We did not have the advantage
of a Group of Experts back in 1999.
We had to formulate it
inside the building
and I remember very well that it was
a process which was painstaking
and occasionally divisive.
One of the reasons why we left…
...some issues a little bit vague is
that we were aware
of the divisiveness.
So, for instance, the issue of nuclear
weapons remained more or less
on the same status as before.
I see with growing concern
that many NATO nations are
preparing
through their armaments
programmes for yesterday’s war
while spending tomorrow’s money,
that's something we need to change.
What matters in the future is first
and foremost information superiority
and there we are
not too well developed in NATO.
Secondly, we have
to prepare for cyber operations.
And there I think NATO is
just at the beginning
of thinking
this cyber dimension through.
Third… I’m afraid
we have to take into account
more than we do
at this point in time,
that proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction may take place
and whether we are
adequately prepared and equipped
for instance for CRBN,
the defence against chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons,
I’m not entirely sure.
The capabilities gap is, I think,
is number two on my list of priorities,
number one is the political will.
And if we do not get
our acts together as Europeans
and speak with one voice
and try to find common views
with our American partners,
then you can forget
about the capabilities issues.
Well that is of course
the hottest potato in the pot.
At this point in time, we still have
the rather cumbersome process
that all NATO nations
can take the decision,
but not only in the Council
but at all levels below the Council.
My former colleagues and I proposed
that the consensus-based
decision-making should be preserved
but only at the Council level.
In all levels below it should be
a majority decision-making.
That would speed up the process.
In crisis management
time is of the essence
and to move up the ladder
of decision-making escalation
as we do it right now in NATO,
at 28, that will never allow us
to be there on time.
It seems to me that
the new American administration,
president Obama,
really has taken some steps
in the direction of the Europeans.
But, if I may say so as a European,
he has not been rewarded
by the Europeans through increased
commitments to the common cause.
And for that reason, if we Europeans
do not get our acts together,
particularly on Afghanistan,
then we may soon end up
with growing frustration
on the side of the Americans...
I think we... One of the lessons
learned in all alliance actions is
that the alliance has to be
of benefit for all partners.
So Europe cannot be
a consumer of security,
we have, together with the United
States, to be producers of security.
I believe the core of the issue is:
What means collective defence
in the future?
That is what the new allies expect.
The new allies joined the alliance
because they wanted to help
American commitment to Europe.
And… against the background
of a more assertive Russia,
which pretends to be strong
although it isn’t strong at all,
they want to have
the assurance that the old formula
one for all and all for one
is still valid.
In my conviction, collective defence
and the article 5 guarantee,
is the very basis
for the preparedness of nations
to engage
beyond the NATO Treaty area.
Since if nations are not able to tell
their nations you are protected,
you will never win
the support of people
to send their forces
in to harm’s way elsewhere.
I think we have to find convincing
formulas, also in the new Concept,
which tell our public
there is a need to invest in security.
Of course, in a balanced way,
but that I think is one of the main
tasks of the new Strategic Concept,
to tell the NATO success story
to the people,
and to tell them
that we have to continue
to stick to the Transatlantic Alliance,
since there is no security for Europe
without the United States,
and the United States of America
need Europe as a partner.