Partnerships: Old and New
# Partnerships: Old and New

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Coming at the cusp of a number of major anniversaries, this edition of the NATO Review focuses on several of the Alliance’s most significant relationships, and on some of the structures that underpin NATO’s partnerships. In recent years, these relationships have become increasingly essential to the Alliance’s efforts to promote security, democracy and the rule of law in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

As geo-political realities have shifted following the end of the Cold War, and again after 9/11, so NATO’s partnership programmes have grown and evolved to reflect the new environments. These programmes have provided forums for greater understanding and joint action with former adversaries, facilitated concrete security collaboration with Partner countries, aided aspirants to become Allies and contributed to Euro-Atlantic security, stability and cooperation.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, as well as the fifth anniversary of the inauguration of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Dmitri Trenin suggests a future course for relations with Russia, while Paul Fritch discusses the NRC in a commemorative article.

Robert Simmons reflects on ten years of achievements by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and Grigoriy Perepelytsia discusses Ukrainian steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration on the tenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. Former president Lech Wałęsa reminisces on the tenth anniversary of NATO’s membership invitation to Poland.

We interview Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, on EU military developments and cooperation with NATO, and Fritz Rademacher explains the Training Cooperation Initiative launched at the Riga Summit. Amadeo Watkins and Srdjan Gligorijevic advocate greater NATO engagement in the western Balkans, while Masako Ikegami discusses a potential role for the Alliance in improving East Asian security. Forty years on, Lawrence Kaplan looks at the Harmel Report, which, by noting that détente should be one of the major functions of NATO, planted the seeds for future partnerships.

In addition to the articles on NATO’s partnerships, Adrian Kendry explores the economics of international terrorism, and on the fortieth anniversary of the relocation of Alliance headquarters from Paris to Brussels, François Le Blévennec recounts the story of ‘the big move’.
Much has changed in the ten years since Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance made their first attempt at strategic partnership. Ten new states in Central and Eastern Europe have joined the Alliance. The enlargement of the European Union (EU) has transformed the socio-economic landscape of the continent. We have overcome major challenges in the Balkans, only to face the new threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Much has changed in Russia as well, where efforts to build a functioning democratic state, a free society and a prosperous market economy have faced enormous challenges.

These changes should have brought NATO and Russia closer together, and in many cases they have. Yet too often, when the NATO-Russia relationship makes headlines, it is for the wrong reasons. In Russia and in the West, journalists, political scientists and all too many senior politicians thrive on confrontations, both actual and potential. Nothing sells newspapers like the declaration of a “new Cold War”.

Has the NATO-Russia partnership been free of controversy? Of course not. We have had our disagreements, sometimes minor, sometimes less so. Could we have done more, on both sides, to build an effective and enduring partnership? Perhaps.

But in order to understand where we’re going, we must first acknowledge where we are today, and how we got here. For amid all the speculation over the problems in our relationship, there is too little awareness of what Russia and the member states of NATO have actually achieved together.

We often look back on the first years of the NATO-Russia partnership as a necessary but unpleasant transitional phase, brought to a decisive close with the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Yet in those difficult years, we succeeded in managing Europe’s most pressing security crisis – the chain of civil war and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia – and in doing it together. Russia became the largest non-NATO troop contributor to NATO-led military operations, a distinction it held for more than seven years.

The second phase of the NATO-Russia partnership, which began with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, was intended to be a more decisive step away from the stereotypes of the past, and toward more effective cooperation in facing the challenges of the future. When heads of state and government gathered in Rome five years ago, the memory of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks was still fresh in their minds. They resolved that the threats of the 21st century demanded a new, more interdependent approach to security, and that Russia and the member states of NATO could no longer afford to dwell upon the residual stereotypes and hostilities of the past.

Much has been accomplished since that time. In order to enhance their ability to stand together
against shared security threats, NATO and Russia have intensified work to develop interoperability of military forces and equipment, of civil emergency planning teams, of theatre missile defence systems and – not least – of threat analysis. In 2004, the NATO-Russia Council approved a comprehensive Action Plan on Terrorism, which includes concrete initiatives to prevent, combat and manage the consequences of terrorist acts. Russia became the first non-NATO state ever to contribute to an Article 5 collective defence operation, when in 2006, Russian Navy assets joined the Alliance’s anti-terrorist naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea.

The transformation of the NATO-Russia relationship has not been limited to technical projects. An intensified political dialogue on contemporary security issues has served to identify new areas in which NATO and Russia share fundamental challenges, and new ways in which they can pool their efforts to enhance common security.

Nowhere has this trend been more evident than in the international effort to bring peace, stability and democratic development to Afghanistan. In 2005, NRC foreign ministers recognised that the illegal narcotics trade posed a fundamental challenge to this effort. They launched a path-breaking joint
training programme designed to build counter-narcotics capabilities throughout the region. By the end of this year, more than 350 officers from Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbours will have graduated from this programme.

Finally, the NRC has evolved into a forum for serious dialogue on those issues where we do not see eye-to-eye. Earlier this year, when Russia expressed concern over the implications of US plans to locate a third missile defence site in Central Europe, both Moscow and Washington turned to the NATO-Russia Council as the appropriate forum to address this politically charged and technically challenging issue. Experts agreed to expand the scope of the NRC’s annual work programme, to build upon an established record of cooperation in field-deployed theatre missile defence and to explore broader cooperation in the missile defence area. The NRC agreed to organise a series of high-level meetings, reinforced by policymakers from capitals in order to promote transparency and dialogue, to better understand the US plans and the Russian concerns, and to find a cooperative way forward.

Another contentious issue on our agenda concerns the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Here, there are longstanding differences over complex legal and political questions – from the Russian side over the timetable for ratification and entry into force of an agreement to adapt the Treaty to the current
security environment, and from the Allied side over Russia’s compliance with the Treaty’s host-state consent provisions in Georgia and Moldova. In April, President Putin declared a “moratorium” on Russia’s implementation of the Treaty, and Russia subsequently called for an extraordinary conference of the Treaty’s participants.

Amid all this controversy, it is easy to forget what NATO Allies and Russia have achieved together in the CFE framework. More than 60,000 pieces of heavy military equipment have been destroyed, and the potential for a large-scale military attack in Europe virtually eliminated. NATO’s holdings of Treaty-limited equipment have been reduced so dramatically that today’s Alliance of 26 states is more lightly armed than the Alliance of 16 that existed in 1990. The NATO-Russia Council has expressed repeatedly its support for CFE as an essential cornerstone of European security, and rightly so.

As the NATO-Russia relationship moves forward, we need to continue our dialogue on these and other difficult issues, even as we work to intensify our practical cooperation in areas where our interests clearly converge. In the first five years of our partnership, working in the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, our primary focus was on overcoming the legacy of the past by promoting transparency and mutual confidence. In the second stage, motivated by the urgent threats of terrorism and proliferation, we geared the work of the new NATO-Russia Council almost exclusively toward questions of the future and toward new ways in which we could join forces to face unprecedented new threats. Over the next five years, we will have to pursue both of these goals simultaneously, in order to ensure that deepening cooperation stands on a firm foundation of mutual trust. If we are to succeed in facing tomorrow’s challenges, we can do no less.
For nearly a decade after the emergence of the Russian Federation, NATO-related issues were a key focus of Moscow’s foreign policy. The Alliance was both a symbol of the Cold War and the premier Western club. Russia vacillated between half-hearted attempts to join the Alliance on special terms, and futile efforts to prevent the country’s neighbours from seeking membership as a security guarantee against Russia itself.

Three main developments shaped the relationship during the 1990s:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the NATO/US use of force in 1995 led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the subsequent peacekeeping operations, in which Russian troops took part under NATO command;
- NATO’s enlargement invitation in 1997 to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and their accession in 1999, a bitter pill barely sweetened for Moscow by the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a consultative mechanism between Russia and the Alliance; and
- the 1999 Kosovo crisis, which culminated in NATO’s 78-day air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite Russia’s most vehement protests.

Despite these serious issues, Russia continued to participate in Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and indeed requested to join the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June 1999, again under NATO command. Nevertheless, by the end of President Yeltsin’s time at the Kremlin, Russia-NATO relations were in a deep freeze.

A New Start?

At the beginning of President Vladimir Putin’s first term, there was hope for a new start. Some believed that, if Russia were to accede to NATO, this would serve as a silver bullet, doing away forever with past enmity and ushering in genuine friendship. But it was not to be. Relations were restored and membership was probed anew, but again without success.

There were, however, unexpected bonuses. A few weeks after 9/11, a US-led military campaign removed the most serious post-Cold War external threat to Russia’s security, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Soon thereafter, NATO forces took on the mission of helping to stabilise Afghanistan – the Alliance’s first major out-of-area military campaign. From Moscow’s perspective, an alliance, which for decades had been facing the Soviet Union in Central Europe, had turned into a coalition that was helping to secure the approaches to Central Asia, Russia’s most vulnerable flank.

In 2002, the Alliance’s relations with Russia were reconfigured and the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established. In contrast to the Permanent Joint Council which was essentially a bilateral structure, the new NRC meets at 27, so that each nation participates in its national capacity, and on an equal footing with the others. Thus the Russia-NATO relationship has been able to survive and develop, even though Moscow’s foreign policy from 2003 onward became more independent and assertive, and Russian relations with NATO began to sour.
Partnerships: Old and New

The NATO-Russia Council meets regularly – most recently in June 2007 in St. Petersburg and Moscow to commemorate its fifth anniversary. Russia has a mission at NATO Headquarters and a military office at the Allied Command Operations (SHAPE), while NATO keeps a military liaison as well as an information office in Moscow. There is a range of common interests, from fighting terrorism to ensuring WMD non-proliferation. Under the auspices of the NRC, 17 subordinate bodies work on key areas of cooperation. Occasionally joint exercises are held in areas such as emergency response. Russian warships have started to participate in NATO’s Active Endeavour maritime counter-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean. Moscow signed a Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO, and allows Germany and France to use a corridor across its territory en route to Afghanistan. There has been wide-ranging collaboration in defence reform, military-to-military cooperation (importantly, the NATO-Russia military interoperability programme), maritime search and rescue and a joint pilot project on counter-narcotics training for Central Asian and Afghan personnel.

The Russians certainly understand NATO much better today than they did in the 1990s. All this lends a degree of stability and predictability to the relationship, even though mutual expectations have been revised downward.

Ambivalence

There is fundamental ambivalence in Moscow about the existing situation. Russia treats NATO as a geopolitical “factor”, rather than as a partner. The country now has a window on the Alliance – but still has no handle on it. Russia is voicing strong objections to what it views as negative developments:

- the possibility of the Alliance admitting Georgia and Ukraine as members;
- the temporary use by the United States, on a rotational basis, of existing military facilities in Bulgaria and Romania; and especially
- the planned deployments of elements of a US ballistic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Russia has several additional concerns: NATO countries delaying ratification of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Alliance’s reluctance to establish formal relations with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Some of NATO’s newer members bring memories of Soviet domination to the table. So Moscow is now emphasising bilateral relations with individual European countries, concentrating on remaining sympathetic ears in Central Europe and hoping for more farther to the west.

It is clear, though, that five years after the Rome Declaration on NATO-Russia Relations and ten years after the Paris Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, Russia-NATO relations are not currently headed toward any kind of major convergence. Yet, the relationship continues to be important. What it needs most is careful management to ensure that inherent rivalries are minimised, and that cooperation is maximised wherever possible.

Enlargement

On the issue of NATO enlargement, Moscow would be wise to leave the decisions to the countries in question. Whether candidate countries join the Alliance – and if so, when – should be up to those nations themselves. In view
of Moscow’s stated goals, Russian intervention can only be counterproductive. The Kremlin’s official position of treating Alliance accession as a sovereign right of each individual country, and of focusing on the management of Russia’s own security, makes good sense.

It may be that Georgia will get the Membership Action Plan in the spring of 2008, which would put the country on track to join the Alliance a few years later. In Ukraine, however, NATO must admit that the accession issue is likely to remain politically divisive and potentially destabilizing. Calm handling of these situations by both sides would help to uphold stability and security in Europe’s east.

Missile Defence

While these do not fall under NATO, the issue of the US ballistic missile defence plans represents both a risk and an opportunity for the NATO-Russia relationship. The risk is that, if the United States shuts Russia out, anti-Western trends in Russia’s security and defence policy could be exacerbated, which is clearly not Washington’s objective.

The opportunity is that, if the issue were to be used to reinvigorate WMD cooperation, mutual confidence would be strengthened. It would lead to closer interaction on the source of the perceived danger; that is, Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes. Cooperation on ballistic missile defence will not be easy, but is certainly worth trying. Indeed, a shared system – which would use Russian radar and detection facilities, as well as information-sharing sites – has been recently proposed by President Putin as an alternative to current US plans.

The current NATO and Russian joint efforts in the field of theatre missile defence could be a model for possible US-Russia MD cooperation and could provide a basis for a more integrated and comprehensive approach for a missile defence architecture for Europe.

Similarly, the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), prohibited under the 1987 INF treaty and now being raised again by Russian officials, calls for close consultations between Russia and NATO with a view to strengthening mutual confidence and preventing a destabilising arms race.

CFE Treaty

Since it was signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty has been the principal material foundation of the European security order. It must continue to play that role. Moscow’s concerns about the Baltic nations’ accession to the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty, and its ratification by the United States and other Western countries, are genuine and should be taken seriously – Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE Treaty would be in nobody’s interest.

By the same token, NATO members’ concerns about Moscow’s implementation of its Istanbul commitments concerning its remaining troops in Georgia and Moldova call for joint action – even if, in Russia’s view, there is no formal link between these commitments and the ratification of the Adapted Treaty.

President Putin’s declaration earlier this year of a “moratorium” was followed by Russia’s call for an Extraordinary Conference, which occurred in mid-June. Russia had already begun to delay CFE inspections, but after President Putin’s meeting with the NATO Secretary General during the NRC anniversary celebrations, the inspection regime resumed. The President took another positive step in recommending that CFE issues should be discussed in the NRC, and this recommendation was taken up.

Peacekeeping

Moldova’s frozen conflict on the Dniester offers a real opportunity to launch the first-ever peacekeeping operation in which Russia and NATO act as equal partners. Arguably, this is the least difficult of the former-Soviet flashpoints to be resolved.

Moldova has reaffirmed its intention to abstain from seeking NATO membership. The operation would involve only a limited military and police force, probably just a few hundred men. Russia is genuinely indispensable to any solution in Moldova, and can be expected to act on an equal footing with NATO.
If successful, such a joint operation could pave the way for Western countries to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. It could also serve as a model for other joint peacekeeping missions – most likely in the southern Caucasus – in situations that meet what might be called ‘the Moldova criterion’, that is, where Russia has an interest in finding a solution, is indispensable to that solution and yet is unable to solve the conflict single-handedly.

For several years, Russia and NATO have been working on increasing interoperability, with a view to engaging in joint peacekeeping operations. Neither the Middle East nor Africa appears to be likely areas for putting that expertise into practice. Certain areas of the former Soviet Union, on the other hand, could – and, in my view, should – represent an ideal area to test interoperability.

**Afghanistan**

The Russians have no reason to feel any schadenfreude as a result of the difficulties faced by NATO and the United States in Afghanistan. If international efforts fail to stabilise that country, Moscow will be faced with a resurgent Taliban threatening Russia’s soft Central Asian underbelly. There is therefore a clear need for closer consultations between Russia and the West on how to turn the tide against Islamist radicals. Helping the moderates to hold on to Kabul and the Afghan provinces is a far better alternative than having to start reconstituting the Northern Alliance in Taloqan.

**NATO-CSTO**

That, in turn, raises the issue of NATO-CSTO ties. So far, NATO has been very reluctant to formalise any relationship with the organisation, fearing that such a step would seal Russian dominance of Central Asia.

In reality, there is not much evidence of any such domination. Kazakhstan has been openly pursuing a multi-vector policy, successfully manoeuvring between Moscow, Beijing and Washington. Uzbekistan’s fealty to Russia is uncertain and at best temporary, as Tashkent refuses to be Moscow’s pawn. Two years after the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) call for a US withdrawal, Kyrgyzstan is still permitting a US base to exist next to a small Russian one. Tajikistan has adopted a tous azimuts foreign policy, its president having symbolically de-Russified his last name.

By engaging with the CSTO, NATO could contribute to that organisation’s evolution toward a more modern regional security arrangement. It would also reassure Moscow that the Alliance does not seek to displace Russia as a major player in Central Asia, which would not be in Western interests anyway.

Agreement on a NATO-CSTO link could come as part of a package with the SCO opening up to the United States as an observer. It is senseless for NATO members, Russia and China to continue to play a petty game of regional rivalry at the price of allowing their common adversaries to take them on one by one.

The NATO-Russia partnership may well be at a turning point. After a bumpy ride through the 1990s, solid improvements in the first few years of this decade, followed by the recent souring of relations, it is clear that for the relationship to improve, both sides must make significant efforts.

Russia should let its neighbours to join NATO if they wish. At the same time, NATO should think strategically about which countries it offers membership. Cooperation on missile defence – excluding, for the time-being, the United States’ controversial plans for a European ballistic missile shield – is at least being attempted, thus boosting cooperation in the area of WMD non-proliferation and building confidence for consultations on the INF Treaty. Beyond this, both sides need to take steps to ensure ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. NATO-Russia interoperability can and should be tested in joint peacekeeping operations in areas of the former Soviet Union such as Moldova. Russia and the international community would also be well-advised to collaborate on stabilising Afghanistan – and in stemming the flow of drugs out of that country. Lastly, NATO should engage with CSTO.

In my view, these actions would almost certainly improve the NATO-Russia partnership.
NATO and Ukraine: At the crossroads

Professor Grigoriy M. Perepelytsia gives his personal perspective on the choices facing Ukraine in its relations with the North Atlantic Alliance.

Ukraine finds itself at a crossroads in its relations with NATO. One path could lead to membership and offers Ukraine the prospect of becoming a westward-looking European state, protected against threats to its sovereignty and national security. The second path may lead Ukraine to renounce its Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations, with less certain outcomes. While a promising start was made on the road to NATO membership in the wake of the Orange Revolution, the process has since slowed due to the political uncertainties in Ukraine that surfaced with the March 2006 parliamentary elections and the formation of a new government.

What is at stake?

NATO membership would be in the Ukrainian strategic interest and also represents a major societal choice. It would provide solid guarantees for the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty, national identity and territorial integrity, while helping to consolidate and continue Ukraine's democratic reforms. Further progress towards meeting Euro-Atlantic democratic standards would also protect and encourage mainstream and minority cultural development, as well as the evolution of Ukrainian civil society.

The alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration lies in Eurasia with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is currently characterised by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, grey economies and marginalised or underdeveloped civil societies.

The Editor
this path would be welcomed by those who view Ukraine’s independence as being counter to Russia’s vital geopolitical interests and its efforts to restore its great power status.

Ukraine’s interest in Euro-Atlantic integration has led to closer cooperation with the Alliance. However, any future accession of Ukraine to the Alliance will ultimately depend on the ability of the country to meet membership criteria, and on the domestic political will to move forward.

Walking the path

The first declaration of Ukraine's intent to increase its integration in Euro-Atlantic structures was made ten years ago in the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and identified areas for consultation and cooperation. However, cooperation with a view to furthering Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration goals was given a sharper focus with the adoption of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002. The Action Plan aims to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine relationship and to support Ukraine’s reform efforts on the road towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. It sets out specific objectives, covering political and economic issues; security, defence and military issues; information issues; and legal issues. These objectives are supported by Annual Target Plans in which Ukraine sets its own targets for the activities it intends to pursue both internally and in cooperation with NATO.

The Action Plan itself will not lead directly to membership. However, its successful implementation is regarded as a precursor to an invitation to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan, and would help Ukraine move towards meeting the requirements expected of a candidate for NATO membership.

The Orange Revolution brought in under President Viktor Yushchenko a new Ukrainian leadership, which put NATO accession at the top of its foreign policy priorities. This led the Allies to invite Ukraine to start an Intensified Dialogue on its membership aspirations and related reforms at the NUC meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, in April 2005. The aim of this dialogue is to give Ukrainian officials the opportunity to learn more about what would be expected of Ukraine as a potential member of the Alliance, while simultaneously letting NATO examine Ukrainian reforms and capabilities.

In parallel with the launch of the Intensified Dialogue, the Ukrainian and Allied foreign ministers agreed a package of short-term actions to help Ukraine in moving the reform process forward. This package covered a range of areas, including strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing political dialogue, intensifying defence and security sector reforms, managing the social and economic consequences of reform, and improving public information.

To improve the internal coordination of Ukraine’s implementation of activities agreed in the framework of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, on 27 December 2005 President Viktor Yushchenko signed a decree in which deputy heads of the central executive authorities were assigned specific responsibilities. The president tasked the Cabinet of Ministers to strengthen cooperation between the executive authorities and the parliament, giving priority to relations with NATO and to public promotion of the benefits this cooperation brings to Ukraine.

Towards a Membership Action Plan

In January 2006, the defence ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, meeting in Budapest, Hungary, announced that their countries were ready to support Ukraine on its path to NATO accession. Hungarian Defence Minister Ferenc Yukhas stated after the quadrilateral meeting that “we believe it is an important task for us to help Ukraine on its way to integration and accession to NATO.” The four countries announced that they would organise a special committee to promote Ukrainian military reform.
A month later, in February 2006, President Viktor Yushchenko reiterated in Brussels, Belgium, that Ukraine was ready to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP). In March, he followed this up with a decree setting up an interagency commission to prepare Ukraine for NATO accession. This body can set up task forces to deal with specific directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, and is chaired by the relevant national coordinators.

The National Security and Defence Council is responsible for defining the strategic goals and conceptual approaches to Ukraine-NATO cooperation and submitting relevant proposals to the President. The Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for implementing the national policy of Ukraine-NATO cooperation, in particular with regard to the fulfilment of membership criteria.

Participation in the MAP would allow Ukraine to prepare better for NATO accession through technical assistance and practical advice from NATO. It would not, however, guarantee any future membership in the Alliance – such an invitation would depend on the country’s ability to meet membership criteria. In the MAP framework, Annual National Programmes are developed which focus on a number of requirements for aspirant countries, including in the political, economic, resource, legal and security fields. Aspirant countries are expected to demonstrate a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority populations; commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbours; the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the Alliance; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and structures.

In March 2006, Ukrainian Defence Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko expressed the opinion that if Ukraine works effectively to meet these requirements, and the Allies agree, “the decision on granting membership to Ukraine could be taken in the nearest future. Ukraine will be granted a transition period to finish its preparatory work, which is about a year and a half or two years… That’s why full-fledged membership
is possible by 2010, but it is only a forecast. Life may bring changes into it.”

Of course, one of the current major hurdles to Ukraine’s joining the MAP is significant public reluctance to move further – according to opinion polls, only some 20 per cent of the population actually support NATO membership, whereas some 54 per cent are opposed. Outdated and counterproductive stereotypes about NATO still hold sway over many in Ukraine. However, the Defence Minister also expressed confidence that by the time Ukraine has to make a decision on NATO accession, the public will be ready to support such a step.

A change of pace

By holding a free and fair democratic parliamentary election in March 2006, Ukraine successfully passed a key test for NATO membership. So it is ironic that the result of that election has been a significant slow-down in the pace of progress towards that goal.

It took months of political turmoil for a new government to be formed. During this time, anti-NATO sentiments among the population were exploited for political gain, provoking demonstrations against the US-Ukrainian Sea Breeze exercise in the summer of 2006. The “Anti-Crisis Coalition” that eventually emerged, with Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister, put the brakes on moves toward NATO membership and made improving relations with Russia a priority.

Visiting NATO Headquarters in September, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych reassured Allies that Ukraine was committed to developing closer relations to NATO through ongoing cooperation. But he said that the Ukrainian people were not yet ready for Ukraine to consider joining the Membership Action Plan and that the issue of membership would eventually have to be put to a referendum. He did, however, promise that the Ukrainian government would launch a major public information campaign to explain NATO and its cooperation with Ukraine.

Meanwhile, President Yuschenko has continued to push for NATO membership. But there is no doubt that under the Anti-Crisis Coalition we have seen not just a change in pace in relations with NATO, but also a change in the language used. Political leaders tend to refer to “cooperation” with NATO rather than to “integration”.

Stirring things up further, Russia itself has warned Ukraine of potential costs of joining NATO. During his visit to Kyiv, in December 2006, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, while recognising the “sovereign right of Ukraine to choose major vectors of its security policy”, warned of the “negative consequences of Ukraine’s accession to NATO” on relations with Russia.

Clearly, the political uncertainties in Ukraine over the past year and the ongoing rift between the camps of the President and the Prime Minister have had an impact on the level of cooperation with NATO. This was manifest in the delay in finalising this year’s Annual Target Plan, which was only approved by the Cabinet.
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of Ministers and sent to the President for signature in early June.

At the crossroads

So Ukraine finds itself at a crossroads in its relations with NATO. Most likely, both roads will lead Ukraine to develop closer cooperation with the Alliance. However, the key question is how close the country will get to actual NATO membership. This will largely depend on the ability of the authorities – and society at large – to preserve the gains of the Orange Revolution and to further develop democratic structures and practices in the country.

Time will tell how important basic democratic values are for the Anti-Crisis parliamentary majority. If they really share these values, the time it takes for Ukraine to join NATO will be no longer than the time needed to achieve Euro-Atlantic standards and to reach consensus at the national level.

As Defence Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko stated in an October 2006 interview:

“Ukraine has not lost its chance to move forward and join the Alliance… How long it will take, depends, first of all, on the level of coordination of our authorities. Second, it depends on our desire to build a country that meets NATO standards. And third, it depends on the will and determination of key political players in our country to support NATO accession.”

For all of this to happen, it is clear that civil society will have to work closely with government, parliament and other relevant political actors. It is also essential that a broad public information campaign should be launched to raise awareness of the benefits of NATO-Ukraine cooperation and potential membership.

There are plenty of good stories to tell about the practical benefits of ongoing cooperation with NATO. Since 1994, NATO and individual Allies have provided professional military training to some 8 500 Ukrainian officers. Moreover, between 2001 and 2006, NATO has supported the retraining of over 3 000 retired Ukrainian military personnel to help their transition to civilian life. In 2006 alone, nearly 800 servicemen were retrained, and 440 have already found new jobs. Since 2006, new professional courses have been launched for former military personnel in Kirovohrad, Melitopol, Chernihiv and Lviv. And language courses are ongoing in Odessa, Kyiv and Simferopol.

Another good example is the support that individual Allies are giving to demilitarisation projects in Ukraine through Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund projects. These projects are helping Ukraine deal with its huge stockpiles of surplus and obsolete munitions, which pose a major security risk to local populations. A first project, launched in Donetsk in 2002 while Viktor Yanukovych was governor there, safely destroyed 400 000 anti-personnel landmines. A second project – the largest single demilitarisation project of its kind in the world – aims to destroy 133 000 tons of conventional munitions, 1.5 million small arms and light weapons, and 1 000 man-portable air defence systems over twelve years at a total estimated cost of €25 million.

Highlighting these kinds of initiatives to the Ukrainian public would go some way to overcoming the Cold War stereotypes about NATO that remain prevalent. That may encourage people to learn more about what NATO is today.

Ukraine is likely to remain stuck at the crossroads for a while. With another parliamentary election now scheduled for September, no clarity on the way forward is likely to emerge soon. In this climate, NATO remains a highly politicised issue in Ukraine. Nevertheless, I remain hopeful that a recent statement by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer may come true. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, he expressed his desire to see Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine move closer to the Alliance by the time of the NATO Summit in 2009. “The Ukrainian people will have to decide for themselves. Nevertheless, I hope in 2009 we’ll see a stronger relationship with Ukraine.”

Partnerships: Old and New
NATO’s post-Cold war evolution has been strongly influenced by events in the Balkans. And although at each consecutive NATO summit meeting, the Alliance expands its areas of strategic interest and engagement, the Balkans remains a region of special concern to the Organisation.

But the view of NATO from the region itself is not so positive. Now that peace has largely been secured, questions remain. What will it take for the Alliance to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people of the region – and more importantly, what needs to happen to increase stability in the area?

The Riga threshold

A positive consequence for the western Balkans from NATO’s November 2006 Riga Summit is that now all countries in the region have institutionalised relations with NATO – either through outright membership, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Historically, whenever Balkan countries have had sharp differences in security, trouble has ensued. Now that all of these nations share the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and all of them are engaged in a common forum via their relations with the Alliance, a risk-laden threshold has to a large extent been passed.

That said, the security situation in the western Balkans is still far from ideal, with no guarantee that the Kosovo ‘solution’ will put an end to tensions in the region. NATO is aware of this fact – its Riga Summit Declaration mentioned that “Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability” for the western Balkans.

Background

The Alliance shares responsibility, as an active participant, for defining the post-conflict setting which has gradually evolved during the past six years or so, when all Balkan states have moved towards democratic practices in varying degrees.

NATO’s earliest engagement with the region dates back to the Oslo Ministerial meeting in June 1992, in the early stages of the Bosnian war. At the Ministerial, NATO foreign ministers expressed their willingness to support, on a case-by-case basis, some peacekeeping tasks under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the precursor to the OSCE), by contributing assets and expertise.

Over the next few years, the evolving situation in the Balkans required the Alliance to broaden its political and military activities. On 28 February 1994, Alliance aircraft shot down four warplanes that violated the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the first time that NATO forces ever engaged in combat.

After the conclusion of the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the autumn of 1995, NATO was tasked by UN Security Council Resolution 1031 to field an Implementation Force (IFOR) numbering some...
60 000 troops, thus taking over responsibility for peace and stability in the country. IFOR was the first peace-keeping operation ever undertaken by NATO.

NATO action was also undertaken to enforce peace in Kosovo in 1999 and again to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and collect their weapons in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* in 2001. Today, the Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR) remains the largest NATO operational deployment in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Changing course

And so the Alliance remains present in the region today. In addition to KFOR, NATO maintains local headquarters in Sarajevo, Skopje and Tirana. Since December 2006, the Alliance has set up a liaison office in Belgrade, tasked with facilitating Serbian cooperation with NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. These presences are a positive factor not only in terms of enhancing security, but also in helping to move the region closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.

NATO’s relationship with the western Balkans has evolved over the past decade. Today the Alliance can be seen to be bringing the parties together, as the individual countries in the region are all striving to greater or lesser degrees to get closer to the Euro-Atlantic club, and to move away from the turbulence of the past.

NATO assists and supports reform initiatives through a variety of mechanisms. For example, Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* all participate in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) as ‘advanced’ regional candidates. Prior to joining PfP, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina benefited from Tailored Cooperation Programmes. These programmes are now being adjusted following the Riga Summit. The next step will be for these countries to develop Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs).

Considering the above, NATO’s standards should serve as the ultimate benchmark for evaluating defence and associated reforms in the region. However, this goal has on occasion been undermined at a practical level by interference from bilateral relationships which did not necessarily dovetail with a particular country achieving its strategic reform objectives. In our view, the lack of coordination and transparency among NATO Allies has been and continues to be the single most important impediment to a more effective engagement and has at times played a negative role in the course of defence reform in the region.

Hesitation and micro-management

Has the Euro-Atlantic community’s initial hesitation to engage in the Balkans, which was so evident in the early stages of the Yugoslav wars, finally been eliminated?

The answer is no. While the Alliance is ready to engage in terms of offering guidance and advice, it is still hesitant to use its political weight to accelerate reforms. The best way to achieve the kind of reform that NATO members would like to see in the Balkans, both in terms of quality and time, is to introduce an even more intensified dialogue with the regional actors. Such dialogue would of course need to be tailored to the unique situation of each country in accordance with the “regatta principle” (i.e. that each country should progress at its own pace, and according to its ability to take on the obligations of closer association). The process would of course be delicate, but not impossible if correctly applied.

Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability

While the physical presence of Alliance forces in some parts of the region remains crucially important, over the past few years NATO has increasingly become engaged in defence reforms. The Alliance is developing a new area of competence in line with its new strategic orientation.
The question of micro-management is also relevant in this context, especially with regard to NATO’s future activities, as well as lessons already learned from the region. Full-scale micro-management by the Alliance is not desirable because it diminishes local ownership of the objective. Nor is there capacity for that level of intimate involvement within the current NATO framework.

Nevertheless, a more vigorous and compelling methodology could be taken by the Alliance. A stronger, more engaged approach by NATO would likely help regional actors to achieve political consensus more easily, as well as mitigate some of the difficulties caused by their lack of resources. The Alliance’s Defence Reform Group initiative in Serbia was certainly a move forward and should be reinforced.

Challenges ahead

Building the trust that is fundamental to success, both vertically between NATO and the regional capitals, and horizontally among the countries of the western Balkans themselves, has not been easy. The Partnership for Peace programme uses a variety of channels to advance reforms and build confidence. While many of these channels are related to defence, there is also a broader scope of initiatives, stretching across the spectrum of governmental and non-governmental activity.

There are still challenges ahead, many of which stem from either lack of appropriate capacity within the region, or more significantly, from the lack of political maturity on the domestic front. Euro-Atlantic integration is an important objective for many actors in the western Balkans, and we believe that it is one which can be used as a tool to help address several of the region’s more difficult security and stability challenges. So mechanisms must be found to ensure continued active support to the western Balkans’ still-weak institutions, especially in the south – all while reinforcing the message with the region’s political elites.

NATO has been engaged in the Balkans for well over a decade now. Perceptions of the Alliance are not overly positive in some countries. NATO membership is still a relatively low priority for many people on the street – and amongst some elites – in the region. The single biggest reason for this is the lack of adequate information about the Alliance. Although this effort must ultimately be domestically led, NATO should undertake
to positively encourage public opinion in the region as soon as possible.

Regional cooperation

There is no doubt that NATO has helped to drive regional cooperation. And although limited in quality and quantity, some positive results are slowly emerging. For example, Croatia, following the Slovenian model, is gradually beginning to engage the region, in particular in sharing its experience with its neighbours. But there is still much room for improvement across the region and more concrete measures, especially in increasing local ownership, are clearly needed.

It must be made clear to all the actors in the western Balkans that regional cooperation, particularly in the context of addressing negative legacies and improving economic development, is vital to the region as a whole, as well as to the countries individually. Further, limited local budgets for defence reform, especially for interoperability, increase the need for innovative models of regional cooperation to benefit all. This should act as the ultimate benchmark for the countries concerned.

In addition, the Alliance’s PfP initiative should place more emphasis on the regional aspect, particularly in ‘soft’ areas such as education and training. This would be a good way to boost practical regional cooperation, get the former conflicting sides to start working together and build trust. To date, focus on these aspects has been somewhat limited, and much of the concentration has been on increasing interoperability with NATO forces.

International organisations

One of the focal points of NATO’s transformation is its cooperation with international organisations. The long-lasting crisis in the Balkans in which the Alliance was intensively involved set a new precedent for subsequent NATO relations with major international organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE, a fact that was highlighted in the Comprehensive Political Guidance endorsed at NATO’s Riga Summit.

Perhaps the most viable cooperation, as a strategic partnership, is the one between NATO and the European Union (EU). This partnership was not only conceived in the Balkans, but the region represents a testing ground for future NATO-EU cooperation. Both NATO and the EU will have an important role to play in post-settlement Kosovo. The cooperation between NATO and any future EU civilian mission in Kosovo will be an interesting test.

* * *

The period from 2007 to 2008 will be crucial for the western Balkans, but also for NATO, mainly because of the issue of Kosovo’s future status and the related regional implications.

The Alliance has achieved much in the region, most importantly in providing a stable and secure environment for long-term development. Lower down the scale, the Alliance has initiated programmes such as the trust fund on demobilisation and regional training. However, as suggested above, NATO’s work should not stop there. The region is a post-conflict transition zone by many parameters, and needs continued assistance, particularly as the Alliance contemplates further enlargement. The switch to local ownership must be carefully managed, possibly in line with the Stability Pact’s Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) initiative.

Understanding NATO’s role in the Balkans requires acceptance of the fact that the countries in the region are fundamentally different. At the same time, while the regatta principle is without doubt the only effective way forward, the regional framework must not be disregarded. Tensions remain between these two principles at the practical level – especially among the key players in the region – and NATO’s active engagement remains an important balancing factor.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Alliance headquarters in January 2007 – the first visit by a Japanese head of government – marked a high point in the NATO-Japan relationship, which has developed steadily since the early 1990s. The Alliance and Japan have started a strategic dialogue, with high-level officials meeting regularly. In addition, a series of NATO-Japan Security Conferences have been held since 1990.

In my view, more NATO-Japan collaboration would be useful, given the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to global stability, and given both parties’ complementary needs and interests. This was also the message brought back by 22 parliamentarians of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to their capitals after visiting Tokyo and Osaka, Japan in June 2007.

Recent history

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has extended its operations – and collaboration with partners – in response to major threats to peace and stability such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Both the Alliance and Japan have been compelled to redefine their respective security policies and strategies. The overarching threat concept became less defined, while regional and ethnic conflicts were multiplying.

Security-related collaboration between individual Allied nations and Japan has become more concrete since 9/11, particularly in the global fight against terrorism. Tokyo has, since 2001, sent naval assets into the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to help re-supply Western navies. Since 2003, Japan has also made a major contribution to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups in Afghanistan, working in close proximity to NATO forces and pledging to provide humanitarian assistance as well as underwriting support to NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Further, the Japanese Self Defence Forces have worked alongside several NATO member countries’ forces in UN-led peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights; in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq at the request of the United States; and in earthquake disaster relief and rescue in Pakistan.

Changing security environments

In post-Cold War Europe, the risk of major armed conflicts has been significantly reduced. Unconventional threats such as terrorism now dominate European security concerns. In Asia the picture is much gloomier.

After the disintegration and transformation of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it was inevitable that the Alliance would change and extend its mission scope. Without a grave, imminent threat, the ‘softening’ of the Organisation’s mission was a logical result. The changing nature of the external menace – from the Soviet Union to shadowy, amorphous non-state actors – has also blurred NATO’s threat definition. As a result, the Alliance was reformulated on the basis of “shared values and will”.
The extension of the Alliance’s collaboration with partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic area was to be expected as NATO’s resources and operations spread into wider theatres. And so Japan and NATO have strengthened ties to promote effective burden-sharing in global security.

However, Japan’s security environment changed in a very different way from that of Europe after the Cold War. Unlike NATO, Japan has gradually become exposed to new and more imminent military threats, while US forces have been increasingly engaged in the Gulf and in Afghanistan.

Asian instability

There are still two major flash-points in East Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, where in a worst-case scenario, the risk of inter-state conflict involving WMDs cannot be ruled out. Additionally, the East China Sea and Spratly Island disputes, among others, count as risk zones for armed conflicts over territory and natural resources. And China’s hunt for those resources is intensifying, backed up by its growing military muscle.

Nuclear North Korea

Japan’s concerns have been intensified by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Nodong missile launches 1993, followed by the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995 and 1996 and the Taepodong missile launch in 1998. With the subsequent missile and bomb tests in 2006, the North Korean nuclear crisis escalated significantly, crossing what was a ‘red line’ only a decade ago. Japan could soon be within range of a DPRK nuclear missile attack.

Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, many experts believe that the current six-party talks will not persuade North Korea to completely denuclearise. The agenda of the talks caters to Pyongyang’s needs, with the DPRK offering to deal with the nuclear issue in return for a security guarantee for the regime, as well as economic aid to ensure its survival. However, highly enriched uranium is easy to hide and cannot be rooted out without North Korea’s complete commitment, which is unlikely.

On the other hand, any insurgency that might be caused by economic strangulation and consequent DPRK regime instability – or any North Korean offensive action in retaliation for economic sanctions – could easily escalate. In addition to the near-automatic involvement of both Koreas, China would almost certainly intervene. The risk of inter-state conflict on the Korean peninsula is still quite real.

China and Taiwan

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has deployed nearly a thousand short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and US forces based in Japan. Beijing claims that these missiles are intended to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence – but a surprise attack using hundreds of missiles is also regarded as an effective opening gambit for any attempt to seize Taiwan by force.

Further, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly procuring offensive weapon systems,
including an amphibious assault ship which will significantly improve the Chinese navy’s sealift and power projection capabilities. The PLA is also intensifying preparations for operations against Japan on the assumption that Tokyo would provide logistical support for any American intervention in a cross-Strait conflict.

In 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese territorial waters, and PLA electronic warfare planes have frequently violated Japan’s air defence zone. Measured by cases in which Japan’s Air Self-Defence Forces scrambled against PLA aircraft, the frequency of air intrusions by China’s air force jumped from 13 occasions in 2004 to 107 the following year. And in an unpleasant surprise in 2006, a submerged PLA attack submarine shadowed a Japan-based US aircraft carrier in the East China Sea undetected until the submarine surfaced.

These actions are allegedly for the purposes of collecting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) data and electronic intelligence. But the fact is that the PLA is intensifying actions that target US-Japan security cooperation, which is presently the only major obstacle to China’s ambition for unification with Taiwan by force.

Asian nuclear non-proliferation is a prime example of a pressing issue on which NATO and Japan could collaborate to good effect. A. Q. Khan’s network, revealed in 2004, was a global, clandestine syndicate of nuclear-related technology. In Asia, many weak or failed states involved in the network tend to also get involved in, or provide a base for, people- and drug-trafficking. Thus, when virtually failed states seek to possess weapons of mass destruction as deterrents to major powers, WMD proliferation and clandestine business merge to form a proliferation network.

All of this has happened against the background of rapid growth in China’s military spending over the last decade, with a 165 per cent rise in military expenditure since 1996. Beijing purchases large quantities of advanced weapons, including 43 per cent of all Russian arms exports in 2005. And in terms of the 2001 to 2005 aggregate imports of major weapons systems, China was ranked the top arms recipient with an import value of over US$13 billion.

China’s rapid military build-up of advanced weapon systems, recent large-scale military exercises with Russia linked to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO; current members are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), and repeated intrusions into Japanese airspace and territorial waters all suggest that the PLA’s preparations for the use of force against Taiwan are not a bluff.

A joint security agenda

NATO-Japanese cooperation has thus far been mainly focused on support to post-conflict recovery work such as reconstruction and peacekeeping in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Since the Cold War, NATO has mainly been engaged in post-conflict settlement work rather than deterrence or conflict prevention, a fundamental change in direction for the Alliance. That said, given its powerful military forces, the Alliance is still able to exercise its deterrent capability for the purpose of conflict prevention.

Asian nuclear non-proliferation is a prime example of a pressing issue on which NATO and Japan could collaborate to good effect. A. Q. Khan’s network, revealed in 2004, was a global, clandestine syndicate of nuclear-related technology. In Asia, many weak or failed states involved in the network tend to also get involved in, or provide a base for, people- and drug-trafficking. Thus, when virtually failed states seek to possess weapons of mass destruction as deterrents to major powers, WMD proliferation and clandestine business merge to form a proliferation network.

If this currently peculiar proliferation model – the combination of a military junta, isolationism, the “bunkerisation” of a capital, and WMD development, as in the cases of North Korea and Myanmar – spreads globally, it will pose a serious challenge to international security. It is therefore vital to find a comprehensive solution for the problem posed by the convergence of nuclear ambitions, trafficking, counterfeiting, etc.
This issue is beyond the scope of Asian efforts alone, and NATO-Japan cooperation could play a crucial preventive role. Measures could include such actions as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), cooperation for more effective border controls and economic containment of proliferators.

Another important potential area of cooperation is in the prevention of a cross-Strait conflict between China and Taiwan. Beijing’s current calculation that only the United States and Japan will intervene in defence of Taiwan, combined with PLA’s growing confidence, might well prompt the PRC to take military action.

But if other major powers and organisations such as NATO begin to communicate ‘strategic ambiguity’ to China – namely that those powers might support the United States against the PRC in any such conflict – Beijing would probably abandon its intention to use force against Taiwan.

In order to exercise effective deterrence, NATO should maintain a high degree of unity among its members and partners.

It is also worthwhile to note that since 9/11, China has been consistently upgrading the SCO from a regional conflict prevention organisation into a collective defence bloc. Recent joint military exercises, flows of oil resources and unregistered arms transfers between Shanghai Cooperation Organisation member nations, in combination with the organisation’s nuclear capability suggest that the SCO has the potential to become a major adversary to both Japan and NATO.

Steps for Japan

Japan’s unique political constraints prohibit it from maintaining any offensive or retaliatory military capability, but Tokyo has also set up a special commission to investigate whether Japan’s Constitution could be reinterpreted to ease some of the restraints on the roles and missions of the Self-Defence Forces.

In addition, Japan has upgraded international peacekeeping operations from their previous status as “supplementary” to “priority” missions for the Self-Defence Forces.

Tokyo is creating a new National Security Council to coordinate security policy across various ministries, which have not always communicated well with each other in the past.

And lastly, the Defence Ministry has recently been upgraded from the status of an agency to that of a full ministry.

Beyond these recent actions, the main viable measures Tokyo can take against such serious security concerns are to:

• reinforce US-Japanese security cooperation;
• increase partnership with NATO to ensure credible deterrence;
• improve the international security environment by increasing support to peacekeeping operations;
• contribute to peacemaking with economic and humanitarian aid; and
• remain firmly committed to international arms control and disarmament schemes.
In this context, Japan has been consistently expanding its contributions to major international security initiatives since the early 1990s. Closer collaboration with NATO is fully aligned with this set of measures.

**Steps for NATO**

In order to exercise effective deterrence, NATO should maintain a high degree of unity among its members and partners. If the Organisation overstretches its cooperation commitments with countries with widely differing positions, Alliance coherence might diminish. In other words, geographic expansion devoid of any overarching principle could be counterproductive for NATO, as would strong partnership with actors that do not share the fundamental values of democracy and human rights. In the worst case scenario, such partners could turn out to be ‘Trojan horses’ that would eventually erode NATO’s unity.

A coalition composed of partners who share basic values will, on the other hand, strengthen NATO’s implementation capacity and deterrent effect. In order to mitigate such risks and capitalise on resulting opportunities, NATO might decide to set up an affiliation system with two categories:

- active partnership for global “security-making” with countries that share fundamental Euro-Atlantic values; and
- association for the purposes of engagement and confidence-building with countries that do not adhere to Alliance principles, but are nevertheless significant actors in international or regional security.

Under such a scheme, Japan would fit into the first category, while Russia (or eventually China, if invited) could fit into the second. NATO could thus enhance confidence-building measures with some countries, while acting more vigorously for conflict-prevention with those close partners that share basic Euro-Atlantic values and commitments.

* * *

In summary, the NATO-Japan partnership, which has been developing steadily since the early 1990s, has entered into a new phase. In my view, it is time for Japan and the Alliance to assume greater responsibilities together, and to engage more actively to promote global security and peace.

The relationship is on the right track, but a clear joint vision and roadmap are needed in order to enable these crucial next steps.
Lieutenant General David Leakey, Director-General of the European Union Military Staff

As Director-General of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), British Army Lieutenant General David Leakey oversees early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the EU. The latter includes planning for the EU’s missions in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. From December 2004 to December 2005, General Leakey commanded the first EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, experiencing first-hand the Berlin Plus arrangements in practice.

NATO Review: What are your priorities as Director-General of the EU Military Staff?

General David Leakey: The military aspect of ESDP [European Security and Defence Policy] has been running for six years now and so, by comparison with NATO, it is still in its infancy. But it has got off to a good start organisationally, politically and militarily. It has delivered some really excellent results and, like any organisation, it is evolving.

My ambitions are first of all to make our organisation fit for purpose. In this changing world, the nature of the ESDP military missions has been quite diverse: Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo; then the adventure in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*; then Bosnia; and then the Congo again. These operations were all different in size and scale, in potential risks and in geographic distance from here. Congo – and we have been there twice – is not the same as ‘just down the road’ in the Balkans. So we need to be agile, because the next military operation is never the same as the last – and it is never the one you are expecting.

The second thing connected with operations – because that is first and foremost where we deliver – is that in NATO, in the UN and in EU capitals, we are talking about effects-based operations, comprehensive approach or global approach. It does not matter what you call it. I think we all know roughly what we are talking about: the integration of lines of activity between the military, economic, political, and judicial components, as well as the police. And it is only where one gets a good integrated effect that one can succeed in the areas of instability around the world.

So one of the things we are working hard at in the Secretariat is civil-military cooperation, civil-military staff work. We are in the process of readjusting one of the staff divisions here in order to better integrate the military capabilities in planning, support and work with civilian planning. That is something that we need to get better at within the Council Secretariat – getting the civilian and military planning together. We have been doing it for some time, actually. But we are trying to strengthen that integration.

One of my ambitions is to make the civil-military integration better, but not at the expense of compromising military capability. First of all, you need a critical mass of military planning staff to do the essentially military operations; both the uniquely military operations and the military parts of other types of operations. Second, we are not going to adopt a mindset in which civil-
military operations are all about tree-hugging, community relations and humanitarian projects.

The military’s essential contribution is to set the conditions. In order to set those conditions, one may have to have a fight, and the EU is prepared to do that. What we must do in generating civil-military integration and cooperation is to maintain sight of the fact that, first of all, we must retain critical mass for military planning, retain the military ethos; that of being a warrior. One may have to fight. One may have to take casualties. One may have to inflict casualties. And unless we are prepared to retain that as part of our ethos, then we are not militarily credible.

That leads on to the next ambition. Obviously, for operations, we must have the necessary capabilities.

My predecessors here made good progress in many areas in that regard.

First of all, the ‘battlegroup’ concept reached initial operating capability in 2005, and has been fully operational since January of this year. Two battlegroups are on call, ready to go at any time during their respective six-month periods, and we need to have agile command and control to manage that well. What we have now is not bad, but it could be better. Other concerns include the battlegroup’s enablers. Here, we face the same problem as NATO – strategic lift. Who is going to produce it? Who is going to fund it? Will it be available on the day?

We have done some really good work on the headline goals. In doing this, we have looked very carefully at how NATO has done its business with defence planning questionnaires, so we have been able to capitalise on the lessons learned from that work. We are doing it for a slightly different purpose, so we have slightly different requirements and have set different targets. This work has been an extremely profitable exercise. Now we are just getting to the stage where we can draw conclusions from it in terms of the catalogue capability shortfalls and gaps, and also to see whether we cannot use European industry in some discrete areas to achieve better interoperability and gap-filling. Here the European Defence Agency has a role to play.

So again, we are at a point where we have done very good work. Now we come to the difficult bit. We have done the mechanical part – producing the data. We need to use that data both in the EU Military Staff, amongst the member states and in the European Defence Agency. That has actually complicated the work, both from a staff point of view and also from a political perspective. So that is the challenge, and it is going to require a lot of hard work.

We are very small. The EU Military Staff has only 178 military people, and so we need to smarten the way we plan at the strategic level.
NR: What lessons were drawn from EUFOR in Congo last summer?

Gen. Leakey: Congo was a success. We got the EU deployed – a couple of thousand people out to a place a long way away, with an operational headquarters – and that was a great success. We put a force in theatre that did its job and returned. We had some luck, but every operation needs its share of luck. So it was a success. But one of the many lessons is that at the military strategic level, we need to smooth political-military planning within our mechanisms. And that means looking at any lessons learned immediately.

NR: When will the ‘lessons learned’ process be completed?

Gen. Leakey: In about ten years’ time. This is a serious point because we may not have the same operation again for another decade, and some of the lessons will not apply to the next four operations we do. Some of them will not apply unless we go to the Congo again. So when I say ten years’ time, that’s what I mean.

We need to be agile, because the next military operation is never the same as the last – and it is never the one you are expecting.

The first thing we’ve learned is that we must have these lessons available on an accessible database where we can find and retrieve them. So there is a process point here, and one of the things that we are doing is setting up a software-enhanced lessons-learned database. We have had a look at the NATO system, we have been to some member states and we looked at what they have, and we have optimised a solution which we think is going to be at the front edge of how these things are done. There is a lot of experience around, and as I say, the key thing is to be able to make the lessons accessible to the people who need them.

NR: What are your staff’s contacts and relationships with NATO like?

Gen. Leakey: We do have staff-to-staff contacts. Every single day I hear that my staff has had NATO people in here, or that we have been up to NATO to discuss any of a whole range of issues – everything from looking at each others’ lessons-learned databases to see how we do things, to the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution contract. We are sharing the responsibilities and partnership strategic airlift in Sudan.

Our cell in SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe], which gives us a common liaison there, and the NATO permanent liaison team in my headquarters here are working on technical agreements with NATO for the upcoming ESDP mission in Kosovo. We are also doing a lot of planning work for the ESDP police mission in Afghanistan with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRTs].

At the higher levels, the [EU and NATO] military committees meet together, the PSC-NAC [Political and Security Committee-North Atlantic Council] meet together, and the two secretary generals meet together. So are relations good? The answer is yes and no. When the [personal] relationships are good, then relations are good. And when they are not so good, well, then they need to be improved. If I think back to when I was in Bosnia as commander of EUFOR under Berlin Plus, I remember that we had some real challenges there – and the issues just need working through.

It is a credit to both organisations that the respective staffs take pride and demonstrate a bit of corporate identity – and we need to respect that. But actually, both at the political level and at the highest command levels there is openness and a realisation that we are all working towards the same overarching goal. I remember SACEUR [then
Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones] saying, “I am committed to making sure that the EUFOR operation is a success in Bosnia.” And down at the working levels, I can honestly say that it worked pretty well, and I think that is the same for both the Kosovo and Afghanistan planning. There will be some teething problems at the start to divide up and sort out. For example, the issue of who is going to pay. Or of who really has the responsibility. Or whether we need to get political clearance of the staff arrangement that we are making.

These things were the same, for example, when the EU worked with the UN in the recent operation. And they were the same when NATO and the EU collaborated in Kosovo. It takes a bit of time, too, because each organisation and every context is different.

People only hear the bad news stories. When a NATO or an EU official says that things have gone from bad to worse in any given situation, then it may well have been on one subject on a particular day. In my view, the general trend is onwards and upwards.

NR: As far as capabilities are concerned, what is the division of labour between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EUMS?

Gen. Leakey: There is not an absolutely concrete, black-and-white dividing line between the two. In fact, if there was, then we should start worrying because, for example, all of our work that is going on in the capability area feeds into the EDA. So there is a dialogue. There are people from the EDA working in here who bring stuff out of the EUMS on a daily basis, and we have got our own guys over in the EDA talking about other things and feeding into that organisation.

When we hand data or information, requirements that we have identified, lessons learned, from the EUMS to the EDA, they take and use them for some of their own agendas, like capability gaps, research and development. The EDA looks at the long term and tries to extrapolate using our lessons learned and our doctrine work.

It is a cooperative thing and I think it is rather good. On some things we have to work in very close partnership. For example, with network-enhanced capability and information exchange requirements, there is a lot of work that the EDA cannot do unless the EUMS establishes the baseline for it.

They have a different set of outputs – based on research and capability – in terms of equipment, development and so on. That is EDA’s objective. The EUMS’ output and delivery is operational. The EDA’s is some way out in the future. Ours tend to
be here and now. But one cannot live without the other.

NR: As far as coordination with NATO is concerned, how is the NATO Response Force (NRF) deconflicted from the EU battlegroups?

Gen. Leakey: The battlegroups are discrete – they are assigned for EU use only during their rotation. Each battlegroup is uniquely assigned when it comes onto the roster. It is not double-hatted. So if there is a place where, for example, a catastrophe breaks out, we might be invited by the UN to go and put in a bridging operation until the UN accomplishes its force generation. Then we would ring up one of the battlegroups which is allocated for EU use. So there is no conflict. The battlegroups on the roster are available, and they are not assigned to anyone else.

NR: As the first commander of EUFOR in Bosnia, how did Berlin Plus work in practice?

Gen. Leakey: From the very outset, Berlin Plus worked because the Secretary General and SACEUR passed a message down the NATO chain of command that Berlin Plus was to work. And so there was, first of all, the political will and a real can-do spirit. Second, it worked because many of the people on the ground in SFOR [NATO Stabilisation Force], both in the headquarters and out in the force, transferred across into EUFOR. That really helped, made it easier. So the spirit was right.

We learned some lessons about cost-sharing agreements, intelligence-sharing and some procedural points. We also learned lessons about having a clear delineation of tasks whenever there are NATO and EU military operations in the same theatre.

We had a seamless transition from SFOR into EUFOR, continuous access to the intelligence databases and generally good transfers of intelligence. We had no interruption in CIS [communication and information system] provision for headquarters EUFOR, which was achieved under Berlin Plus. We were running rehearsals for the operation reserve into Bosnia, which was coordinated by the EU and NATO. That worked pretty well.

But what is interesting about the EUFOR operation down in Bosnia is that the EU took over that operation from NATO for a variety of reasons. NATO thought that it was the right time, that they had done their bit. The juncture where Bosnia had reached was that it needed an all-EU integrated solution for the future. So it made sense to hand the military aspect as well as the civilian fields over to the growing EU presence.

NR: With the downsizing of EUFOR, given how small the force is becoming, is Berlin Plus even necessary anymore?

Gen. Leakey: Berlin Plus is still necessary because there are shared reserves. That is critical. Berlin Plus
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still works because a lot of the command and control from Brussels down to the operation headquarters is still provided by SHAPE. That is Berlin Plus. You cannot get around that.

NR: So this could not be done by an EU operational headquarters?

Gen. Leakey: It could, but there is no point in changing the command and control framework now. For the Berlin Plus organisation with the operational headquarters, it works very well. It ain’t broke, so don’t fix it.

NR: Is the EUMS planning the Afghanistan and Kosovo missions and their coordination with the NATO forces there?

Gen. Leakey: Yes, but there is a civilian lead because these are civilian operations – police, justice and rule of law missions – that are going into Kosovo and Afghanistan. Civilian, not military. But we are providing support for the planning and preparation of those missions, support which will cover a whole spectrum of things which ensure that civilian planners who are experts in the police, rule of law and justice fields know exactly what they are trying to do, what their objectives are. But there are also things which we can help with. For example, ensuring that they have thought through the CIS implications and that have they have a good plan for that CIS. And that they have thought through the security situation on the ground and made the necessary arrangements, particularly with NATO, for their own security and protection. The military knows very well what the intelligence considerations are, the availability of databases. Have we made good technical arrangements to have access to databases? Have we got the right people, and the right clearances?

There are a whole lot of things which the military can do to help the civilians better plan their operations. We can provide planning expertise, experience, knowledge and sometimes direct planning support – because that is what we do all the time. For example, in the Aceh mission in Indonesia, more than half the people were military because, under the circumstances, they were the right people to be doing the job. That required some military advice in the planning and construct of the mission. It was not a military mission, but that is a way to make a civilian mission more effective: give them more structured planning, a stronger plan and access to some of the available support.

But that is not to prejudice the civilian leadership of the civilian missions, nor is it to prejudice the ethos of the military force that must be prepared to fight. Even in the most benign deterrence, reassurance or peacekeeping operation, when a soldier gets shot at, for him it is high intensity warfare. He needs to be able to do all the right things at the right time and not say: “Well, I thought I was here peacekeeping. Where is the peace?”

In this world of extraordinary instability, many wars don’t end up with a result. We usually stop them halfway through. And it is in those areas of instability that our soldiers have to project themselves. They must be prepared to fight if necessary, if they come under attack or if there is a serious protection issue where they need to become a little bit offensive in their defence.

Whether it is in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, there are never going to be enough carabinieri, gendarmes, customs people, border patrols or advance people, and some of these jobs are not necessarily out of the combat handbook, but soldiers need to be adaptive.
At the November 2006 Riga Summit, Alliance Heads of State and Government launched the NATO Training Cooperation Initiative as a way of sharing Allied training expertise with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Partners from the broader Middle East. To this end, NATO intends to build an expanding network of NATO training activities that will modernise defence structures and train security forces through an evolutionary and phased approach.

This initiative is part of the Alliance’s continuing transformation of its capabilities and relationships in response to an ever more complex security environment. Today, NATO is engaged in operations and missions across three continents ranging from crisis response operations to training missions and disaster and humanitarian relief operations. In addition, the Alliance maintains partnerships, dialogue and cooperation at varying levels of intensity with close to forty countries, making the family of Allies and Partners a group that comprises one third of United Nations member states. And NATO is pursuing ever-closer consultations and cooperation with other international and non-governmental organisations, both at the strategic level and in theatre.

Cooperation through education

The Alliance is playing an increasing role in educational and training initiatives that help non-Allied countries reform their defence structures and make their armed forces more interoperable with Allied militaries. NATO can build on the considerable experience and expertise gained in training and educating Partner militaries and security forces in the context of its various partnership and cooperation activities, making use of a well-established and unique array of NATO, Allied and Partner facilities.

At the same time, education and training have become part of NATO’s operational activities. The Alliance, for example, is directly involved in the training of Iraqi Security Forces through the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. It is also providing support to the training of Afghan security forces through NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and, more broadly, through a substantial programme of long-term cooperation recently agreed between NATO and Afghanistan. Finally, the Alliance has contributed to building the capacity of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) through, among other things, the provision of staff training.

In this context, Allies began consideration of a NATO Training Initiative for military forces of non-Allied countries and international organisations in the regions of Europe, the Middle East and Africa. With the Alliance’s commitment to strengthening relations with the broader Middle East made at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 as a basis, Allied Heads of State and Government endorsed at Riga
the creation of an expanding network of training activities for the mutual benefit of MD/ICI Partners and Allies.

A key objective is to help interested countries make their military forces more capable and interoperable with those of Allies. Other possible objectives, if mutually desired, could include assisting those countries in the fight against terrorism and in the modernisation of their defence structures.

From an Alliance perspective, several principles underlie these objectives. Activities should be in the mutual interest of Allies and Partners, undertaken in the spirit of joint ownership, and demand-driven. They should also build on existing structures and programmes, add value to existing bilateral and multilateral programmes, and avoid duplication. These principles require transparency and coordination with other national and international players, including the United Nations and the European Union. Other principles include, *inter alia*, inclusiveness, non-discrimination, and self-differentiation.

A gradual approach

The precise manner of the Training Initiative’s implementation is still being decided. In setting up this expanding network of NATO training activities, NATO would build on existing structures and programmes in an evolutionary and gradual manner consisting of distinct but related phases. An initial phase could possibly include:

• Expanded MD/ICI partners’ participation in relevant existing training and education programmes at NATO education facilities, such as the NATO Defense College in Rome; the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany; and the NATO Communications and Information Systems School in Latina, Italy; as well as national PfP Training Centres and Centres of Excellence.

• Expanded MD/ICI Partners’ participation in other existing or developing partnership programmes, such as the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP), the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), or Education and Training for Defence Reform and the Partnership Real-Time Information, Management, and Exchange System (e-PRIME).

• The establishment of a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defense College for short staff courses tailored to MD/ICI Partners and for modular courses at NATO, Allied, and PfP facilities open to officers and civilians from NATO and MD/ICI countries and, if offered, at appropriate facilities in the region.

As a second phase, NATO could consider supporting the establishment of a security cooperation centre in the region. This centre would be owned by the MD/ICI countries and could receive funding from within the region and NATO assistance. At Riga, Allies made clear that a decision on contributing to the establishment of such a NATO-supported centre in the region would require further preparatory work with the MD/ICI Partners. It would also depend on overall political and security considerations and the lessons learnt from the initial phase, in particular the conduct of possible modular courses at facilities in the region.

Various levels of Alliance involvement in such a security cooperation centre are conceivable. If, for example, there were a preference for a low level of NATO involvement, an institution similar to a PfP Training Centre could be created in the region. An example of a ‘medium’ level of involvement would be an institution such as the Baltic Defence College. By contrast, the heaviest possible form of NATO involvement would probably entail the
establishment of a NATO Middle Eastern Security Cooperation Centre patterned on the NATO Defense College. These models themselves could be seen as alternatives, or as steps in an evolutionary process.

The phased approach outlined here has the advantage of a network-based method that provides flexibility, keeps options open with regard to the ultimate level of ambition, allows for lessons to be learnt by Allies and MD/ICI Partners alike, and facilitates the “jointness” of the endeavour.

Regarding the latter, some MD/ICI partners have shown interest in the joint development and instruction of possible courses and modules. This reflects their desire for a Training Cooperation Initiative that is a two-way street, with Allied personnel benefiting from Partners’ expertise and experience in relevant fields in a way that underscores the joint ownership of the Initiative.

So far, discussions have focused on training activities targeted at mid- to senior-level military and defence officials in a wide range of areas including, *inter alia*:
- defence reform, defence budgeting, and defence planning;
- military education, training and doctrine;
- the operational aspects of peace support operations;
- interoperability;
- the response to terrorism;
- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- civil emergency planning;
- “civil-military relations” as defined by MD/ICI Istanbul Summit documents;
- language training;
- logistics;
- the military aspects of border security; and
- crisis management.

While potential partners in this Initiative are generally supportive of these topics, there is particular interest in interoperability, maritime cooperation, crisis management, illegal trafficking, and border security. Further discussions are necessary to better define specific partner interests and to ensure that topics match NATO objectives and expertise.

The implementation of such an Initiative will require substantial financial and human resources at a time of high demand for NATO training and education facilities. Allies believe that employing a network-based approach could help balance potential partners’ training and education requirements with...
budgetary factors. Creative solutions are required which could include voluntary national contributions to fill faculty slots or to staff mobile training teams as well as voluntary funding (trust funds) to which Allies and Partners of the Initiative as well as third countries could contribute.

In addition, public diplomacy efforts taking into account regional and local sensitivities will need to be developed together with MD/ICI Partners. These efforts should also make clear that such an Initiative would serve the interests of all parties involved.

Moreover, security and safety issues should be fully taken into account in evaluating the various elements of the Initiative. In general, these issues would vary according to the location of the training activity, with host nations providing security.

The way ahead

Further work is required on many of the aforementioned issues, both within the Alliance and in close consultation with MD/ICI Partners. While care should be taken that the implementation of the Initiative is carried forward at a pace that is comfortable for all actors involved, it is important to maintain momentum by taking the first steps toward ‘phase one’ activities soon. The evolutionary character of the approach will facilitate timely implementation.

Joint ownership of the Initiative is crucially important as an incentive for Partners to get involved. It is also important in winning over public opinion and in overcoming lingering misperceptions and mistrust. Last but not least, it potentially enlarges the room for manoeuvre in terms of resources.

This Initiative and the other partnership efforts as well as the Alliance’s operational role in this field show clearly that training and education, as part of defence and security sector reform and capacity building, are becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s activities. Many countries and regional and international organisations both inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic arena have shown a growing interest in the unique capabilities the Alliance can offer.

Looking ahead, it is not too bold to predict that the Alliance will be faced with further requests for cooperation and support in this field, both in the context of intensifying the efforts in the framework of its various partnerships and as part of its operations and missions. NATO’s preparation for such activities will require both further transformation within NATO and progress in the way NATO cooperates with the United Nations, the European Union, non-governmental organisations and local actors.
Ten years of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: A personal reflection

Robert F. Simmons Jr gives an insider’s view of the genesis and evolution of NATO’s main Partnership forum.

One of the key areas of NATO’s transformation has been the creation of the Alliance’s Partnerships. In my work, I have been fortunate to have been involved in many of the stages of this development.

In 1991, after the end of the Cold War, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a means of reaching out to the countries that had been members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as to the new states born from the demise of the Soviet Union. As a member of NATO’s Political Committee, I participated in early visits to many of these NACC Partners, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, the Baltic states and Russia.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, inaugurated in 1994, integrated more Partners and a wide range of defence cooperation, including interoperability and defence reform. But the membership and new policy areas handled by the PfP were not perfectly aligned with the Partnership for Peace’s practical cooperation. So we linked membership in the EAPC to participation in PfP, and the two are entirely complementary institutions.

Based on this work, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was established by Allied and Partner ministers in Sintra, Portugal, on 30 May 1997. The EAPC reflects a common purpose and ownership that goes beyond military interoperability – it is constructed on the basis of fundamental, common values.

The Council has helped to create an impressive network of Euro-Atlantic political leaders, diplomats, soldiers and civil servants, who now have a shared experience of discussions within the EAPC, and of having worked and solved problems together.

In short, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides an important contribution toward a common, Euro-Atlantic security culture based on enhanced political dialogue and practical cooperation between Allies and Partners. With 26 Allies and 23 Partners as members, the EAPC speaks with the authority of 49 states.
When we were developing the Basic Document, our goal was to design a flexible structure that could evolve with changing circumstances — the founding document talks of a “process that will develop through practice”. It was meant to be inclusive, but simultaneously to allow each individual Partner the right to set the pace of its own engagement.

In addition to regular plenary meetings at ministerial, ambassadorial and working levels, the Basic Document allowed Partners to develop a direct political relation with the Alliance both individually and/or in sub-groups of EAPC members. In the jargon we referred to “Allies (then 16, now) 26; plus one and plus ’n’”.

The political discussions and practical cooperation which take place within the EAPC/PfP framework:

• enable cooperation between the 49 states;
• facilitate reform of their military and relevant defence institutions; and
• assist in the education and training of individuals from those countries in both Allied and Partner institutions.

Ultimately, this translates into the ability to act and operate effectively together, and can lead to integration in various areas between the states concerned. In these and other ways, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council assists its members in strengthening and extending peace and stability.

During its ten years of existence, the EAPC has already helped to prepare ten nations for the responsibilities of NATO membership. Other Partner countries are currently following the same path, a fact which proves that the door to NATO membership remains open.

Yet the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has also provided a unique instrument for countries which are not seeking NATO membership to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security without compromising their own distinct foreign and security policies. Monthly meetings at ambassadorial level within the EAPC Political Committee (PC) ensure regular dialogue between all members on the important issues of the day. These meetings also offer an opportunity to develop common thinking and consider new areas of cooperation.

Viewed over the decade since its inception, the development of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is striking. The practical focus of both the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace is on preparing the military forces of Allies and Partners to work together seamlessly.

Thirteen of the 18 non-NATO contributing nations (NNCNs) participating in NATO-led operations are EAPC members. Nine EAPC countries are contributing approximately 2300 personnel to NATO-led operations in the Balkans. And nine Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council members are contributing about 780 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Partners are also engaged in Operation Active Endeavour, a maritime action against terrorist threats in the Mediterranean.

One of the most successful aspects of implementation of the EAPC has been the Political Military Frame (PMF) for contributing Partners to participate in the decision-making process for these Allied missions. Both the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) meet in the format of Allies plus contributing states – the most successful implementation of “Allies plus n” meetings.

Partners who contribute to NATO missions are also involved in developing Operational Plans (OPLANs) and Periodic Mission Reviews (PMRs) for those missions. Many Partner participants in operations would like to see even greater involvement at earlier stages of the decision-making process, and a recent
advance has been the inception of meetings of the Military Committee with contributing states.

Following the shocking events of 11 September 2001, the EAPC and PfP have provided a framework for the participating nations to respond together to the threat of terrorism.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council's evolution reflects the needs and wishes of both Allied and Partner members, and has been given clear direction by heads of state and government through the summits held in Prague, Istanbul and (most recently) Riga.

The Partners played a particularly active role in developing the Partnership paper adopted at the Prague Summit. Regrettably, the time for consultations with Partners declined before both the Istanbul and Riga Summits because of disagreements among the Allies. From the start, the EAPC was intended to represent the joint ownership of both Allies and Partners. But maintaining that principle requires constant work – and we have not always been successful.

I returned to NATO as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Partnership as we were preparing for the Istanbul Summit. The Summit focused on the Partners of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and it was agreed to appoint resident liaison officers stationed in each region to assist the Partners who were more geographically distant from NATO Headquarters. This has been a particularly successful step. The resident officers, often co-located in Partner ministries, have significantly advanced Partner participation in EAPC and PfP programmes.

In addition, it was decided to appoint a Special Representative for these two regions. I was given that job, which I have tried to fulfil by maintaining high-level political contacts with the leaders in each of the relevant Partner countries.

Even more important was the development of new instruments focused on fulfilling the mandate in the EAPC Basic Document that permits countries to develop a direct and individual political relationship with the Alliance. The very successful use of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) has stimulated defence reform in aspirant and other Partner countries. PARP has helped many nations to build modern, effective and democratically responsible armed forces, as well as other defence institutions.

With the Istanbul Summit, Partner countries were invited to agree common goals with NATO in Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). These plans:

- include political and economic reform goals;
- carry over and expand PARP objectives in defence reform;
- set goals for cooperation in other areas, such as Civil Emergency Planning and Science;
- and, perhaps most importantly, suggest to Partner countries to set up an interagency process to manage these goals collectively.
Reviewed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), IPAPs also give the Partners a schedule for active political dialogue with NATO, and bring Partner ministers to Brussels regularly to discuss security and other concerns. Five EAPC Partner countries have active IPAPs, and more are considering them.

The November 2006 Riga Summit Declaration emphasised the enduring value that NATO attaches to its Partnerships, and reconfirmed the directions set by previous summits. These include a focus on priorities, operations and strengthening NATO’s ability to work practically with Partners; combined with continued close attention to the observance by Partners of the commitments they made and values they adhered to upon joining the EAPC and the PfP.

The Riga Summit also marked a significant step in the evolution of the EAPC, and of Partnership relations with south-eastern Europe, by extending the invitation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia to join the Council and the PfP. The three countries are now in the process of integrating fully within the relevant structures.

This development brings substantially enhanced relations with these countries, and allows for comprehensive and inclusive discussions on the region amongst Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council members. Extending the invitations at the Riga Summit, NATO heads of state and government reaffirmed the importance they attach to the principles set out in the EAPC and PfP Basic Documents. Notably, the NATO members also expected Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

A key result of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’s success is that it has become the model and furnished the tools for NATO Partnerships with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) nations of the Gulf, and an expanding range of other countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and Japan.

As we greet this ten-year mark, we can look back on a record of achievement. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has been a catalyst for domestic transformation and of international security cooperation on an unprecedented scale. NATO has always been at the core of this endeavour. However, over the years, the EAPC and Partnership have also moved towards the core of NATO’s business.

Looking to the future, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will continue to evolve along the lines set out at the Prague, Istanbul and Riga Summits, and ongoing review of the process will continue to ensure that the full potential of Partnership is realised. Flexible consultation and practical cooperation focused on nations’ priorities are essential to achieving this goal.

Procedures and programmes are being simplified and opened more widely, and EAPC members have spent time reflecting on and prioritising the issues that they wish to address. But the Allies must do more to ensure that our EAPC Partners have a real sense of co-ownership – co-ownership which was intended by the Basic Document whose tenth anniversary we are commemorating.

The active pursuit of such an approach has been demonstrated by the success of the January 2007 PfP Planning Symposium. It was also evident in the commitment of EAPC ambassadors and of nations within the EAPC PC to enhancing the practical value of consultations. And lastly it was shown by the agenda of the June EAPC Security Forum meeting, which allowed participants to engage in detailed exchanges about how to address the security challenges currently facing NATO and the EAPC.

The agenda for the continued evolution of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership must be ambitious. The evidence of the last decade shows what can be achieved. And our common aim – to strengthen and extend peace and stability – provides a compelling motivation.
The Alliance’s lesson in ‘Solidarity’

Lech Wałęsa reminisces on the tenth anniversary of NATO’s membership invitation to Poland.

The path of Poland and other countries of the former Eastern bloc towards membership of the North Atlantic Alliance was neither easy nor short – and the journey did not go smoothly, either.

The biggest obstacle was posed by the fact that the West was not psychologically prepared for us. For a long period after 1989, it remained focused on the old times and an outdated, confrontational way of thinking. The West failed to notice that the geopolitical environment had changed dramatically and that, with tearing down of the Iron Curtain, we had symbolically begun a new era. A global era, governed by different rules, where we all live increasingly close to each other.

The West could not at first comprehend that the enlargement was not to be directed against anyone; that it needed to be an answer for new global challenges. It was also meant to be a contemporary expression of international solidarity. During the time of the Cold War and confrontation between the two blocs, the dominant perception was the following: what was good for us had to be damaging for our adversary; and the other way round: what was good for the adversary had to be damaging for us. Statisticians call this a zero-sum game. In a game of cards, for example, one can win only as much as the opponent loses.

Yet politics is governed by different rules. There are cases where both sides win. In the new global era this has a specific and tangible meaning. That round of the Alliance’s enlargement – and I hope, the subsequent ones – was not carried out to pose a threat to anyone, but rather was meant to leave no space for confrontation, to take control of the situation and to expand the area of security. For a no-man’s land is the worst possible thing. Various parties always fight for a no-man’s land. The no-man’s land tempts all to take it over; to conquer it. It becomes a bone of contention. And contention can easily evolve into a conflict.

Does it mean that we are totally secure now? Of course not. In North Korea and in Cuba there are still islands of communism. And yet, we are not only menaced by external threats. The Chernobyl disaster has shown us how threatening our own technology can be for our ecology – and those kinds of threats do not ask for passports or visas. Nevertheless, to estimate their true scale, we have to think globally. The world without borders in which we now live must have as its foundations as precise rules as possible, on necessary regulations. This is also a role for the Alliance. The more countries it encompasses, the better and more effectively it will do its job.

NATO’s enlargement was not, is not now and will not be directed against anyone. Now, the old saying that ‘American boys will die for Gdansk’ is without foundation. On the contrary, had the enlargement process not continued, the situation could have evolved towards a confrontation, possibly resulting from a resurgence of the two old blocs. Then those boys might have had to die. We cannot let this happen. I live in Gdansk – and I do not wish anyone to have to die for my hometown.

At the time that NATO was being enlarged to encompass Poland and other countries, there were people who argued that the enlargement would entail expenditures and that the American or the western European taxpayer would have to bear the costs. None of this has happened – the decisions on further enlargement of the Alliance have been primarily political in nature.

This is of course not to say that there have been no economic effects. But let us look closer at them. The economic effects can be seen in the Polish armed forces. Willingly or not, they need to be modernised – this is inevitable for any military force, as equipment ages quickly, and

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it rapidly ceases to meet the Alliance’s requirements. So we have to buy new equipment. The question is where we buy it – in Russia or in the United States.

Any answer to this question must take into account more than only political and economic relations. It will also decide which country is to make money on the export, and whose employees will have orders, jobs and earnings. The enlargement process has been profitable for the American and the western European entrepreneur, employee, and – consequently – for the taxpayer. We live in a globalised world, a world of increasing interdependence. Therefore, all benefits are in the end mutual and even multilateral. I will not dwell on the strictly political or military dimensions of these benefits.

Finally, ten years after the decision to enlarge the Alliance, let me now reconstruct the context and true significance of the enlargement round that enabled Poland’s participation. Drawing from my personal recollections, I will remind you that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland was a prerequisite for Poland’s membership, for it is impossible to admit into NATO a country in which foreign troops are stationed – particularly if they are the troops of a nation that had been the Alliance’s adversary for the last 50 years.

Politics is governed by different rules – there are cases where both sides win

I remember a very emotional moment when, on 17 September 1993 (a symbolic date in its own right) the last Russian soldier was leaving our country. A dozen or so military men and women, having been bidden farewell at the courtyard of the Belvedere [the then residence of the President of Poland], marched across the street to the Russian embassy. But the last soldier didn’t follow the others; after passing through gate, he simply broke step and turned to walk down the street. Maybe there was some symbolism there.

Another memorable story relates to the so-called Warsaw Declaration signed by Boris Yeltsin in August 1993. Especially today, when we are still mourning the first President of Russia, this anecdote is worth recalling. There he was, signing the document and – in front of cameras from all over the world – stating that Russia had nothing against Poland’s accession to NATO. The West did not grasp the full significance of this event, as it was not psychologically prepared for it. Knowing this, the Russians later tried to back out of the statement, but we held tight to the words for several years, as we had to wait for some time yet to enter the security zone of the North Atlantic Alliance. Still, we already had our foot in the door. And, as in the past when the worker’s shoe, stuck in the doors of liberty, had finally kicked the doors open, then – after years of hard work and struggle – we were admitted to the Alliance as equals.

Today, ten years after this momentous and historic decision to enlarge NATO, our Allies can say with full confidence that it was worth doing. And we, Poles, are able to state with clear conscience that we have carried our share of the Alliance’s load. Together, we have to show determination to ensure that the Alliance’s lesson of solidarity continues to bear fruit for the world, responding to the challenges of the global era.
The 40th anniversary of the Harmel Report

Lawrence S. Kaplan explores the document’s origins, impact and long-term significance.

In the almost sixty-year history of NATO, there have been few milestones that portended major changes in the direction of the Alliance. The two most visible have been the Korean War with its impact on the structure of the organisation between 1950 and 1952 and the implosion of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 that began with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. A third major change had as much impact on intra-Alliance relations as it had on the Cold War: the Harmel Report of 1967. Now forty years old, the Harmel initiative reflected the influence of the smaller members of the Alliance upon the larger powers, particularly upon the superpower, the United States. NATO’s acceptance of the message in that report blunted centrifugal pressures that might have led to the Alliance’s dissolution. It also set NATO on a course that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War.

Pierre Harmel, Belgium’s foreign minister, initiated the “Harmel exercise” in 1966 “to study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace.” The resulting report to the Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December 1967 has rightly gone down in NATO history as the voice of smaller nations urging détente as well as defence be equally the Alliance’s major functions in the immediate future. Recognising the continuing potential for crises, particularly over the German question, the report did not overlook the importance of “adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression.” But its main thrust was to recognise that the Allies must work toward a more stable relationship in which political issues, especially the status of the Germanies, could be resolved. The assumption in this report was that there were signs that Soviet and East European policymakers saw advantages in working toward a stable settlement in Europe. Détente was a means to this end.

The spade work for the report was not confined to members of the smaller powers. Among the rapporteurs of the four sub-groups of a special group that the North Atlantic Council established under then-Secretary General Manlio Brosio were Karl Schutz, J.H.A. Watson, and Foy Kohler from the respective foreign offices of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. Watson and Schutz led the sub-group 1 on East-West relations, while Kohler was rapporteur for sub-group 2 on general defence. Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak chaired sub-group 3 on inter-Allied relations, and Dutch Professor C.L. Patijn of the University of Utrecht served in sub-group 4 on developments outside the NATO area. The presence of American, British, and German diplomats in the framing of the Harmel report was all-important to converting Harmel’s initial interest in a strictly European caucus into a broader programme embracing the entire Alliance; emphasising European solidarity against US pressure was too narrow a focus.

The written reports of the sub-groups, begun in April 1967 and completed by September, were the
The substance of the International Staff Secretariat’s summary document presented to the foreign ministers in December. Rather than entitling the report “The Future of the Alliance”, they called it “Future Tasks of the Alliance” to remind the Allies that the Alliance’s mission would continue beyond its twentieth birthday in 1969.

This collaboration among large and small powers in the working group reflected a major shift from the atmosphere that had produced the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Collaboration in NATO in 1956. The “Wise Men’s” report was essentially a cri de coeur of smaller nations that had felt excluded from the decision-making process. They were asking for genuine collaboration in NATO councils. That report was overshadowed by the Suez crisis which in itself was an illustration of the marginalisation of the smaller NATO Allies. While the Council endorsed the report in May 1957, its specific recommendation of “expanded cooperation and consultation in early stages of policy formation” was largely ignored over the following decade.

Why détente was to occupy such an important place in NATO’s history and why the smaller nations’ voices came to be heard more clearly by the mid-1960s were both consequences of the changing geopolitical scene. Just as the Anglo-French Suez debacle deflected attention from the advice of the Three Wise Men, so a host of events within the Alliance and between the two blocs served to promote the goals of the Harmel Report. A primary agent was the sense that the Cold War had entered a new stage with the ending of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Berlin crisis in 1964. In both these circumstances the Soviet Union withdrew from the brink of war—in Cuba by withdrawing its missiles from the island and in Berlin by signing a treaty with the German Democratic Republic that omitted mention of the status of West Berlin.

The result was an assumption, particularly among the European Allies, that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc were increasingly moving toward normal, if often adversarial, relations with NATO. The language of the Harmel report suggests that the subsequent relaxation of tensions would not be “the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement.”

Charles de Gaulle’s France provided a second though unwitting element in the background of the Harmel Report. By withdrawing from the military structure of the Alliance, President de Gaulle signalled his belief that military confrontation with the Soviet bloc was a thing of the past, and that the Soviet Union could be treated not as an abnormal entity seeking the destruction of the West but as a potential partner in a new European order. Continuing defence measures would be irrelevant in this scenario for the future of Europe.

The Harmel report in this context represented NATO’s response to the Gaullist challenge. The report made clear that the success of the military pillar made détente possible. Building on this foundation, NATO could develop credible means of expanding political and economic contacts with the Warsaw bloc. While de Gaulle agreed with détente as the means of achieving a new relationship with
the Soviet adversary, he was dissatisfied with the role the North Atlantic Council would have in coordinating national policies to achieve this objective. The problem was resolved when France agreed to the general concept of political consultation without having to accept the prospect of an integrated political structure. Rather than risk further isolation within the Alliance, France reluctantly agreed to a downsized version of the working groups’ specific recommendations. The result was a document that consisted of only 17 paragraphs.

France’s withdrawal from SHAPE also opened opportunities for the smaller nations to raise their voices in the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group without the threat of France’s opposition. The United States cultivated the Nuclear Planning Group in particular as a substitute for the failed Multilateral Force. While nuclear weapons would not be owned by Europeans, there would be European participation, even if limited, in nuclear planning. All the Allies with the exception of France would acquire information about nuclear matters that had been denied prior to 1966. The collegiality requested in the Three Wise Men’s report gave the smaller nations a stake in the future of NATO that they had previously lacked. Harmel’s name on the report was a symbol of genuine change.

For its part, the United States recognised that the Vietnam War was weakening the nation’s role in NATO as well as creating internal tensions within the nation itself. Détente looked to be an opportunity for the United States to extract itself from the Vietnam morass. America’s reasons for promoting détente were not identical with Europe’s. Nor was there full consensus over its meaning. American policymakers did not share the conviction that the Cold War had evolved to the extent that détente could achieve equal status with defence in NATO’s relations with the Soviet bloc. But strained domestic circumstances along with hopes of European and Soviet help in resolving the Vietnam conflict at the time of the Harmel report made it imperative that the United States accept its parameters. The trans-Atlantic superpower had lost some of its authority by the end of the decade but its participation in NATO remained vital to the success of détente as well as to the continuing defence of the Alliance.

The Harmel Report’s pressure for détente discomforted the United States even as it was compelled to recognise its necessity. Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer was concerned that the Allies had accepted the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with excessive equanimity, and had qualms about the Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Ostpolitik was a by-product of the German decision in the Harmel negotiations to play down the issue of reunification in favour of improving relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union.
Under other conditions the United States might have opposed the Federal Republic’s approach to East Germany. But in the shadow of the Vietnam War, the spirit of détente was seen as a means of solidifying American links to its Allies as well as easing the way out of Vietnam. Moreover, the Nixon administration embraced its own version of détente as National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought to tie the Soviet Union into a balance-of-power system rather than banish it beyond the diplomatic pale.

The Soviet bloc’s violent overthrow of the Dubček government in Prague in August 1968 reminded NATO of the continuing need for defence preparations. It did not, however, divert the Allies from following the recommendations of the Reykjavik declaration at the North Atlantic Council meeting in June 1968 by signalling an interest in pursuing mutual and balanced force reductions. Brandt’s initiative seemed to open the way for negotiations for mutual and balanced troop reductions in Vienna in 1973. In the same year the Harmel Report inspired the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that produced the Helsinki Final agreement of 1975. Unlike their behaviour at the Vienna talks, the Soviets were anxious to conclude an agreement to legitimise their post-war boundaries. But the Helsinki arrangements also provided an agreement to uphold human rights and extend freedom of information in all signatory countries.

The ripple effects of the Harmel Report spread through the 1970s and into the 1980s as arms control was an ongoing subject of negotiations between East and West. The initial wave of optimism over détente ended by the mid-1970s when the Soviets and NATO engaged in a new arms build-up, but the seeds sown by the Harmel report remained fertile. Concern about détente may be found in the dual track initiative of 1979 when NATO linked the deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe to renewed efforts in arms control. The American guarantee to Europe’s defence was balanced by its commitment to work toward an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union joined the United States a decade later to terminate the Cold War, they were, in effect, responding to the Harmel Report’s message.

For the text of The Future Tasks of the Alliance (“The Harmel Report”), see: www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt/b671213a.htm
On 10 March 1966, in a memo addressed to the 14 other NATO nations, the French government announced its intention to withdraw French personnel from the NATO integrated military headquarters, to terminate the assignment of French forces to international commands and to request the removal from French territory of NATO’s headquarters, Allied units, and other facilities and bases which were not under French authority. But France did not question the Washington Treaty, and wished for the Atlantic Alliance to continue.

The French announcement hit international relations like a thunderclap. Since returning to power as the leader of the country in 1958, General de Gaulle had wanted to reform the Organisation – in particular, NATO’s nuclear policy, integrated command structure and the leadership role of the United States – but not the Alliance itself. The treaty signed in Washington in 1949 had brought together a group of nations to face the threat from the Soviet Union. The Organisation, as it was established between 1950 and 1954 by a decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), was to be led by an American general in peacetime. It was tasked with setting up an integrated command structure, drawing up operational plans for the forces deployed in Europe and coordinating the training and integration of those forces.

As early as March 1959, General de Gaulle had refused to integrate France’s air defences into the NATO system, had withdrawn the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO control and prohibited the United States from stationing its nuclear weapons and associated launchers in France. In 1960, he tried to review the Treaty as allowed by Article 12, but was not supported by the other member nations.

Thus the decision of March 1966 was not really a surprise, even if it broadly exposed fundamental differences regarding the view of the future of the Organisation between one of the main Allies and the other partners.

It was in the midst of this crisis that, on 15 March 1966, I presented myself at the Porte Dauphine headquarters on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne with a letter of acceptance in my pocket. My intention was to take up a post I’d been offered in the Central Registry. This white building – in the form of a giant A (for Atlantic Alliance) – was known to me, since I had spent 14 of my 16 months of military service with the Standing Group there. The dilemma was what to do with this young Frenchman, with his enthusiasm and good intentions? A solution was quickly found: a temporary three-month contract, with the promise of an indefinite contract if all went well.

So, checklist in hand, I made a small tour around the various services – in the company of Ursel Lorenzen, a quiet, unsmiling young German woman who became famous 20 years later when she appeared on East German television in a different guise: that of defecting spy.

During the second quarter of 1966, the atmosphere in the corridors at “Dauphine” was tense. As the victims of a situation for which they were not responsible, the French members of the International Staff kept their heads down. Their colleagues from other countries, meanwhile, made laudable efforts to hide any resentment they felt.

François Le Blévennec is now retired. As a member of the International Staff, he worked from October 1966 to January 2007 in the NATO Press & Media Section, Public Diplomacy Division, where he ended his career as Head of Media Operations & Special Events.
At the beginning of June, the NAC decided to transfer the military headquarters out of France, preferably to a location somewhere in the Benelux. In September, the 14 Allies on the Defence Planning Committee agreed that the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should leave Voulceau-Rocquencourt near Versailles, France and be reconstituted at Chievres-Casteau near Mons, Belgium as from 1 April 1967.

The deadline allowed for building the headquarters was very short, and hardly anyone believed that it could be met. However the building companies, most of them Belgian, achieved the amazing feat of completing the construction on time, and the inauguration of SHAPE took place on 31 March 1967.

The problem of the Alliance Headquarters remained. For several months of uncertainty rumours were rife. Rome was briefly put forward, but there was not enough accommodation in the Italian capital with its chronic housing shortage. The Netherlands was also mentioned, but here again, the limited housing available could not meet the requirements of the Headquarters staff. For a short while London, where the first headquarters of the Organisation had been, was offered up as the new heart of the Alliance, but was rapidly withdrawn when the Allies showed little enthusiasm.

After lengthy arguments between the countries which wished to for the Alliance Headquarters to remain in Paris and those which wished for it to be moved elsewhere, on 26 October 1966, the decision was taken to set up house in Brussels.

The next question was that of a suitable site, with modern transport links and adequate telecommunications facilities – and all had to be up to NATO security standards. NATO paid what was then a substantial option fee for the Namur tower, but a feasibility study concluded that this building in the heart of town did not have sufficient space available, and that the security of the site and its surroundings was found to be lacking.

Time was pressing and a solution had to be found quickly. The Belgian government then proposed the Heysel area, which had housed the Expo ’58 (the
Brussels World Fair). Everything needed was there: a large area outside the town centre; good tram and bus connections; the telecommunications facilities of the Expo; good housing in sufficient quantity; etc. It was too good to be true!

The clock was ticking, and it was out of the question to keep the Paris headquarters going long enough to build something of equivalent quality. The Belgian government stepped into the breach with a two-stage solution – a temporary arrangement to be prepared very rapidly, and a permanent headquarters to be built at the Heysel within five years.

For the temporary headquarters, the old Brussels airport in the district of Haren met all the criteria. At the time this disused airfield was being considered as possible site for a military hospital. It was well situated between Zaventem airport and the centre of town. There was just one little problem when it came to digging the foundations: the nearly indestructible concrete airstrips had been built during the Second World War by the Luftwaffe for its bombers, which took off from Haren to attack targets in Great Britain. In his book, *The Big Show* – which sold hundreds of thousands of copies after the war – the French RAF fighter ace Pierre Closterman described how the Luftwaffe later bombed the airfield they had built, after the Allies had taken it from them. On the night of 31 December 1944 to 1 January 1945, at the height of the Battle of the Bulge, the German air force carried out its last great bombing raid on the site of the current Alliance Headquarters, destroying several dozen Allied aircraft grounded there by poor weather conditions and New Year celebrations.

The temporary headquarters at Haren was built as quickly as SHAPE had been, on a similar design free from any architectural extravagance, and the official inauguration was set for 16 October 1967.

The move from Paris to Brussels, which made the fortunes of many moving companies, went without any major hitches – apart from the collapse of the crane which had been brought in specially from Germany to lift the Turkish fresco now situated at the entrance to the Headquarters.

Of course the staff had been evacuated for this tricky operation. From an excellent vantage point on the Place Dauphine, they witnessed the jib failing, the operator fleeing headlong – luckily escaping with his life – and the crane crashing to the ground on the square. An unsolved enigma: the only picture of the falling crane was taken from the roof of the building by a photographer from the Communist newspaper *L'Humanité*. Nobody knows how he got there without authorisation – and without being noticed.

One of the Secretary General’s major problems at the time was the widespread lack of enthusiasm among the International Staff for moving to and setting up house in Brussels. Less than half of staff members responded positively to his proposal.

During the second quarter of 1966, the atmosphere in the corridors at “Dauphine” was tense

Some of them – particularly the French, but also other nationalities – were well integrated into French society and had invested in real estate. Their children were being educated in the French school system, and in their view, the move held nothing but disadvantages for them.

Others had serious problems with the salaries. The Belgian scales were lower than the French ones.

For still others – particularly the large body of British secretaries and typists who responded on the whole unfavourably – the best thing about working for NATO was being able to live in Paris. They did not want to go to Brussels, particularly to draw a lower salary, and especially when they would have no difficulty in finding well-paid work in Paris in a time of strong economic growth and full employment.
remedy this problem that the secretarial allowance was introduced.

As far as I was concerned, the exotic aura of Brussels attracted me. For a right-thinking Parisian in the 1960s, Brussels was somewhere on the way to the North Pole – in other words, for me, an adventure. The Belgian capital was not yet the cosmopolitan, multicultural city it has now become. Compared with Paris, it was ‘provincially charming’. But on 15 August 1967, when I went to Brussels for the first time with some colleagues to find an apartment, we were the victims of a successful meteorological disinformation operation – we were met by a heat-wave and a tropical sky.

Like many others, in anticipation of the move from Haren I rented a flat in a district close to Heysel without hesitation. That was a big mistake! The move never happened, and the Haren headquarters was to remain what it is today, the Headquarters of the Alliance, whose temporary nature has been aggravated by the addition of a jumble of prefabricated wings which are even more disgraceful than the original buildings.

In October 1966, after passing a concours, I moved to the Press Service. I took up my post at Haren on 9 October 1967, one week before the official inauguration. At that time, the roads inside the Headquarters had not yet been paved. The heat-wave only lasted for a few days in August, and then the typical, incessant Brussels drizzle transformed the entire area into a mud-bath. Inside the buildings, the plaster walls were as yet unpainted. The quality of the construction was clear for all to see, and the head painter, a bearded Bruxellois with the accent and hearty humour to match, insisted that he, his men and their paint were there to prevent the walls from falling in at the first light breeze.

Much of the equipment which came from Paris by day tended to disappear at night because not many of the doors had locks. For the first arrivals the SOP was very simple: DIY! So to speed up the installation process, like an IKEA customer, I armed myself with a screwdriver and an adjustable spanner, and in a few days I had put up the metal shelving needed by my service.

The inauguration ceremony on 16 October 1967, before the brand-new but already rusty statue in the fore-court, was all that one could desire: VIPs clearly visible on wooden stands, and a number of solemn speeches, all watered by a continuous thin rain – just to give a bit of local flavour.

By the end of the morning everything had been completed. The Alliance and its Council were installed in Haren for better or for worse. Indeed, the worse was long in coming, with the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia just around the corner on 20-21 August 1968.

But that’s another story.
Money at the root of evil: The economics of transnational terrorism

Adrian Kendry shines a light into the shadowy world of terrorist finance.

Economic basis of motivations and behaviour

Economic ideas and techniques have a timeless potency: their ability to illuminate the motivations, choices and trade-offs in decision-making by people and organisations in all walks of life. This has been vividly demonstrated in two recent acclaimed books by notable economists Steven Levitt and Tim Harford.

Both Levitt and Harford illustrate the universal and compelling contribution made by economic analysis and principles in explaining topics as diverse as globalisation, the causes of impoverishment in various countries, the structure and behaviour of drug-dealing gangs, traffic congestion and the price of coffee in different locations.

Similarly, it can be shown that economic reasoning is a vital tool in successfully countering the funding and implementation of terrorism. NATO is not an economic organisation, but it has an important, if modest, role to play in exchanging economic and financial information with Allies and Partners to help them confront an increasingly complex and sophisticated challenge. This article primarily examines that part of the challenge which comes from the funding of jihadist terrorism.

Scope and scale

The organisation and delivery of terrorism is often complex, sophisticated and wide-ranging. It encompasses the generation of revenue for jihadist terrorism in Iraq, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the enactment of domestically produced terrorism (as witnessed in the London suicide bomb attacks of 2005).

Terrorism is targeted against military forces, civilians and critical infrastructure – including energy and computer networks. Although reports of cyber-terrorism are relatively rare, there is concern at the growing capability of terrorist groups to attack and undermine both public and private information networks.

Funding for terrorism can come from a wide array of potential sources, including:

- state sponsorship;
- income generation from legal businesses;
- illegal income generation (sometimes in partnership with organised criminal groups) from such sources as kidnapping, trafficking of migrants, women, drugs and sales of small arms and light weapons;
- misuse of charitable donations;
- contributions from radicalised diasporas;
- informal money transfers utilising the hawala system, through an extensive network of hawaladars (financial service providers...

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operating on the basis of trust, with minimal records and a light regulatory structure); and

- theft, smuggling and corruption (particularly related to oil).

**Financial linkage**

In April 2007, Al-Jazeera broadcast the following statement from the putative leader of al Qaida’s forces in Afghanistan, Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid:

“As for the needs of the jihad in Afghanistan, the first of them is financial. The mujahideen of the Taliban number in the thousands, but they lack funds. And there are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations, but they can’t find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of jihad.”

In the same month, Saudi Arabia announced that it had disrupted an al Qaida-linked plot to attack oil facilities and military bases, arresting more than 170 suspects, including trainee pilots preparing for suicide operations.

The complexities surrounding the funding of terrorism are revealed by the paradox of Saudi Arabia’s multibillion-dollar petroleum industry. This primarily government-owned sector has generated private wealth that allows individuals to contribute to the funding of global Wahabism, the establishment of madrassas in Pakistan and, as noted by the Iraq Study Group in 2006, the financing of Sunni insurgents in Iraq (along with private donors from other Gulf States). Saudi donors are also implicated in funding jihadists in Somalia, as well as Hamas in Palestine.

**The spread of international terrorism**

The 2006 US State Department report “Country Reports on Global Terrorism” cites the increasing incidence of terrorism, reflected in approximately 14 000 attacks defined as “terrorist”, with more than 20 000 resulting deaths. This represents a 25 per cent increase in attacks – and a 40 per cent rise in deaths – over the previous year.

While acknowledging the need for the United States to continue to pursue and eradicate the leadership of terrorist organisations, the report emphasises that “incarcerating or killing terrorists will not achieve an end to terrorism” and that the “struggle of ideas” requires a systematic and sustained strategy to counter the “extremist rhetoric and disinformation coming from hostile groups.”

The transformation of international terrorism has led the State Department to describe it as a “form of global insurgency” orchestrated out of safe havens – such as Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Somalia, East Africa and various border areas in Latin America – where terrorist organisations are able to “organise, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train and operate in relative security”.

**Economic structure and organisation**

The organisation and planning needed to sustain transnational terrorism takes place under the umbrella of three principal economic structures. Loretta Napoleoni, author of “Money and Terrorism”, has described these increasingly sophisticated stages of terrorist economic development as follows:

- first, state-sponsored terrorism, which is arguably of diminishing importance on an intra-state but not inter-state basis (recognising the continuing concerns over the scale of funding from Iran to various organisations and groups throughout the Middle East);
- second, privatised terrorism, where terrorist organisations either choose or are forced to create quasi-autonomy in the form of shell states (finances and resources are marshalled and directed toward terrorist operations, as seen in Afghanistan and Chechnya); and
• third, the highest stage of terrorist economic organisation, the *global terror network* (*al Qaida* and its affiliates, which exploit the opportunities offered by globalisation and the weakening and dissolution of trade borders).

**Changing methodology of funding**

In this structure, increasingly pragmatic relationships with organised crime and diaspora members generate the funding and resources needed to undertake terrorist activity. The growing embrace by these organisations of less traditional funding mechanisms (e.g. bootlegging, counterfeiting, drug trafficking and the use of precious metals) is in part the unintended consequence of the strengthening and efficiency of international financial and money laundering controls.

This phenomenon is at the base of “Goodhart’s Law”, which recognises the substitutability of financing methods from tightly-regulated channels to the less-regulated channels. In the case of *al Qaida*, this implies portfolio diversification across the terrorist network encompassing, among other things, diamonds, other precious stones and counterfeit goods.

Such diversification increasingly relies on symbiotic and unconventional linkages between organised crime networks and terrorist organisations, particularly in supporting the latter’s logistical requirements in the transportation and accommodation of *jihadists*. Uncomfortable bedfellows they may be, but the forging of shared interests between organised crime and terrorism is one of the undesired outcomes of the greater economic and financial liberalisation in the Euro-Atlantic area.

**Social and economic imperatives**

The planning and execution of *jihadist* terrorist acts is often sophisticated, reflecting a combination of attributes among recruits. These include accomplishments in technical higher education; radicalisation through inability or unwillingness to examine the deeper tenets of the religious faith; and a strong sense of injustice based upon perceived persecution by other religious faiths or groups.

These characteristics have been observed in both international and “home-grown” terrorists (e.g. the perpetrators of the London bombings in July 2005). The perceived lack of an effective voice in society, together with the compulsion to violently protest...
against economic and social injustice, provide a potent backcloth for the instrument of “suicide terrorism” as the most cost-effective method of asymmetric warfare.

**Economic insurance and the response to terrorism**

Societies can appear to attach a much higher priority to allocating private and public resources to countering terrorism than to take steps to reduce the risk of death, injury or property damage from the more frequent incidence of vehicle accidents – even if the latter cause far more casualties and impose much greater direct costs upon society.

Although the risk associated with a terrorist attack is low for the average individual, the fear of personal, monetary and psychic loss is considerable. This leads to a willingness to accept costs and policies that are disproportionate to the potential benefits that they might produce. Individuals and society are confronted with important economic choices regarding the additional risk premium to be paid to further reduce the low probabilities of attack; and differentiating between those additional protective and security actions that primarily reassure, but do little to change the actual risk.

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The forging of shared interests between organised crime and terrorism is one of the undesired outcomes of the greater economic and financial liberalisation in the Euro-Atlantic area

Under these circumstances, the public and private sectors of countries threatened by terrorism should increase their cooperation to ensure that scarce resources are efficiently allocated for the production of counter-terrorism capabilities. Economic resilience and the strengthening of consequence-management are vital components in this debate.

**NATO’s contribution**

The 26 Allies meet annually to exchange information on measures in the international community directed toward undermining the economic and financial support for terrorism. The Alliance is not the lead organisation in this endeavour; nor does it seek to replicate the activities of other international organisations. However, the sharing of information enables all of the Allies to benefit from a deeper understanding of the methodology and mechanisms that can be employed to confront and degrade the resourcing of terrorism.

As the overarching document on NATO’s relations with Partners in combating terrorism, the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), provides a framework for those activities among Allies and Partners that focus upon the economic and financial countering of terrorism. Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Partners and other states may participate in these initiatives on a case-by-case basis. The current implementation of the PAP-T can be further enhanced through increased cooperation with international organisations building upon the following examples.

In 2003, the first Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)/Partnership for Peace (PfP) workshop was organised by Switzerland in Geneva. “Combating the Financing of Terrorism” highlighted the fact that cooperation between states, the private sector and international organisations needed to be strengthened through a more integrated and interdisciplinary approach, both at the national and international levels.

In 2004, the NATO Defense College in Rome organised an innovative event which incorporated international financial institutions, government analysts, parliamentarians, think-tanks and NATO personnel. It focused on the pooling of perspectives to enhance the financial and economic aspects of the fight against terrorism.
And in 2005, echoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s desire to strengthen ties and work more closely on specific issues and projects, Switzerland organised a conference on Public-Private Cooperation in Combating the Financing of Terrorism, in which NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) joined forces with the US State Department. Counter-terrorism officials from the 55 OSCE member states sought to achieve a balance between policy development (building political commitment and implementing international legal obligations) and technical support (how to build a financial intelligence unit and how to prosecute terrorist financing cases).

Recommendations

In promoting a greater understanding of the economic and political benefits to be derived from cooperation in seeking to fight terrorism, the intensifying of inter-agency efforts within Allied and Partner countries concerning the following remains paramount.

First, a coordinated and systematic appraisal and monitoring of the effectiveness of current anti-terrorist financial regulation (including money laundering, control and freezing of financial assets and the enforcement of international financial standards) and its implementation must be carried out by the designated national and international bodies responsible for this surveillance.

Second, Allies in conjunction with Partners should seek to conduct risk assessments on the most vulnerable elements of critical economic infrastructure which is susceptible to terrorist attacks targeted at communications, energy, trade and transportation facilities.

Third, a coordinated national and international evaluation of the economic and financial impact of counter-terrorist measures on defence expenditures and budgets is necessary – one which takes into account the strain on those budgets – in order to make optimal decisions for the funding of capabilities of various operations and actions. Within the Alliance, such coordination would require a cross-cutting approach in order to evaluate the implications for future defence capabilities.

Finally, the deepening and widening of the analysis and explanation of the economic benefits and costs of cooperative arrangements among NATO and Partner countries is essential to making the most efficient use of our collective resources and supporting the escalating struggle against the funding of terrorism and insurgency.
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Series illustrating NATO’s practical cooperation activities, including building the Virtual Silk Highway, disposing of anti-personnel mines in Albania, flood prevention in Ukraine, limiting the damage from earthquake-induced disasters, AWACS aircraft, tackling challenges of defence reform, the environment and security and Trust Fund projects

Riga Summit Reader’s Guide

An overview of the decisions taken at the NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, 28-29 November 2006, and related background information

Security through Partnership

Publication examining NATO cooperation with Partner countries through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

Security cooperation with the Mediterranean region and the broader Middle East

This brochure explains NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to increase dialogue and cooperation in these strategically important regions

For and Against: Debating Euro-Atlantic security options

Publication bringing together and reproducing the debates that appeared in the online editions of NATO Review in 2002-2006

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