fact.

The Permanent Joint Council (PJC) provided a forum where NATO and Russia could come together, but its rules virtually ensured that we would remain at a safe distance from each other. The PJC was essentially a bilateral forum, where Allies agreed all their positions in advance before beginning the dialogue with Russia. Russia, for her part, often used the PJC to express dissatisfaction with NATO policies, such as those on enlargement, without truly engaging with Allies in a genuine spirit of cooperation.

We have reached an important milestone, where more meaningful cooperation has become possible. One of the most important reasons for this has been the change in leadership in the Kremlin. When Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency in December 1999, one of his first foreign policy decisions was to end the year-long “freeze” in NATO-Russia relations that had been imposed by his predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin, in response to the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia. President Putin has pursued consistently his vision of Russia as a “European” power, often in the face of significant domestic scepticism. Gone is the rhetoric about “good” (EU) and “bad” (NATO) Europe. Putin’s “Westernist” strategy envisions genuine cooperation with Western Europe and the United States, in order to restore Russia’s political and economic might and to face more effectively long-term threats to the south and the east. Here, the events of 11 September 2001 did not produce a radical change in course. They merely provided an opportunity for Putin to justify this plan to his domestic critics, and to accelerate its pace.

Last autumn, the Allies put forward many ideas on how we might best capitalise on this new spirit of cooperation. Among the most ambitious of these was an idea to scrap the stiff, formalistic structure of the PJC, in favour of a more flexible NATO-Russia body. In such a body, the Allies and Russia could come together as equal partners in areas of common
interest, and retain the ability to work together before key decisions had been made — to engage in joint analysis of emerging threats, develop joint positions, and, where possible, take joint decisions and launch joint actions. In short, to move from the PJC’s “19+1” structure to a format of “20”.

Work “at 20”, or, following this year’s enlargement decisions, at up to 28, gives us the opportunity to take advantage of unique Russian capabilities, information and political perspectives on a range of issues — often before the Alliance has taken a position on a given issue. It does not mean we will agree on everything. It does not mean that NATO and Russia will no longer have the opportunity to act independently where our interests diverge. But it does mean that where we can identify common interests, where we want to work together, we can do so much more effectively than in the past. And as the level of mutual confidence and the number of common interests grow, this flexible format will grow with it.

While there are important areas on which we continue to disagree, the new forum can serve to promote mutual understanding through sustained contact and dialogue, in a way that can only serve to promote shared Allied values within Russia as well as in her foreign policy decisions. As Lord Robertson has often said, the real difference between “19+1” and “20” is not a question of mathematics, but of chemistry. In the end, it will be attitudes, not structures that determine our success. And here too, the early signs are promising. We are not yet guaranteed success, but we cannot afford to fail.
NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said, famously, that his three priorities on taking office in October 1999 were “capabilities, capabilities and capabilities”. This objective received powerful resonance when defence ministers meeting on 6 June in Brussels stated that they were “committed to providing NATO with the capabilities to carry out the full range of its missions”. They agreed that member nations should therefore be ready “to adapt their military capabilities to ensure that they can contribute to meeting the new demands, including those posed by terrorism”.

These are powerful statements, but all too often communiqués, replete with ringing, declaratory language, gather dust in the filing cabinet. Are the Allies really prepared to make good their promises? Are they ready, in the procurement area as in others, to augment their national plans? And are they really prepared to spend more smartly and to provide extra defence money where it is needed? The answers to these questions will determine NATO’s future.

DCI successor

Critical in this respect will be the successor to the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), a programme launched at the 1999 Washington Summit to equip NATO with the capabilities to meet modern security challenges. This is not to say that the DCI has been a failure. On the contrary, it has made a difference and brought welcome enhancements to the Alliance’s defence capabilities. But the overall score card reads rather like a 1-1 draw in the World Cup: not the worst outcome, but still unsatisfying.

The national armaments’ directors of NATO member countries agree that effort on the DCI should be maintained right up to the Prague Summit. However, they also want a follow-on programme to be focused on “a smaller number of critical capabilities”. These views were reflected in the defence ministers’ communiqué of 6 June which directed the North Atlantic Council to prepare recommendations for a “new capabilities initiative” based on a “small number of capabilities essential to the full range of Alliance missions”. To ensure this new capabilities initiative has more success than the last, ministers agreed that it should be based on “firm national commitments with specific target dates”.

Among other things, the new initiative is to encourage “cooperative acquisition of equipment and common and multinational funding”.

These decisions constitute an important and valuable policy framework of intent. The challenge in the run-up to the Prague Summit is to translate them into a real programme with teeth. These “firm national commitments” need specific funding commitments backed by the necessary resources in national defence budgets.

What programmes will these firm national commitments be targeted at? The short list could simply broadly identify critical capability areas that need to be addressed or, hopefully, be more precise by specifically identifying defence projects and systems. Ministers have already agreed on a number of occasions, for example, that NATO requires a commonly owned and operated core capability for Alliance Ground Surveillance. Now is the opportunity to seek clear funding commitments to launch this project, even if the eventual total programme cost is not yet known.

Fundamental questions

Success or failure in enhancing NATO’s defence capabilities will therefore depend in great measure on the ability of our armaments community to accelerate...
Military matters

through the gears of change and innovation and produce more, better and, wherever possible, cheaper defence capabilities. The defence procurement community needs to know what our political masters would like present and future generation defence equipment to be able to do. There is no point building large numbers of tanks, for example, if large-scale armoured warfare is not deemed likely. In this respect, overarching guidance, such as the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, already exists and the NATO military authorities play an invaluable role in NATO’s specialist armaments’ committees by giving advice on military requirements. However, even more fundamental questions concerning the future relationship between the United States and its Canadian and European Allies need to be addressed.

One question is that of future trends in defence spending. Before constructing a new, specific capabilities initiative, it is critical to understand what resources are really going to be made available for defence. Without this, the exercise risks becoming largely theoretical. European Allies collectively spend a lot on defence — more than $150 billion a year — but one main reason for the transatlantic defence capabilities gap is the difference in the size of the defence output, which is growing. Europe’s defence spending has been running at about 60 per cent that of the United States for most of the past decade, but European military research and development spending has only been one quarter of the US level. And according to some calculations, per soldier, it has only been one eighth. Moreover, the returns on even this investment are further lowered by the fact that the investment is fragmented between different sovereign states and their respective defence establishments.

A second fundamental question is how the Canadian and European Allies view their future military operational partnership with the United States. Do they wish to be a full partner of the United States across the entire spectrum of warfighting capabilities now associated with high-intensity conflict? Do they wish to take advantage of, and buy into, the revolution in military affairs, and develop forces which can join with those of the United States in high-intensity, high-tech, long-range coalition expeditionary operations? Or will Canada and Europe end up opting — perhaps by default — for far more modest (and less expensive) crisis management and peacekeeping tasks, including post-conflict reconstruction? I hope the former will be the case. The United States needs Allies with military, as well as with political and economic, strength. The transatlantic axis, on which NATO is based, needs to be a balanced axis along its whole length. Balance and strength are inextricably linked. As Lord Robertson has said, NATO must either modernise or be marginalised. And in order to achieve this balance, many more Allies will need to increase significantly their defence spending.

Throughout its history, NATO has struggled to mount a collective, conventional defence capability worthy of the aggregate of the individual input of its members. Too often, the whole has been less than the sum of its parts. Insufficient cooperation among Allies in research and development has been one reason. Today, significant shortfalls remain in the capabilities required to implement fully Alliance strategy — shortfalls that were all too starkly exposed in the skies over Kosovo and, since 11 September 2001, in the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. But unlike during the Cold War, we cannot look to nuclear weapons for compensation in addressing the new security challenges of the 21st century.

We need a system which ensures that the military requirements of the NATO commanders can appropriately influence national armaments plans and intentions

Improvements

One thing NATO can do is to improve its interoperability and standardisation. The Alliance has achieved a high degree of both in terms of military planning and doctrine. But in the defence materiel area, the results have been less successful. Materiel interoperability means the ability of different systems to work together. Materiel standardisation means any efforts towards fielding common systems that are the same in form, fit and function. In the words of the defence analyst, Thomas Callaghan: “Interoperability is what we do with the mess we have. Standardisation is what we do to avoid having the mess in the future.” Standardised weapons are intrinsically interoperable, whereas non-standardised weapons have to be made interoperable. The benefits of standardisation, both military and economic, are found in terms of longer production runs and lower unit prices.

Although rendering different systems interoperable remains in many instances an important goal of NATO armaments cooperation — and this is certainly reflected in the DCI — the fundamental mission of NATO’s armaments community is the enhancement of
defence capabilities. Increasingly, such enhancement is more likely to be achieved through common programmes, either by providing NATO-owned and operated capabilities, or by spreading the resulting national assets to the armed forces of member (and perhaps also Partner) nations. This is not to question the importance of making different systems interoperable. When applied to existing, often highly disparate defence systems owned by a number of countries, it can bring real military benefit. But if our goal is merely to attain interoperability for new systems, then we will in a sense be perpetuating the problems that we have today.

Common programmes offer the best prospects for equipment of different member countries to be compatible, because it will essentially be the same. Moreover, NATO commonly operated capabilities clearly provide NATO commanders with immediate assets at their disposal. However, even for larger countries, the cost of defence equipment is becoming exorbitant — way beyond that of civilian goods in any relative sense. It is, therefore, important to examine new forms of ownership. Does it really make sense for small countries to invest huge sums procuring limited numbers of, say, tanks? Would it not make more sense to embrace notions of procurement specialisation, in which common pools of equipment can be developed, and leasing arrangements devised? Leasing potentially offers a solution to one of the intractable problems inherent in the financing of defence equipment programmes, which is that huge up-front investment is required when programmes go into production. The size of the investment, in case after case, has usually resulted in a smaller production line than the one required, which in turn has resulted in higher unit prices. This is the exact reverse of economies of scale.

Another prerequisite of progress is the reform of US export licensing and technology transfer regimes and their underlying legislative basis in US law. The chief executives of 39 US defence companies made this very point recently in an open letter to President George Bush saying: “Major changes to the US export control regime are required to ensure that it reflects both current global market realities and America's strategic policy imperatives... We must ensure the success of critical cooperation and interoperability among the United States and its allies, in time of peace as well as in crisis.” Moreover, US Assistant Secretary of State Lincoln Bloomfield has announced that the United States will soon initiate a comprehensive review of its export control regime.

Here, Washington can take a series of measures to improve the situation. It can accelerate and fully implement all ongoing “simpler, faster, more user-friendly” reforms. It can expedite and rigorously pursue the Munitions List review, the review of which equipment and munitions must be manufactured in the United States. It can give higher priority and special, expedited handling to licences for NATO agencies. It can assign the highest priority to processing licences required to support Alliance acquisition of the items on the short list for the new capabilities initiative that will be launched at the Prague Summit. In its Joint Strike Fighter programme, the United States is using a global project licence to facilitate international cooperation, and this approach could be used as well for the Prague list. The United States has already agreed to exempt Canada from the restrictions of its International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, and exemption negotiations with the United Kingdom, which are now proceeding, should be extended to other Allies. The United States also can recognise the increasingly multinational character of Alliance armaments cooperation and transatlantic defence industry, and negotiate a framework agreement with the six European nations who have signed a “Letter of Intent” to promote greater intra-European armaments cooperation.

While NATO’s armaments community has done excellent work over the years to produce guidance for harmonising acquisition practices, countries continue to pursue national policies and practices in this field, which vary greatly from one to the other. Internationally accepted acquisition practices need to be established so that all those involved in acquisition — specification writers, technical draftsmen, financial and budgetary experts and legal experts — sing from the same song sheet. A lot of time and expense is wasted in joint projects learning how collaborators go about their business.

Although defence and force planning are conducted collectively within the Alliance, there is no comparable NATO armaments planning system. Indeed, earlier attempts to set up such a system failed. Membership of NATO brings with it responsibilities, and it is extraordinary that while shouldering those responsibilities collectively in the overall defence-planning field, the armaments community of member countries has sought exemption from them. Such an approach must be reformed. We need a system which ensures that the military requirements of the NATO commanders can appropriately influence national armaments plans and intentions. Only in this way will it be possible to ensure that the men and women who defend our peace, security and democracy are given the best possible tools to do the job.