Interpreting Prague

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Every mention in this publication of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote: Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
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Transforming NATO

Lord Robertson examines the significance of the Prague Summit and considers the challenges ahead.

The measure of any organisation is not how it performs when everything is going well, but how it responds when the going gets rough. In this respect, the Alliance has in the months since November’s Prague Summit had to confront issues where member states have disagreed and where it has taken difficult negotiations to reconcile the various national positions.

The beginning of 2003 saw intense debate among Allies on the timing of defensive support for Turkey to deter possible attack by Iraq. But difficult, consensus-building negotiations are the essence of NATO. Moreover, in spite of differences over policy towards Iraq, within Europe and across the Atlantic, despite mass protests and impending elections in several NATO countries, the Alliance achieved sufficient consensus to provide Turkey with defensive assistance to meet the threat posed by Iraq.

Broad consensus

First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of the defining challenges of the 21st century. The NATO Allies acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight al Qa’ida and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial debate on whether NATO could or should go “out-of-area”.

At the Prague Summit, we took that consensus a decisive step further. We agreed a new military concept for defence against terrorism, which states that our forces must be able to “deter, disrupt and defend” against terrorists, and that they should do so wherever our interests demand it. Moreover, the Alliance has already substantiated that commitment by providing support for the Dutch-German command of the International Security Assistance Force that is now deployed in Kabul.

We have also come a long way towards building a new consensus on how to handle the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. In Prague, NATO leaders agreed to improve detection capabilities, to equip NATO forces with better protective gear, and to support civilian authorities in case of an emergency. And they launched a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

A new consensus has also emerged on the military capabilities that we need to deal with the new threats. In Prague, agreement was reached on reforming NATO’s command structure to make it more responsive and more rapidly deployable. The Allies also committed themselves to major improvements in key areas of...
modern operations: strategic transport, interoperability, and precision-guided munitions, among others. Many Allies committed to making improvements individually, others to forming teams to address shortfalls more effectively. But importantly, all these commitments are clear and specific — which will make it easy to monitor progress. In this way, the Prague Capabilities Commitment marks a real turning point in the adaptation of European capabilities to the requirements of the 21st century.

Another major breakthrough in the capability area was the agreement reached in Prague on the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF). This state-of-the-art force will give the Alliance the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to new threats. The NRF will balance risks more fairly by engaging more Allies in actual operations, rather than in post-conflict responsibilities alone, simply by default. And by bringing together the best forces from both sides of the Atlantic, the NRF will also serve as a catalyst for the necessary transformation of all Allied forces. Once again, a remarkable new consensus was achieved in an extremely short time.

Alliance transformation

Before 9/11, the Prague Summit was generally expected to be focused on NATO enlargement. In the event, the issuing of invitations to seven new countries became part of a much broader transformation agenda. But there is strong consensus that the Alliance’s enlargement remains a strategic imperative, even after the seven invitees formally accede next year. This is because, together with the expansion of the European Union, NATO’s enlargement will help consolidate Europe as a common security space. And this will be a great step towards turning Europe into a continent from which wars no longer originate.

Some security analysts have questioned whether NATO will be able to operate with many more members. To be sure, more views will be expressed around a larger North Atlantic Council table. But, as we have seen with earlier rounds of NATO enlargement, more views do not necessarily mean more different views. While none of the seven invitees possesses spectacular military capabilities, each of them has niche capabilities that will be valuable to NATO. Moreover, they will bring enthusiasm, a willingness, if necessary, to take on risks, and an appreciation of the value of a permanent transatlantic Alliance. Based on such strong political commitment, NATO will remain a vibrant organisation, regardless of how many members it has.

9/11 transformed terrorism from a domestic security concern into a truly international security challenge. For this reason, the Allies have been keen to involve their 27 Partner countries in meeting this threat. The Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism agreed in Prague identifies opportunities for concrete cooperation in this area. Broader efforts to assist Partners with domestic reform and security issues should have a positive effect on the root causes of terrorism, and its spillover into other countries.

Cooperation with one particular Partner, Russia, has already received a major push over the past year. In the wake of 9/11, the NATO Allies and Russia rapidly realised that they face common dangers and can no longer afford to argue over issues such as NATO enlargement. This realisation led to the creation, in May of last year, of the NATO-Russia Council. Moreover, it continues to encourage constructive cooperation under the aegis of that forum on a wide range of security issues, including combating terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Just after the Prague Summit, in December of last year, we achieved another breakthrough by agreeing a formal basis for cooperation between the Alliance and the European Union in crisis management and conflict prevention. Before then, although the two organisations were able to cooperate successfully in the field, notably in heading off civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* in 2001, we were unable to institutionalise the relationship. This has now changed.

The new EU-NATO agreement holds the potential of transforming not only European security, but also the transatlantic relationship. By enabling EU-led operations to draw on NATO assets and capabilities, both sides of the Atlantic stand to gain. The European Union will have the opportunity to demonstrate its potential as a serious security actor. And if it is gradually able to take greater responsibility for stability in the Balkans from NATO, US forces, in particular, will become available for other pressing tasks. This will help facilitate a new, fairer burden-sharing between the United States and a more mature Europe.

All in all, we have come a remarkably long way since 9/11. There has been a broad convergence of views on the new threats that we face and how best to respond to them; on the capabilities that we require to respond; on the contribution that new members will be able
to make to our cause; and on the need to work with Partner countries and our key strategic partner, the European Union. It is clear, at the same time, that we cannot be complacent.

**Future challenges**

First of all, NATO and its members have a demanding agenda ahead in meeting the various commitments that were made at the Prague Summit. This applies to enhanced efforts to meet the terrorist threat, including deeper cooperation with our Partners. And it applies, in particular, to the commitments that each of NATO's 19 members has made under the Prague Capabilities Commitment, each and every one of which is fundamental to NATO's longer-term effectiveness and credibility.

Second, we must complete our links with the European Union. Work on implementing the December agreement started immediately, with particular emphasis on allowing the European Union to take over NATO's mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* But the longer-term potential for our cooperation stretches well beyond crisis management in the Balkans. And it is bound to become even greater as both organisations enlarge and have as many as 19 members in common.

Third, we need to redouble efforts to bring the wider public along. One of the characteristics of this new security environment is that our security policies — and our institutions — are changing faster than the perceptions of our publics. As a result, the task of explaining what NATO is and what it is doing is becoming ever more demanding. We must therefore exercise additional effort to ensure that public understanding of the new NATO remains widespread, strong and supportive.

9/11 and Iraq demonstrate that we are in a period of fundamental transition. The security environment is changing, as is the way in which we react to it, and to each other. What is crucial during such a period of transition is that we preserve and strengthen what has brought us where we are today, and delivered so much for our security, prosperity and well being. That is, in a nutshell, our common transatlantic culture of trust, cooperation and mutual support.

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* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
An atrocity took place on a scale and of a level of barbarity that it appalled the entire world and, from the NATO perspective, led to a fundamental change in the way in which the Alliance operated and the kind of task it dealt with. The atrocity was the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995.

The groundwork for NATO's expanded role in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been prepared in the previous years in internal Alliance documents as well as agreements with the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, before the Srebrenica massacre, Allies had remained reluctant to take the logical next step and launch the kind of intervention that might end the war. In the wake of Srebrenica, in which possibly as many as 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were summarily executed by Bosnian Serb forces, international attitudes against the Bosnian Serbs hardened. Within two months of the massacre, NATO had carried out its first air campaign, leading to the signing of a peace agreement to end more than three-and-a-half years of fighting. By December of that same year, NATO was leading a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and providing the security for a peace process to take root.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have had an even greater impact on Alliance strategic thinking than the Srebrenica massacre. A day after hijackers flew commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the Allies responded by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the Alliance's history. And by agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should trigger NATO's collective self-defence obligation, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.

**Comprehensive approach**

Since then, NATO's political and military authorities have put in place the building blocks for a comprehensive Alliance approach to terrorism, which could have similar, long-term implications for the way in which NATO operates. On the political side, the North Atlantic Council has decided that NATO should be ready to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks directed from abroad, as and where required. It should be ready to help national authorities cope with the aftermath of attacks. And, on a case-by-case basis, the Alliance should consider providing its assets and capabilities to support operations, including those against terrorism, undertaken by or in cooperation with the European Union or other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies. On the military side, NATO now has a military concept for defence against terrorism for which the Alliance's military authorities are now developing a concept of operations to put it into effect.

Such measures have clearly been in the Alliance's best, long-term interest as increasingly its relevance is measured by its contribution to the war against terrorism. Indeed, had the Alliance been unable or unwilling to contribute to addressing the challenges posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, it would have risked detaching itself from the US security agenda thereby ceasing to be an effective organisation.

To be fair, what the Alliance was doing before 9/11 — rebuilding failed states in the former Yugoslavia, forging partnerships with Russia, other former adversaries in the East and countries in the wider Mediterranean region and expanding Europe's...
zone of stability by bringing more countries into the Alliance — was extremely relevant for Euro-Atlantic security and remains equally relevant today. Moreover, even prior to 9/11, the Alliance was beginning to face up to the challenge of terrorism. The Strategic Concept that NATO leaders adopted at their Washington Summit in 1999 included the following reference: “Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources…”

However, despite this recognition, the Alliance gave terrorism relatively little collective attention. This was largely because there was no consensus on NATO’s role in what were seen by most Allies as internal security problems. As a result, there was little or no sustained discussion of the nature of terrorism, of its sources, or its implications for Alliance concepts, policies, structures or capabilities.

But 9/11 changed terrorism from what was essentially a domestic, law-enforcement concern, into an international security problem that, if it is to be adequately addressed, requires a broad spectrum of political, economic, and law-enforcement measures, as well as military engagement.

The first step in NATO’s response was the invocation of Article 5. But having taken this unprecedented action, the Allies' initial contribution to the US-led campaign against al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan was modest [for details of early NATO support, see article Aiding America in the winter 2001 issue of NATO Review]. In the intervening period, however, Allies have played an increasingly significant role. Indeed, 14 NATO countries deployed forces to Afghanistan.

At their Reykjavik meeting in May last year, NATO foreign ministers agreed that: “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.” Since then, NATO has begun to provide support to those countries, currently Germany and the Netherlands, which are running the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. And at the Prague Summit, NATO leaders endorsed a lengthy package of measures and initiatives, virtually all of which can be considered as designed to combat terrorism.

Reform agenda
NATO’s new capabilities initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), is designed to improve, among other things, the Alliance’s terrorism-related capabilities and in general to ensure that European militaries are equipped to move faster and further afield, to apply military force more effectively and to sustain themselves in combat. It includes the following eight fields: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.

Once implemented, the PCC should at least quadruple the number of large transport aircraft in Europe, from 4 to 16 and possibly more. It will also significantly increase air-to-air refuelling capacity among NATO’s European members by, among other initiatives, establishing a pool of 10 to 15 refuelling aircraft. And it will increase NATO’s stock of non-US, air-delivered, precision-guided munitions by 40 per cent by 2007.

Another Prague initiative, the NATO Response Force, which should have an initial operating capability by October 2004, is designed to give the Alliance a new capability to respond quickly to an emergency, to go wherever required, and to hit hard. And NATO’s Military Command Structure is undergoing transformation, including the creation of a strategic command in the United States responsible for the continuing transformation of Alliance military capabilities.

The Prague package also included a Civil-Emergency-Planning Action Plan to assist national authorities in improving their civil preparedness; improved intelligence sharing and assessment arrangements; improved crisis-response arrangements, including a new air defence concept for dealing with “renegade” aircraft, so that procedures are in place to deal with a repetition of 9/11; streamlined arrangements for deploying AWACS aircraft where needed; and increased cooperation with Partners, with a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism [see article Working with Partners to fight terrorism by Osman Yavuzalp in this issue of NATO Review].

In addition, Alliance leaders endorsed implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, which will enhance the Alliance’s
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NATO's new military concept for defence against terrorism sets out four categories of possible military activity by NATO. These are anti-terrorism; consequence management; counter-terrorism; and military cooperation. In this context, anti-terrorism means defensive measures to reduce vulnerability, including limited response and containment actions by military forces and such activities as assuring threat warnings, maintaining the effectiveness of the integrated air defence system and providing missile defence. Consequence management means post-attack recuperation and involves such elements as contributing planning and force generation, providing capabilities for immediate assistance, providing coordination centres, and establishing training capabilities. Counter-terrorism means the use of offensive measures, including counter-force activities, both with NATO in the lead and with NATO in support of other organisations or coalitions involving Allies. And military cooperation covers among other things cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue countries and other countries, as well as with other organisations, including the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations.

Even NATO's science programme, which has traditionally focused on encouraging cooperation between scientists from different countries, has been redesigned in such a way that it, too, is now addressing efforts relevant to defence against terrorism, especially within the context of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the NATO-Russia Council.

Implementation

Implementation of what is an impressive package of measures and initiatives may still prove problematic. Even if countries do live up to their commitments, NATO itself will have to change the way in which it operates to reflect the requirements imposed by a new strategic environment. Although the Alliance will soon have 26 members, the organisation's working methods have remained largely unchanged from those developed for an Alliance of twelve.

NATO has moved a long way since 9/11 to be able to contribute effectively to the war on terror. Nevertheless, many issues related to this war remain controversial and achieving consensus on concrete actions may prove difficult. Indeed, in many ways, the situation today concerning NATO's role in the war of terror is akin to that in 1994 or the first half of 1995 concerning taking on out-of-area missions in the former Yugoslavia. That said, the rift within the Alliance was probably greater in the 1990s over policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina than it is today, though its nature is clearly different today because this time the United States has a vested national interest at stake.

NATO came to terms with the problem in the 1990s. Whereas it took three-and-a-half years of war for NATO to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alliance took action to stop the fighting in Kosovo after one year and NATO deployed preventively in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to forestall greater conflict. In this way, the Alliance demonstrated that, although it might take some time to adapt to a new security paradigm, once it does adapt, NATO learns its lessons fast and delivers results when tested.

It took the Srebrenica massacre to persuade Allies of the merits of the initial intervention. The challenge today, therefore, is to achieve consensus around the best strategy to address the threat posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction without another such atrocity.

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Working with Partners to fight terrorism

Osman Yavuzalp describes how NATO members and Partner countries will be working together to combat terrorism.

In the immediate wake of 9/11, the 46 members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) — 19 NATO members and 27 Partner countries — unconditionally condemned the attacks on New York and Washington and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism. At the Prague Summit, EAPC leaders made good this pledge by formally endorsing a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (Action Plan).

In signing up to the Action Plan, which was drawn up by NATO in close consultation with Partners, EAPC leaders recognised, above all, that all countries faced the same security challenges and that only by working together would they be able to combat them. Indeed, many Partner countries — especially those in Central Asia — have been victims of al-Qaida-sponsored terrorism and have already provided significant support to Allies for operations in Afghanistan by, for example, providing overflight rights and access to bases.

The Action Plan itself, which was published on the NATO web site during the Prague Summit, foresees the promotion and facilitation of cooperation among EAPC states in the fight against terror through political consultation and practical programmes under the auspices of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. As such, it is designed to benefit Allies and Partners alike.

Allies stand to gain because the Action Plan increases the opportunities and provides mechanisms for interested Partners to contribute to and support NATO’s efforts in the fight against terrorism. Partner contributions will be consistent with their obligations under international law with respect to combating terrorism, and with the specific character of their security and defence policies.

Since NATO’s interest in promoting Partnership transcends military goals, Allies also stand to gain if measures contained in the Action Plan to promote democracy and nurture cooperation among Partners are implemented. In this way, potential sources of instability and conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area should be reduced. Moreover, the five Western European neutral members of the EAPC — Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland — will likely be interested in joining such Allied efforts.

From the Partners’ perspective, the Action Plan helps increase cooperation among them in combating the threat posed by terrorism. Clearly the Action Plan is not the first initiative of this kind. Similar cooperative initiatives already exist within, for example, the Commonwealth of Independent States — a body including most former Soviet Republics — and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation — a regional grouping including China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, rather than undermining these structures, cooperation within the EAPC framework is complementary, since it benefits from the participation of NATO member states.

The Action Plan may also serve as an instrument by which countries can share expertise and experience of combating terrorism with others. Article 9 of the Action Plan, for example, defines one of its key objectives as “to provide assistance to EAPC states in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks”. In this way, Allies and Partners which have developed particularly effective mechanisms for addressing this problem over the years, may provide mentoring programmes to countries seeking to improve their own anti-terrorist capabilities.

To take the Action Plan forward, focus has to be placed on the following areas in the coming months:

Political consultations
The Action Plan foresees the opportunity for Allies and Partners to consult regularly on shared security
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Concerns related to terrorism. Moreover, it provides the possibility for Partners to seek, in accordance with agreed procedures, direct political consultations with NATO, either individually or in smaller groups, on concerns related to terrorism.

Information sharing
The development of an EAPC/PfP Intelligence Liaison Unit should enhance information sharing. In this context, the possibility of establishing permanent working contacts among intelligence agencies of interested EAPC countries and especially those in the Caucasus and Central Asia could prove particularly useful.

Border control
A number of Partners have expressed their wish to initiate or enhance cooperation with NATO in the area of border control. In this unique context, priority may need to be given to Partners from Central Asia, which, because of their geographic location, may require assistance to prevent illicit movement of personnel and material across international borders.

WMD-related terrorism
Procedures have to be agreed to cater for Partner support for and participation in NATO-led activities to enhance capabilities against WMD-related terrorism and share appropriate information and experience in this field.

Enhancing cooperation in civil-emergency planning
In connection with the previous point, Allies and Partners have to continue working together to improve civil preparedness for possible terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. To this end, Allied leaders at the Prague Summit endorsed a Civil-Emergency-Planning Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological agents. Moreover, one of the principal objectives of the Action Plan is for Allies, upon request, to provide assistance to EAPC states in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks, including on their economic and critical infrastructure.

Information exchange about forces
Another channel to be explored in the short term is the exchange of information regarding forces responsible for counter-terrorism operations and the facilitation of contacts among them.

Force planning
In total, 22 Partners, including the three Caucasus countries — Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia — and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, now participate in NATO’s Planning and Review Process. In the wake of the decision to invite seven countries to begin NATO accession talks, the development of Partnership Goals aimed at improving the capabilities of these Caucasian and Central Asian countries will likely receive priority attention, since the Prague Declaration emphasises “further enhancing interoperability and defence-related activities, which constitute the core of Partnership”.

Overall, the Action Plan is a robust document reflecting NATO-Partner solidarity in the face of the terrorist threat. It consists of both time-tested and innovative mechanisms to improve consultations and information sharing; enhance preparedness for combating terrorism; impede support to terrorist groups; develop consequence-management capabilities; and assist Partner efforts against terrorism. As such, it constitutes a significant step towards adapting the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace to deal with the security challenges of the 21st century. 
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Enhancing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue

Alberto Bin examines how the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue has been upgraded at the Prague Summit and considers its future evolution.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has come under increased scrutiny both in the Mediterranean region and beyond. This has raised a number of questions about its future development, especially in connection with the much broader issue of the Alliance’s role in the post-9/11 security environment.

At the Prague Summit, Alliance leaders agreed a package of measures to upgrade the Mediterranean Dialogue. This package has the potential fundamentally to change the nature of this important relationship between NATO members and Partners in the wider Mediterranean region to the benefit of both sides.

NATO’s involvement in the Mediterranean goes back to the Cold War. At the time, the Alliance perceived security in the Mediterranean as little more than an extension of the East-West confrontation and viewed it in terms of the threat of Soviet intrusion in the region. As such, the Mediterranean was important to NATO primarily in military terms, a fact reflected in it being identified as the Alliance’s “Southern Flank”.

The profound changes to the European security environment that resulted from the end of the Cold War led NATO to recognise the interdependence of European and Mediterranean security and, therefore, to consider the latter on its own merit. The recognition that stability in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean explains the Allies’ decision, taken in December 1994, to establish contacts between NATO and a number of countries in the wider Mediterranean region. In February 1995, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia were invited to participate in a dialogue with NATO. An invitation was extended to Jordan in November 1995, and to Algeria in February 2000.

Dialogue aims

The overall aim of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is to contribute to regional security and stability, and achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. The Alliance also intends to correct any misperceptions that may have arisen with regard to NATO activities. In particular, it wants to dismantle the myth of an Alliance in search of new, artificial enemies. And it seeks to dissipate fears that the emerging European security architecture may exclude its Southern neighbours. In short, NATO wants to bring an end to the image of the Mediterranean as a new dividing line. At the same time, it seeks to improve its understanding of the security perceptions and concerns of its Mediterranean Partners.

From a conceptual standpoint, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue may be defined as a key instrument in support of the Alliance’s overall strategy of partnership, dialogue, and cooperation. This was clearly outlined in the 1999 Strategic Concept, the document describing the security environment and the ways in which NATO addresses threats faced by member states, which elevated partnership into a fundamental security task of the Alliance.

The tragic events of 9/11 did not change the conceptual framework established in the 1999 Strategic Concept. Nor did they fundamentally alter the aim of the Dialogue itself. They did, however, highlight the need for NATO and its Mediterranean Partners to move closer together and to forge a genuine partnership in the face of common challenges, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, the interest of Alliance members and their Mediterranean Partners in upgrading cooperation after...
9/11 was not expressed in a vacuum. The principles, instruments, programmes and mechanisms for further development of the initiative were already in place as a result of work done in previous years.

From the outset, the Mediterranean Dialogue was designed to evolve. Indeed, over the years it has both widened and deepened. The number of Dialogue countries has grown from five to seven. Political discussions have become more frequent and more intense both in the multilateral — NATO plus seven — and bilateral — NATO plus one — formats. The number of cooperative activities has grown from a handful to several hundred. These are laid out in an annual Work Programme which includes information; civil-emergency planning; science and environment; crisis management; defence policy and strategy; small arms and light weapons; global humanitarian mine action; proliferation; and a fully-fledged programme of military cooperation.

In spite of difficult regional circumstances, considerable progress has been made towards the overall aim of building confidence between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. Moreover, the Dialogue's increasing focus on areas where NATO can add value, including in the military field, is perceived by Mediterranean Partners as an important contribution to regional cooperation.

Notwithstanding, the Dialogue has remained a big step behind NATO's other outreach efforts, notably the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace. It is still an exercise in confidence-building rather than a true partnership.

There are several reasons why the Dialogue has yet to reach its full potential. One reason has been a lingering difference of views among Allies as to how best to develop it. Mediterranean Partners, too, differ over what they ultimately want from the Dialogue and how far they want cooperation with NATO to go.

**Strengthening and deepening**

Paradoxically, the tragic events of 9/11 may have helped give the Dialogue greater clarity of purpose. The strengthening and deepening of relations between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries is now considered among the highest priorities for the Alliance. In turn, NATO’s Mediterranean Partners have demonstrated a strong interest in further developing their cooperation with the Alliance in a variety of fields, including by tabling a number of concrete proposals. The outcome was the substantial package of measures aimed at upgrading the political and practical dimensions of the Mediterranean Dialogue, which was endorsed by NATO’s leaders at the Prague Summit. Such measures include the possibility of further exploiting the opportunities offered by the existing multilateral/bilateral dialogue with a view to establishing a more regular and more effective consultation process; intensifying the political relationship through high-level contacts and the involvement of decision-makers; taking advantage of the EAPC framework, including by associating the Mediterranean Partners with selected EAPC activities; and further developing practical cooperation in security matters of common concern through more focused activities, a tailored approach to cooperation, and a continuous process of consultation at expert level.

The latter applies especially to areas where NATO has a recognised comparative advantage and can add value, and where Dialogue Partners have expressed interest. These could include military education, training and doctrine to address basic interoperability requirements, with a view to making Mediterranean Partners better prepared to participate in military exercises and related training activities; military medicine including nuclear, biological and chemical related preventive measures; defence reform and defence economics, including best practice in the economic and civilian management of defence forces; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; border security, especially in connection with terrorism, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons and other illegal activities; civil-emergency planning including disaster management; science and environment including activities in the fields of desertification, drought, management of water and other natural resources, and environmental pollution.

Under certain circumstances, such enhanced practical cooperation could be achieved by taking advantage of the Partnership for Peace framework, including by opening selected Partnership for Peace activities to Mediterranean Partners or adapting those activities to the Dialogue’s specific requirements.

**Further engagement**

Observers have often pointed out that “NATO supply” has consistently been greater than “NATO demand” in
most Mediterranean Dialogue countries. NATO has been offering more cooperation than Mediterranean Dialogue countries — with the exception of Israel and Jordan — have been demanding. In part, this is due to a lack of information about NATO and its policies. In order to achieve “equilibrium” between “demand” and “supply”, NATO’s information effort will have to be stepped-up by further engaging civil society in Dialogue countries, with the twofold objectives of providing a better understanding of NATO’s policies including the Mediterranean Dialogue, and of stimulating the growth of a “security community” in these countries.

Parallel to that, the Dialogue’s parliamentary dimension will have to be strengthened with a view to widening its scope and increasing its visibility, including by further involving public opinion in both NATO and Dialogue countries. In this regard, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has an important role to play.

NATO’s Mediterranean Partners should also increase their level of active participation in the Dialogue. This could be achieved by, among other things, emphasising prior consultation with them; by further involving them in the preparation of the annual Work Programme; and by establishing individual cooperation programmes to be jointly developed and agreed. While respecting the principle of non-discrimination embedded within the Mediterranean Dialogue and embodied in the common Work Programme, this would help promote greater flexibility, recognising that the needs of each Dialogue country vary and that it is for each one of them to identify the kind of cooperative activities most suited to those needs.

Regarding the relationship between NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and other cooperation initiatives in the region, some observers have pointed to the potential for competition between organisations. However, huge differences in objectives, scope and resources between the various initiatives make it difficult to speak of simple comparison, let alone of competition. In fact, from the outset, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue has complemented efforts by other international organisations to promote cooperation in the Mediterranean, such as the European Union’s Barcelona Process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and the OSCE Mediterranean Initiative. Such complementarity should be strengthened with a view to fostering fruitful synergies, and avoiding unnecessary duplication. For instance, it seems possible to envisage regular briefings and exchanges of information on each organisation’s activities in the area of security and stability in the Mediterranean region and expert-level meetings between organisations on the complementary Mediterranean dialogues and partnerships.

Future of the Dialogue

In light of the above, the question of what could be the future for NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is a legitimate one. Many observers have suggested turning the Dialogue into an extension of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace. Indeed, any further development of the Mediterranean Dialogue will likely draw inspiration from what NATO has already achieved with the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace, including the efforts that the Alliance has been making with its Partners to ensure that these two key outreach programmes retain their dynamism, attractiveness, and effectiveness even after the latest wave of NATO enlargement.

To be sure, the overriding principle that underpins all NATO partnerships is similar, namely, building stability through cooperation. Yet the objectives that the Alliance has developed with its Partners in Europe and Central Asia differ in many respects from those which have been developed within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The question, therefore, is not so much whether the Dialogue should eventually become a “Mediterranean Partnership for Peace”, but rather how to bring it closer to the mainstream of NATO’s outreach programmes. This should be done in a realistic and forward-looking manner, bearing in mind the specificity of NATO’s relationship with the countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean and the limited resources available.

The real challenge confronting NATO and its Mediterranean Partners today is that of making the Mediterranean Dialogue ever more relevant to both. The aim should be to establish an effective, long-term relationship based on mutual security interests. In this way, the Alliance would enhance its contribution to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation within the Mediterranean region, and make a real contribution to Mediterranean security.
Dear François,

As it enters the 21st century, NATO faces a new set of strategic challenges quite different from the ones it faced in the past. I welcome this opportunity to discuss this issue with you and hope our discussion will help clarify how these new challenges can best be addressed.

In recent years NATO has begun to move away from its original focus on Europe and recognise that the threats facing the Alliance are more diverse and geographically distant than during the Cold War. This shift in emphasis was explicitly acknowledged at the Prague Summit last November. The communiqué issued in Prague noted that NATO needed to have the capability to field forces that can move quickly “to wherever they are needed” and sustain operations over great distance, including in an environment where they might be faced with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

This change essentially ends the “out-of-area” debate that has raged within the Alliance in the last few years. However, some in Europe oppose what they see as an effort to “globalise” NATO. They argue that NATO should remain focused on threats in the European area and its periphery. Such a view, in my opinion, is anachronistic and wrong-headed. It fails to recognise the degree to which the nature and locus of the challenges facing Europe and the United States have changed since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Today the main threats to Western security are no longer in Europe, but emanate from beyond Europe’s borders. They are posed not by the threat of Soviet invasion or instability in the Balkans but by weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and outlaw states which may be tempted to use such weapons or pass them on to terrorists. If NATO is to remain relevant and retain support among Western publics, it must be capable of addressing those new threats and challenges.

The Prague Summit made a good start in this direction. The Prague Capabilities Commitment and the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) will enable the Alliance to better address these new threats. The initiatives represent the best chance — perhaps the last best chance — to narrow the divergence in strategic agendas and military capabilities between Europe and the United States that has grown over the last decade. Unless the capabilities gap is narrowed, European and US forces will find it increasingly difficult to operate effectively together to meet new challenges, especially those beyond Europe. This will have two results — both of them negative. First, it will increase the trend, already evident, toward US unilateralism. If European and US forces cannot operate together, the United States will have little choice but to act alone. European Allies will be reduced to providing mop-up forces. Second, Europe’s ability to influence US decisions and policy will further decline, creating even greater frustration and resentment in Europe, as Europe finds itself increasingly unable to affect decisions that impact on its own security. Both these developments would have a debilitating impact on transatlantic relations and the ability of Europe and the United States to address collectively the new threats and challenges they face today.

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François Heisbourg is director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.
The real test will be whether the commitments made at Prague are actually implemented. This will require many European Allies to reorient their defence investment priorities. Many still have too many forces oriented toward Cold War missions. To meet the new challenges, these countries need smaller, lighter more mobile forces that can be sustained over long periods far from their homeland.

Some Europeans are worried that the NRF will weaken or undermine the European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force. I don’t see why this should be the case. The two forces have quite different purposes. The NRF is essentially a strike force for use in high-intensity combat operations beyond Europe whereas the European Union’s RRF is primarily designed for peace and stability operations in and around Europe. Thus, the forces are basically complementary rather than conflictual.

Given the difficulty in achieving consensus on how and when to use force in confronting these new threats, most non-European operations are likely to be conducted by “coalitions of the willing” rather than NATO as an organisation. But European and US forces will be better able to operate together if they have trained together and have similar operational doctrines and procedures. The NRF and Prague Capabilities Initiative should help strengthen cooperation in this regard. Moreover, as recent developments in Afghanistan illustrate, NATO as an organisation may play an increasingly important role in post-conflict stability operations in areas beyond Europe.

I look forward to your response and continuing this debate.

Yours,

Steve

Dear Steve,

NATO is faced with two basic strategic challenges. The first is directly linked to the constantly shifting set of military contingencies that the Allies have had to face since the end of the Cold War. The second concerns the increasing disengagement of the United States.

The Gulf War, the Kosovo air campaign and operation Enduring Freedom in and around Afghanistan bear little resemblance to each other either in terms of the enemy or the ways in which the campaigns have been fought. The situation is best encapsulated by the Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz pithy and essentially accurate line that: “The mission determines the coalition.” This has a paradoxical effect on NATO. On the one hand, the focus on European contingencies ceases to make sense. This is especially the case since the situation in the former Yugoslavia has calmed down in large part as a result of NATO’s interventions in 1995 and 1999. On the other hand, a “one-size-fits-all” approach is no longer appropriate. In this respect, the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) strikes me as being wrongheaded in terms of its strategic premise which might be summarised as: “The coalition determines the mission.” In the real world, each contingency will involve a different set of political and military actors. You don’t, for example, send the same people to respond to a crisis in the Ivory Coast, as you do to Iraq, irrespective of the broader issue that NATO as such has not been invited to participate in operations in either instance, no more than it was in the case of Enduring Freedom or Desert Storm.

Like you, I don’t see the NRF as being in competition with the European Rapid Reaction Force. Double-hatting can work here as it does for other military forces such as the Eurocorps. However, I doubt that a 26-country force, with a rotating standing component, will in practice be able to respond in the way it is supposed to. Political inertia and military reality will see to that. When European and US nationals have to be evacuated in 48 hours from a place like Bouaké in the Ivory Coast, you don’t call a 26-nation meeting and then order whichever nation currently forms the standing component of the NRF to take on the mission. It is no insult to Norway or Hungary or indeed to most NATO members to suggest that their response capability is not optimised for operations in sub-Saharan African. In practice, in the case of an NRF-style emergency, two or three countries possessing the political will and the military ability will send in forces possessing some knowledge and experience of the terrain. That is why French and US forces took the humanitarian intervention in Bouaké on themselves last September. In this new strategic context, NATO has a major role to play in making the formation of meaningful coalitions possible. NATO as a producer of interoperability is absolutely indispensable in this respect. Indeed, if the NRF is to serve a useful purpose, it will be because of its function as a catalyst for improving interoperability among “first military respondents”, to borrow a phrase from the language of counter-terrorism.

Here, the second basic challenge to NATO kicks in, in the form of the United States’ increasing disengagement from the organisation. There are, of course, a number of solid reasons for this development. These include the end of the Cold War and the corresponding relegation in importance of the European theatre of operations;
the increasingly autonomous nature of US theatre commands, most of which — PACOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM — are not accustomed to NATO procedures, standards and norms; and, of course, the growing capabilities gap between Europe and the United States, with its growing impact on European militaries' ability to interface fully with their US counterparts.

With some 92 per cent of the US force structure outside NATO, what will be the future meaning of NATO interoperability? In practice, NATO's main customer for this public good will increasingly be European forces. The creation of a transformation-related command in the place of SACLANT may help reduce the transatlantic interoperability gap. But it will not be easy to make NATO interoperability relevant to the Unites States' non-European theatre commands, as was demonstrated by some of the difficulties encountered during operation Enduring Freedom.

Europe, for its part, has to do its share, in the form of higher and better defence spending, notably in those areas relevant to force projection and to network-centric warfare. However, this is not taking place to anything like the necessary extent. Neither the benchmarking involved in NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative nor the launching of the European Union's defence policy have generated any substantial change in this regard.

Yours,
Steve

Dear Steve,

The NRF is indeed conceived for contingencies larger than the evacuation of Bouaké. But the point I made applies at the higher end as well, for instance in case a non-permissive evacuation operation had operate together in a coalition and address many of the new threats they will face in the future. Regarding the second challenge, you are right. There is a danger of US disengagement from NATO — but less for the reasons you cite. The real driving force for US disengagement is the capabilities gap between European and US forces. Unless the European members of the Alliance restructure their forces away from their Cold War posture and acquire more expeditionary capabilities, the capabilities gap will grow and European and US forces will not be able to operate effectively in a coalition. The Europeans have to spend more — and spend differently — than in the past. The problem, as you note, is that this is not happening to the extent necessary. Unless this changes, the United States will have little choice but to operate on its own, whether it wants to or not. To be sure, the United States deserves some blame as well. Some of the initial positions adopted by the Bush administration — on the Kyoto Agreement, the junking of the ABM treaty, and the International Criminal Court — gave the impression that the administration was not much interested in the opinion of its Allies and was disengaging from NATO. Its decision to sideline NATO in the Afghanistan crisis reinforced the impression that the Alliance was being downgraded as a vehicle for coordinating transatlantic security and defence policy.

But the administration has also learned from its missteps. The NRF and the Prague Capabilities Commitment — both US initiatives — are designed to make NATO more capable of meeting new threats and offset the impression that the administration was downgrading NATO in its strategic planning. Since Prague, the administration has pushed to give NATO a greater role in Afghanistan and in Iraq if military action is taken there. Ironically, however, as the administration has sought to transform and adapt NATO for a new era, some of the Europeans who criticised the administration most vocally for by-passing NATO in the Afghanistan crisis reinforced the impression that the Alliance was being downgraded as a vehicle for coordinating transatlantic security and defence policy.

Yours,
François

Dear François,

I agree that in the new strategic environment the focus on European contingencies doesn’t make sense. I also agree that a “one-size-fits-all” approach is not appropriate. As you point out, in the real world, each military contingency will involve a different set of political and military actors.

Finally, it’s true that in a Bouaké-like contingency (rapid evacuation of citizens of NATO members), the NRF would not be much use. But that does not mean that the NRF is wrong-headed, as you suggest. The NRF is not designed for Bouaké-like contingencies. It is designed to be a strike force for highly demanding combat contingencies far from NATO territory. For lesser contingencies, such as Bouaké, other solutions will be required. However, NATO also needs to be able to deal with more demanding scenarios. And for these scenarios the NRF makes sense and can help to foster interoperability — a key requirement if European and US forces are going to be able to
to be organised at short notice for the 20,000 or so foreign nationals residing in Abidjan. How would the NRF fare militarily in its currently planned format? The NRF should not be the hybrid that is currently envisaged — Is it a “standing, non-standing force” or a “non-standing, standing force”? — but a toolbox force, with only headquarters functions being of a permanent nature.

What you say about the European-US capabilities gap is indeed correct, but I would add a reinforcing point along with a couple of nuances. The gap has entrenched a de facto division of labour, with the United States “kicking in the doors” and the Europeans “doing the dishes”. This is difficult to sustain politically even at the best of times, that is when there is a high degree of agreement on aims and policies as has been the case in the Balkans since 1995. It becomes deeply corrosive when consensus doesn’t prevail within the Alliance, as is the case in the Iraq crisis. A doorkicking operation involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will not gracefully lead to a dishwashing “UN feeds - EU funds” peace-support operation.

The first nuance I wish to underscore is that the capabilities gap between European NATO members is proportionally much greater than that between Europe and the United States. Whatever the measure of effort, the discrepancy between best European practice (that in the first instance of the United Kingdom and then of France) and the laggards (who know who they are) is greater than the transatlantic divide. The other caveat: some US rhetoric about the gap is overwrought. I suspect that if by some miracle Europeans ramped up their defence spending to levels allowing them to acquire the whole suite of command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4 ISR) capabilities required to conduct major force-projection operations on their own, the response would be to talk of “useless duplication”. Indeed, this is already the case with the Galileo programme, the civilian-funded European equivalent of the United States’ Global Positioning System.

Finally, you talk about the Bush administration learning from its missteps. I don’t agree. The Bush administration does not view its actions on Kyoto or NATO as “missteps”. This is policy. When a US Secretary of Defence compares Germany to Cuba and Libya 24 hours before joining the International Security Conference in Munich; when repeated and consistent attempts are made to split NATO (and not only the European Union) along “Old Europe/New Europe” lines, it is difficult to conclude that the Bush administration is making inadvertent mistakes.

Of course, the Americans haven’t been the only ones to play such games during the Iraq crisis. But the lead nation’s actions have greater consequences than those of others. Indeed, we have reached the point where it becomes difficult to imagine a single contingency that could draw a united military response from all 26 NATO nations and invitees. Even the post-9/11 invocation of Article 5 would be difficult to recreate, so great has been the growth of transatlantic disaffection.

This is as bad a situation as I can recall. Admittedly, I can’t pretend to remember Suez.

Yours,
François

Dear François,

I agree that the capabilities gap is reinforcing a dangerous division of labour, with the United States acting, in effect, as a SWAT team kicking down the door and most Europeans relegated to the role of the “shovel brigade” (or dishwasher) which arrives at the tail end of an operation to clean up the rubble created by the United States. This division of labour is corrosive to Alliance unity — and military effectiveness. It also leaves Europeans essentially in the position of dependency. They have little influence on US military operations but have to pay the political and economic costs of these military actions.

This is why reducing the capabilities gap is so important. If they want leverage over US-led operations and decisions, European members of the Alliance need to be able to operate with US forces in the early stages of combat operations not just to participate in mop-up or post-combat stability operations. Otherwise, they will have little choice but to act as the shovel brigade.

I also agree that a capability gap exists between the more advanced members of the Alliance, such as France and the United Kingdom, who have been developing expeditionary and network-centric capabilities, and the rest of the Alliance. Indeed, if present trends continue, there is a real danger that a three-tier Alliance may emerge: (1) the United States and a few select NATO members who can project power; (2) the bulk of the Alliance, which remains wedded essentially to a Cold War posture; and (3) the new members, whose forces are less modern than those of the second group.

Some of the rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic — and here I would include President Chirac’s criticism at the EU summit of the East Europeans for siding with
the United States in the Iraq crisis — has made an already bad situation worse. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic need to “stop digging” and begin to act more responsibly to heal the emerging transatlantic rift. But the main problem lies in the fact that there is no shared consensus in the United States and much of Europe on how to address the new strategic threats and challenges that the Alliance faces. Without such a consensus, it will be hard for NATO to use the military forces at its disposal effectively — with or without the NRF.

Creating the needed strategic consensus will require enlightened US global leadership and a willingness on Washington’s part to treat its European Allies as genuine partners, not vassals who are expected to fall unflinchingly in line behind every new US policy initiative (“You are either for us or against us”). This is not just a question of the United States consulting more — though that would help — but of building the necessary strategic consensus within the Alliance for its actions. At the same time, the United States’ European Allies need to begin taking the emerging new threats and transformation of their military forces more seriously than most have done to date.

Yours,
Steve

Dear Steve,

That Europeans should be investing more in defence is something we have no trouble in agreeing. This is pretty much what environmentalists would call a “no penalty” policy. We need to limit the transatlantic gap to help keep the Alliance together, and if the Alliance were to fall apart, Europeans would have to spend more on defence. Unfortunately, the fact that the two of us agree will presumably have little, if any, material impact.

The Alliance has to cope with two even more important problems. One is due to the changing nature of security threats. A political-military alliance designed to cope with a state-centred threat is not well geared to deal with non-state menaces such as al Qaida. Police work, non-military intelligence sharing, financial monitoring, and social and economic initiatives are not core competencies of NATO. In the same vein, in a world of rapidly changing challenges, with geostrategic focus shifting from Afghanistan in 2001-2002 to Iraq in 2003-2004, the mission does indeed dictate the coalition. With or without a Response Force, NATO will struggle to “zap” from one conflict to another.
Unfinished business
Christopher Bennett reviews literature examining military reform in the seven countries invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit.

By the next NATO summit in May 2004, the seven countries invited to join the Alliance in Prague in November should be fully-fledged members. The timetable is, therefore, tight for what is the fifth and by far the most complex round of NATO enlargement to date. Earlier rounds — the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982 and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999 — involved in total as many countries as are now joining in one go. Indeed, it is only possible to proceed so rapidly in this instance because all invitees have been groomed to join the Alliance by participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) since 1999. But how well prepared are these countries militarily for membership and what remains to be done?

In the course of the next year, the situation is likely to become clearer as existing NATO members scrutinise invitees’ preparedness before deciding whether to ratify their accession. This process, for which a year has been allocated, is not a formality. Indeed, as Karel Kovanda, the Czech Republic’s permanent representative to NATO, pointed out in his contribution to this issue of NATO Review, his country’s membership of NATO was held up by three months during the first post-Cold War round of enlargement until it had satisfied the US Congress that it was in a position to meet so-called Minimum Military Requirements. In all the invitees, the armed forces inherited from the communist period were inappropriately organised, equipped and staffed to deal with the challenges of the post-Cold War era. In the three Baltic republics and Slovenia the task of building appropriate armed forces was especially great, since they had to be built almost from scratch. Although the notions of professional armed forces and professionalisation are complex, there has been broad agreement that military reform requires more professional armed forces. There is also widespread acceptance that the aim of professional armed forces is threefold: that the military accept that their role is to fulfil the demands of the democratic, civilian government; that armed forces are able to undertake military activities in an effective and efficient way; and that the organisation, ethos and internal structures of the armed forces reflect these twin assumptions.

Forster, Edmunds and Cottey argue that professional armed forces are defined by four core characteristics, namely their role, their expertise, their responsibility, and their system of promotion. They have clearly defined and widely accepted roles, in relation both to external functions and domestic society. They have the expertise and skills necessary to fulfil these functions effectively and efficiently. They have clear rules defining the responsibilities of the military as an institution, and of individual soldiers. And promotion within them is based on achievement. Within the context of post-Cold War Europe, the book’s editors argue there are four distinct models of professional armed forces: a Power Projection model, entailing armed forces
substantially oriented towards the deployment of military power outside national territory; a Territorial Defence model, entailing armed forces primarily oriented towards national defence but also capable of contributing in a limited way to multinational power-projection operations; a Post-Neutral model, entailing small armed forces primarily oriented towards national defence but heavily reliant on mass mobilisation of reserves in time of war, and capable also of contributing to traditional peacekeeping operations; and a Neutral model, entailing armed forces almost entirely oriented towards national defence.

The four models are ideal types and do not necessarily reflect countries’ individual experiences. Nevertheless, they provide the analytical framework through which contributors examine the strategic defence policy and professionalisation choices facing countries and compare emerging patterns of professionalisation in post-communist Europe.

The book’s editors identified three patterns of professionalisation among the armed forces of post-communist Europe, two of which cover all seven invitees. The first and largest cluster of states are those that aspire to the Territorial Defence ideal type. This group includes Romania and Slovakia, as well as the three countries that joined NATO in 1999, Croatia, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ukraine. In both Romania and Slovakia, the military legacies of Communism included large, primarily conscript-based armed forces, high defence budgets and a history of Soviet-style command and control structures. In the post-communist period, both Romania and Slovakia expressed their national security priorities in terms of reformed national defence and closer integration with the West, with NATO membership the ultimate prize. And in both instances, foreign assistance and, in particular, the rigours demanded by the MAP have proved critical to the reform process. However, lack of resources continue to undermine progress.

In the Romanian chapter, Presidential Adviser Marian Zulean points out that, with the exception of 1994-95 and 2000-1, the country’s GDP has declined continuously since 1989. Despite this, the money allocated for defence was increased by 35 per cent to $1 billion in 2001 to speed up reforms. No doubt, this rise was in part a response to a particularly pessimistic evaluation of the country’s armed forces a year earlier by the chief of staff and defence minister. This report concluded that the military remained unprepared and poorly trained; that 70 per cent of the air force’s pilots were not operational because of lack of flying time; and that the navy had received only 15 per cent of the fuel it required. Nevertheless, an engineering battalion of around 200 has participated in the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 and a group of staff officers in KFOR since 1999. Both contingents were increased in 2001 after the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September.

In the Slovak chapter, Marybeth Peterson Ulrich of the US Army War College also devotes considerable attention to resources pointing out that a lack of money led to the suspension of flight training in 1999, until early 2000. The acquisition of sophisticated flight simulators has helped to make up some of this particular deficit, but attempts to abolish conscription and create an all-volunteer military by 2006 have foundered for lack of resources. At the same time, however, Slovakia did produce in 2001 its first National Security Strategy; has faithfully followed the MAP; and, after half a decade in which it had minimal military-to-military contact with Prague after Czechoslovakia split up, has intensified military cooperation and exercises with the Czech Republic.

Ulrich also considers briefly the legacy of Vladimir Meciar, independent Slovakia’s first prime minister in power until 1998, who, she says, was “noted for corruption”. Corruption is never far from the surface of any discussion of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, yet data are extremely hard to come by, with the result that few analysts are able to write about it. One who has had a go is Anton Bebler. A Slovene academic and former diplomat who is also the president of his country’s Atlantic Council, Bebler contributed a chapter entitled Corruption Among Security Personnel in Central and Eastern Europe in the book Army and State in Postcommunist Europe (Frank Cass, London, 2001), which also contains a useful chapter on military reform and defence budgeting in Bulgaria by Dimitar Dimitrov. In his contribution, Bebler analyses historical influences, collects published sources for corruption — including data produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and Transparency International — and assesses conditions of service and levels of temptation before issuing a ten-point list of recommendations. It is sobering to learn that whereas the monthly salaries of military officers in Central Europe vary between $300 and $1,500, those of their peers in the poorest Southeastern European countries and in parts of the former Soviet Union range between $25 and $100, and are not regularly paid in some instances.

Most of Bebler’s specific illustrations of corrupt activities come from the former Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe. He does not spare his own country, citing parliamentary inquiries into the profits from illegal arms sales from Slovenia to other former Yugoslav republics.
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time, Slovenia was subject to a UN-imposed arms embargo that was only lifted after the Dayton Peace Agreement came into force, ending the Bosnian War.

Professionalisation in Slovenia has taken a different direction to that in Romania and Slovakia. Indeed, Forster, Edmunds and Cottey lump Slovenia together with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all of which have adopted Post-Neutral type military force structures based on relatively lightly armed territorial defence forces, supplemented by large reserves and small armoured and/or power-projection forces. This model of military organisation is particularly suited to small states with few military traditions and limited economic resources. The purpose of the military strategy of these states is not so much to inflict military defeat on what is presumed will be a far superior enemy, but to make any invasion and subsequent occupation as difficult and costly as possible.

According to Igor Kotnik-Dvojmoc and Erik Kopac, both lecturers at Ljubljana University’s Department of Defence Studies, Slovenia struggled to come to terms with decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of its 1991 ten-day war with Yugoslavia for most of the 1990s. Indeed, it was not until 1999 that a long-term strategy for the size and structure of the Slovene armed forces was adopted. Nevertheless, Ljubljana’s desire to join NATO — a goal that Slovenes endorsed by a wide margin in a referendum on 23 March of this year — has been a significant factor motivating the reform process and has led, for example, to the creation of a special unit, the 10th Motorised Battalion, whose main purpose is international cooperation.

External influences have played an even greater role in the construction of armed forces and the process of their professionalisation in the Baltic republics. Indeed, in the Latvian chapter, Jan Arveds Trapans of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces points out that: “Uncoordinated and inappropriate assistance is an important issue in the further development of professional Latvian armed forces.” The country has, nevertheless, largely benefited from foreign involvement, which has included the appointment of a British colonel of Latvian origin as the deputy chief of staff between 1994 and 1997. Moreover, the country has moved a long way from the time of the Soviet withdrawal when, according to a NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report: “All that was left behind consisted of 26 sunken submarines and ships leaking acid, oil and phosphorus.”

In a contribution that is interesting, among other things, for its description of Lithuanian resistance to Soviet rule until 1953, Robertas Sapronas of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence describes how expatriates have played an even greater role in Lithuania. Indeed, a number of former US officers of Lithuanian origin were appointed to senior posts after the 1996 elections and in 1998 a Lithuanian American was elected president. In this way, some military structures have been established using the US model. But as in Slovenia and the other two Baltic republics, the focus on power-projection capabilities and the cultivation of professional cadres within the armed forces, in part designed as a political message to NATO, has helped create a two-tier military and generated tension in terms of the allocation of resources.

Bulgaria’s limited commitment to the development of power-projection capabilities places it in the Post-Neutral category. But, Laura Cleary of Cranfield University points out, unlike the Baltic republics and Slovenia, Bulgaria continues to rely on relatively heavy armoured formations rather than lightly armed territorial defence forces to defend national territory. The country started to move towards professionalisation late and has resisted the temptation to go for quick-fix solutions, cancelling equipment purchases that do not directly contribute to reform plans and adopting a medium to long-term approach. Here again, the introduction of the MAP has provided a more focused and more widely cast set of objectives for the military reform process.

The desire of most Central and Eastern European states to join NATO has given the Alliance considerable leverage in shaping the defence policies of these countries. Forster, Edmunds and Cottey point to the extension of NATO values and especially the development of shared understandings of what is meant by democratic, civilian control of armed forces and the normalisation of the relationship of the armed forces to society, as one of the Alliance’s major achievements over the past decade. However, they question the future of professionalisation of armed forces after NATO accession, predicting that political pressure for defence reform may decline, along with political willingness to invest scarce resources in further professionalisation. Moreover, the lopsided nature of reform processes, in particular the creation and prioritisation of special units for international cooperation, may also mean that the
overall effectiveness of the military — whether in or out of NATO — may be compromised.

NATO invitations were not the end of a process, but the beginning. There is a continuing need across the region for a more holistic approach to military reform and professionalisation. Fundamental questions still need to be asked about the role of armed forces in the post-Cold War environment and the appropriateness of particular models of military organisation to fulfil these roles. Until these questions are properly addressed, the invitees will not necessarily be able to play as influential a role in the Alliance as they and the existing members would like.
Interview

General James L. Jones: SACEUR

General James L. Jones is the first Marine to be appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander of US Forces, Europe. He succeeded General Joseph W. Ralston on 17 January this year and is the 14th SACEUR. As SACEUR, he is in overall command of NATO’s military forces in Europe as well as of military forces from more than 30 countries participating in the ongoing NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. A Vietnam veteran, he was raised in France and is bilingual English and French.

NATO REVIEW: You are the first Marine to be appointed SACEUR. You are also the first SACEUR brought up in France. What special experience will you bring to the post?

JAMES L. JONES: I come from a culture that operates from sea bases and is able to pack up and go with a moment’s notice. Marines are by nature expeditionary and we have a light footprint wherever we go. To the extent that that is an asset to the Alliance, so much the better.

Being raised in Europe gives me a perspective on European priorities and European ways of looking at things. I’m enormously grateful for the opportunity to be here. I’m very comfortable in Europe. I like living here and have been a big believer in NATO ever since my early days as a child in Europe. I appreciate what it achieved in the 20th century and feel fortunate to be able to help in whatever it is going to be in the 21st century.

NR: What do you wish to achieve during your term as SACEUR and what difficulties do you anticipate?

JLJ: I wish to help in the transformation of NATO from its 20th century construct to an organisation prepared to face 21st century realities. That is a very exciting challenge. Whether NATO chooses to be a regional or a global force will obviously depend on the level of investment that member nations are willing to make. My role is to give good military advice to the North Atlantic Council and to member nations about how best to proceed.

The difficulties I am likely to face are probably the same as I would face working in any large institution. NATO is made up of member nations. My work will require a lot of consensus-building, dialogue, and discussions to help convince people of the right way ahead. But this is the way in most democratic institutions. You have to understand the rules of any institution you come into, so that you can navigate within them to achieve your goals.

NR: Before becoming SACEUR, you were involved in preparations for a possible Iraq campaign. What dangers must military planners be aware of in the event of war?

JLJ: Military planners should always prepare for the worst-case scenario. After all, there are lives at stake. It’s important always to ask what is the worst thing that can happen and to prepare contingency plans for that eventuality. The greatest difficulty we have to prepare for in Iraq is the reason we may have to go in in the first place, namely the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The second greatest difficulty would likely come in sizeable urban areas. My counsel was to think these issues through before they become a real problem. You can always hope for the best and hope that, if it starts, the conflict would be resolved rapidly. But you also have to have plan B in your pocket, in case events don’t work out the way you wanted them to.

NR: The creation of the NATO Response Force was one of the most ambitious initiatives to come out of the Prague Summit. How do you envisage it working?

JLJ: The NATO Response Force should have three parts to it. The first part, namely a truly expeditionary capability, should be put together quickly in response to the Prague decisions. Such a force could be formed out of units that already exist in the Alliance with niche capabilities. It should be an integrated force with air, land and sea capabilities, all of which already exist in the Alliance and are, in principle, already bought and paid for. It should have a headquarters. It should have a training centre and it should be credible, capable and sustainable, if and when we decide to use it. The good news is that it’s not terribly difficult to put together such a force. We are hoping to be able to announce a framework under which that force will operate by the June meeting of NATO defence ministers and to have some operating capability by the fall of this year.
The second part of the NATO Response Force is for use in case the first part is not sufficient for a task. I characterise this force as being more deployable than expeditionary, a little more robust, a little slower to get in theatre, perhaps, but once it has arrived, it has the capability to take on a lot of tasks. The third part is for use in case of a major regional conflict where you need the totality of the force. The simple geometry of a triangular NATO Response Force with an expeditionary force at the top, a deployable force in the middle and a follow-on force at the bottom seems logical both in terms of effective use of resources and the readiness factors of each of the tiers. We'll have to make sure, above all, that the NATO Response Force is credible and that it is not just something that appears impressive on paper.

NR: The NATO Command Structure is currently being reconfigured. What kind of structure do you want to see?

JLJ: I would like to see structures that have military utility and applicability that are streamlined to reflect how military command structures should be in the 21st century as opposed to the 20th century. Much has changed. You no longer need huge military headquarters with hundreds of people to be effective. Commanders in the 21st century don't have to take everything with them because of the tremendous technological reach that exists today. The whole dynamic is shifting and our command and control system has to shift with it to become more efficient, more capable more deployable and add even greater capability than we have had in the past.

NR: What do you understand by a Transformational Command?

JLJ: The Transformational Command is going to be tasked with making sure that transformation takes place on both sides of the Atlantic. Transformation is a bridge that goes in two directions that all people can walk across. Europeans can be involved in transformation. Americans can be involved in transformation. There should be a common “school house” for the vetting of ideas and the subsequent development and procurement of the systems to help us in the transformation process.

I believe that transformation has four characteristics. The first is the one that most people understand transformation to be, namely the harvesting of new technologies. I would also draw a distinction between transformation and modernisation. Transformation can be only one of two things. On the one hand, it’s being able to do something that wasn’t possible before by acquiring a new capability, a new invention for example. On the other hand, it’s an existing capability that has been transformed exponentially as a result of an innovation. Take, for example, “smart” weapons. The ability to fly a weapon through a window and achieve extremely precise results is transformational and the use of the Global Positioning System has transformed the way the military does business from the most common rifle squad up to our surveillance satellites.

The second characteristic of transformation is the operational concept on the battlefield. Network-centric warfare has clearly arrived. Investing in network-centric capabilities and developing as much awareness as possible allows you to reduce the size of the field headquarters. Reality is that you can send infantry companies out to do the work that was beyond entire battalions just 20 years ago. Institutional reform is a third aspect of transformation. Large ponderous headquarters built on the traditional building-block system are a thing of the past. There should be fewer headquarters and they have to be lighter and more agile. Lastly, I believe that people in positions of authority like me need to be able to articulate a vision for our organisations, whether it is NATO or SHAPE, and to tie that vision to an efficient use of resources. We have to demonstrate that we are able to use resources effectively because we have to convince people to invest in change. This has to be accompanied by a clearly thought-out plan of what any vision is going to cost.

NR: How might the stationing of US troops in Europe change in the coming years?

JLJ: It's too early to tell. But if you apply the transformational theme to all our forces, not just the US forces, it's clear that some things can be done differently and that economies of scale can be achieved. This is particularly the case in infrastructure, as some of the logistical footprint is transferred into effective use at the pointed end of the spear. That is the kind of change we are looking at. The world is certainly much smaller in terms of being able to get places rapidly and it is possible to do more with a reduced force structure. That means that it is possible to change how and where soldiers are based, all the while maintaining our traditionally strong ties within the Alliance.

NR: How do you envisage working together with the European Union in practical situations such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and elsewhere?

JLJ: It is important that the forces that are used in EU missions are one and the same as they are in NATO missions, that we maintain the NATO standards the NATO terminology and the NATO training. It would
be extremely disruptive to try to duplicate these capabilities. With regard to the upcoming mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* I don’t see any military difficulty in what we are doing. The Deputy SACEUR, Admiral Rainer Feist, and I are working hand in hand and I expect this to be a successful undertaking.

**NR:** At the Prague Summit, seven countries were invited to join NATO. What problems do you foresee in integrating these countries into Alliance structures?

**JLJ:** This will be my first close look at this kind of integration. But NATO has already learned many lessons from the experience of the last round of enlargement and I don’t think that any problems are insurmountable. From the military-to-military standpoint, we’ve already had close ties with these countries for many years through the Partnership for Peace programme and the Membership Action Plan, so we know what we are dealing with.

**NR:** The Prague Summit has prepared the political groundwork for NATO to operate beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. What kind of mission could the Alliance be ready to take on and where?

**JLJ:** The ISAF 3 mission that just started up in Afghanistan under German leadership with Holland and France participating is a good example. It’s not a classic NATO mission, but the key countries involved are NATO members and they are using NATO terminology, NATO procedures and NATO capabilities. In the event of crises that are humanitarian in nature or require peacekeeping, NATO has proven that it can deal with them. If it wishes, NATO will have the capability to operate within the full spectrum of military operations anywhere.

**NR:** What kind of internal reform may be required for NATO to operate beyond the Euro-Atlantic area and yet maintain its cohesion?

**JLJ:** We are in the process of restructuring the two Strategic Commands to create one for operations and one for transformation. It is the Transformational Command that will provide the vehicle by which nations can join in the transformational dialogue and adapt their militaries. Greater investment in command and control and intelligence will be important as will trying to keep common operating procedures as common as possible, and making sure that the capabilities’ gap doesn’t widen. It will be up to people like myself and other leaders in NATO to articulate the importance of this venture. Once again, this relates to a more efficient use and understanding of how we get and spend our resources.

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* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Preparing for membership

Karel Kovanda considers how the Czech experience of NATO accession may be useful for the seven countries invited to join the Alliance at the Prague Summit.

The celebrations in the seven countries invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit were well deserved and reflect a great national achievement. However, if the Czech experience is anything to go by, the latest round of invitees still have many hurdles in front of them to overcome.

The situation today, in the aftermath of the Prague Summit, differs from that which the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland faced when invited to join NATO at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. For one, all seven countries have benefited from participating in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Nevertheless, the parallels are sufficiently great for the new invitees to benefit from our experience in preparing for Alliance membership during the accession process, in building up effective delegations and ensuring that appropriate security procedures were in place concerning both personnel and information.

In the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement, membership invitations were followed by four rounds of accession talks. These covered political and economic issues; issues of military reform; issues of resources; and issues of security, culminating in the signing of accession protocols. The ratification process ended in December 1998, but it took another three months before we formally became members of the Alliance in March 1999. Moreover, our own teething problems are still not completely behind us.

The Madrid Summit was preceded by several rounds of discussions during which Prague and Brussels got to know each other. After Madrid, these discussions became intensive talks in which there was no room for negotiating. Our team consisted of experts from the foreign and defence ministries, as well as the finance and interior ministries. Ahead of each round of talks, NATO provided us with questions. We then prepared detailed written answers, which we handed over during the actual meeting. At that point, we also presented an oral summary of our documentation and answered any supplementary questions.

We found it particularly useful to work together with the other two invitees, Hungary and Poland. Since the dates of each round of accession talks were staggered, whichever country went first in each round would subsequently share its impressions with the other two.

Accession talks

This time around, there will only be two rounds of accession talks. This is because many areas have already been covered in the MAP process. Accession protocols are scheduled to be signed in late March 2003, after which the existing 19 members and all the invitees will have a little over a year to ratify accession for the process to be completed by the next NATO Summit in May 2004.

The MAP process was one in which countries volunteered to adopt and absorb NATO recommendations. There may, however, be some issues that NATO will require countries to address as members. In our case, a series of such matters came up during the last phase of ratification. This included the issues of our compatibility with NATO air defences and legislation that would permit effective assistance under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the collective defence clause. We had to work hard to meet these Minimum Military Requirements, as they were called, though they obviously concerned more than simply military issues. And this was the reason for the three-month delay between December 1998 and March 1999 before we were able to sign the Washington Treaty.

One new issue during the accession talks was the size of our contribution to NATO’s civilian, military and security-investment budgets. The percentage was calculated by NATO’s economists on the basis of gross domestic product and purchasing power parity.
considerations and approved by the North Atlantic Council. It was then presented to us on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

In the case of the Czech Republic, we contribute 0.9 per cent to each of NATO’s three budgets. This amounts to about 15 million Euros annually. These contributions, and the cost of maintaining representation and the officers in NATO’s command structure, are the only real direct expenses that NATO membership entails. All other expenses are either voluntary or would be needed whether or not a country is in NATO.

Once we completed the talks, we sent the Secretary General a letter reconfirming our interest in joining NATO. The talks then culminated in our witnessing Allied ministers sign separate accession protocols for each country in a joint ceremony in Brussels. Once the accession protocol was signed, it had to be approved by all member countries. This was a time-consuming process in which parliamentary ratification was generally required.

My own country also had to ratify its accession to NATO. One way to have done this would have been to wait for the completion of the ratification process in all 16 existing members and then pass our own national legislation. However, that would have slowed the process by several weeks. As a result, we passed “conditional” legislation effectively authorising the cabinet to accept an invitation to join NATO “should such an invitation be extended”. Each country has slightly different procedures. In the Czech case, we found it useful to formalise the broad outlines of the inner workings of our delegation, including for example the relationship among people who are seconded by, subordinated to and paid by different ministries, in a statute. Before this statute was promulgated, its provisions were broadly discussed in Prague, especially between the foreign and defence ministries. It was first drafted when the Czech Mission to NATO was established, and modified when we became a full-fledged member of the Alliance to reflect our new standing and the experience we had gathered in the interim.

The ratification period should also be used for intensive recruitment of personnel. At the time the accession protocol was signed, the Czech Mission to NATO had fewer than ten full-time employees and consisted of a defence adviser, a military representative, a secretary, a driver, a couple of diplomats and the ambassador. Beefing up the mission was one of my first tasks — and one that could not wait.

One reason it could not wait was that — contrary to our expectations — NATO opened most committees to us almost immediately. Indeed, within weeks of the signing of the accession protocol, we found we could barely cope with the number of meetings we were being invited to, which eventually included everything for which we had security clearance. Although officially we participated as observers, this did not prevent our representatives from speaking up. And the only meetings we had difficulty attending were those with third parties where third-party agreement was required as well. In effect, we ended up participating in all such meetings — with the exception of the Permanent Joint Council, where the NATO Allies met with Russia.

The implication is clear. The new invitees will likely be able to participate in NATO structures almost as soon as the ink on the accession protocols is dry. Since this is an extremely valuable learning experience, countries would do well to beef up their missions as fast as is possible.
Interestingly, countries have “missions” until they formally become NATO members. Then, they have the option of renaming their “mission” a “delegation”. All NATO members, with the exception of the United States, have delegations. At the same time, whereas the abbreviation for Partner countries used at NATO has three letters, it shrinks to two letters for members. In this way, the abbreviation for the Czech Republic changed from CZE to CZ.

The Czech delegation now has some 50 people, including diplomats, defence advisers, military personnel and support staff. For our needs, this is about the right size. Some delegations, though, are smaller. In building up delegations, it is important to find people who are competent in the issues, fluent in at least one of the Alliance’s two working languages and who will have the necessary security clearance. These are tough criteria and I have to wage a constant struggle to maintain my delegation at full strength.

Finding qualified military personnel is even more difficult. This is because the military have to find officers who, in addition to competence, language skills and security clearance, have the appropriate rank. Moreover, they have to staff not only the Czech delegation and our representation at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons but also dozens of posts in various NATO military commands. The NATO command structure is currently being revised and the last step in this revision will be the extraordinarily difficult “flags to posts” exercise, determining, among other things, which slots the invitees’ military will be expected to fill. In addition, NATO’s International Military Staff is staffed according to national quotas.

Many of the latest round of invitees may find the task of finding qualified personnel to staff delegations even more challenging than we did. This is because five of the seven newly invited countries will be joining the European Union at about the same time as the NATO ratification process winds up. In addition to augmenting their NATO representations, therefore, they will also have to strengthen their EU presence.

Security issues
The importance of well-drafted national security legislation cannot be overestimated. There is a NATO standard policy that could simply be translated and put in force at home. For historical reasons, however, Czech legislation ended up more exacting than the minimum NATO requirements. As a result, the vetting process has proved extremely time-consuming. Planning for rotation of diplomats and soldiers for NATO-related posts is disproportionately long and cumbersome compared to planning for any other positions in our foreign missions. Moreover, additional difficulties arise when it comes to certifying communication equipment and certifying national industrial companies for work with NATO. Devising a secure communications system is critical to a delegation’s effectiveness, since NATO classifies documents according to their level of confidentiality, ranging from “Restricted” to “Confidential”, “Secret” and beyond. Within NATO, we use the Minerva system to receive documents with classification up to and including “NATO Secret”, which we send to Prague via NATO's Cronos system. However, every delegation has to resolve the question of managing its communications and document flow with its head office or even with several head offices. Great care has to be given to building if not a unified then at least a compatible communications system for both political and military sides of the delegation. This is not an easy task. Every institution wants to have its own system and expects others to convert to using it.

To be honest, we are yet to find an ideal way to manage the flow of documents. We know how to receive documents and pass them on to our capital relatively efficiently. To date, however, we have great difficulty in passing on NATO documents to our embassies in third countries. Needless to say, much useful information gathered at NATO goes to waste and this undercuts the efficiency of our foreign service.

Closely connected with communications is the handling of documents. Between 25,000 and 30,000 pass through our registry every year. It took us some time to reduce our own complex system to a single registry for both civilian and military use, but we are now happy to have a single line of document numbers for all parts of the delegation. For even though all NATO documents are already numbered, they receive a Czech number as well. At every step, security considerations and common sense have to be balanced. And this underscores the importance of communication and coordination, in administrative issues as well as in issues of substance, between the different components of the delegation.

The coming years will clearly be difficult for the invitees, just as the past few years have been a challenge for the Czech Republic. However, the ultimate prize, namely establishing an effective presence at NATO, is well worth the effort. And NATO membership is a great national achievement for all our countries.
Romania’s invitation to begin NATO accession talks together with six other Central and Eastern European countries has been hailed as a national triumph. However, Bucharest has its work cut out if it is to be prepared for membership by May 2004 and an effective contributor to the Alliance from day one.

To be sure, Romanian membership of NATO will provide the Alliance with certain immediate benefits. Together with Bulgaria, Romania will help reinforce the Alliance’s southern flank by creating a land bridge between Hungary and Turkey; improve NATO access to its Balkan peacekeeping operations; and enhance regional cooperation and stability in Southeastern Europe. Bulgarian and Romanian membership of NATO also bolsters the Alliance’s presence around the Black Sea.

Having been the first country to join the Partnership for Peace in January 1994, Romania has effectively been preparing for NATO membership for the best part of a decade. In this way, Bucharest endorses the Alliance’s comprehensive approach to security outlined in its Strategic Concept and is committed to the Alliance’s efforts to reduce the dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.

The period between now and May 2004, when the ratification process is scheduled to be completed, will be especially critical for Romania’s NATO preparations. The decision to invite Romania to begin NATO accession talks at the Prague Summit has already provided a major boost to national self-confidence and the positive energy that this has unleashed must be channelled into further military reform. In this respect, particular attention will have to be devoted to defence planning, legal issues, civil-emergency planning, and security of information, transforming the defence industry into a security and defence industry, and adapting it to the new security environment.

Ongoing restructuring
Romania’s Armed Forces have to continue their restructuring in accordance with ongoing programmes — Programme Force 2003 and Objective Force 2007 — to become more operational and efficient. The future force structure will try to balance forces with financial resources and will comprise active and territorial forces. It will allow for a rapid reaction capability in a possible future conflict, which will secure the time needed for augmenting the territorial forces and the intervention of the Allies. Emphasis will be placed on operational mountain troops, paratroopers, aviation, artillery, navy and infantry.

In the Membership Action Plan (MAP), Romania has focused on increasing the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of its forces earmarked for peace-support operations and Article 5 missions. Priority has been given to training, including operational language training, and operational readiness to comply with NATO standards.

In this way, Romania has earmarked a number of units for collective-defence operations and other Alliance missions ranging from peace-support and crisis-response to combat operations. All forces earmarked for collective-defence or Partnership-for-Peace operations are also available, as required, for operations in or outside Romanian territory on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, Romania is determined to participate in all NATO’s new force structures, including the NATO Response Force.

From the force package made available for peace-support operations, Romania already has the capacity to sustain in theatre two battalions for a period of six months and is making great efforts to increase this capability. Indeed, as a result of Romania’s involvement in the international campaign against terrorism and the deployment of Romanian troops in Afghanistan, this
level has already been surpassed. More than 1,000 troops are currently deployed abroad without counting Romania’s contribution to the SFOR/KFOR Strategic Reserve. Moreover, by the end of this year, Romania should be in a position to deploy and sustain 1,500 troops in operations abroad. That said, the Romanian military still needs to focus its contribution to NATO in terms of niche capabilities — alpine units, military police, de-mining and military intelligence sub-units — and infrastructure facilities for air, sea and land operations.

Concerning defence planning, Romania already has a NATO-compatible system and is now taking steps to prepare for the rigours of NATO force planning. This involves improving decision-making explicitly to link Romania’s Alliance responsibilities with the country’s limited resources. In this way, the country’s defence budget is now pegged to GDP forecasts and based on the government’s commitment to ensure a proper level of defence spending.

As soon as Romania becomes a fully-fledged Alliance member, the country will want and be expected to have an effective national representation at NATO and to fill a number of posts in Alliance structures, both civilian and military. Identifying personnel with the appropriate language skills, experience and qualifications for these tasks is a major undertaking. As a result, a commission has been set up within the defence ministry to coordinate this process and select a pool of civil servants, military officers and non-commissioned officers with the necessary backgrounds.

In addition, since January this year, the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest has been organising a Senior Executive NATO Programme in cooperation with the NATO Defense College and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. This course offers tailored training for civil servants and military personnel to prepare them for posts linked to NATO and positions within the Alliance itself. Lecturers include government officials, foreign scholars and Romanian academics as well as members of the National School’s faculty.

Nevertheless, human resource management in the Romanian Armed Forces needs to be revamped to bring it in line with best NATO practice. This will require improving military career structures, reforming recruitment and training systems and offering greater professional opportunities to non-commissioned officers. A considerable reduction of central structures will be achieved by eliminating unnecessary signal, logistics and administrative support units, as well as by eliminating redundant installations, depots and training facilities, reorganising Romania’s military education and reducing the current infrastructure.

Preparing for NATO membership is an intergovernmental, interdepartmental and interdisciplinary matter. As a result, establishing horizontal contacts between governmental officials and various security agencies is critical. Unfortunately, there have been many cases when departments in the same ministry were unaware of their respective duties and activities; when different ministries charged with security and defence issues have given different messages on topics of common concern; and when the presidential administration and the government conveyed contradictory signals on key domestic political issues.

The issue which threatened to undermine Romania’s NATO candidature — corruption, a weak economy and the residual influence of Communist-era secret police in security agencies — remain real. Bucharest needs to combat corruption more convincingly and not simply to make grand gestures for foreign consumption. For their part, Western counties should reconsider the tendency to tolerate corruption among individuals in positions of authority as long as they appear to be moving matters in the right direction. Unless Romania improves its economic performance, it will not be able to sustain either existing military reforms or current levels of defence expenditure. And the issue of remaining Securitate in positions of authority has to be tackled for Allies to have confidence in Romania’s ability to handle sensitive information.

Since NATO membership concerns the whole of Romanian society, civil society has a major role to play in maintaining momentum for Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration. As independent players, grass-roots, non-governmental organisations have to put pressure on the authorities to accelerate the pace of defence reform, flag problems that might occur in the process, monitor how different NATO-related programmes are being implemented and help build and maintain informed support for NATO membership.

For their part, the authorities should work together with security-oriented, non-governmental organisations, informing them of government initiatives, consulting with them and contracting out research to them, as well as actively involving them in promoting Euro-Atlantic integration. The forging of a new security culture based on a genuine partnership between government and civil
society will likely create a new awareness on the part of the population of the need for active involvement in countering the new security threats.

This is important because a public debate on the significance of NATO accession and the changing security environment has yet to take place. Issues such as the restructuring of armed forces in terms of the impact of their downsizing, modernisation and professionalisation need to be properly aired. Reform of the defence industry in general and its relationship with business must be discussed. And appreciation among the general public for Romania’s contribution to peace-support operations, the status of implementation of NATO integration programmes and the opportunities arising from NATO membership is necessary to maintain long-term commitments.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 have significantly changed perceptions of the world and, among other things, have heightened awareness of the complexity of the new security environment. Since the new threats and especially that of terrorism have blurred the boundaries between internal and external security, Romania — in common with many countries — needs to launch a wide-ranging review of the division of labour between law-enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as between the domestic and foreign branches of the latter. And it must actively promote inter-agency security cooperation and effect changes in defence research and development, with priority given to high-tech intelligence systems.

Contemporary security threats — terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons, drugs and nuclear material trafficking, illegal immigration, corruption, money laundering, natural hazards, water, oil and gas depletion — clearly cannot be properly addressed without effective cooperation between military and civilian institutions. Moreover, only a proper partnership between public and private sectors can effectively address issues such as border management, transportation safety, safeguarding public order and civil strife prevention, civil defence and disaster-relief preparedness.

The need for such a partnership is even more evident when it comes to combating terrorism. Indeed, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to terrorist acts virtually requires the creation of a private sector task force comprising financial experts, computer analysts, scientists, bio-chemists, physicians and other highly trained specialists ready to work together with the increasingly numerous private security firms to prevent the repeat of the kind of event that took place on 11 September 2001. Devising and implementing an effective public-private partnership and promoting it at both governmental and non-governmental levels should, therefore, also be a post-Prague priority.

Cooperating with the neighbours

In the run-up to the Prague Summit, Bulgaria and Romania succeeded in persuading Greece and Turkey to support their membership candidatures and lobby with other member states on their behalf. They did this by convincing Ankara and Athens that Bulgarian and Romanian membership of the Alliance, the resulting consolidation of NATO’s southern flank and the defusing of bilateral regional tensions were both in their best interests and those of NATO as a whole.

Cooperation both between Bulgaria and Romania and all four countries should not stop now that membership invitations have been issued. Instead, it should be intensified. Bulgaria and Romania should take their military cooperation to a new level and work together in areas such as developing joint capabilities and promoting regional cooperation. Even before considering role specialisation and niche capabilities within a NATO context, the two countries should start developing common NATO assets. Such cooperation could also include deeper involvement in crisis-management operations, including joint initiatives in Southeastern Europe and the linking of the air surveillance systems of the two countries. In this way, Bucharest and Sofia would be able to demonstrate that together they can help improve the security environment in what was Europe’s most volatile region during the 1990s.

Promoting possible joint Greek-Turkish oil and gas pipeline projects from the Caspian Sea to Western Europe could enhance cooperation between Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey. Such pipelines would likely transit Bulgaria and Romania as well and would, in this way, introduce a new dimension — energy security — into quadrilateral relations.

Having worked so hard for so long to obtain an invitation to begin NATO accession talks at the Prague Summit, Romania risks becoming complacent. However, the ratification process must not be taken for granted. In the months ahead, the country’s progress in dealing with outstanding problems and reforming structures in line with NATO’s own transformation to be better prepared to deal with the new security threats will come under further scrutiny. From the latter perspective, setting up specialised military units that can contribute to overall Euro-Atlantic security and forging a genuine public-private partnership in security should greatly increase Romania’s chances not only of becoming a fully-fledged NATO member, but an active and responsible one, too.
Improving Europe’s air-to-air refuelling capabilities

Federico Trillo-Figueroa Martinez-Conde describes how Spain has taken the lead to build a fleet of European air tankers.

In recent years, both the Alliance and the European Union have been concerned by shortfalls in essential capabilities — including air-to-air refuelling, stocks of precision-guided munitions, and strategic transport — among European countries. In response, countries are now joining forces in an innovative way to boost capabilities in these areas. And Spain is the lead nation in a consortium of nine working to create a fleet of refuelling aircraft.

Air tankers are expensive assets, but are critical to long-distance deployments in support of other aircraft. Indeed, the United States possesses more than 700 air tankers. The lack of such aircraft in Europe is a major shortfall in EU military capabilities. It could also undermine NATO’s ability to respond to crises. For this reason, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain agreed at NATO’s Prague Summit to examine ways to make good this shortfall in the short to medium term.

Both the European Union and NATO have analysed the nature of the air-to-air refuelling shortfall in an effort to identify eventual solutions. At NATO, a High Level Group chaired by the Netherlands developed the first study of the air-to-air refuelling shortfall within the framework of the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative, the Alliance’s high-level programme to increase capabilities.

A more recent effort to improve Europe’s air-to-air refuelling capabilities came with the launch of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) within the framework of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy. The ECAP set up multidisciplinary panels of experts — known as “ECAP panels” — to address the most serious capability deficiencies. This included an Air-to-Air Refuelling Panel, in which nine EU member states under Spanish and Italian stewardship have been working together with industry to explore cost-effective ways of increasing the number of air tankers in Europe.

Avoiding duplication

In the ECAP, the European Union has worked together with NATO and its agencies to avoid duplication and find synergies. In this way, NATO representatives have attended and contributed to some ECAP meetings. Similarly, when NATO defence ministers launched the Prague Capabilities Commitment, the Alliance’s new capabilities initiative, they decided that this new initiative should “achieve mutual reinforcement and full transparency with related activities of the ECAP, taking account of the importance of the spirit of openness respecting the autonomy of both organisations, under modalities to be developed”.

The need for mutual reinforcement is especially important in any activity involving multinational cooperation. To facilitate this, care was taken at the Prague Multinational Cooperation Conference in September 2002 to assign NATO lead functions for multinational activities to the same countries that had already assumed a similar responsibility in the EU context. For this reason, Spain has taken the lead on air-to-air refuelling.

Although the European Union and NATO have identified common solutions to common deficiencies, they retain different approaches to the problem and continue to work within different political and strategic frameworks. NATO defence planning reflects the objectives and means for achieving them set out in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. In response to an annual

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Capability shortfall: The lack of air tankers in Europe could undermine NATO’s ability to respond to crises (© NATO)
Defence Planning Questionnaire, Allied governments submit to NATO their force and defence-spending plans for the coming five years, which are examined with the aim of harmonising them with the NATO Force Goals. In the process, the Alliance's Strategic Commanders — Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic — have helped identify capability requirements based on their operational needs and missions.

The European Union does not currently have a Strategic Concept in which to frame the political decision taken in Helsinki in 1999 to develop specific military capabilities. As a result, capability requirements were identified by simulating generic scenarios spanning the whole spectrum of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and crisis management operations, the so-called Petersberg tasks, and incorporated in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue. The shortfall is the difference between those requirements and the various national contributions.

The shortfall in air-to-air refuelling severely limits the European Union's operational capability and is difficult to put right in the short term. This is because normal procurement programmes take many years to generate results. Moreover, even transforming existing transport aircraft into tankers would take a long time and prove costly.

European countries have been reluctant to invest in air tankers for a variety of reasons, one of which is clearly the cost. Defence budgets have come under pressure ever since the end of the Cold War and especially in the past few years as countries have sought to meet the economic criteria — including strict limits on public borrowing — imposed by the creation of a single European currency. Moreover, in the case of many smaller countries, acquiring and operating air tankers on a national level makes neither economic nor military sense.

Spanish initiative
The Spanish initiative is aimed at creating a multinationally procured and jointly operated fleet of between 10 and 15 multi-role tanker and transport aircraft. All possible procurement options — including leasing, renting, purchasing and private financing — will be considered. The modalities of contribution, cost sharing, type of aircraft, force design and operational requirements will be subject to oncoming studies. At present, however, Airbus 310, Airbus 330 and Boeing 767, seem in principle to be the most suitable aircraft.

In Prague, the nine participating countries decided to set up an appropriate management organisation to procure the means and recruit the multinational force to operate the aircraft. In this way, the fleet would have the character of a commonly operated capability. Although it would primarily exist for NATO's benefit, it would also be available to the European Union. Moreover, the capability could be used for national purposes under conditions, which are yet to be agreed. The venture also remains open to other countries that might wish to join at a later stage, and to contributions in kind.

Since the Prague Summit, the Spanish defence ministry has formed a National Task Group to take the initiative forward. The Group has since helped create a multinational team to analyse the various procurement and management options, which met for the first time in the last week of January in Madrid. Although it is still early days for this initiative and there is a long way to go, it has the political endorsement of the leaders of all the countries involved. The omens are good. If the initiative comes together as planned, it will provide the European Union, NATO, and individual nations with significant additional capability.