ISTANBUL SUMMIT SPECIAL
## ISTANBUL SUMMIT SPECIAL

### Special

**4**
**Anticipating Istanbul**
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer outlines areas of special focus for the Istanbul Summit.

**7**
**Right time, right place**
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sets out his vision for the Istanbul Summit.

### Partnerships

**22**
**Building effective partnerships**
Christopher Bennett examines how NATO has forged effective partnerships.

**26**
**Forging a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East**
Chris Donnelly examines how NATO’s experience with the Partnership for Peace might help build a comparable programme in the Greater Middle East.

**30**
**Continuing to build security through partnership**
Robert Weaver analyses the challenges that face NATO’s partnerships.

### Operations

**33**
**NATO’s evolving operations**
Adam Kobieracki examines the evolution of NATO’s operations.

**36**
**The way forward in Afghanistan**
Hikmet Çetin analyses the evolution of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan.

### Analysis

**9**
**The meaning of enlargement**
Tomáš Valášek examines the impact of both EU and NATO enlargement.

**12**
**Debating security strategies**
David S. Yost examines the implications for NATO of US strategic thinking.

### Debate

**16**
**Should the Middle East be NATO’s new central front?**
William Marshall versus Peter Rudolf

### Strategic relationships

**43**
**Building hope on experience**
Paul Fritch examines the evolution of the NATO-Russia Council.

### Great expectations

Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier examines the challenges facing both Afghanistan and NATO.

---

Published under the authority of the Secretary General, *NATO Review* is intended to contribute to a constructive discussion of Atlantic issues. Articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments or NATO. Articles may be reproduced, after permission has been obtained from the editor, provided mention is made of *NATO Review* and signed articles are reproduced with the author’s name.

Every mention of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote: Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. Every mention of Macedonia is marked by a dagger (†) referring to the following footnote: NATO members with the exception of Turkey recognise the Republic of Macedonia as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
This is a one-off, hardcopy special issue of NATO Review for the Istanbul Summit. Otherwise, NATO Review is an electronic magazine published four times a year on the NATO web site that can be read in 22 NATO languages as well as Russian and Ukrainian at www.nato.int/review. This Istanbul Summit Special brings together much of the most relevant writing to have appeared in recent electronic issues in one volume covering the principal Summit themes of capabilities, operations and partnerships. Articles by Julian Lindley-French, Paul Fritch, James Sherr, Air Vice-Marshal Andrew Vallance and myself, as well as the interview with General Konstantin Vasiliyevich Totskiy, the first Russian ambassador to be exclusively accredited to NATO, originally appeared in the autumn 2003 issue. The article by David S. Yost originally appeared in the winter 2003 issue. Articles by Chris Donnelly, General James L. Jones and Robert Weaver, as well as the debate between Will Marshall and Peter Rudolf and the interview with Brigadier-General Anders Brännström, the Partner officer who commanded a sector in the NATO-led operation in Kosovo, originally appeared in the spring 2004 issue. Everything else appears in the current summer issue, which also includes a review of recent writing on transatlantic relations by former NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea; an analysis of relations between Serbia and Montenegro and NATO by Pavle Janković and Srdjan Gligorijević, two analysts from the G17 Institute in Belgrade; and a debate on international involvement in the former Yugoslavia between Gerald Knaus of the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative and Nicholas Whyte of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. The on-line edition is continuously being improved and, in addition to articles, interviews, debates and book reviews, includes many special features, such as interactive maps, suggested further reading on NATO topics and relevant statistics.

The Editor
On 28 and 29 June, NATO leaders will meet in Istanbul for the Alliance’s 17th Summit. During NATO’s first four decades, we had only ten Summits. In the 14 years that followed we will have had seven. So the frequency of Summits has doubled. These numbers alone are a strong indication of how the pace of change has accelerated and Summits had to be called to give specific top-level guidance, often in response to a rapidly evolving strategic environment.

London 1990 declared the Cold War over and offered a hand of friendship to the East. Rome 1991 defined the contours of a new NATO, including a new Strategic Concept. Brussels 1994 gave this new NATO a more concrete agenda, including potential enlargement and new mechanisms for security cooperation throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic area. At Madrid in 1997 we issued invitations to three new members, after having put the NATO-Russia relationship on a firmer footing. Washington 1999 codified much of our crisis-management experience from the Balkans, and it looked to the future with a new, much broader Strategic Concept which added crisis management and partnership to NATO’s principal task of collective defence. Finally, the 2002 Prague Summit invited seven additional countries to join the Alliance and transformed the organisation even more substantially in order to cope with the new 21st century threats.

All these Summits had one thing in common. They were short on rhetoric, but long on substance. Moreover, they moved NATO forward from a static Alliance to a dynamic agent of change. The Istanbul Summit will maintain this tradition. The first Summit to take place with our seven new members, Istanbul will both build on established mechanisms for shaping security and unveil new policies and instruments to make our Alliance even more responsive to the new security environment.

Istanbul will demonstrate that the new, transformed Alliance is already up and running. Today’s NATO is reinforcing our common security by reaching out, through our partnerships and our operations, to promote stability and tackle the threats and challenges of the 21st century wherever required.

Enhancing capabilities

Military capability is the crucial underpinning of our safety and security. It directly translates into political credibility. But in order to meet the full spectrum of modern security challenges, especially those originating outside Europe, we need capabilities that are different from those we needed in the past. We need forces that we can deploy more quickly, that can reach further and can stay in the field longer. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders agreed a number of far-reaching initiatives to equip the Alliance with these capabilities. Since then, we have created a new Command Structure and a NATO Response Force. We have also made significant progress in acquiring key capabilities for modern operations, including strategic air- and sea-lift, air-to-air refuelling and precision-guided munitions. But for NATO to meet the challenges ahead still more needs to be done to enable Alliance forces to carry out the tasks Allies have agreed. That is why the Istanbul Summit will move beyond taking stock of the progress made so far, and introduce significant improvements in NATO’s defence-planning and force-generation processes. These changes will further strengthen our ability to deploy the right forces at the right time.

Combating terrorism

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 put terrorism high on our agenda as a threat to Allied security and the world
at large. NATO has acted quickly to counter this threat. At the Prague Summit, the Allies agreed to improve intelligence sharing. They also agreed to develop specific capabilities to deter terrorist activities and potential attacks, and to counter them if they should occur. They agreed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, in order to involve NATO’s Partner countries more closely in this struggle. And they agreed a new military concept for the defence against terrorism. The concept states that the forces of the Allies must be able to “deter, disrupt and defend” against terrorists, and to do so wherever the interests of the Allies demand it. At Istanbul, we will carry this work another major step forward. An enhanced package of measures against terrorism will further improve NATO’s potential for addressing new, unconventional threats.

Protecting against weapons of mass destruction

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a grave and gathering threat, and a key area of Alliance attention, for many years. A more recent concern is the possibility of terrorists getting their hands on these kinds of lethal weapons. Against this background, at Prague, the Allies took a number of steps to increase their defence posture against possible attack with nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons. These measures include enhanced detection capabilities, better protective gear for NATO forces, and support for civilian authorities in case of an emergency. The Allies also agreed to begin a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. At Istanbul, we will complete various Prague initiatives, including a missile threat assessment, and mark the full operational capability of our new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Battalion.

Building stability in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a top priority for NATO. If we want to win the war on terrorism, we must first win the peace in Afghanistan. That is why, last summer, the Alliance took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). And it is why NATO is determined to see this mission through, and to make it a success. The security provided by ISAF has already helped achieve progress in a number of areas. Legitimate political institutions are developing. Fighters are gradually being disarmed and their weapons placed in secure sites. Reconstruction projects and other initiatives are improving the daily lives of many citizens. At the same time, however, serious challenges remain. The Istanbul Summit provides the perfect setting for NATO to demonstrate its unflinching commitment to a better future for Afghans and Afghanistan. The Alliance will expand the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed outside Kabul. It will work with the Afghan authorities to spread security and stability. It will establish closer relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours. And we will make it possible for other international organisations and non-governmental organisations to make their unique contributions to Afghanistan’s future.

Bringing the Balkans back to Europe

The Istanbul Summit will also emphasise our continued stabilising role in the Balkans. A decade ago, we committed ourselves to a better future for the Balkans. Patience and persistence are paying off. Istanbul will be a time when we can legitimately point to our achievements. After all, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved to the point that we can gradually reduce our troop presence there, and hand over important responsibilities to the European Union. However, our job is not yet over. In Kosovo, NATO’s continued presence remains essential. And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO will remain engaged after the Stabilisation Force it has been leading since December 1996 comes to an end to assist with defence reform, the search for indicted...
war criminals, and the fight against terrorism. We want Bosnia and Herzegovina to overcome the remaining hurdles for joining the Partnership for Peace programme. And we want Serbia and Montenegro to do the same.

A new era of partnership

Istanbul will also be the place where we will raise relations with our Partner countries to a new level. The success of NATO’s partnership policy has been remarkable. It has created military and human interoperability across Europe and well into Central Asia. And last March seven Partners turned into Allies – a step that changed the configuration of the remaining group of Partner countries. Our Partner countries are now more diverse, both geographically and in terms of their security interests and cooperation needs. This means that our partnership policy will have to enter a new phase – a phase characterised by more individualised cooperation with Partners, a much stronger focus on cooperation with the Caucasus and Central Asia, and a greater emphasis on defence reform to meet the new threats, such as terrorism. Such a new partnership will ensure that the unique strategic value of these mechanisms remains high – for Allies and Partners alike. Today’s global challenges require global answers. NATO and its Partners are an important part of the response.

Relations with Russia

NATO-Russia relations are a permanent fixture of European security. Sound NATO-Russia relations mean a boost in our ability to cope with the new challenges of today and tomorrow – as already evidenced by the now regular ambassadorial and ministerial exchanges. The creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002 has taken our cooperation to a qualitatively new level. By focusing on the most critical issues facing both NATO and Russia – terrorism, proliferation, crisis management, civil emergencies, and defence reform – the NRC has established itself as a serious forum. We also discuss matters of disagreement, such as issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Moreover, we will note progress on various projects on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including missile defence and a global proliferation assessment that will help further work in this area.

Relations with Ukraine

NATO’s relationship with Ukraine is no less important, and we want to give that relationship new momentum in Istanbul as well. One look at the map makes it clear that the entire Euro-Atlantic community has a powerful interest in assisting Ukraine’s reform process. That is why, since 1997, NATO and Ukraine have engaged in a Distinctive Partnership which addresses key areas in which the Alliance and Ukraine can work together. In the NATO-Ukraine Commission, Allies and Ukraine hold regular discussions on topical security issues, and discuss how NATO can assist Ukraine’s reforms, with a particular focus on the military and democratic reform processes. This includes supporting Ukraine’s implementation of its Annual Target Plan, in which the country sets standards it will strive to meet.

Relations with the European Union

The establishment of a strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union is a fundamental institutional development. It holds the promise of giving us a far greater range of complementary instruments to meet current and future security challenges. And it is, at the same time, a major element in crafting a more mature, more equitable transatlantic relationship. The transfer of important military responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO to the European Union – details of which will be unveiled in Istanbul – will reinforce the strategic partnership. Closer EU-NATO cooperation in the Balkans would also help in broadening EU-NATO cooperation to other areas, such as combating terrorism, coping with proliferation, and improving military capabilities in a mutually reinforcing way.

Mediterranean Dialogue and outreach to the wider region

Istanbul could also be the opportunity to launch a broader and more ambitious framework for NATO’s outreach to countries from the Mediterranean and the wider region of the Middle East. Through a stronger focus on military interoperability, defence reform and the fight against terrorism, we should elevate the existing Mediterranean Dialogue to the level of genuine partnership. Istanbul could go even further, by launching a cooperative initiative for the wider region. Clearly, advancing security and political and economic progress will require strong engagement by the countries in the region since ownership is of the essence. It will also require a sound understanding on our part of their ambitions and concerns. And it will require a new degree of cooperation between our international institutions. At Istanbul, we should be able to underline NATO’s contribution to such an effort.

By making progress in all these different areas, the Istanbul Summit will reaffirm NATO as the principal forum where Europe and North America address the key military and political issues of the day. Europe and North America have a unique strategic responsibility to uphold global stability. To continue to meet that responsibility, they must be prepared to project stability, in new ways and in new places, and to do so together. The Istanbul Summit will underline NATO’s indispensable role in that crucial effort.

For more on the Istanbul Summit, see www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul
As members of the Euro-Atlantic community gather in Istanbul, these are momentous times both for NATO and for Turkey. In the wake of the Alliance’s latest round of enlargement, this is the first NATO Summit at which all 26 Allies will participate. Turkey is proud to welcome the leaders of the most successful alliance in history at what is by any standards a defining moment.

Today, an enlarged and transformed Alliance, committed to addressing the challenges of the 21st century and more robust than ever, is taking on new responsibilities to provide security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. At the same time, in today’s geopolitical environment, Turkey is becoming an increasingly important player at the hub of a vast region where the weight of the past comes up against the many uncertainties of the present and future. Our geography and history enable us to play a unique bridge-building role between regions, peoples and cultures, with the result that Istanbul provides a perfect setting for NATO’s seventh post-Cold War Summit.

The changes in the security environment that have moved Turkey from NATO’s periphery during the Cold War to what is effectively today’s front line have also been the spur behind the Alliance’s transformation. In a remarkably short time, NATO has grown from a collective-defence alliance into a collective-security organisation, with operations stretching from Kosovo to Afghanistan, with Partners from Ireland to Uzbekistan, and with roles varying from civil-emergency planning to the fight against terrorism. The most striking element of this transformation is that it has not followed any pre-ordained script. Rather, the Alliance has taken on new roles and missions in response to the emerging threats we face. Moreover, as the world keeps changing, NATO will continue to adapt and transform itself for the good of its members and the security of the wider international community.

The Istanbul Summit, with its ambitious agenda and concrete set of deliverables, is testimony to the way in which NATO is able to evolve and transform itself to meet new challenges. I believe that the Summit will not only confirm the progress that has been made in the Alliance’s transformation since the Prague Summit, but also present a fresh and reinvigorated transatlantic vision for the Alliance in the years to come.

First among the elements of this new vision comes our recent historic enlargement – the largest in NATO’s history. With seven new members committed to the defence of our core values, our Alliance is now stronger than ever. But the enlargement process must continue. The door should be kept open for every country in the Euro-Atlantic area that is willing and able to meet the criteria and commitments that Alliance membership entails. Our message in Istanbul to the remaining three aspirant countries – Albania, Croatia and Macedonia – as well as others who wish to become members in the future, should, therefore, be one of motivation and encouragement.

The success of the enlargement process is to a large extent due to the achievements of our partnership policies. Without the guidance and assistance provided to Partners within the framework of both the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, we would not have been able to extend the security and stability that the Allies enjoy today across so much of Europe. In the process, both Russia and Ukraine have become genuine Partners and once uneasy relationships have been transformed in a remarkably short space of time.

Today, in the wake of enlargement, we need to ensure that our partnerships remain dynamic and effective so that we can meet even greater challenges. This, in turn, requires us to be more responsive to the needs and expectations of the remaining Partners, and in particular to those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, given the nature of the challenges they
face. For this reason, we have decided to shift the focus of our partnerships to these strategically important regions. Given Turkey’s special ties to this part of the world, my country is deeply committed to helping turn this strategic shift into a working reality. Moreover, I believe that the package of measures on the new direction of partnership prepared for the Summit provides a good start.

Our Mediterranean Partners find themselves in a similarly difficult situation. Here again, we have an obligation to develop and improve our relations with these countries. Indeed, given the stakes involved, the creation of a functioning partnership with the wider Mediterranean region is arguably the most significant investment that NATO can make in the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Since developments in this region have an obvious and direct impact on Turkey, my country has played and will continue to play an important role in bringing these countries closer to NATO and to the values that underpin the Alliance. A reinvigorated Mediterranean Dialogue together with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, a new partnership programme aimed at building relationships with countries of the Greater Middle East, can help overcome misperceptions, build enduring stability and head off future problems.

As we reach out to the east and south, where new challenges as well as risks and threats abound, a renewed and stronger transatlantic link will be critical to developing effective policies and finding durable solutions. In this respect, the EU-NATO strategic relationship holds great potential that has yet to be fully realized. To be sure, we have come a long way in deepening and broadening our cooperation since the Alliance’s last Summit. The best illustration of the progress that has been made is probably the imminent hand-over of responsibility from NATO to the European Union for the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is, however, still room for further progress. Since Turkey is both a key Ally and aspires to joining the European Union in the near future, we believe that we have a unique role to play in this process. Istanbul, therefore, provides an excellent opportunity for the European Union and NATO to demonstrate their commitment to combating today’s security challenges on the basis of a common strategic vision and thereby more generally to reinvigorate transatlantic relations.

Enhanced transatlantic cooperation will also be indispensable to our common fight against terrorism. The international community needs to stand together and to show resolve in the face of this threat, which seeks to undermine both our societies and the values that unite us. We should be under no illusion that this cancer will gradually fade away with the passage of time. Instead, in the war on terrorism, the Allies need to demonstrate as much determination and solidarity as they did during the Cold War, and to be prepared to combat this scourge for as long it takes. Our response to 9/11 demonstrated that the Alliance is committed to waging such a campaign. Yet more is both possible and necessary. We must, therefore, continue to explore the ways in which the Alliance can enhance its contribution to the war on terrorism.

While there is no justification for terrorism, we must not lose sight of its root causes. In this way, we should work together to eradicate the grievances and injustices that breed discontent and radicalism and contribute to the recruiting of terrorists. And we should pursue any initiative that seeks to address the underlying causes of terrorism and extremism, with the utmost determination.

Afghanistan presents a daunting challenge for both NATO and the wider international community in terms of terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. In the words of former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Those who are not prepared to go to Afghanistan will find Afghanistan coming to them.” Turkey has already played a major role in helping rebuild security in Afghanistan in addition to its contribution to the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in part because we have special historical ties with the people of that country. Indeed, even before the Alliance took responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August of last year, we were already heavily involved in bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan, having led ISAF II for eight months during a most critical period. While I do not wish to under-estimate the task ahead, I am confident that we will succeed in Afghanistan. This is both because NATO has consistently managed to rise to the most difficult challenges and also because the way that the Alliance performs in Afghanistan – both politically and militarily – will have a direct bearing on its wider international credibility.

The NATO Summit comes at a crucial time with a number of important issues to be discussed, debated and decided by the Allies. The venue, situated at the crossroads of manifold civilisations, cultures and religions, in many ways corresponds to the agenda and should contribute to constructive and focused talks. With the echoes of Turkey’s rich history reverberating around meeting rooms and through the discussions, I am confident that this special atmosphere will enable everyone to look to the future with a new sense of common purpose. Istanbul is the right place and this is the right time for this truly historic event.

For more on the Istanbul Summit, see the host country web site at www.natoistanbul2004.org.tr
The meaning of enlargement

Tomáš Valášek examines the impact of both EU and NATO enlargement on security thinking in Europe.

The twin enlargements of NATO and the European Union in March and May 2004 respectively were momentous events in their own right. At the same time, they took place in a larger context: one of a profound – if gradual – reshaping of Europe’s security landscape. Its most visible manifestations are the shift towards more autonomy from the United States and an intense debate over the circumstances in which force should be used to combat new threats. Lurking in the background is the question, arguably more open today than at any time in recent memory, of Russia’s role in European and global security. Enlargement will have an impact on all three issues in ways that are not yet clear, but whose contours are already becoming visible. In turn, the final shape of the European Union’s security architecture and its chosen strategy will determine NATO’s future role on the continent.

New threats, new missions

The 11 September and 11 March attacks left all EU and NATO members more keen to act against new threats but not necessarily in agreement on how to use military force, against whom and under what conditions. There is a general consensus that early and “robust” use of force may occasionally be needed, but it sits awkwardly alongside a deep-seated preference for a society governed by international law in which the use of force is rendered unnecessary by the discipline imposed by multilateral institutions. All Allies would agree that ideally military action should be both effective and multilateral, but the relative emphasis that countries place on “effectiveness” as opposed to “multilateralism” differs, as witnessed in contrasting attitudes towards both the Afghan and Iraq campaigns.

Differences have spilled over into other areas of NATO’s work as well. The NATO Response Force (NRF) was created to give the Alliance the ability to apply force rapidly when necessary. But its creation has not been without controversy. Agreement in principle to conduct more expeditionary war-fighting is generally to be welcomed, but the relative emphasis that countries place on “effectiveness” as opposed to “multilateralism” differs, as witnessed in contrasting attitudes towards both the Afghan and Iraq campaigns.

Where do the new members fit in? Their words and actions speak in favour of the more assertive posture that has not always found universal acceptance in Europe. They seem to come down on the “effective” side of the debate rather than the “multilateral” one. The new members’ militaries, too, are being rapidly retooled for the new missions. Indeed, in some ways, the newcomers are ahead of the established Allies in moving away from static defence postures. This is by necessity as much as by choice. The need for downsizing expensive Warsaw Pact-era militaries coincided neatly with the demand for leaner and more expeditionary forces.

To be sure, the new Allies’ commitment to participating in new missions comes with reservations. The flip side of being both newly free and relatively poor is a tendency to take a narrow view of one’s interests. Wars and reconstruction are expensive and the thought of spending scarce economic and human capital on improving somebody else’s lot rings hollow in countries where the average income barely reaches 50 per cent of the European average. As accession countries know all too well, their new freedom of choice includes the freedom to stay out of “somebody else’s” wars. “The need for global action is far from universally welcome in the Czech Republic,” writes Czech security analyst Zdeněk Kříž in a forthcoming book on EU enlargement and security. “A number of key parties and personalities prefer an essentially buck-passing strategy of leaving the responsibility to other, bigger and more influential countries.”

Even so, the new Allies lean towards the assertive vision of security put forth by London and Washington. Their governments in general seem to take a bleaker, more Darwinian view of international relations than their Western neighbours. Strategic calculations also argue in favour of sticking close to Washington. Military power matters and the United States has most of it. As Hungarian researcher Tamas Meszerics writes: “[The new Allies’] realist geopolitical rhetoric may not be in sync with the language of the present-day European discourse… but it goes a long way towards explaining the willingness of many small and medium European powers to challenge the French and German visions of European foreign policy.” The glue binding new Allies to Washington, in other words, is built on more than a sense of gratitude and moral obligation.

NATO-Russia relations

Whether enlargement will change NATO’s policy toward Russia and if so, how, remains an open question. What is clear...
is that the event has transformed Russia's view of NATO, since Moscow has responded to enlargement with a mixture of scepticism and hostility. For NATO, Moscow's reactions have clearly raised the potential cost of getting Russia policy wrong.

The new members bring with them a different view on Russia and one that has not significantly been aired at NATO to date. Most of their political elites grew up with an intense distrust of and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, attitudes which, rightly or wrongly, have generally been transferred to Russia. Five years ago, fears that Poland's accession to NATO would cool the Alliance's relationship with Moscow proved unjustified. But these fears were based on a rather shallow reading of Poland's foreign policy vision. This, far from being Russia-centric, has consistently focused on carving out a respected role for Warsaw in Europe and a leading role in the region as well as on prodding Poland's Eastern neighbours – Belarus and Ukraine – towards democracy. A confrontation with Moscow might have undermined this policy. The priorities of the new accession countries' foreign policies are different with the result that they may not follow Poland's path.

On the other hand, NATO may benefit from acquiring a more finely tuned “Russia” radar, informed by the knowledge and experience of some of those countries that know Moscow best. One can safely assume that Moscow's continued search for its own identity will involve forays in both foreign and domestic affairs that most European states would deem unacceptable. On recent such occasions, neither the European Union nor NATO has succeeded in crafting a principled common response, one that might deter similar behaviour in the future. Russia's importance in the campaign against terrorism, its mineral resources, and its dominant role in the region simply offer Moscow too many opportunities to discourage criticism and to sow discord among its counterparts. This is a structural problem that plagues both EU and NATO relations with Russia.

The new members might help restore some balance to the relationship. The Baltic states in particular are far more
focused on Russia than any of the old Allies, and also less likely to be willing to compromise. The challenge for NATO will be to avoid giving in to irrational fears while tapping into the energy and the focus of the new members’ policies towards Moscow. Getting the balance right will be important, all the more so because of the attention that Russia has given to enlargement.

Relations with Washington

The defining event of spring 2004 may turn out to have had little to do with the Alliance directly. A few weeks after NATO enlarged, the European Union opened its doors to ten new members, including eight former communist countries. If these countries manage to make their voice heard in Brussels, they could play an important role in defining Europe’s relationship with Washington and, in turn, the European Union’s relationship with NATO.

The European Union, at least on the security front, has undergone a change no less dramatic than that of NATO. So-called “common” foreign and security policies were, until recently at least, essentially produced in Brussels exercised little influence over member states’ policies and was not in a position to create policies of its own. It was still largely built by mining the various member states’ policies for common positions, but for the first time, in a modest but symbolically important way, it pushed a number of EU countries towards a security philosophy which they might not have embraced of their own volition. The document has been described by an insider as 90 per cent descriptive and 10 per cent prescriptive. While 10 per cent may not appear much, it would have been unthinkable a few years ago. It seems to herald the era of mixed responsibility for European defence, with policies still mostly made in and implemented by member states, but increasingly circumscribed and sometimes prescribed by interests defined at the level of 25.

What is not yet known is the exact form of the future Brussels contribution to this process. To some EU members, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents a “Plan B”, to be used in cases when the United States cannot or does not want to become involved. To others, less America in Europe is the whole point. For yet another group of countries, EU foreign and security policies are an institution-building exercise with little relation to defence. These competing visions conceal very different outcomes for the future shape of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic, and the eventual result could be a profoundly different EU-NATO relationship.

The new EU members come to the debate over Europe’s security policy late. They were largely absent from earlier discussions when many of the blueprints for ESDP were drawn up. Indeed, in 2003 alone, the European Union adopted its Security Strategy, inaugurated a Rapid Reaction Force and launched its first two military missions.

But the new members’ sideline narratives consistently stressed the indivisibility of EU and NATO roles. In practical terms, “indivisibility” tends to translate into coordinated threat assessments, preference for joint operations and a common set of planning standards for the expeditionary portions of countries’ armed forces. It implies the continuation of the transatlantic alliance in its real sense – doing things for others that one would not normally do.

The new Allies are most clear on the need for an ongoing US role in European security. The EU discourse on this point covers quite a range, from heartfelt desire to keep NATO and the United States in the centre of Europe’s defence plans to suggestions that the United States could – or perhaps should – leave the business of defending the continent. The new Allies seem firmly and unequivocally to favour the former vision. “It is in Slovakia’s interest (as well as in the interests of EU accession countries) to make sure that NATO is still seen as relevant from the point of view of the United States,” writes Slovak sociologist Ol’ga Gyarfášová. “If the ties between the United States and the rest of the Allies are weakened, this would also lead to weakening of the security guarantees in which Slovakia has invested so much political capital.”

While the new members have articulated their views clearly, their ability – or even their desire – effectively to influence the European Union’s security agenda is an open question. The governments in Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and elsewhere have tended to view EU integration as essentially a passive process, one of identifying EU consensus and reshaping their policies to fit the mould. On many issues, however, and on defence in particular this is the wrong approach. Europe’s security identity is only now being formed and unequivocally to favour the former vision. “It is in Slovakia’s interest (as well as in the interests of EU accession countries) to make sure that NATO is still seen as relevant from the point of view of the United States,” writes Slovak sociologist Ol’ga Gyarfášová. “If the ties between the United States and the rest of the Allies are weakened, this would also lead to weakening of the security guarantees in which Slovakia has invested so much political capital.”

For more on the Center for Defense Information, see www.cdi.org
Debating security strategies

David S. Yost examines the implications for NATO of US strategic thinking and urges an Alliance-wide debate.

In October 2003, during their informal gathering in Colorado Springs, NATO’s defence ministers considered how their military forces might cope with a terrorist threat involving chemical and biological weapons. While details of the discussions remain classified, it seems that the defence ministers got a clearer picture of future operational and decision-making requirements, including the urgency of pursuing the development of the NATO Response Force and the rest of the transformation agenda approved at the Alliance’s November 2002 Prague Summit.

The discussions were valuable because they may help to foster what the Alliance needs more of – wide-ranging and thorough debate about strategy, including strategic concepts and their practical requirements and political implications. The strategic thinking advanced in the United States since September 2001 in various documents – above all, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy – deserves critical analysis and could serve as a point of departure.

To date, the debate on new security concepts that has taken place in the United States has attracted more attention than that in Europe, though Europeans may be catching up following publication of an EU Security Strategy. Nevertheless, as disagreements over the Iraq campaign demonstrate, there is a need for the Allies to examine US concepts seriously and thereby carry forward an informed transatlantic debate. Three of these concepts deserve particular attention: dissuasion, deterrence by denial, and pre-emption.

Dissuasion

Dissuasion is of course the word the French use for deterrence, but the US Department of Defense gave dissuasion a specific definition in the Quadrennial Defense Review, a definition that has been used in subsequent documents. In short, “dissuasion” means to persuade other powers to refrain from initiating an “arms race” or competition in military capabilities with the United States. The official strategy documents suggest that dissuasion is to be achieved by convincing the adversary of the futility of competition with the United States, either on a general basis or in a particular category of military power, which could be nuclear weapons or fighter aircraft or attack submarines or anything else. The goal is to lead the adversary to conclude that it would be pointless to compete in the acquisition of military capabilities. In the May/June 2002 issue of Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the logic of the concept by giving an example. “We must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing,” he wrote. “For example, deployment of effective missile defenses may dissuade others from spending to obtain ballistic missiles, because missiles will not provide them with what they want: the power to hold US and allied cities hostage to nuclear blackmail.”

If we consider this example, there is clearly a role for the Allies in dissuasion. Moreover, by this logic, the Allied role in dissuading potential adversaries from seeking ballistic missiles will grow to the extent that Allies and the Alliance as a whole develop and deploy missile defences.

Some NATO Allies have been pursuing shorter-range missile defences for years. The United States has been working with Germany and the Netherlands on Patriot PAC-3 and with Germany and Italy on MEADS, the Medium Extended Air Defence System. The French-Italian Aster system has been deployed on the French aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle; and France and Italy plan to deploy the first ground-based versions in 2005. Some Allies are also acquiring or intend to acquire Aegis radars and Standard Missile 3 interceptors for sea-based missile defence.

In addition, the Alliance as a whole has completed various Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) studies. In November 2002 in Prague the Allies went beyond TMD for the protection of deployed forces when they decided “to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats”. The feasibility study for this is expected to be complete in the first half of 2005.

The fact that Allies are pursuing missile defences – actual capabilities as well as studies – does not, however, mean that they accept the US theory of dissuasion. In fact, a number of Allied observers, like some US observers, have expressed caution, if not actual scepticism. The usual comment is that, even if NATO or the United States dissuades adversaries from pursuing one type of military capability, determined adversaries will pursue other options, including asymmetrical warfare; and we must be as well-prepared as possible.
possible to deal with this threat. This argument does not, however, effectively engage the theory of dissuasion. The US administration has, moreover, been preoccupied with asymmetrical threats as well, as the extensive discussions in the United States indicate.

With regard to Secretary Rumsfeld’s specific example, critics have asked, to what extent will NATO or US missile defences discourage missile-builders and missile-buyers that are interested in being able to launch missiles against non-NATO countries? If the immediate targets of their missiles are regional antagonists outside NATO territory, the strike capability that could be redirected on command against NATO is a bonus. By this logic, greater utility for NATO resides in the capacity of missile defences actually to defend against missile attacks than in their potential effect on missile acquisition decisions. The US government is, however, interested in operational effectiveness as well as in trying to achieve dissuasion, if possible. Indeed, achieving dissuasion depends on attaining such practical effectiveness. Even if the capabilities fail to prevent military competition, US strategy documents suggest that they may complicate the adversary’s planning and shape the competition in directions advantageous to the Alliance.

Critics have raised further objections. If the purpose of dissuasion is to persuade potential adversaries not to compete in the accumulation of military capabilities, could this not be achieved by methods other than – or in addition to – publicising Allied and US military superiority? As various Allied and US observers have pointed out, other activities could contribute to the aim of discouraging arms competitions, and these activities generally involve cooperation with allies and other security partners. They include shaping the security environment by upholding export controls, legal norms, and non-proliferation regimes; cultivating positive political relations to lessen incentives for military competition; promoting regional political stabilisation and security to reduce motives for competition with neighbours; and nation-building and state-building, notably to support democratisation and the free market.

While such cooperative activities have not been highlighted in some US strategy documents, they figure significantly in
the *National Security Strategy*. Moreover, the United States is increasingly disposed to accept an expanded definition of how to achieve dissuasion. The clearest sign of this is probably the interest in nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Deterrence by denial**

If dissuasion does not work, arms competitions and conflicts may follow, and the goal then will become deterring aggression or coercion. US strategists have for years advocated supplementing the Cold War’s dominant form of deterrence – deterrence by threat of punishment – with deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial means persuading the enemy not to attack by convincing him that his attack will be defeated – that is, that he will not be able to achieve his operational objectives.

In January 2002, US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch made a reference to this approach to deterrence when he discussed the findings of the *Nuclear Posture Review*. Crouch suggested that the United States could employ missile “defenses to discourage attack by frustrating enemy attack plans”. In other words, if the missile defences do not discourage an enemy from acquiring missiles (the goal of dissuasion), they might discourage him from using them (the goal of deterrence by denial).

The deterrence by denial theory is not limited to missile defences, of course. The theory applies to any capability that can deny an enemy success in achieving his objectives. For example, passive defences such as decontamination equipment and suits and gas masks for protection against chemical and biological weapons might help to convince an enemy not to use such weapons. The *National Security Strategy* suggests that “consequence-management” capabilities for responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks may contribute to both dissuasion and deterrence by denial. It states: “Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends.”

To be sure, it is hard to prove the validity of any theory of deterrence or dissuasion since it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively why something did not happen. The absence of arms race activity does not prove that a competitor has been dissuaded, just as the absence of aggression does not prove that a hypothetical aggressor has been deterred. Moreover, even if we were correct about a deterrence arrangement working for a while, we could not be sure of its permanent reliability.

**Pre-emption**

In other words, deterrence may fail and war may come with little warning. This possibility brings us to the controversial topic of pre-emptive action, which is linked to doubts about the reliability of any kind of deterrence. The *National Security Strategy* states that: “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.”

“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries,” the document continues. “Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.” It concludes that: “The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”

The concept of “pre-emptive action” is controversial partly because the US administration has elevated it to the status of a doctrine, instead of an option available to all governments in extreme circumstances. Moreover, definitional issues have exacerbated the controversy. The US government has chosen to call “pre-emptive” what many Americans, Europeans, and others would call “preventive” war. Many observers would make the following distinction: Pre-emptive attack consists of prompt action on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike. In contrast, preventive war involves military operations undertaken to avert a plausible but hypothetical future risk, such as an unacceptable imbalance of power, a situation of increased vulnerability, or even potential subjugation – or the possibility of a transfer of WMD to a terrorist group. The latter risk was one of the main justifications advanced by the US government for the military campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in March and April 2003.

On the whole, even Allied governments that opposed the US-led action to end Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq do not
rule out the idea of pre-emption on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to attack. In fact, that principle appears explicitly in a recent and authoritative expression of French security policy, the Military Programme Law for 2003-2008. This document states that: "The possibility of a pre-emptive action could be considered, as soon as a situation of explicit and known threat was recognised."

Allied and US critics of US policy argued that there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was about to attack the United States or to transfer WMD to terrorists, so this was not a pre-emptive action but a preventive war – a war on the basis of a hypothetical future threat. Critics condemned the idea of preventive war as a violation of international law. Both critics and supporters of the use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq asserted the need to uphold the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Critics also argued that the US approach amounted to a prescription for permanent war against all terrorists and WMD proliferators, unless the United States could somehow dominate the entire world.

The critical analyses sometimes failed to acknowledge the problem that in some exceptional cases pre-emptive or even preventive action may be the wiser choice – that is, in some cases, notably involving WMD, pre-emption or preventive intervention may be more prudent than waiting to be attacked. The challenge is identifying which cases truly require pre-emptive action, and which cases may even justify preventive war. This is not a new problem. It goes back at least as far as Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War, but it has been rendered more acute by modern technologies.

Debate

It is constructive to debate the issues in general terms. It is useful to discuss, for instance, questions such as the following: Under what circumstances may the resort to pre-emption or even preventive war be justified? Should the international legal regime be explicitly modified to provide in extreme situations for new defensive options, even preventive war, that take into account unprecedented vulnerabilities arising from modern technologies? How should the classical criteria for pre-emption of "necessity" and "proportionality" be construed in light of modern technologies and strategic options? What principles in addition to "necessity" (or "imminence") and "proportionality" should govern the decisions? What might be the consequences for international order of recognising such new precedents and principles in international law? How could risks of precipitate and/or ill-founded actions be diminished? To what extent might policies of pre-emption or preventive intervention encourage adversaries to adopt similar policies and thus lead to more volatile crisis situations? To what extent could the responsibility for undertaking pre-emption or preventive intervention (and dealing with its consequences) be shared? While the US government has recognised the obvious desirability of multilateral legitimisation, notably via the UN Security Council, for preventive or pre-emptive action, such legitimisation might not be available in all circumstances. If it is not available, what constraints should states and coalitions observe in exercising the right to self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter? To what extent, and in what ways, should the Alliance’s decision-making structures and capabilities be modified to enhance the ability of Allies, acting under NATO auspices or in other coalitions, to assess evolving threats and to conduct pre-emptive actions?

Discussing such questions may well deepen understanding of the risks and responsibilities in policies of pre-emption or preventive intervention. At the end of the day, however, we will be forced to make decisions about specific cases.

The US National Security Strategy offers a point of departure. It recognises that: "No nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.” NATO holds an exceptional role in US policy, because "There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.” When it comes to contingencies in which “pre-emptive” action may be required, the National Security Strategy suggests three guidelines for action. It states: “To support pre-emptive options, we will build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge; coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”

The second guideline – to “coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats” – is most important if we are to preserve Alliance cohesion. As we saw in the Iraq case, Allies may differ sharply in their assessments of the gravity of the threats in specific cases, and in their views about the right way to deal with them. Given the likelihood that the Allies will face more challenges of comparable gravity, the need for close coordination in making assessments and defining policy choices is increasingly imperative. Concepts will carry us only so far. In the end, we will be forced to deal with messy realities that do not fit into tidy conceptual categories.

Accordingly, to complement the decisions on NATO’s transformation taken in Prague, the Allies should initiate a determined effort to develop a common assessment of the most dangerous threats to Alliance security and possible responses, on the occasion of the Istanbul Summit.
Dear Peter,

Since the 9/11 terror attacks, opinion in the United States has been congealing around the proposition that the Greater Middle East is to the 21st century what Europe was to the 20th century – the world’s prime crucible of conflict.

Of course, there are other hot spots; North Korea is especially worrisome. But the Greater Middle East, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, is far and away the most likely nexus of the dangers we fear most today: nihilistic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue dictators and failed states.

This view seems to be gaining ground in Europe. At February’s Munich Conference on Security Policy, for example, Joschka Fischer described the Middle East as “the epicentre of the greatest threat to our regional and global security at the dawn of this century: destructive jihadist terrorism with its totalitarian ideology”.

If Americans and Europeans are indeed moving towards a common definition of the new threats we face, it follows that NATO, the institutional cornerstone of the transatlantic Alliance, should reorient itself to confront those threats.

What’s the alternative? The Alliance has been running on fumes since the Soviet Union unravelled. NATO enlargement has given the appearance of purposeful activity, but it has had more to do with consolidating the West’s Cold War gains than with defining a new mission for the Alliance. The question remains, what is NATO for? Especially after the rupture over Iraq, the transatlantic partners had better agree on an answer, and soon, or else find themselves moving inexorably down divergent paths.

I think the answer is pretty straightforward: NATO should be rededicated to defending our common security interests and liberal values against the new totalitarianism brewing in the Greater Middle East. This is not exclusively a military challenge. Over the long haul,
success requires changing the conditions – harsh political repression, economic stagnation and pervasive fears of cultural decline – that breed fanaticism and violence in the region. In the United States, both President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry, the Democratic challenger for the White House, have called for a broad strategy of modernising the region, through expanded trade, increased aid tied to governance reforms and vigorous support for human rights, the rule of law and independent civic groups. Fischer calls this strategy “positive globalisation”, but it amounts to the same thing.

But if military power by itself can’t defeat the new totalitarian threat, neither is victory likely without the credible threat of force. After all, Al Qaida has already attacked three NATO Allies: Spain and Turkey as well as the United States. To defend the “transatlantic homeland” against further terrorist attacks, NATO must develop the capacities to detect and disrupt terrorist cells and deprive terrorists of safe havens. This of course is the justification for NATO’s precedent-shattering intervention in faraway Afghanistan.

In fact, in organising the 6,500-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, NATO has already crossed the Rubicon and begun its strategic reorientation toward the Greater Middle East. The challenge now is for NATO to become a more aggressive and effective peacemaker. That means moving out of the capital, disarming warlords and militias and bringing them under the central government’s authority, and cooperating more closely with the 10,000 Americans who are fighting Taliban and Al Qaida remnants along the Pakistan border.

Just as the United States cannot afford to fail in Iraq, NATO cannot afford to fail in Afghanistan. It’s essential that our European partners beef up ISAF with more troops and equipment and start extending security and stability to other parts of the country, especially the restive Pathan regions in the south. In fact, Afghanistan could be the catalyst Europe needs to hasten development of its new Rapid Deployment Force as well as the lift and logistical capacity necessary to project power at long distances.

A better-focused and equipped NATO could also reinforce more vigorous international diplomacy aimed at stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. Would Europe have succeeded in getting Iran to open its nuclear programmes to international inspection without a vivid demonstration of US military power next door? It seems unlikely. The same is true of Libya’s decision to renounce WMD and Pakistan’s belated crackdown on A.Q. Khan’s nuclear bazaar. But beyond improving its ability to project force in the region, NATO should work out arrangements with countries in the region, modelled on the Partnership for Peace programme with former Soviet bloc countries, aimed at boosting security cooperation, transparency and confidence-building measures throughout the region. And yes, NATO should develop the capacities that will allow it to strike pre-emptively at nuclear facilities in countries that flout international non-proliferation norms.

In addition, it’s not inconceivable that NATO could take a more active part in stemming conflicts and reinforcing political settlements in the region. For example, it could reinforce efforts to stop civil strife in Sudan by post-10,000 Americans who are fighting Taliban and Al Qaida remnants along the Pakistan border.

Just as the United States cannot afford to fail in Iraq, NATO cannot afford to fail in Afghanistan. It’s essential that our European partners beef up ISAF with more troops and equipment and start extending security and stability to other parts of the country, especially the restive Pathan regions in the south. In fact, Afghanistan could be the catalyst Europe needs to hasten development of its new Rapid Deployment Force as well as the lift and logistical capacity necessary to project power at long distances.

A better-focused and equipped NATO could also reinforce more vigorous international diplomacy aimed at stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. Would Europe have succeeded in getting Iran to open its nuclear programmes to international inspection without a vivid demonstration of US military power next door? It seems unlikely. The same is true of Libya’s decision to renounce WMD and Pakistan’s belated crackdown on A.Q. Khan’s nuclear bazaar. But beyond improving its ability to project force in the region, NATO should work out arrangements with countries in the region, modelled on the Partnership for Peace programme with former Soviet bloc countries, aimed at boosting security cooperation, transparency and confidence-building measures throughout the region. And yes, NATO should develop the capacities that will allow it to strike pre-emptively at nuclear facilities in countries that flout international non-proliferation norms.

In addition, it’s not inconceivable that NATO could take a more active part in stemming conflicts and reinforcing political settlements in the region. For example, it could reinforce efforts to stop civil strife in Sudan by post-
NATO membership to become unacceptably high. Perhaps we should be more concerned about over-stretching the Alliance than about the absence of a unifying mission and a new central front.

Yes, there is a common threat. However, leaving political rhetoric aside, it is a threat of much greater importance to the United States as a “Middle Eastern power” than it is to Europe. That said, the threat posed by Islamist terrorism is, as you pointed out, not exclusively a military challenge. Indeed, I would argue that it is not primarily a military challenge at all. The real question seems to me: what functional contribution can NATO make to a broad strategy of addressing threats by transnational Islamist terrorists and of coping with security risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons? So broad a strategy should avoid grouping different challenges and risks into one monolithic threat, as appears to be the case in the current US foreign policy debate.

The focus on the Greater Middle East should not be seen as Alliance therapy. In the absence of a sober analysis of engagement in the Greater Middle East – one that is based upon strategic priorities and takes into account finite resources and capabilities – your long list of things the Alliance might get involved in could easily lead to over-stretch. NATO remains too important an institution for its existence to be jeopardised by an overly ambitious and costly engagement in the Middle East.

It has almost become a cliché to say that the West cannot afford to fail in Iraq and Afghanistan. But one should be careful about putting NATO’s prestige and credibility on the line. What does failure mean? It is certainly desirable that both countries develop into stable democracies. But this cannot be a yardstick for measuring success and failure in terms of an “exit strategy”. Preventing Afghanistan from again disintegrating into a haven for transnational terrorism is a more limited and realistic goal. Resources are finite and the readiness to incur costs limited – even in the United States. Official rhetoric and actual policies do not match. Deeds speak louder than words when it comes to assessing vital interests. Few NATO member states relish the idea of taking on warlords all over the country, which is presumably what you would expect from European Alliance forces.

You are right to say that your vision requires “dramatic changes” on the European side, including higher military budgets and a different strategic outlook. Yet these changes are no more likely than the required change on the US side that you failed to mention: a willingness to treat European states somewhat better than junior partners whose only option is to jump on the US bandwagon or to risk a confrontation with the dominant partner. The reasons that the United States is eager to share the burden of being a Middle Eastern power are clear. But burden-sharing among Allies involves shared decision-making. While the tone of US foreign policy might become more amenable under a different President, accepting greater European influence in the Middle East will not come easy to Washington irrespective of who is in the White House.

Pre-emptive strikes “at nuclear facilities that flout international non-proliferation norms” might become necessary at some point. But would any US president be willing to try and build consensus within NATO for such a policy? NATO legitimisation for such a policy is no doubt a major political incentive for entering into such delicate negotiations, but the cost of trying to reach agreement on action against, say, Iran, might prove prohibitively high.

If the United States is successful in fighting the insurgency in Iraq and for a great-power conflict escalating into (nuclear) war it is East Asia. The rise of China will surely pose difficult questions for both American policymakers and their European counterparts. I don’t wish to downplay the fact that Islamist terrorism currently poses the most serious transnational threat. I only want to question the assumption that the Greater Middle East may be to the 21st century what Europe and Asia were to the 20th century.

On the other hand, I am too much influenced by liberal international relations thinking to believe that NATO will inevitably disintegrate as a security institution unless it has an overarching mission in terms of addressing common threats. Such a development, which you seem to expect, would entail a profound shift in strategic preferences within the core members of NATO. So dramatic a change in the domestic coalitions and ideas that favour the preservation of NATO as a security institution with multiple functions would surely only become possible, were the cost of

NATO could provide security guarantees to facilitate a negotiated, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Will Marshall
the political situation there begins to improve and evolve in a positive direction, involving NATO would be politically attractive but of comparatively modest military value. If, however, the situation does not improve, the guerrilla campaign gathers momentum and Iraq disintegrates in civil war, any NATO forces deployed there would have to expect to face combat missions. This is not an attractive scenario, given public sentiment in most member states and it would surely be a recipe for transatlantic strife.

The Greater Middle East is emerging as the focal region of European-US policy coordination. But Greater Middle East initiatives will lead nowhere unless the US administration re-engages in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Pushing for economic modernisation and political liberalisation might in the very long run contribute to drying out the reservoir for new terrorists. In the process, however, we must expect a lot of instability and this may pose even greater challenges and dilemmas for the West. If NATO can contribute to managing those challenges, it should be used to this end. If, for example, military partnerships along the lines of the Partnership for Peace can help socialise Middle Eastern military officers in democratic norms, such initiatives would no doubt bolster the overall strategic approach.

But NATO as a security institution with a growing membership cannot be expected to develop into the central forum for transatlantic policy coordination on the Greater Middle East. Such coordination would surely be easier within functional and smaller groupings involving the European Union as an important actor.

Yours,
Peter

---

Dear Peter,

With images of the horrendous carnage of Madrid fresh in my mind, it's hard to take seriously the idea that “the management of great-power relations” is more important than confronting the new terrorism of mass murder, as well as the dreadful prospect that terrorists could get their hands on mass destruction weapons. The one challenge seems abstract, academic; the other is exploding in our faces.

In any case, the United States has been managing its great-power relationship with China since the Korean War and will go on doing so even as we confront terrorism and jihadi fanaticism. I don’t believe China’s growing geopolitical weight poses a potential threat to America or Europe. The threat, if there is one, arises from the ideology and ambitions of China’s leaders, and the habitual tendency of despotic regimes to conjure up external “threats” to justify their repressive rule. If the liberalising forces now transforming China aren’t suppressed and continue to seep from the economic into the political realm, Sino-US relations are likely to get better, not worse. That’s why, for the present, I’m more worried about Russia’s relapse into authoritarianism than the prospect of war with China.

But let’s get to the crux of our disagreement. You say NATO is too important for “its existence to be jeopardised by an overly ambitious and costly engagement in the Middle East.” Important for what? Does NATO now exist simply for the sake of existing, or does it have a strategic purpose? If the Alliance now confronts challenges of such overriding importance that it cannot commit more resources to stabilising Afghanistan, I would like to know what they are. Without a real mission to counter real threats, NATO risks becoming the institutional equivalent of a child’s security blanket – something that comforts but doesn’t actually ward off dangers.

Incidentally, contrary to your suggestion I did not say that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan should be to establish a democratic government. Rather it is to help the central government pacify the country so that it doesn’t dissolve into chaos and once again become a haven for terrorists. Yes, that will probably require taking on some warlords, an idea you say few European countries would relish. And yet it needs to be done if the mission is to be accomplished. There’s no danger of overreach in this instance: Wealthy Europe obviously has ample human and material resources to help the government of an impoverished, backward country extend its writ beyond Kabul and, while you’re at it, help US forces destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants along the Pakistan border. This is a question of will, not resources.

Finally, you are right that a new transatlantic project aimed at modernising the Greater Middle East will require a new attitude in the United States as well as in Europe. But Europeans can’t have it both ways: If they don’t want the
Dear Peter,

I don’t assume the end of great-power rivalry. It’s not inconceivable that a new strain of pan-Slav nationalism could take hold in Russia, perhaps prompting an aggressive bid by Moscow to absorb parts of the old Soviet empire. This is a worst-case scenario, but with liberalism seemingly in retreat in Russia now, it cannot be entirely ruled out so by all means, let’s preserve NATO as an insurance policy.

What’s puzzling, however, is the argument that such purely conjectural dangers should take precedence over the unmistakable threats we face right here and now. NATO is a military alliance formed to protect its members against armed attacks and intimidation. Three NATO members have now been attacked by a global terrorist network rooted in the Middle East and Islamic extremism. Either NATO should develop the plans, capaci-

United States to treat them like “junior partners”, they’ve got to carry a senior partner’s load. That means spending more on defence, developing the new capabilities of high-tech warfare and, probably hardest of all, being willing to use force when our mutual security interests demand it. I recognise that these are big, politically difficult steps. Many European leaders apparently don’t believe the threats arising from the Greater Middle East justify taking them. Maybe they are right, but what happened in Madrid argues powerfully against complacency.

Yours,
Will

Dear Will,

Let’s leave aside the issue of whether the peaceful management of great-power relations and the avoidance of catastrophic greater-power conflict will remain as great a challenge in this century as it was in the last. I only wish that I could share your liberal optimism about the end of great-power rivalry. What I question is the emerging assumption in the US foreign policy debate that the Middle East will become the predominant conflict region of this century – not the fact that we are confronted with a mortal, transnational terrorist threat of unprecedented historic proportions.

This transnational threat does originate in the Middle East, but it has already been present within European societies for some time and cannot be dealt with primarily by military means. As a result, NATO will be of limited value in this struggle. But, as far as most Europeans are concerned, this does not mean that the Alliance will become irrelevant unless it goes into the Middle East. You seem to take it for granted that traditional European security dilemmas and problems will never re-emerge, though, to be fair, you do express some concern about developments in Russia. Maybe they won’t re-emerge. But we cannot be sure. NATO is not “a child’s security” blanket, but a wise insurance policy. Certain risks may not be particularly likely and therefore appear, in your words, “academic”. But it is surely both prudent and rational to insure against them, as long as the premiums are not too high.

In addition to the structural role the Alliance plays in underwriting European security, as a result of ingrained habits formed by years of military cooperation, the “new” NATO is in many ways a security-services provider. As such, it is also able to make available a pool of forces of coalitions of the willing. If, therefore, NATO can make a useful contribution to resolving or managing specific problems in the Middle East, it should clearly be used. But contingency planning for politically delicate military missions in the region – and one could easily imagine crisis scenarios involving “friendly” countries such as Saudi Arabia and/or Pakistan – is one thing. Elencating the importance of the Greater Middle East to the Alliance so that it becomes NATO’s new central front and raison d’être is another.

In the case of Afghanistan, there is simply no denying the fact that no member of NATO – not even the United States – is willing to devote the human and material resources necessary to get the job done. Well-meant calls for ambitious undertakings, which ignore political constraints and different strategic perspectives, are doomed to end in frustration and irritation.

Nevertheless, I think that we agree that both within NATO and, more likely, in other settings, a sustained transatlantic dialogue about strategic priorities and possible common policies in the Greater Middle East is urgently needed.

Yours,
Peter
ties and will to combat this menace effectively, or it should give up any pretence of remaining a true mutual-defence pact.

The notion that NATO could become a pool from which members could draw military assets or form “coalitions of the willing” seems fanciful given the absence of a political consensus about the purposes for which those assets should be used. More likely, it would devolve into a transatlantic security forum or perhaps a predominantly European framework for security integration. In either case, that would spell an end to NATO as we know it – the potent American-European partnership, based on a clear and unambiguous mission, that underpinned the West's successful Cold War strategy and a dramatic expansion of liberal democracy.

We agree that terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone. But some tasks – denying terrorists safe havens in failed or rogue states, detecting and destroying terror cells wherever they may be plotting to do us harm, keeping the peace and nation-building in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, interdicting the transport of nuclear and other dangerous materials – ineluctably involve military force. Afghanistan does pose a crucial test. You assert that neither the United States nor European members of NATO are willing to devote the resources to get the job done. Shall we then withdraw and hope for the best? Is Osama bin Laden right about the irresolution of the democratic West?

Lurking just below the surface of today’s transatlantic debates on terrorism, Iraq and Middle East transformation are mostly unstated fears about each other. Europeans fear that America will drag them into unnecessary fights; Americans fear that Europeans don’t have the stomach for necessary fights. I do agree with you that a candid transatlantic dialogue is urgently needed to dispel both fears and forge a more effective, common response to the new dangers we face.

Yours,
Will

Dear Will,

You rightly mention fears lurking just below the surface of the transatlantic debate. They seem to be the current manifestation of what academics have called the “alliance security dilemma”. On the one hand, states belonging to an alliance fear that their allies may abandon them in their moment of need. On the other, they themselves are afraid of becoming entrapped in conflicts they do not consider to be in their own vital interests. And the Iraq War stirred up some fear of entrapment in Europe – and created serious doubts about the strategic wisdom of this US administration and its priorities at a time when global Islamist terrorism is, no doubt about it, the clear and present danger.

Again, I do not believe that the “old” NATO based on one overriding geographically focused mission can be resurrected. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, NATO did invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, yet no member state interpreted this action as obliging it to provide unconditional military support. Moreover, as you will recall, Washington clearly preferred to build a coalition of the willing for its war on terror to risking becoming entangled in Alliance decision-making.

I have not advocated and do not advocate a NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, I don’t see how the mismatch between high-flying rhetoric and actual policies can be bridged. And I’ve been unable to detect any evidence to the effect that the stabilisation of Afghanistan is a top priority for Washington. As a result, I would be cautious about the extent to which we put NATO’s credibility and prestige on the line in this operation. More than a decade ago, the United Nations was strongly (and wrongly) criticised and subsequently held responsible in the United States for the failure of the international community’s intervention in Somalia. This contributed to further erosion of support for the United Nations in the United States. For the sake of NATO and the transatlantic relationship I hope that the Alliance is able to avoid a similar fate in Afghanistan.

Yours,
Peter

For more on the Progressive Policy Institute, see
www.ppionline.org

For more on the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, see
www.swp-berlin.org

We should be more concerned about over-stretching the Alliance than about the absence of a unifying mission and a new central front

Peter Rudolf
Building effective partnerships

Christopher Bennett examines how NATO has forged effective partnerships with non-member states and other international organisations since the end of the Cold War.

One of the great changes in NATO’s approach to providing security since the end of the Cold War is the way in which it has reached out to form partnerships with non-member states and other international organisations. This policy bore early fruit with the creation of forums and programmes to assist the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, evolved pragmatically in response to the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and received added impetus and a sense of urgency following the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. Moreover, its ongoing importance to the Alliance as it transforms itself to combat the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism was reaffirmed at NATO’s last Summit in Prague.

The rationale behind this policy is simple, namely that as the strategic environment has become increasingly complex, no single institution can claim to own the magic formula to guarantee peace. Rather, the way to provide the greatest possible level of security both to NATO members and to the wider world is by creating a network of cooperating partners all with a vested interest in preserving and promoting stability and prosperity. Today, barely a week goes by without either the NATO Secretary General meeting with the head of another international organisation or the leader of a Partner country, or a visit to Alliance Headquarters by an individual of similar standing. And NATO has even developed effective working relationships with international financial institutions and non-governmental organisations working in crisis areas of the world.

The starting point for NATO’s partnership policy was the hand of friendship that the Alliance offered to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe soon after the Berlin Wall came down and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated. In the first instance, this manifested itself in the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at NATO Headquarters in December 1991 as a forum for discussion and promotion of security issues for both NATO members and the Alliance’s former adversaries. At the time, the pace of change in Europe was so rapid that the Soviet Union actually disintegrated during the NACC’s inaugural meeting with the result that the Soviet ambassador present was only able to speak on behalf of the Russian Federation by the end.

In 1994, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace, a practical programme of military cooperation and assistance tailored to the individual needs of each participating country, designed initially to help establish democratic control over armed forces, assist the military reform process and help develop NATO-compatible militaries. As other European countries saw the benefits of security cooperation through the NACC and the Partnership for Peace, more wished to join and membership was extended beyond the NATO members and former communist countries to include Western Europe’s traditionally neutral states. To reflect this change and the evolution of NATO’s relationship with Partner countries, the NACC was renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.

Today, all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area are members of both the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, both of which aspire to membership. Moreover, in line with NATO itself, the EAPC has become increasingly focused on addressing modern security threats since 11 September 2001. In this way, for example, EAPC leaders endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism at the Alliance’s Prague Summit in November 2002. (For a forward-looking assessment of the Partnership for Peace, see Continuing to build security through Partnership by Robert Weaver on pages 30 to 32.)

Security variable

Probably the greatest variable influencing security in the Euro-Atlantic area since the end of the Cold War has been Russia. A democratising, Western-oriented and reforming Russia would clearly be a major stabilising factor for the whole Euro-Atlantic area. This explains the enormous investment in building and improving relations with Moscow that the Alliance has made in recent years, one that after several false dawns increasingly appears both farsighted and shrewd.

In the first half of the 1990s, a still suspicious Russia joined and participated in both the NACC and the Partnership for Peace. And in 1996, it contributed 2,000 soldiers – the largest non-NATO contingent – to the Alliance’s first peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These soldiers, who remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina until August last year, worked together with their peers from NATO countries and,
in the process, helped break down barriers and build bridges on both sides paving the way for a more formal NATO-Russia relationship.

In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security*. This was an ambitious document that established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to “provide a mechanism for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern”. In practice, however, it failed to deliver fully on its promise. This was in part because the Russian élite tended to see it as a damage-limitation exercise in the context of NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement, and in part because many NATO members also harboured residual suspicions of Russia’s intentions. Moreover, many analysts viewed the very decision-making process within the PJC as flawed, since NATO members had already arrived at common positions before PJC meetings on the basis of a discussion process within the Alliance and

Allies and Partners parading together: One practical benefit to NATO of its partnerships is the contribution that Partner countries have made, and continue to make, to Alliance-led peacekeeping operations
were reluctant to relinquish their hard-won consensus on the basis of Russian objections. When in 1999, Russia walked out of the Permanent Joint Council in protest at the Alliance’s intervention in Kosovo, few missed its meetings.

The Permanent Joint Council did, nevertheless, resume meeting in May 2000 and NATO opened an Information Office in Moscow a year later, but it took the tragedy of 11 September 2001 to bring NATO and Russia into a fuller, more trusting partnership. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, both sides recognised that they could only gain in security terms from cooperating with each other. This led to the creation in May 2002 of the NATO-Russia Council. This body, which has replaced the Permanent Joint Council, works on the basis of consensus and includes all NATO members and Russia as equal partners. Moreover, the first two years of its existence have proved extremely positive with achievements in a wide range of areas. (For more on NATO-Russia relations, see Building hope on experience by Paul Fritch on pages 43 to 45 and the interview with General Konstantin Vasilyevich Totskiy, Russia’s ambassador to NATO on pages 54 to 56.)

NATO also has a vested interest in stability and a smooth transition to democracy in Ukraine, the second most populous independent state to emerge from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. NATO-Ukraine cooperation has intensified since the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in 1997. This Charter provides the formal basis for NATO-Ukraine consultations on issues of Euro-Atlantic security and a NATO-Ukraine Commission was created to direct activities undertaken within this partnership, including promoting defence reform, civil-emergency planning and disaster preparedness and cooperation in the fields of science and the environment. NATO opened an Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine in 1997 and a Military Liaison Office in 1999. In 2002, NATO and Ukraine agreed an Action Plan providing a strategic framework for intensified consultations on political, economic and defence issues and setting out Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities on the road towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic security structures. Moreover, Ukraine has formed a joint peacekeeping battalion with NATO Ally Poland and has participated actively in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. (For more on NATO-Ukraine relations, see Edging erratically forward by James Sherr on pages 46 to 49.)

Seven years before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 highlighted the importance of good relations between the West and the Arab world, NATO had already established a Mediterranean Dialogue. This initiative, which today involves seven countries – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – in the wider Mediterranean region, seeks to contribute to regional security and stability and achieve better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners. Moreover, it, too, was upgraded in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. (For an analysis of the possible evolution of the Mediterranean Dialogue, see Forging a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East by Chris Donnelly on pages 26 to 29.)

Interestingly, the desire to build relations with NATO goes far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Japan has attached considerable importance to its relations with the Alliance with the result that regular, biannual NATO-Japan security conferences have taken place since the early 1990s. Two NATO Secretaries General – Manfred Wörner in 1991 and Javier Solana in 1999 – have made official visits to Japan. And a series of so-called “high-level talks” have taken place between a NATO team headed by the Deputy Secretary General and senior officials from the Japanese Foreign and Defence Ministries. Moreover, as the Alliance continues to transform itself to meet the security challenges of the 21st century and moves beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, interest in partnership with NATO grows. Indeed, today China too is investigating the potential of a closer relationship.

### Practical cooperation

One very practical benefit to NATO of its many partnerships is the contribution that Partner countries have made, and continue to make, to Alliance-led peacekeeping operations in terms of troops, equipment and resources. Indeed, generating the 70,000 troops that were required for the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1999 and 2000 would have been extremely difficult without Partner contributions. By contributing troops, Partner countries were demonstrating their commitment both to Euro-Atlantic security and to Euro-Atlantic security cooperation. But the task of rebuilding peace and stability in war-ravaged regions of the former Yugoslavia was one that required more than simply military solutions. In addition to working with non-member states, therefore, NATO has forged increasingly effective partnerships with other international institutions in the interest of eventually achieving self-sustaining peace processes.

Although the wars of Yugoslavia’s dissolution caught the international community largely unprepared, the key institutions involved – the European Union, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations – gradually came to grips with the situation and, in the process, began to forge effective working relations. Moreover, the experience of working together on the ground firstly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then in Kosovo and then in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* has
helped shape all these organisations and their relationships with each other.

NATO deployed into Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. In doing so, it provided the conditions in which other international organisations, including the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations and a range of non-governmental organisations, could contribute to rebuilding peace and stability in the country. Despite the historical silence that had existed in the past between NATO and its new partners, practical relations were quickly established that have since been intensified and improved as a result of the experience of working together.

That model proved a valuable guide for Kosovo. In 1999, a NATO-led force deployed in the province to provide security with a mandate from UNSC Resolution 1244. And the United Nations divided responsibility for the peace process between itself (police and justice work as well as civil administration), the OSCE (democratisation and institution building) and the European Union (reconstruction and economic development). In this way, each organisation has a specific role to play in rebuilding peace and stability.

The focus of NATO’s relationship with the United Nations today is clearly on peacekeeping issues. The NATO Secretary General reports to his UN counterpart on progress in NATO-led operations, including that of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, for which NATO took responsibility in August last year, and informs the United Nations of key decisions of the North Atlantic Council. Staff-level cooperation and the flow of information have increased in recent years since the appointment in 1999 of a NATO liaison officer to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the attachment of a liaison officer from the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Directorate. Meanwhile, international responses to the threat posed by terrorism is emerging as an area for enhanced relations.

European security architecture

Already in December 1990, NATO foreign ministers envisaged a triangular construction to shore up security in Europe, declaring that: “The three key elements of the European architecture are the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE [the OSCE’s forerunner].” But here again, it was practical cooperation in the former Yugoslavia that paved the way for regular contacts and intensified exchange of information. And the profile of NATO-OSCE cooperation and cooperation of both organisations with the European Union was raised in 2000 and 2001 as the NATO Secretary General made regular visits to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with his EU and OSCE counterparts in what proved a successful attempt to head off a growing conflict there.

NATO-OSCE relations are governed by the so-called Platform for Cooperative Security agreed at the OSCE’s 1999 Istanbul Summit. In this, the Allies expressed their readiness to deploy NATO’s institutional resources in support of the OSCE’s work, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management.

NATO’s most important relationship in the coming years will likely be that with the European Union, as that organisation seeks to enhance its security – including military – capabilities. When both organisations work together with a common aim, as they did in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, they can be a powerful force both for conflict prevention and crisis management. Moreover, as the European Union enlarged to take in ten more countries, thereby increasing its membership to 25, and NATO enlarged to take in seven more countries, thereby becoming an alliance of 26, the overlap in membership has grown to 19.

The development of a European Security and Defence Policy can and should strengthen both Alliance and EU crisis-management capabilities. This will especially be the case as the European Union meets the Headline Goal that it set for itself in Helsinki in 1999: to be able to deploy and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 60,000 troops to undertake the so-called “Petersberg tasks” of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

Although NATO established formal relations with the European Union in January 2001 and the two organisations have been meeting formally since then, the relationship remained largely a blueprint with little substance until December 2002, when an EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP was adopted. Since then, a series of agreements have been agreed between the European Union and NATO on cooperation in crisis management. These agreements made it possible for the European Union to take over from NATO responsibility for peacekeeping in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia last year and should pave the way for a similar hand-over in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (For more on EU-NATO relations, see The ties that bind by Julian Lindley-French on pages 50 to 53.)

The many partnerships that NATO has helped establish in recent years and is continuing to develop have not been created simply for their own sake. In the face of transnational security threats, there can be no substitute for international cooperation – between countries, and between institutions. This is why partnership has formed a key element of the Alliance’s transformation since the end of the Cold War, and why the partnerships will be further deepened and enhanced at the Istanbul Summit.
decade ago NATO launched two ground-breaking partnership programmes, the Partnership for Peace for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Dialogue for countries in the wider Mediterranean region. Both programmes now have to be redesigned to take account of changes in Euro-Atlantic security such as NATO enlargement as well as the new challenges that the Alliance faces today. In seeking to reform the Mediterranean Dialogue and possibly extend it to cover more of the Middle East, much can be learned from the PfP experience.

Unlike the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue has not been a great success. It has played no significant role in stabilising the region or in helping and promoting the evolution of participating countries. There are several reasons for this. They include a lack of investment of time, people and money; a profound suspicion and ignorance of NATO on the part of many countries in the region; the lack of those mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on which the success of NATO and the Partnership for Peace is based, and, the inability to decouple wider regional security issues from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Whereas a decade ago NATO’s prime security concern was the stabilisation and transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, today it is addressing problems coming from or passing through countries of the “Greater Middle East”. If NATO is to meet the security concerns of its members, it will have to shift the focus of its attention from Central and Eastern Europe to this region over the coming months and years, and the Mediterranean Dialogue will have to evolve accordingly.

Of course, these potential developments are all “ifs”, and big “ifs” at that. But looking back over the past five years, let alone the past 15, the pace of NATO’s evolution has far outstripped what was predicted at the time. The pace of world events is accelerating and NATO, despite its shortcomings, is the international institution that has proven the most flexible and capable of evolving to meet the demands of the new security environment. This is likely to continue to be the case, and NATO’s evolution is likely to hold more surprises.

As the Alliance moves further from its “Cold-War” role as a passive defensive organisation towards becoming the proactive security organisation that today’s “Hot Peace” requires, it is becoming increasingly evident to Allies that their security can only be achieved collectively. The divide between “Allies” and “Partners” needs to close rapidly. Allies’ security can only be assured by close collaboration with Partners in Central and Eastern Europe and the Greater Middle East as well as with each other. It is this development which, more than any other, is today driving NATO’s evolution, and provides the biggest incentive to make partnership programmes more substantive and better integrated into the Alliance’s mainstream activities.

Building on success

If NATO’s partnership mechanisms are to evolve to meet the new security challenges, it would be logical for this evolution to be based on the features of NATO that have been responsible for its success. Wags have sometimes joked that NATO stands for “No Action, Talk Only”. It is, however, precisely the Alliance’s ability to provide a forum for dialogue where members can argue out their problems rather than coming to
blows over them that has been the basis of its success. This is what the Partnership for Peace did for those nations that wanted to join the NATO club, and what the Mediterranean Dialogue has to date failed to do, despite its name. Developing these mechanisms for the diverse situations now facing Central and Eastern Europe and the Greater Middle East is the fundamental challenge facing both the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue.

NATO’s mechanisms, both formal and informal, for creating a common defence and security culture are not only the basis for its traditional raison d’être – the provision of collective defence – but, when exported to Central and Eastern Europe, have proved to have a significant influence on the democratisation process as a whole. Democratic control of armed and security forces, civil military relations and defence reform are now known to be far more important elements of democratic and economic transformation of a country than was at first thought. These issues are still a challenge to many Eastern European and Balkan countries, but they are also today of great concern to many countries of the Greater Middle East. Developing these mechanisms and extending them to new parts of the globe will be an essential element of a new NATO partnership mechanism.

To build security partnerships in the wider Mediterranean region and the Greater Middle East, NATO now needs to develop greater expertise in this part of the world and to increase institutional mechanisms for engagement. Just as NATO in the late 1980s and early 1990s had to develop greater institutional expertise in the Soviet Union and subsequently its successor states, so the Alliance today needs to do the same for the countries of North Africa and the Greater Middle East. The Partnership for Peace provides a model of the kind of framework necessary to support engagement primarily in so far as it was a mechanism capable of great flexibility. An analogous programme for the Mediterranean and Greater Middle East needs to take account of certain specific regional features, some of which are the same as were met within Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, and some of which are very different.

For example, there is almost total ignorance among populations, and even certain governments in the region, about the true nature of NATO. As a result, a long-term, broad-based information and communications programme is needed. This requires active engagement not only of government bodies but also of non-governmental organisations, as was done with Central and Eastern European countries a decade
or more ago. But whereas Central and Eastern Europe saw the Partnership for Peace primarily as an implement to draw information and engagement out of NATO, and to get NATO to inject influence into Central and Eastern Europe, countries of North Africa and the Greater Middle East want first and foremost a means of getting their voice heard, and of influencing Allies’ decision-making. This is good because we need to listen and understand before we can reply and formulate policies. Our influence in the region will be directly in proportion to our readiness to listen and to hear.

Within the region as a whole, civil society is less developed than in most of Europe, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe 15 years ago. This makes the engagement of non-governmental organisations and universities important, both as a means of getting NATO’s message across and to help the development of democracy. In some cases, such as Algeria, there is an immediate and specific need for access to experience and expertise in establishing a new civil-military relationship and democratic control of armed forces.

Whereas from the start, many Central and Eastern European countries wanted to join NATO, and the Partnership for Peace provided a mechanism for them to do so, the same is not true of countries of North Africa and the Greater Middle East. If public opinion in these countries sees a new initiative as being a revival of a military alliance, as a tool for Western pressure or control, or, worst of all, as a tool to give Israel an early perspective of NATO membership, then no progress will be made.

**Forums for dialogue**

For that reason, a new mechanism to replace the Mediterranean Dialogue should not include formal documents to be signed, particularly if they contain a list of principles and values to be shared. All that is needed in the first instance is a series of forums for regular political and military/security dialogue coupled with a dense web of cooperative offers on many levels based on the proven PIP principle of self-differentiation. These offers and invitations must be seen as being complementary to, and not rivaling, those of the European Union, and they must reflect what the countries themselves want and need. If they are seen as “top-down” proposals they will be politely ignored.

In parallel with a programme of information and diplomatic engagement, there is increasing scope for military confidence-building measures. Here, bilateral relations between NATO members and Central and Eastern European Partners on the one hand and Mediterranean and Greater Middle Eastern countries on the other can be mutually beneficial to developing multilateral links. But experience in this field teaches us that the Alliance needs to increase its sensitivity to concerns in the region. NATO force groupings operating in the Mediterranean, set up, of course, with other concerns in mind, can inadvertently appear threatening to North African countries.

In addition to the military and security confidence-building measures, which will be as valuable in the Mediterranean or Greater Middle East regions as they have been in Central and Eastern Europe, there is much greater scope for a formal information-sharing mechanism. There is a need for a new Partnership and Cooperation process to become a networking centre where everyone can find out what is going on in the region. This can perhaps most effectively be done with the help of an electronic system. There is no substitute for bringing people together on a regular basis to meet and talk, but extended use of video conferencing can certainly increase communication at low cost.

As “soft” security issues are less sensitive than hard military ones in most North African and Middle Eastern countries, it is the former which will be the most benign area in which NATO can initially become engaged. The NATO Science Programme is an ideal mechanism to break the ice. Using its Science Programme as well as other public diplomacy tools, NATO is in a good position to generate interest and debate in the region on new security issues that pose a common threat. Under the auspices of scientific and information programmes, NATO officials will be able to visit the regions more and also expand their own expertise. Just as in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, we can expect NATO’s initiatives with these programmes to stimulate bilateral engagement by academic institutions in Allied countries. Such engagement will quickly lead to the much-needed development of think tanks in the region, with which collaborative programmes can be run. In current circumstances, non-governmental organisations and universities in Allied countries are aware of the need to refocus their attention on this part of the world, which many have neglected. A relatively modest initiative here by NATO can stimulate a flood of benign Western engagement, as it did in Central and Eastern Europe.

An important feature of such a focus, and one that is often undervalued, is the work that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NPA) can do with regional participants. Although the NPA is separate from NATO, its programmes are useful to support the Alliance’s aims and to complement diplomatic and military activity. The NPA can often go where NATO’s bureaucracy finds it difficult to tread and parliaments often find it easier to talk to one another than governments. A good
example is the parliamentary dialogue that is currently taking place in the Caucasus in spite of regional tensions. Similar dialogue might help improve relations between certain North African countries.

**Getting it right**

The most important consideration for turning partnership and cooperation in this area into a success is to be able to divide up the area, formally or informally, to work in sub-regional clusters. Above all, the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian question needs to be separated from the issue of NATO’s relationship with North African states. Many states of the region also have serious tensions with their own neighbours. For these reasons, collaboration with NATO is likely to develop first along bilateral lines and only secondly in a sub-regional collective forum.

A further consideration is that new security problems, including the key issue of terrorism, now concern states much further afield than the existing PfP or Dialogue members, including Indonesia and Pakistan. The new mechanisms should be capable of opening at least some of the dialogue to other countries with similar problems. After all, NATO’s role in Afghanistan necessitates political contacts with distant countries. A painless and immediate mechanism for this would be, for example, to open NATO’s Science Workshops to participants from these countries. At present, only residents of PfP and Dialogue countries are eligible to be invited to such activities.

In one area in particular it is important to draw the correct lesson from the development of Partnership for Peace. PfP membership was originally offered to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union without conditionality. Subsequently, for those countries such as Serbia and Montenegro that aspire to join the Partnership for Peace as a path to rejoining the Western community, a condition of democratisation and good governance has been imposed.

While the value of this can be debated, one thing is certain. It is essential that a new programme for partnership and cooperation with North Africa and the Greater Middle East should include no such condition. The countries of the region will choose different paths towards democracy and modernisation, and will move at different speeds. They will resent anything that appears condescending or culturally imperialistic.

The cultural gap between Europe and North Africa on the one hand and North Africa and the Greater Middle East on the other is greater today than that between East and West at the end of the Cold War. Efforts to help close this gap will be more effective if collaboration is offered gently and with sensitivity.

Although terrorism is as great a threat to Middle Eastern countries as it is to Europe and North America, and collaboration on this issue is of prime importance, representatives of these countries are tired of attending meetings where all conversations start by linking the Arab world and the threat of terrorism. We will get further in such discussions if we moderate our approach.

The feature of the Partnership for Peace that has had the greatest impact has undoubtedly been the establishment of official representations at NATO Headquarters. Providing office space for representatives from PfP countries and encouraging those countries to send serious civilian and military contingents to serve at NATO Headquarters created a momentum for change which immediately had a profound impact on all those countries which took up the opportunity. It will be this measure which, above all others, will contribute to building real dialogue and cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean and Greater Middle East.

Once such representation is in place, all the many and varied activities that have evolved within the Partnership for Peace can be developed for these regions too. The growth of a team of national representatives who understand NATO and who can begin to transmit their understanding back to their own capitals makes engagement possible in a way that nothing else can do. All the programmes open to PfP countries become immediately accessible. Diplomatic engagement becomes more effective. Most important of all, it is the presence of a decent-sized representation that opens the informal channels of communication. Much of NATO’s real work in smoothing out conflicts and eliminating friction is done face to face by mid-level diplomats and officers in the bar, the restaurant or the corridors of the Headquarters. Indeed, it is the fact that all national delegations and representations, military and non-military, are co-located under one roof that makes NATO unique. The congenial atmosphere that this fosters allows real diplomacy to flourish. It is this privilege that we need to extend to our Mediterranean and Middle Eastern colleagues.

As the Partnership for Peace is itself overhauled and rebranded, there will almost inevitably be a greater degree of collaboration between it and the new mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation with North Africa and the Middle East. Perhaps the best solution, therefore, would be one common umbrella programme covering all aspects of partnership, both the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue, beneath which there could be a greater distinction between the regions, and between parts of the whole: a “Partnership for Cooperation” which takes in Central and Eastern Europe, the wider Mediterranean region and the Greater Middle East.

For more on the UK Defence Academy, see www.defenceacademy.mod.uk/DefenceAcademy
The future development of NATO’s relations with Partner countries will be a major agenda issue for the Alliance’s Istanbul Summit at the end of June. The original objective of NATO’s Partnership policy was to break down barriers between former adversaries and to build security through dialogue and cooperation. The objectives of today’s Partnership are much more ambitious – for Partner nations are now engaged with NATO in tackling 21st century security challenges.

As NATO has transformed, Partnership has developed. In every area – whether undertaking challenging peacekeeping missions, or meeting the new threats to our common security such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – Partners play an important role both in shaping and helping to implement NATO’s responses to these new challenges. NATO’s advice and assistance, provided through Partnership mechanisms, has also become indispensable in helping Partners tackle important reform issues.

NATO regularly consults with its Partners through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which provides the overall political framework for relations with Partners. Each Partner is also able to build up an individual relationship with the Alliance through the Partnership for Peace, a programme of practical activities from which Partners can choose their own cooperation priorities. These two essential mechanisms of Partnership have turned into key fixtures of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

For Partnership to retain its dynamism and relevance to the Alliance, it needs to be constantly adapted to meet NATO’s evolving priorities. As NATO is such an important security actor, it is natural that Partners wish to develop a close relationship with the Alliance. But Partnership also needs to remain an attractive proposition to Partners, and continue to help meet their aspirations. As NATO and its Partners prepare for the Istanbul Summit at the end of June, several challenges need to be addressed.

First, the balance of the relationship between Allies and Partners has changed. On 29 March, seven former Partners – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – became Allies. For the first time, NATO now has more members (26) than Partners (20). Allies must therefore be prepared to take an even more active role in ensuring that the Partnership remains vibrant. It also provides the occasion to re-examine what priorities we should pursue together through Partnership.

Second, the Partners are a very diverse group. They include both the strategically important countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia and the Western European non-aligned states. All of these countries have very different security needs and desires, with the result that their priorities and objectives in pursuit of Partnership will vary. Partnership has to be flexible enough to take this into account.

For the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example, Partnership tools must help them pursue their own reform initiatives. Given the Alliance’s expertise in defence reform, and the experience gained with the new members through the Membership Action Plan, helping to reform defence and military structures will be a core part of this process.

Responding to reform needs

But to respond best to reform needs, Partnership must also help tackle other important areas of domestic reform. To do so, NATO is offering Partners a mechanism known as the Individual Partnership Action Plan, or IPAP, which is designed to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a Partner interacts with the Alliance and to sharpen the focus on domestic reform. The IPAP should set out clearly the cooperation priorities of the individual Partner, and make sure that the various mechanisms in use correspond directly to these priorities.

Robert Weaver is head of the Country Relations and Political Affairs section in NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division.
To date, several countries have shown a keen interest in this initiative, and Georgia became the first to begin the process when its President, Mikhail Saakashvili, handed over his country’s Presentation Document at NATO Headquarters on 6 April.

While some Partners are developing their defence structures and capabilities, others are able to contribute significant forces to NATO-led operations. Swedish troops, for example, played an especially important role in restoring order in Kosovo after the outbreak of violence in March. For these Partners, it is of particular importance that NATO’s Partnership mechanisms continue to give them a voice in NATO’s decision-making process, so that they can influence the preparation and conduct of missions in which they participate, or might wish to play a role.

Third, Partnership needs to keep pace with NATO’s own transformation. The fight against terrorism is now one of the Alliance’s major priorities. The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States led to the first ever invocation by NATO of Article 5. The very next day, the 46 members of the EAPC unconditionally condemned the attacks on New York and Washington DC and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism. As Partners themselves have become victims of terrorist attacks, they share NATO’s ambition to enhance cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Practical work in this area will continue through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. This is designed to promote and facilitate cooperation among EAPC states through political consultation and practical programmes under the auspices of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.
Partnerships

To tackle the new threats, and to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO leaders have committed themselves to enhancing the Alliance's military capabilities. Allied forces must be able to move quickly to wherever they are needed and to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats.

If Partners wish to contribute to the most challenging NATO-led missions, then they too must field forces that are able to meet these requirements. The Planning and Review Process (PARP) has long been the vehicle for preparing Partner contributions to missions through the development of the appropriate capabilities based on NATO standards. This process has come to closely resemble NATO's own Defence Planning Process, and needs to continue to do so to ensure that Partners are able to contribute to missions in the most efficient manner possible.

Afghan assistance

Perhaps the most powerful example of the way NATO has evolved in recent years is the Alliance's involvement in Afghanistan. The Alliance has been leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since August 2003 to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and ensure that the country is never again used as a base for terrorists.

Operating in Afghanistan, far away from NATO's traditional perimeter, highlights the reasons why Partnership is so important for the Alliance, and also why the Alliance needs to pay more attention to the needs of its Central Asian Partners. At present, eight Partners are represented in the mission, many providing valuable specialised forces such as military police and de-mining teams. These capabilities are generally in short supply, but are an important part of the balanced force structure that is key to the success of any operation.

Partner nations in Central Asia have been instrumental in ensuring the logistic supply of ISAF forces as equipment must cross several Partner countries before arriving in Afghanistan. Relationships developed through the Partnership for Peace have laid the basis for Allies to draw up bilateral agreements for the transit of material across these states and the basing of forces and supplies on their territory.

Given the diverse ethnic make-up of Afghanistan, several Central Asian Partners also have influence on important local actors, which they can use in support of ISAF objectives. As a result of these various factors, the states of Central Asia, once considered as being on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, are now an important neighbouring region of the Alliance – and Partnership should reflect that enhanced importance.

Fourth, the Partnership needs to stay open for new members. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro have made clear their desire to join. NATO has made clear that to achieve this they will have to meet established NATO conditions, foremost among which is full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

Fifth, Partnership needs to continue to fulfil its original function, and provide a forum for consultations with Partners on the issues that are at the forefront of current security concerns. Partnership has at its disposal a range of mechanisms available for meetings among all Allies and Partners, or in smaller but open-ended groups depending upon the subjects under discussion. The attractiveness of those various mechanisms – to Partners and to Allies – must be maintained.

Partnership needs to be constantly adapted to meet NATO's evolving priorities

The most recent series of EAPC Ambassadorial meetings held this year have addressed a host of issues that are of critical importance to Allies and Partners alike, including the evolution of the Balkans, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the fight against terrorism. The EAPC has also just agreed to institute a new EAPC Security Forum, which will meet once a year at high-level to discuss important security issues, and how NATO and its Partners can best address them together.

The Alliance's evolving policy of Partnership has been enormously successful in helping to alter the strategic environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. By promoting political and military interoperability, Partnership has helped to create a true Euro-Atlantic security culture – a strong determination to work together in tackling critical security challenges, within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. As the 26 Allies and 20 Partners continue to grow together, they will increase their ability to meet these common challenges with common responses. The Istanbul Summit will confirm this trend and point the way ahead.

For more on the Partnership for Peace, see www.nato.int/issues/pfp
For more on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, see www.nato.int/issues/eapc
For the review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, see www.nato.int/issues/eap_review
NATO’s evolving operations

Adam Kobieracki examines the evolution of NATO’s operations and considers prospects for future deployments.

There is probably no better illustration of how NATO has changed since the Prague Summit than the geographical extent of the Alliance’s operations. Today, in addition to ongoing crisis-management operations in the former Yugoslavia – in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo – the Alliance is running major operations in the Mediterranean and in Afghanistan and is assisting the multinational division led by Poland provide security in a sector of the stabilisation force in Iraq.

While the current list of NATO-led operations is already impressive, the pressure to take on more is growing ever stronger. In many ways, the Alliance has become a victim of its own success, with the result that security analysts and even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan increasingly look to it to help solve many of the world’s more intractable problems. There are, however, limits to the Alliance’s capacity to deploy forces. Clear capability shortfalls have to be met if NATO is to become an effective crisis manager with a rapid reaction capability and global reach, provided all Allies accept such a perspective.

Capability shortfalls in the groundbreaking operation in Afghanistan – the first NATO-led mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area – have been the focus of widespread media attention and a cause of some discomfort to the Alliance. The problem is not, however, a lack of equipment or manpower. The Allies possess the modest assets – medical facilities, transport aircraft and helicopters – that NATO’s military authorities have requested for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in abundance. Moreover, the European Allies and Canada have between them some 1.5 million men and women under arms – 2 million if reserves are included – and only some 60,000 troops deployed on multinational missions, in sharp contrast to the forces available at any one time to the United States. The problem goes much deeper, to the very heart of what NATO is or should be capable of doing at any one time to the United States. The problem is not, however, a lack of equipment or manpower. The Allies possess the modest assets – medical facilities, transport aircraft and helicopters – that NATO’s military authorities have requested for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in abundance. Moreover, the European Allies and Canada have between them some 1.5 million men and women under arms – 2 million if reserves are included – and only some 60,000 troops deployed on multinational missions, in sharp contrast to the forces available at any one time to the United States. The problem goes much deeper, to the very heart of what NATO is or should be capable of doing.

Since the Prague Summit, NATO has invested considerable time and effort in military transformation. This includes reforming the Command Structure, building the NATO Response Force and overseeing implementation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment – reforms that are designed to give the Alliance greater expeditionary capabilities. Results to date have been encouraging. (For details and assessment of these developments, see Transforming NATO’s military structures by General James L. Jones on pages 57 to 59; A radically new Command Structure for NATO by Air Vice-Marshals Andrew Vallyance on pages 64 to 67; and Marrying capabilities to commitments by John Colston on pages 68 to 70.)

If, however, Allies want NATO to be able to “go where the threats are”, the Alliance’s political and operational decision-making processes will have to be brought more in line with each other. To achieve this, it will be necessary to apply the same transformational logic to the setting of force goals and to the defence-planning and force-generation processes as has been applied to military structures. While these processes have served the Alliance well over the years, they were designed during the Cold War and inevitably reflect the priorities of that era, not the needs of today.

Expanding operational commitments

To be sure, given the relatively small number of current operations, it is still possible to continue muddling through on the basis of ad hoc contributions and improvised solutions, much as the Alliance has been doing since launching its first peace-support mission, the Implementation Force, in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 1995. But any increase in demand will put existing mechanisms for generating and supporting forces on extended, far-away deployments under immense strain. Moreover, as things stand, the political decisions have already been taken that NATO should steadily expand its presence in Afghanistan; extend the scale and scope of its Mediterranean operations (as has already happened); and maintain its commitment to Kosovo – the largest of its missions – at current levels for the foreseeable future. In addition, many pundits and practitioners would like to see NATO play a greater role in Iraq and possibly elsewhere in the Middle East.

By taking on responsibility for the UN-mandated ISAF in August last year, NATO helped overcome many of the problems that the mission had faced since its creation in December 2001, in particular avoiding the need for the continual search, every six months, for a new lead nation. Moreover, by creating a permanent ISAF headquarters, the Alliance was able to add stability and increase continuity, as well as enabling smaller countries, which would not have the capacity required to act as lead nations, to play a stronger role within the operation. However, while ISAF’s initial man-

Adam Kobieracki is Assistant Secretary General in NATO’s new Operations Division.
The date was limited to providing security in and around Kabul, the need for an international security presence throughout Afghanistan was clearly increasing. Hence a new UN Security Council Resolution last October to expand ISAF’s mandate to help the Afghan government to extend its authority beyond Kabul and provide a safe and secure environment for elections – both prerequisites for the spread of the rule of law and the reconstruction of the country.

Since December, therefore, NATO has indeed been steadily expanding its presence in Afghanistan by taking on responsibility for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These are small teams, including both civilian and military personnel, which have demonstrated their effectiveness in areas where they have already been operating. The Alliance took command of a PRT in Kunduz in the north of the country in January and, moving anti-clockwise to the west, south-west and finally south-east provinces of Afghanistan, is planning progressively to take responsibility for many more. In fact, four additional PRTs are to be established by the time of the Istanbul Summit. NATO is also discussing deployment of a quick reaction force in the run-up to the elections scheduled for September. (For more on NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, see The way forward in Afghanistan by Hikmet Çetin on pages 36 and 37 and Great expectations by Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier on pages 38 and 39).

In addition to NATO’s peace-support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, the Alliance is currently running a maritime interdiction mission in the Mediterranean. NATO ships are patrolling the entire Mediterranean Sea, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to merchant ships through the Straits of Gibraltar to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. The operation, called Active Endeavour, has evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001. The Alliance initially deployed its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean at the request of the United States, a day before the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US-led campaign to oust al Qaida and the Taliban from Afghanistan.

As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role since that time, the operation’s mandate has been regularly reviewed and its remit extended. In March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include the provision of escorts through the Straits of Gibraltar to non-military ships from Alliance member states requesting them. And in March this year, the operation’s geographic remit was expanded to include the whole of the Mediterranean. In this way, Allied ships are systematically carrying out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points as well as in important sea lanes and harbours throughout the Mediterranean. Moreover, because of the operation’s success, some Allies would now like to...
see Active Endeavour extended beyond the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

While the missions in Afghanistan and in the Mediterranean are relatively new, NATO’s operations in the former Yugoslavia are well-established. The upsurge of violence in Kosovo in March of this year was a reminder of how fragile the peace there remains, five years after the Alliance’s deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). As the Alliance becomes more involved in operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, it must ensure that it retains at all times sufficient capabilities to deal with every eventuality in the longer-running operations.

In response to the upsurge of violence, NATO rapidly deployed around 2,000 additional troops into Kosovo, some arriving literally within hours of the decision to dispatch them, to reinforce the forces on the ground. They were subsequently withdrawn as soon as the situation was brought under control but remain ready to return if and when needed. Whereas it was possible progressively to reduce the size of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from 50,000 to about 17,500 troops between its deployment in June 1999 and December last year, further reductions are unlikely in the current climate. The security situation has stabilised but remains fragile and the political situation remains tense ahead of elections in October 2004 and likely discussions on the province’s final status in the second half of 2005.

The planned hand-over of responsibility for the NATO-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union will not give the Alliance much respite. The number of troops deployed in that mission has already been reduced to around 7,000 from an initial deployment of 60,000 in December 1995. And the pool of forces that the European Union is able to draw on for this mission is almost identical to that of NATO. Moreover, the strategic and operational reserves that the European Union has at its command are well-established. The upsurge of violence in Kosovo via are well-established. The upsurge of violence in Kosovo

To be an effective crisis manager with a global reach, NATO needs an internal operational transformation

---

Operations

see Active Endeavour extended beyond the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

While the missions in Afghanistan and in the Mediterranean are relatively new, NATO’s operations in the former Yugoslavia are well-established. The upsurge of violence in Kosovo in March of this year was a reminder of how fragile the peace there remains, five years after the Alliance’s deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). As the Alliance becomes more involved in operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, it must ensure that it retains at all times sufficient capabilities to deal with every eventuality in the longer-running operations.

In response to the upsurge of violence, NATO rapidly deployed around 2,000 additional troops into Kosovo, some arriving literally within hours of the decision to dispatch them, to reinforce the forces on the ground. They were subsequently withdrawn as soon as the situation was brought under control but remain ready to return if and when needed. Whereas it was possible progressively to reduce the size of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from 50,000 to about 17,500 troops between its deployment in June 1999 and December last year, further reductions are unlikely in the current climate. The security situation has stabilised but remains fragile and the political situation remains tense ahead of elections in October 2004 and likely discussions on the province’s final status in the second half of 2005.

The planned hand-over of responsibility for the NATO-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the European Union will not give the Alliance much respite. The number of troops deployed in that mission has already been reduced to around 7,000 from an initial deployment of 60,000 in December 1995. And the pool of forces that the European Union is able to draw on for this mission is almost identical to that of NATO. Moreover, the strategic and operational reserves that the European Union has at its command are well-established. The upsurge of violence in Kosovo

To be an effective crisis manager with a global reach, NATO needs an internal operational transformation

---

To be an effective crisis manager with a global reach, NATO needs an internal operational transformation

---

Ultimately, however, the defence-planning process must be reformed in such a way that it becomes a more useful tool in helping identify and generate the right forces and capabilities for Alliance operations. Here, the idea of establishing “usability” and “output” targets is currently being discussed. This implies that, from the outset, nations commit themselves to deploying a certain percentage of their forces on Alliance operations. This is a good starting point, but it is only that. More effective mechanisms are still required for turning capabilities into concrete operational commitments so that when NATO makes a political decision to take on a particular mission, it has the appropriate mix of forces and assets available and ready to be deployed. These may include greater reliance on standing forces and multinational formations kept on high-readiness for rapid deployment on a rotational basis, expanded role specialisation, and new, innovative funding arrangements to spread the increasing burden of an expanding array of operational engagements among the Allies.

At present, NATO has no footprint in Iraq and its assistance to Poland is limited to some planning support and providing a communications module. But as sovereignty is transferred from the Coalition authorities to an interim Iraqi administration on 30 June, the political climate should change. Moreover, in the event of a UN Security Council Resolution providing the mandate for an international stabilisation force, the Allies will have to think hard about the role NATO might be able to play in it.

Whether or not NATO does eventually become directly involved in helping to stabilise Iraq, the likelihood is that demand for the kinds of operations that the Alliance is currently running will certainly not decrease and will probably increase in the coming years. This is due in part to the fact that, since its deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, NATO has consistently demonstrated that it is able to achieve remarkable results in the most difficult of circumstances. In the process, the Alliance has acquired enormous experience and developed unrivalled expertise in the planning and conduct of complex multinational operations. But if the Allies continue to expand NATO’s operational role throughout the world, this can no longer be done on an ad hoc basis. To be an effective crisis manager with a global reach, NATO needs an internal operational transformation to adapt existing procedures and mechanisms to new requirements and ensure that Allies back political commitments with the necessary military capabilities.

Transforming NATO’s modus operandi

Many of the capability problems that NATO is currently facing could be alleviated relatively easily if Allies were to eliminate or at least reduce the frequent restrictions or caveats accompanying their contributions on the ways in which they may be used. These include limiting the availability of a particular asset to troops from a contributing nation and preventing troops from being involved in certain activities, such as crowd control. The effect of these restrictions is to complicate the operational commander’s task and necessitate the deployment of additional forces and capabilities to compensate.

---

ISTANBUL SUMMIT SPECIAL

NATO REVIEW 35
The way forward in Afghanistan

Hikmet Çetin analyses the evolution of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan and the importance of elections to the country’s future.

Following the successful outcome of the Berlin Conference on Afghanistan, which took place at the end of March and beginning of April, NATO’s attention in this country has been focused on supporting the electoral process and expanding the Alliance’s geographical presence beyond Kabul. These twin tasks, as subsequently set out by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, reflect the Alliance’s ongoing and enduring commitment to Afghanistan and to the stabilisation process that is leading the country towards a more prosperous future, after three decades of turmoil.

At present, the Alliance enjoys strong support across a wide spectrum of Afghan society. The population at large sees NATO, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that it has been leading since August last year, both as a guarantor of peace and stability and as an impartial force capable of creating the conditions necessary for effective implementation of the stabilisation process that was set in motion at the Bonn Conference of December 2001. In the run-up to general elections, one of the key milestones on the road to stability, expectations are inevitably extremely high.

In cooperation with other international and national security forces, NATO is in a position through ISAF to play an important role in neutralising many of the threats that might otherwise undermine the prospects for a new, post-Taliban political era. We must, nevertheless, bear in mind at all times that this process is as much national as it is international. Increasingly, therefore, Afghans should assume ownership both for it and for the future of their country. But until they are able to do this, NATO must ensure that it has the right resources to back the commitments it has made. This is...
especially critical as we expand our presence beyond Kabul and prepare to support the voter registration and electoral process.

The creation of additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will gradually enable NATO to expand its presence in Afghanistan. However, it will clearly take some time for new PRTs to consolidate their position and build their profile on the ground. Moreover, in the immediate future, they will not be able to cover the entire country. While support for the voter registration and electoral processes and the PRT-driven expansion represent two complementary efforts, there is an immediate need for a meaningful security presence throughout the country during the electoral period because of the historical significance of the Afghan elections. Although Afghans need to retain ownership of the overall process, realistically, ownership cannot simply be off-loaded on them in the absence of a comprehensive assistance package from the international community, including NATO.

With general elections scheduled for September, there are concerns over the ability of the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to ensure their fairness and transparency. After all, the government is still in the process of developing a national identity and does not currently have representations throughout the country. There is, however, no serious alternative to the poll. Moreover, elections should lead to two important developments. They should legitimise the elected government in both Afghan and international eyes and they should reinforce that government’s authority vis-à-vis other actors competing for power.

Elections always carry the risk of increased tension in ethnically divided countries that are emerging from years of war and are prone to sectarian violence. In Afghanistan, long-standing grievances risk spilling over into the political arena. Hence fears that the electoral process might lead to a polarisation of politics rather than an enhancement of the political dialogue. Moreover, the contours of a future power-sharing agreement able to balance the legitimate interests of the country’s many ethnic groups remain unclear.

From a political perspective, as we move towards the September elections and the conclusion of the Bonn process, it is important to remember that responsibility for Afghanistan does not lie solely with the international community, but also with the Afghans. They will, therefore, have to take charge in many areas, if they are to build a better future for themselves and their country.

Firstly, they will have to establish a proper nation-wide political system. This will clearly be a major undertaking requiring time and effort. Secondly, they will have to ensure that the political process is governed according to principles of transparency and accountability. At present, many of the leading figures who participated in the jihad against Soviet rule and then waged a bitter campaign against the Taliban, appear to believe that their historical records give them the right to behave as if above the law and to flout the rules and regulations set out in the newly approved law on political parties. Thirdly, the political parties themselves must overcome the stigma with which they are associated in the minds of many ordinary Afghans, as a result of the disruptive influence that they have played in the country’s recent past.

These longer-term challenges are at present overshadowed by the need to achieve widespread voter registration and free and fair polling, since the potential political return from success in this historic endeavour is enormous. A transparent and fair electoral process should help meet the hopes of ordinary Afghans that their vote will herald a new political era, following the collapse of the Taliban regime and the completion of the transitional phase of post-Taliban governance. Successful elections that meet both Afghan and international criteria of legitimacy would facilitate the expansion of central authority and serve as a catalyst for reintegrating communities into an inclusive political mainstream.

The legitimacy of the electoral process is, however, already threatened by several factors. Chief among these is the enduring influence of warlords and military commanders who continue to operate in many parts of the country with total disregard for central authority. And only if all Afghanistan’s ethnic communities perceive the elections to have been legitimate will they truly have been a success.

The stakes are extremely high. Helping ensure that the electoral process is legitimate and that it is seen to be legitimate will be a test of credibility and resolve for NATO. But the potential benefits of successful elections – in terms of promoting stability, enhancing the standing of Afghan institutions and bolstering good governance – are such that the Alliance and the wider international community have a vested interest in making the necessary investment now, before it is too late. Moreover, a successful outcome should help create the conditions in which NATO would be able to develop an effective exit strategy, as well as consolidate Afghan responsibility for the stabilisation process and popular support for the government.

The Afghan year 1383, which corresponds to 2004-2005 in our calendar, will be critical in the history of the new Afghanistan. In the course of this year, Afghans will be electing both a president and a parliament. Meaningful support from NATO at this critical time will assist them to stand on their own feet and, in time, to claim their rightful place in the family of nations contributing to international peace and security.
The Afghan New Year is a time of hope for Afghans, and this year's celebrations on 20 March marked some significant achievements for the country. In the two years since the fall of the Taliban, a long-absent sense of security has returned to Kabul. The city is also experiencing a mini economic boom as refugees make their way home, markets are flourishing, and new constructions are springing up amid the ruins of the old town. A new constitution has been agreed that is now guiding the country’s political development. The five-year drought that brought such hardship for farmers has been tempered by fairly regular rainfall. And perhaps most significantly for the country’s long-term prospects, more than five million boys and girls – the largest number of students ever in Afghanistan – returned to school on 21 March.

These are very real successes for Afghans, who are benefitting from international financial, political and military assistance. At the Berlin Conference at the end of March and beginning of April, the international community pledged to invest US $8.2 billion in the country during the next three years. And some 6,500 NATO-led peacekeepers in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assure the daily security of the people of Kabul and the immediate area around Konduz in the northeast of the country.

The NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Konduz is also nominally responsible for security in the four northeastern provinces of Konduz, Baghlan, Takar, and Badakhshan, although that huge swathe of territory is too large for security to be adequately assured by a single PRT. Secure conditions exist in the capital and around Konduz that permit international aid workers to rebuild infrastructure, education and health services, and to facilitate the spread of the central government’s influence and the rule of law. This success now needs to be replicated throughout Afghanistan. Maintaining the momentum of the political process that was begun at the 2001 Bonn Conference – at which Afghan leaders gathered to plan their country’s reconstruction after the defeat of the Taliban – is essential and is the key to facilitating the orderly conduct of free and fair elections scheduled for later this year.

Despite these indications of progress, very real threats continue to loom over the country and its people. The threat of international terrorism smoulders in the rugged countryside of the south and east where the US-led forces of Operation Enduring Freedom are currently seeking to root out the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaida. Terrorist and insurgent groups such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, continue to plot urban attacks and foment violence against aid workers and international security forces assisting Afghans.

The drugs problem poses another threat. The cultivation of poppies to produce opium is spreading like a cancer in many rural regions of the country. Indeed, Afghanistan is currently providing 95 per cent of the heroin consumed in Europe and 75 per cent of the world’s supply. Drugs are gradually eating away at the moral and cultural fabric of what was traditionally a conservative society. Large private armies are maintained by recalcitrant regional commanders reluctant to recognise the legitimate authority of the central government for fear of losing their grip on local power. Those commanders willing to demobilise have few viable economic alternatives to offer their soldiers.

In most regions outside the capital, the economy remains grossly under-developed with the exception of the narcotics business and organised crime. Returning refugees and internally displaced persons face extreme poverty and have meagre opportunities to rebuild their lives. The development of human capital remains stunted due to illiteracy and ignorance, lack of hygiene and health services, appalling infant and maternal mortality rates, and profound destruction of all types of infrastructure.

This is not an exhaustive list of the challenges facing Afghanistan. But it must be acknowledged that the threats to the people of Afghanistan, with whose consent the Alliance and ISAF operate in the country, also constitute direct threats to the success of the NATO mission. Moreover, as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has repeatedly said, the security of all NATO nations depends on progress and stability in Afghanistan to the extent that the Alliance cannot afford to fail.

While there are many long-term challenges facing both Afghans and NATO in Afghanistan, there is one immediate challenge that overshadows all others: the organisation of...
free and fair elections, including the voter registration process that must precede them. It is here that NATO must now focus its efforts, for failure to support the political process in the short term will undermine the Alliance’s ability to achieve its longer-term goal of building a stable and secure Afghanistan. Since taking the leadership role in ISAF last August, NATO has benefited from and built on the reputation and credibility that ISAF had built up during the first 19 months of its existence. Now the Alliance has reached the point where its credibility has come to rest on the level of real security support it can provide to the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan prior to the elections, which are currently scheduled for September.

For some time now, much of NATO’s focus has been on developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), with the creation of additional PRTs becoming practically synonymous with the expansion of ISAF into other regions of Afghanistan. The PRTs have demonstrated that they are an effective method of providing a limited security presence, building confidence, and coordinating reconstruction activities. But PRTs are not an end in themselves; they are simply one means among many available to NATO of achieving longer-term success.

A network of NATO-led PRTs, starting in the north and then spreading to the west of Afghanistan, requires significant military capabilities to knit it together. These include aviation assets ranging from tactical airlift to close air support; forward support bases for supplying and maintaining the network; command and control structures; quick reaction forces that are light enough to move rapidly, but powerful enough to serve as a meaningful deterrent or effective enforcer; and the communications, intelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities that provide the knowledge base without which the force cannot effectively function.

Such a network is not intended to be the sole provider of security in Afghanistan, nor an open-ended commitment. Indeed, responsibility for security ultimately resides with the government of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, with a NATO-led ISAF providing the security space necessary for indigenous security structures to spread their influence steadily throughout the country. When they have done so, international military forces will be able to leave Afghanistan, confident that the country can look after its own security needs. Sufficient capacity does not yet exist, however, for the Afghan government to assume the full extent of its responsibilities, with the result that the ongoing support of international military forces remains vital. That support serves two complementary and positively reinforcing functions: it reassures ordinary Afghans that their security needs are being addressed so that they may rebuild their lives without fear; and it emboldens the growing Afghan security agencies to accelerate their evolution into fully formed, responsible and effective guarantors of the rule of law.

The physical component of NATO’s commitment to ensuring security in Afghanistan depends on a robust network of PRTs and their enabling capabilities. Its moral component, in the immediate term, rests on the timely expansion of ISAF so that the force is able to make a meaningful and visible contribution to security during the electoral process. To be sure, this security assurance will not take the form of ISAF soldiers guarding every polling booth or being on every street corner; but a visible, mobile and robust presence providing the necessary security and political space, which is the sine qua non of free and fair elections, will go a long way to allay residual fears among the population.

Having been on the receiving end of dubious commitments of support in the past, Afghans have reason to be sceptical. Nevertheless, the enormous credibility ISAF currently enjoys within Afghanistan has engendered confidence in NATO and patience with the pace of ISAF’s expansion to date. Expectations are, however, high, and from the point of view of Afghans, who see the upcoming elections as the seminal event for the future peace and development of their nation – with all of the corresponding implications for global security – time is running out.

For more on ISAF, see www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF
Brigadier-General Brännström: Peacekeeping Partner

Brigadier-General Anders Brännström is the Swedish officer who commanded Multinational Brigade (MNB) Centre in Kosovo within the NATO-led KFOR mission for the first half of the year, including during March’s upsurge in violence. MNB Centre is deployed in central and northeastern Kosovo and headquartered in Pristina. The area has a population of about 700,000, including Albanians, Gorans and Serbs. Brigadier-General Brännström has spent much of his career in Sweden’s Arctic Infantry, where he has had a variety of appointments from platoon leader to brigade commander. In 1982 and 1983, he served as a platoon leader in the Swedish UN Battalion in Cyprus. And in summer 2000, he commanded the Swedish battalion (SWEBAT) in Kosovo. At the time of the interview, he was the only Partner officer commanding a sector in a NATO-led operation.

NATO Review: You played an important role in re-establishing order in the wake of March’s violence. How did you achieve this and what were the reasons for the upsurge?

Brigadier-General Brännström: Let me start with the reasons for the upsurge in violence. In effect, the events of mid-March showed us how unstable the situation in Kosovo really is. From my perspective, the reason for the upsurge was that the security forces were not strong enough to handle extremists within the population, who were eager to riot. The events that led to the explosion were the shooting of a young man and the drowning of some children, but the underlying reasons for it were violent elements within Kosovo’s population. This will definitely happen again in the event that strong police and military forces are unable to control those elements.

The reasons why MNB Centre was able to re-establish order were the rapid and committed deployment of forces to the focus of the Brigade’s efforts and the spirit of the troops. The Brigade managed to deploy units from the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia and Sweden to prevent ethnic cleansing occurring in the village of Caglavica. To achieve this, the troops fought a pitch battle for more than ten hours to protect the village. A crowd of more than 10,000 rioters, some of them armed with stones, Molotov cocktails, iron bars, pistols and rifles attacked them. It was a miracle no soldier was killed. The soldiers on the ground stood firm and refused to let the rioters get their way.

NR: How difficult is it for soldiers from Partner nations to work together with their NATO peers in complex peace support operations?

BGB: It’s actually quite easy to work together. This is the result of ten years of cooperating with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as well as our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Sweden deployed 12 battalions in the 1990s. Moreover, in Kosovo we have already been working together for five years. Critically, all soldiers – whether NATO or non-NATO – are, above all, soldiers with similar training and similar values. This makes the overall experience extremely positive.

NR: What has been your greatest challenge as an officer for a Partner country running a key sector of a NATO-led operation?

BGB: My greatest challenge is the same as that which any commanding officer, whether from a Partner country or a NATO member state, would face. It is to get the very best out of the eight nations that make up MNB Centre. It is to make multinationality a strength and not a weakness.

NR: Based on your experience in Kosovo, do you have any suggestions for improving the way soldiers from Partner nations work together with their NATO peers?

Brigadier-General Brännström: Peacekeeping Partner

Brigadier-General Anders Brännström is the Swedish officer who commanded Multinational Brigade (MNB) Centre in Kosovo within the NATO-led KFOR mission for the first half of the year, including during March’s upsurge in violence. MNB Centre is deployed in central and northeastern Kosovo and headquartered in Pristina. The area has a population of about 700,000, including Albanians, Gorans and Serbs. Brigadier-General Brännström has spent much of his career in Sweden’s Arctic Infantry, where he has had a variety of appointments from platoon leader to brigade commander. In 1982 and 1983, he served as a platoon leader in the Swedish UN Battalion in Cyprus. And in summer 2000, he commanded the Swedish battalion (SWEBAT) in Kosovo. At the time of the interview, he was the only Partner officer commanding a sector in a NATO-led operation.

NATO Review: You played an important role in re-establishing order in the wake of March’s violence. How did you achieve this and what were the reasons for the upsurge?

Brigadier-General Brännström: Let me start with the reasons for the upsurge in violence. In effect, the events of mid-March showed us how unstable the situation in Kosovo really is. From my perspective, the reason for the upsurge was that the security forces were not strong enough to handle extremists within the population, who were eager to riot. The events that led to the explosion were the shooting of a young man and the drowning of some children, but the underlying reasons for it were violent elements within Kosovo’s population. This will definitely happen again in the event that strong police and military forces are unable to control those elements.

The reasons why MNB Centre was able to re-establish order were the rapid and committed deployment of forces to the focus of the Brigade’s efforts and the spirit of the troops. The Brigade managed to deploy units from the Czech Republic, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Slovakia and Sweden to prevent ethnic cleansing occurring in the village of Caglavica. To achieve this, the troops fought a pitch battle for more than ten hours to protect the village. A crowd of more than 10,000 rioters, some of them armed with stones, Molotov cocktails, iron bars, pistols and rifles attacked them. It was a miracle no soldier was killed. The soldiers on the ground stood firm and refused to let the rioters get their way.

NR: How difficult is it for soldiers from Partner nations to work together with their NATO peers in complex peace support operations?

BGB: It’s actually quite easy to work together. This is the result of ten years of cooperating with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as well as our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Sweden deployed 12 battalions in the 1990s. Moreover, in Kosovo we have already been working together for five years. Critically, all soldiers – whether NATO or non-NATO – are, above all, soldiers with similar training and similar values. This makes the overall experience extremely positive.

NR: What has been your greatest challenge as an officer for a Partner country running a key sector of a NATO-led operation?

BGB: My greatest challenge is the same as that which any commanding officer, whether from a Partner country or a NATO member state, would face. It is to get the very best out of the eight nations that make up MNB Centre. It is to make multinationality a strength and not a weakness.

NR: Based on your experience in Kosovo, do you have any suggestions for improving the way soldiers from Partner nations work together with their NATO peers?
BGB: Harmonising staff procedures and communication systems is extremely important. Otherwise, when it comes to training and preparing young soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers for multinational operations, the most important basic skill is that of language. It is absolutely critical for everyone involved to be able to communicate effectively in English.

NR: In addition to language, what other key skills do soldiers require to be effective peacekeepers?

BGB: Peacekeepers need to be fair, firm and friendly. That goes for all levels in a peacekeeping operation. Locals have to see that a peacekeeper is friendly to those people who cooperate with him but that he can be tough with those who do not. In this way, peacekeepers will earn the respect of both local people and of other international organisations operating on the ground, which is essential to the success of a mission. The key skills are in fact simply those of a good soldier. And a good soldier will command respect from all parties.

NR: Do you perceive any difference in the attitudes of Kosovars, whether ethnic Albanian or Serb to peacekeepers from Partner nations?

BGB: Differences are not ethnically based. Overall, the local population – both Albanian and Serb – has as much respect for soldiers from Partner nations as from the NATO countries. I should, however, highlight the exception to this rule. While ordinary, honest people from all ethnic backgrounds have a very positive attitude towards the peacekeepers, the criminal element and people with a destructive political agenda are hostile towards us. This may be a good sign, since it suggests that we are doing a good job.

NR: The sector for which you are responsible, Multinational Brigade Centre, covers some of the most emotionally charged territory in Kosovo including Kosovo Polje the site of the celebrated battle of 1389. What impact if any has this had on your mission both in your preparations and in its day to day operations?

BGB: It is extremely important for all peacekeepers and especially for anyone in a leadership position to study the background to the conflict and the history of the area and its peoples. In this respect, I have a great advantage since I was the commanding officer of the Swedish battalion here in the summer of 2000 and am able to draw on that experience. The job of Battle Group Commander is not, of course, the same as that of Brigade Commander, but my earlier six-month tour stands me in good stead for my current assignment. Otherwise, it is critical to have good advisers. Before I came back to Kosovo I made sure that I had extremely good people around me.
NR: How much of your time and effort is devoted to protecting ethnic Serb communities and what are the prospects for further sustainable Serb returns?

BGB: My task is to protect all ethnicities, people and organisations, as well as anyone and anything else that is threatened. I don’t have any statistics concerning how much time we devote to one community as opposed to another. In any case, we work on these issues together with the police forces. I think that security is an important factor that potential returnees take into consideration when deciding whether or not to return. But it is not the only factor. The prospects for returns, therefore, depend on a combination of several factors. The state of the economy is, for example, also extremely important. We support anybody who wishes to return and to this end are trying to make the environment as safe and secure as possible.

NR: KFOR has been in Kosovo for close to five years and generally remains popular. However, a final political solution for the province remains some years away. What impact has the lack of certainty over Kosovo’s future had on the peace process and have you detected any change in popular attitudes to KFOR between your time in Kosovo in 2000 and now?

BGB: If I compare the situation today with that of in 2000, I don’t see any change in KFOR’s popularity and I don’t foresee any change as long as we continue to perform well. A final political solution for Kosovo would probably make my job easier. But we all have to respect the fact that this is a process that will inevitably take time, since it is extremely difficult to resolve the multitude of problems related to Kosovo. I tell my men that our task is to work to create a safe and secure environment and hope that this will help bring about a political solution.

BGB: Before coming to Kosovo we had to prepare meticulously for this mission. By working together with NATO forces on the ground we have been able to learn the Alliance’s working methods and practical procedures, as well as the way NATO goes about operational planning. At the same time, by working within a NATO framework or indeed any other multinational framework, we are able to make a daily comparison between ourselves and soldiers from other militaries. This is not a competition. Rather it is a constructive exchange of information and opinion, which is positive. As a Swedish officer, both as a professional and as an individual, I have found the experience extremely good. I have received good support from NATO, from my commander, Lieutenant-General Holger Kammerhoff, and from all eight troop-contributing nations within MNB Centre.

NR: Which particular skills and expertise have the Swedish Armed Forces brought to KFOR?

BGB: I would like to highlight two factors. The first is the long history that we have of peacekeeping. Sweden has been involved in peacekeeping missions since the 1940s and Swedish peacekeepers have experience from the Middle East, Cyprus and Congo as well as from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. We are proud of our peacekeeping tradition and of the experience that we bring with us to KFOR. The second factor is the conscript system we have in Sweden. We base all our overseas deployments on people who have been trained as conscripts and who have volunteered to serve in a specific mission. In this way, every single Swedish soldier brings civilian skills to operations such as KFOR and there are teachers, plumbers, policemen and many other professions represented among us. These non-military skills can be extremely useful in peace-support and peacekeeping operations, especially when it comes to working with civilians.

NR: How have you benefited from working together with NATO and how do Swedish soldiers in general benefit from this relationship?

BGB: According to various studies of Swedish public opinion carried out by pollsters like Gallup, the majority of Swedes do not wish to join NATO. However, a question that is never asked in these polls is what Swedes think about Sweden working together with NATO. Here, I’m sure that most Swedes are very happy to be working with NATO in the PfP framework and in peacekeeping missions here in Kosovo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and possibly in other places in the future. I feel that we’re learning a lot from working with many different militaries, people and organisations within the NATO structure. And I’m sure that we can continue contributing to the common international effort here. As to whether we may one day join the Alliance, that’s a political question and you have to ask a politician who is more competent to answer it.
Building hope on experience

Paul Fritch examines how NATO-Russia relations have evolved since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council.

Russia cannot be understood with the mind
Or measured with a standard yardstick,
She has a peculiar character –
In Russia, one can only believe.

Fyodor Tyuchev, 19th century Russian poet and diplomat

Russian schoolchildren have been taught, since long before Tyuchev’s day, that their vast country is a special place that cannot be understood or measured with an ordinary yardstick. Periods of dramatic change traditionally have prompted the Russian people to strive for a renewed sense of national purpose, more often by seeking to shape the world around them than by seeking to adapt to it. The 13 years since the fall of the Soviet Union have certainly brought dramatic changes, and if the new Russia has been seeking her own bearings, the same could be said of the often difficult relationship between Russia and her partners in the North Atlantic Alliance.

When tank armies faced each other across a seemingly permanent inner-German border, that relationship was a masterpiece of simplicity. As the statues of Lenin began to tumble, however, it steadily became less tangible, harder to measure in terms of numbers, facts and figures. Euphoria gradually gave way to disappointment, and disappointment to resentment and rivalry. Both in Russia and in the West, many preferred to cling to old, comfortable stereotypes, to blame the other side when the (perhaps unrealistic) expectations of a post-Cold War world of peace and harmony failed to materialise.

This disillusionment obscured the fact that in the decade between 1989 and 1999, impressive and quantifiable progress was made. Dramatic reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons were codified in landmark arms control treaties. Military forces that had faced each other for generations in a seemingly permanent state of confrontation simply withdrew without firing a shot. The “iron curtain” that had divided Europe for half a century was erased permanently from the map, as states of the former Warsaw Pact asked for, and were granted, full membership in NATO. The drive to integrate a continent so long divided extended to social and economic spheres as well, as the European Union launched its own enlargement process. Russia herself, however, remained largely on the outside, oscillating between democratic reforms, Euro-Atlantic aspirations and lingering imperial ambitions, and – as so often in her history – struggling to find a suitable place in the world.

The world around NATO and Russia was changing as well. Though the overwhelming “threat” of the Cold War had receded, a broad array of new threats, from civil war and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to the growing menace of religious extremism and international terrorism, began to challenge NATO and Russia alike. The old adversaries even managed to join forces on occasion, as in helping to oversee implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, the agreement ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet despite a long and growing list of shared interests, the NATO member states and Russia did not “feel” like partners. The Cold War legacy of hostility and suspicion was simply too powerful to overcome.

The first attempt at formal partnership did not fully succeed in closing this gap between reality and perception. The lofty language of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May 1997, included an explicit recognition that NATO Allies and Russia shared a vision of a “Europe whole and free”. Unfortunately, this did not prevent an enduring – even growing – divergence in strategic analysis. Paper partnership barely concealed creeping rivalry and mutual suspicion, and the first decade of the “post-Cold War era” ended with the schism brought on by the 1999 Kosovo crisis. When Russia walked out of the Permanent Joint Council, many on both sides honestly believed that nothing of great value had been lost.

Responses to 9/11

Then came 11 September 2001. For the member states of NATO, the massive terrorist attacks on the United States represented a wake-up call, a signal that the longer we spent patting ourselves on the back over our successes in overcoming the security challenges of the past, the longer the security challenges of the future would have to creep up on us from behind. The need to engage Russia in the struggle against terrorism was obvious – intelligence capabilities, political influence in relevant regions of the world, heightened sensitivity to the threat, even simple geography made Russia an indispensable partner in the campaign against al Qaida and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan. But the immediate crisis also unearthed a deeper truth. Even the most cursory

Paul Fritch is head of the Russia and Ukraine Relations Section in NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division.
look at the list of NATO’s most pressing “contemporary security challenges” – terrorism, proliferation, regional instability, trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings – made clear that in most areas, any solution that did not include Russia as a cooperative partner was no solution at all. “Going it alone” was not likely to ensure Allied security.

In Russia too, the appetite for an increasingly pointless rivalry with the West had begun to subside. Russian policymakers and analysts, facing real and potential security threats from the south and east, as well as from within, began to advocate a broad rapprochement with the West. Chief among the advocates of such a policy was Russian President Vladimir Putin himself, who did not shy from telling his countrymen in sobering terms the magnitude of the challenges they faced. But if the case for cooperation was even more obvious in Russia than in the West, the psychological obstacles that had to be overcome were far more substantial.

It is said that a second marriage is a triumph of hope over experience, all the more so when the partners are the same. It took a substantial leap of faith from both sides, therefore, to bring the NATO Allies and Russia together in May 2002 to build a qualitatively new relationship, where Russia would sit as an equal partner. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) did not seek to replace NATO itself. The idea – a very simple one – was to create a body where NATO member states and Russia could meet as equal partners to discuss and develop areas of common interests, assuming the same rights and the same responsibilities for implementation of decisions. This new NRC took on an ambitious agenda, including many of the most urgent problems of the day. Expectations for the new body were high. Two years after the Rome Summit, which created the NRC, it is worth examining how the new NATO-Russia structures have worked in practice.

Even hard-nosed sceptics have been forced to acknowledge an impressive array of concrete NRC achievements. These include the following highlights:

- Broad-based cooperation against terrorism, ranging from assessment of the threat by intelligence experts to consequence management by civil emergency planners;
- Agreed political decision-making modalities for future NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations;
- A framework agreement on submarine crew escape and rescue;
- A roadmap towards interoperability of theatre missile defence systems and the completion of the first phase of a comprehensive interoperability study;
- The rapid expansion of military-to-military cooperation, including a comprehensive training and exercise programme designed to promote military interoperability; and
- Expanding cooperation on defence reform.

Ministers and ambassadors have exchanged views regularly on issues ranging from the situation in Afghanistan to the progress and the remaining challenges of the shared effort to bring peace and stability to the Balkans. The NRC has mobilised its substantial political clout as well, taking stands in promoting enhanced border security in the Balkans and military reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. High-level conferences in Berlin, Moscow and Rome have explored further avenues of practical cooperation in defence reform, peace-
Keep and the struggle against terrorism. In May 2003, the NRC gathered for the first time in Moscow itself. And in April 2004, as the NRC family of nations grew from 20 to 27, NRC Foreign Ministers reiterated their determination to continue along the path of partnership set forth in the Rome Declaration, putting to rest the outdated notion that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation are somehow incompatible.

Other visible signs of cooperation – for example, a highly successful NATO-Russia Retraining Centre for discharged military personnel – have brought tangible benefits of cooperation directly to the Russian people. Moreover, cooperation has not been a one-way street. In October 2003, for example, NATO officers participated for the first time in a Russian military training programme, a course focused on aircrew survival techniques. Russia has made a substantial contribution to an NRC initiative to develop civil-emergency planning and response capabilities, and hosted NRC exercises in Noginsk and Kaliningrad. Perhaps most remarkably, at a time when differences of opinion over the nature and scope of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction caused deep rifts within the international community and NATO itself, NRC experts have been busy developing a comprehensive common assessment of global proliferation trends.

New cooperative atmosphere

Here again, the facts and figures tell only part of the story. Perhaps the biggest change brought about by the NRC has been in the atmosphere of NATO-Russia cooperative work. Supported by a total of 17 subordinate structures, each tasked with carrying forward specific cooperative projects in its area of expertise, the NRC has reached out to constituencies at all levels that had never before been involved in the NATO-Russia relationship.

New faces have been particularly evident on the Russian side. Beyond familiar interlocutors in the Foreign and Defence Ministries, the NRC has involved intelligence officers, border guards, interior ministry troops and civil-emergency planning experts. Russian scientists have made regular and substantial contributions to the work of the NRC Science Committee. Colleagues in the Russian Mission to NATO – itself no longer an adjunct of the Russian Embassy to Belgium, but a fully fledged mission headed for the first time by its own ambassador – have even begun to commiserate with NATO counterparts over the sudden surge in “travel agent” duty typical of a busy multilateral delegation hosting a broad array of capital-based visitors. The NRC Preparatory Committee has become one of the hardest working and most collegial bodies at NATO Headquarters, a place where diplomats exchange ideas freely, without the protocol restrictions of an ambassadorial or ministerial meeting. After years of awkward, formal “partnership”, NATO Allies and Russia finally feel like partners.

Two years of cooperative work in the NRC have also yielded another positive surprise – the degree to which NATO-Russia work and broader cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PIP) can be mutually reinforcing. As early successes in civil-emergency planning, science cooperation and joint political initiatives have demonstrated, NRC initiatives can complement, even energise, broader cooperation with EAPC Partners. Also, as military experts have discovered, the most efficient way to jump-start our drive towards technical interoperability – among military forces, air-to-air refuelling aircraft, transport aircraft and in other fields – is through deeper Russian engagement in existing practical cooperative projects in the PIP framework. At the initiative of NRC defence ministers, the NRC has over the past year redoubled its efforts in this area. The final goal, of course, is the development of joint capabilities that can take NATO-Russia cooperation out of the meeting room and into the field.

We have a long way to go to achieve the full promise of the project that was launched in May 2002 in Rome. Many in the West continue to view Russia with an almost instinctive suspicion, and many in Russia continue to harbour fears about NATO’s intentions. Allies continue to voice concerns about the prolonged crisis in Chechnya – its humanitarian consequences, its potential to destabilise neighbouring states, and certain aspects of Russian policy toward the breakaway republic. We will continue to have questions about some of Russia’s policies towards its so-called “near abroad”, where it will take a great deal of effort to overcome old notions of spheres of influence and zero-sum thinking. And as the Russian Ambassador to NATO points out in an interview on pages 54 to 56, Russia will continue to raise questions as well, whether on the future of conventional arms control in Europe or on technical issues associated with the NATO enlargement process. Even here, however, open and frank dialogue has the potential to bring us closer together. NATO and Russia share a lasting interest in spreading peace and prosperity throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, whether in the Balkans, the Caucasus or Central Asia. Individual differences and historic rivalries are gradually yielding to a broader spirit of partnership – a mutually beneficial relationship that, as Tyuchev might say, may not always be comprehensible, but must be believed in.
Edging erratically forward

James Sherr examines NATO-Ukraine relations and Ukraine’s aspirations for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions via the prism of defence reform.

Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and the transformation of its national security system have become indivisible pursuits. For the dedicated professionals who work in these domains, they have also become all-consuming issues. Yet in each area, progress entails a struggle against Soviet legacies and mentalities, a demoralising financial climate and the continual intrusions of domestic politics. Progress is real and palpable, in some areas striking. But is it enough? Inside Ukraine’s Armed Forces, the dynamics of modernisation, stagnation and decay are still delicately balanced. In some other branches of the security sector, the spirit of reform has yet to emerge. Until the corner is turned, until reform is visible, comprehensive and sustained, Ukraine will not be integrated within itself, let alone with Europe.

Progress has been driven by two impulses. The first is Ukrainian national interest. The second is the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

In 1991, Ukraine inherited armed forces designed to prosecute general war under somebody else’s direction and against states that are now partners. It also inherited powerful security forces designed to protect a totalitarian system from domestic opponents, not to say civil society itself. A critical mass of state officials, security professionals and independent experts understand the importance of overcoming this legacy. They know that unless Ukraine’s military and security forces are transformed in function, capability and ethos, not only will they be unable to address new security challenges, they may actually damage national security. Today, Ukraine is less threatened by those who would attack it, than by those who would undermine it. Poorly trained, under-financed and discontented armed forces, security and law-enforcement bodies not only create temptations to undermine it; they furnish accomplices and instruments for that enterprise.

These insights and apprehensions were expressed in Ukraine’s first National Security Concept, drafted by the analytical staff of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) under the leadership of its then secretary, Volodymyr Horbulin, and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) in January 1997. The Concept assailed the general war ethos (which had been inbred in Ukraine’s Soviet-trained officer corps) by stipulating that in conditions where both state and society were weak, the prime security challenge would be to forestall and resolve local crises, emergencies and conflicts and prevent them from being exploited by actors – internal and foreign – with ulterior political motives. Proceeding from this analysis, the Concept identified the “strengthening of civil society” as the first of nine national security challenges for Ukraine. In June 2003, the Rada adopted an updated and far more detailed document, the Law on Foundations of National Security, which is the product of extensive inter-agency work. Less concise than its predecessor, it is still a bold and often revealing document, giving due attention to the connections between a distorted economy, dysfunctional bureaucracies, criminality and threats to the state. It is critical of the performance of the state and, by implication, many who wield power within it. Both national security documents emphasise that reform is an imperative for the entire security sector, not the Armed Forces alone.

Yet it is the Armed Forces that have been the most reformist. Even so, reform has come in stages, each of them beset by collisions with vested interests and economic reality. The most dramatic period of transformation occurred immediately after the country became independent when, in defiance of gloomy Western prognoses, troops of the former Soviet Armed Forces, Interior Ministry and KGB numbering 1.4 million men were substantially reduced and thoroughly resubordinated – all without conflict and upheaval. This undertaking was a contribution to European order second only to the country’s unilateral nuclear disarmament. But it was an early and finite contribution, not an ongoing and dynamic one.

Reform dynamic

Not until December 1999 was such a dynamic launched. Following his re-election as president, Leonid Kuchma appointed an inter-agency group on defence reform, co-chaired by then Defence Minister Army General Oleksandr Kuzmuk and then NSDC Secretary Yevhen Marchuk (who has been defence minister since 25 June last year). The result of its deliberations was a State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-2005, which was approved by President Kuchma on 28 July 2000.
The State Programme outlined a command and force structure far more consistent with genuine security challenges than its 1996 predecessor. But on force reduction, the *sine qua non* of sustainable reform, the State Programme was disappointing. In January 2001, Ukraine’s Armed Forces numbered 310,000 servicemen and 90,000 civilians. By 2005, these were to be reduced to 295,000 servicemen and 80,000 civilians. To proponents of far-reaching reform, these were depressing figures. Moreover, while the State Programme rightly placed its emphasis on Forward Defence Forces (with a large rapid reaction component), it also maintained a requirement for a larger component of Main Defence Forces and Strategic Reserve Forces, as well as an astonishingly large inventory of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery pieces. If in some respects, this force structure was suited to a country against which “the use of full-scale military force... has little probability”, in other respects it clearly was not. Just as clearly, the projected force structure remained at variance with economic reality, as many NATO and Ukrainian experts were quick to emphasise.

Fairly swiftly, this combination of cold economics and expert criticism began to have an effect. By January 2002, Defence Minister Kuzmuk’s successor, Army General Volodymyr Shkidchenko had revised projected equipment holdings downward by more than 30 per cent. During that year, the Programme was also supplemented by two more radical and promising documents, the *Concept of the Armed Forces 2010* and the *State Programme of Armed Forces Transition Towards Manning on a Contract Basis*. Moreover, deep reductions and professionalisation are finally becoming a reality. As of 1 January 2003, the Armed Forces numbered 288,600 servicemen and 93,600 civilians. Minister Marchuk has now authorised an establishment of 160,000 servicemen and 40,000 civilians by the end of 2005, a remarkably short timescale for implementing such an
ambitious reduction. Readiness levels have also experienced a noteworthy increase. In 2003 Air Force pilots in the Rapid Reaction Forces flew an average of between 90 and 100 hours per year, some four times more than in 1999. Moreover, the Defence Review, due for completion in July 2004 (and eventual publication), has subjected the entire organisation of defence to painstaking and remarkably transparent scrutiny, in close cooperation with Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance and experts in NATO, with whom all relevant data has been shared.

Without reform’s second impulse, the NATO-Ukraine relationship, its sustainability would be open to greater question. Most analysts consider the turning point in this relationship to have been the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. However, the issue is more complex. On the one hand, well before conclusion of the Charter the scale and intensity of cooperation with Ukraine had become unprecedented in NATO’s relationships with a non-member state, not to say a state that (before May 2002) did not officially aspire to NATO membership. On the other, in terms of substance and reform, the crucial turning point arose with President Kuchma’s decree on defence reform in December 1999. In previous years, Ukraine had essentially regarded NATO as a vehicle through which it could build closer links with Europe – hence largely in political terms – and the menu of NATO-Ukraine activities lacked a clear direction and theme. After 1999, the scheme of cooperation acquired much more military-technical definition and focus, in the words of Defence Minister Kuzmuk, “to support defence reform in the country”. Consistent with this maxim, the State Programme of Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001-2005 was submitted to NATO Headquarters for review at the same time as it was submitted to President Kuchma.

From that point forward, the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform established under the Charter became the principal working organ of cooperation and the fulcrum of the relationship. Within this framework, Ukraine identified National Defence Reform Objectives for review by NATO, and the overall relationship became one of structured audit and consultation, supported and to an important extent guided by the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv.

Ukraine has participated in the Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace since its inception in 1994. Whereas the original focus was on units declared available for NATO-led PfP activities, Ukraine decided in autumn 2000 to use this planning tool in support of its defence reform efforts and its application was gradually extended to include all armed forces subordinated to the Defence Ministry. These developments have been astonishing developments for a military establishment which only recently regarded transparency as a threat to departmental interests and national security. These developments have also been reinforced from below. Almost 20,000 Ukrainian servicemen have participated in peace-support activities, the majority of them under NATO leadership. In addition, the officer educational system is being recast in a Euro-Atlantic direction, with blocks of NATO familiarisation courses and emphasis on local conflicts and peacekeeping, rather than general war. These steps form much of the background to Ukraine’s May 2002 decision to pursue NATO membership as its long-term objective. They also explain much of the substance of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, which has come about as a direct consequence of the May 2002 declaration and NATO-Ukraine discussions in November 2002 in Prague. Taken together, these developments are producing a significant cultural change in the defence establishment.

But the change has yet to take hold of the country, roughly 30 per cent of whose citizens perceive NATO as an “aggressive military bloc”. Neither has it fully penetrated all relevant governmental departments, which approach Euro-Atlantic integration without sufficient coordination and with different degrees of understanding. These two challenges which have long preoccupied Yevhen Marchuk and his deputy at the NSDC, Serhiy Pyrozhkov were entrusted in part to the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration, established in 2003 and initially directed by Volodymyr Horbulin (former NSDC Secretary) and attached to the Presidential Administration. At an analytical level, issues of coordination and information are also addressed by the National Institute of Strategic Studies (which has several regional branches) and at least two highly influential non-governmental organisations: the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Integration (directed by former foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk) and the Razumkov Centre (directed by the former head of the NSDC analytical staff, Anatoliy Grysenko). Complementing these efforts, the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, which has existed in Kyiv since 1997, has focused much more of its effort on regions where NATO is unpopular and poorly understood.

Defence reform is no longer a slogan in Ukraine. It is reality. Its future, however, remains a matter of deep uncertainty. Unless there is a breakthrough on two fronts, the future is more likely to arouse scepticism than hope.

Obstacles

The first obstacle is finance. The defence budget has grown within the past three years and now stands at about 1.8 per
percent of GDP. Although a presidential decree stipulates that the budget should be set at a level equal to three per cent of GDP, the current figure is not inconsiderable, given the level of spending in other European countries. But there are additional factors to take into consideration.

According to Georgii Kriuchkov, chairman of the Rada’s Standing Commission on Security and Defence: “We cannot maintain [present forces] because there is not enough money, yet in order to reduce them we also need money.” This is because career service personnel cannot be released into the civilian economy without offers of jobs and housing. Moreover, both base closures and the disposal of surplus equipment cost money. Hence, without a considerable increase in resources, the cycle by which force reductions release funds to create a smaller, professional army cannot be sustained.

Moreover, however many presidential decrees are signed, adequate funding will not be available without economic reform in the country. The key test of reform is whether it provides the incentives and guarantees needed to coax Ukrainian business into the legal (and taxable) economy. This will not happen as long as property rights are undefended, as long as the judiciary itself is “practically defenceless”, as long as employees in law enforcement are impoverished and as long as local bureaucrats behave like private entrepreneurs rather than public servants. The NATO-Ukraine Action Plan emphasises these issues even more than issues of military capability, not only because they matter in their own right, but also because military capabilities will remain deficient until they are confronted.

The second obstacle is the security sector outside the jurisdiction of the Defence Ministry. Whereas the collapse of the Soviet Union and its centralised Defence Ministry and General Staff left behind armies of “ruins and debris”, in the case of security and law-enforcement bodies, it left behind coherent structures and the mentalities and practices that came with them. While not all of this sector is obstructionist, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Interior Ministry, which not only controls Internal Troops (a heavily armed gendarmerie) and ordinary police but a number of specialised formations, remain problematic.

NATO was originally slow to recognise this problem. The Partnership for Peace initially focused only on the integration of national armed forces. Only in December 2000 was reform of interior forces and border troops placed on the agenda of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, and such cooperation did not become an open subject of discussion with the SBU until after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The result has been the formation of a schizophrenic security culture in Ukraine. Whereas the Armed Forces are gradually becoming accustomed to transparency, even intrusiveness, the latter structures are ill at ease with democratic scrutiny and oversight and do not provide parliament with a full breakdown of their budgets, expenditures, sources of finance and staffing levels, not to say schemes of command, recruitment and training. The Law on Counter-Intelligence, adopted in December 2002 is, by Euro-Atlantic standards, disturbingly permissive in its definitions of powers, authority and threats. This is not to say that everyone of influence inside these structures regard these standards with suspicion, but it is open to question whether their influence and that of outsiders will overcome institutional resistance.

Fortunately, the resignation of Defence Minister Shkidchenko on 20 June last year has not damaged either the reform process or the NATO-Ukraine relationship. Shkidchenko was a highly respected minister: a thorough professional who secured the loyalty of his subordinates as well as the trust of outsiders, not least the military establishments of NATO countries. However, the appointment of Yevhen Marchuk as Shkidchenko’s replacement five days later has actually intensified the reform momentum. Marchuk not only made NATO-Ukraine cooperation the defining theme of the NSDC during his 20-month tenure there, but also, along with Shkidchenko, was one of the two principal motors driving defence reform. Despite the discouraging political climate – likely to become even more discouraging as the October 2004 presidential elections approach – Marchuk has a decisive attribute. As a former deputy prime minister, acting prime minister and prime minister (between June 1995 and May 1996), he has unrivalled experience of senior state service. As a prominent civilian since the demise of the Soviet Union, he is able to stand up to civilians in a way that is difficult for the Soviet-trained military officer. Yet he also has the contacts and experience to secure the inter-agency support that is now so critical to defence reform.

Changes in the configuration of world politics since 11 September 2001 are also perceived by Ukrainians as a potential obstacle. The war on terrorism and the war in Iraq have led a number of Ukrainians to fear that NATO and several of its key members will diminish the priority they have traditionally attached to Ukraine. Some have also been concerned about NATO’s “low-key” response to the escalation of border tensions between Russia and Ukraine in the Kerch Straits in October 2003. Although defence reform might be the day-to-day business of NATO-Ukraine cooperation, its bedrock for Ukrainians is the contribution it makes to their country’s security. Ukraine’s deployment of 1,600 servicemen to Iraq (the fourth largest Coalition contingent) testifies to this anxiety, as well as the importance that Ukraine continues to attach to its relationship with members of the Atlantic Alliance in these turbulent times.
The build-up to the Iraq War, the campaign itself and its aftermath have all had a profound impact on both transatlantic and inter-European relations. It is remarkable how much appears to have changed in so little time. Indeed, a re-reading of December 2002’s EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, the breakthrough agreement between the European Union and NATO, suggests that it was negotiated in a more genteel age.

At one level, Iraq helped to reinforce a growing realisation that Europeans are now back in the global security business. At another, it reminded Americans and Europeans of the difficulties of finding consensus over collective security. At a third, it must surely have reminded Americans of the vital role of allies in security governance. And at a fourth level, Americans and Europeans, the victors of the Cold War and the inheritors of strategic responsibility, were reminded that they cannot escape the burden of leadership in security governance in this fractured age. In effect, Iraq was the latest chapter in the story of Europe’s strategic re-awakening, a point reflected in EU High Representative Javier Solana’s subsequent European Security Strategy. Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are as dangerous to Europeans as they are to Americans.

The core message of this piece is blunt. The use of the European Union and NATO by political factions in certain countries for domestic political grandstanding must stop. The only winners from such strategic irresponsibility are the enemies of democracy. Given the scope and nature of the emerging dangers, there is room enough for both the European Union and NATO, both of which remain vital to effective security governance.

It is therefore strange that, with such a re-awakening of strategic awareness, so many analysts seem to have drawn the conclusion that the European Union and NATO must ultimately go their separate ways. The division of labour is a clear and complementary one. The mission of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is progressively to harmonise the security concepts and cultures of European states so that they can gradually take responsibility for civil and military aspects of security at the lower to middle levels of intensity and develop a distinct doctrine for multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking that both organisations lack. The continuing and ever more vital role of NATO is threefold: to ensure a continuum between lower and higher levels of intensity, i.e. escalation dominance; to ensure that Americans and Europeans can work together in joint pursuit of security world-wide; and to assure the core defence guarantee so that re-nationalisation of security within Europe will not destabilise Europe’s political base and prevent Europe’s emerging projectability. It is as simple and straightforward as that.

Those in Europe who mistakenly believe that they will achieve a strong ESDP through a weak NATO are profoundly wrong. All they will achieve is an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its place in the world. Those in the United States who believe that NATO no longer matters and that mighty America can manage the world alone will only achieve an isolated America trapped on the wrong side of the balance between legitimacy and effect. NATO matters and will continue to matter to all the partners. Imagine a Europe without NATO. Is it conceivable that ESDP could suddenly be transformed into a mechanism for the planning and execution of multinational European coalitions at several levels of military-technology into coherent forces for projection into dangerous places the world over? The answer is clearly no, but that is what Europe needs and needs now.

Challenges

Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.* These places trip off the tongue like some roll-call of empire. Sadly, they are not one-off events but evidence of a trend. Historians one hundred years from now may well look back on the period 1950 to 2000 as an interregnum between two forms of dependency. Prior to 1950, it was an exploitative dependency; since 2000 it has been one born of state failure, economic misery and disease.

The whole essence of the power of Europe as expressed through the European Union is its fundamental morality. Europe now sees itself as a “shining city on the hill”, a vision that is extremely close to the self-image of the United States. Americans and Europeans are the force for good in this
world. A force the importance of which is magnified by the dangerous relationship between misery and technology that is emerging as a defining feature of this fractured age. Ever smaller and more dangerous groups will in time gain access to the destructive power that has to date been the preserve of the most mighty. It is vital, therefore, that Americans and Europeans together prepare for that reality now. There is enough for everyone to do.

In this way, the future of EU-NATO cooperation must rest on certain security truisms. First, the European Union’s ambitions to be a hard international security actor are still some years from completion. Second, the pace of deterioration in global security will demand of Europeans an increased presence in the world beyond Europe. Third, neat intellectual divisions between different levels of intensity in which Europeans take on the softer tasks and Americans the harder ones will no longer be reflected on the ground. Dangers to forces on the ground can escalate as rapidly as the crises that spawn them. For the foreseeable future, only NATO can provide the planning and the mission-intensity continuum for operations in the emerging security context.

Unfortunately, for all the fine words that were to be found in the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, the relationship is too often mired in the political mud of contemporary transatlantic relations from which it can never be divorced. There is a strange alliance between American neo-conservatives who do not care about the Alliance and European traditional Gaulists who do not want it. It is only to be hoped that these political opportunists realise the damage they are doing to the fabric of their own security by undermining the relationships upon which both the European Union and NATO depend. EU-NATO cooperation has for too long been a victim of the security pretence that has afflicted far too much of the European strategic debate and the strategic self-deceit that has afflicted the American. It is time to get down to business.

Americans cannot avoid the rigours of peacekeeping. Indeed, in spite of a US desire to take on only those operations for which the US military is designed, they are finding themselves sucked ever more into the muddy boots and desk-bound soldiery of nation-building. Europeans can no longer avoid the reality of capabilities. Sooner rather than later they are going to have to dip into their pockets, if their soldiers are not going to die needlessly on operations into which they have been forced by events and for which they are profoundly ill-prepared. In this way, the future of EU-NATO cooperation must, by necessity and the force of events, deepen, with a new transatlantic security deal in which Americans learn to peacekeep and Europeans re-equip to fight.

New transatlantic bargain

Such a deal is the essence of future EU-NATO cooperation. Deepening effective and real cooperation in crisis management is vital as a first step in a new relationship. Both the European Union and NATO bring distinct and complementary contributions to such management, which is strengthened by the legitimacy afforded by the political autonomy of decision-making in both organisations. No single state or institution can manage such complexity. The European Union is pre-eminent in the coordination of multilateral,
multifunctional civilian aspects of the security management cycle and rightfully moving ever more effectively into the military side at several levels of operational intensity. Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been an important step on the road to Europe’s own ability to manage security “in and around Europe” in practical cooperation with the Alliance.

Furthermore, Americans could learn a lot from how certain Europeans do peacekeeping. There are many reasons why the Americans are tragically losing so many soldiers in post-insertion operations compared with the British. The United States is the super-power; US soldiers are in areas in which the remnants of the ancien régime are most active; and there are many more of them. At the same time, it is clear that the British are better peacekeepers, even though they too have tragically suffered fatalities. This is partly the result of years of experience on the troubled streets of Belfast, but it is also a legacy of Empire, one that is shared by other Europeans. What today is called special operations and peacekeeping was in the days of the British Empire known as counter-insurgency and imperial policing. The British Army was designed for those very purposes and retains in its doctrine that legacy. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the five leading contributors to UN peacekeeping operations are all members of the Commonwealth.

At the same time, Europeans must finally get their war-fighting act together. The European Union’s Helsinki Declaration of December 1999 called for a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003 of 60,000 troops deployable in 60 days and sustainable for a year. It is an operation that was to be capable of undertaking the full range of so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, that is tasks ranging from rescue and humanitarian missions, through peacekeeping to that of combat troops in peacemaking. Not only is the European Union a long way from achieving the Headline Goal within Europe, it is even further from being able to despatch such a force anywhere beyond. The danger for Europeans is an increasing tendency of European leaders to pretend they have achieved targets when it is clearly not the case.

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a case in point. France deserves praise for having put together an intervention force to help stabilise the situation in and around Bunia in the north east of the country. In the event, the force did help to stabilise the situation by the self-imposed 1 September deadline for withdrawal. However, it took great risks in so doing because of extended supply lines and dependence on a strip of mud that doubled for an airport. Had the force run into difficulties it would have damaged the European Union’s military and political credibility. The point here is that had the European Union and NATO worked together to plan and generate a force using the capabilities available at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), the ability to protect and/or strengthen that force would have been greatly enhanced. Moreover, such an ability would also have enhanced the political credibility of the mission for the simple reason that when the European Union is working together with NATO much greater and more rapid access to far more coercive power is assured. In future, this will place a particular emphasis on harmonising the development of the ERRF with the NATO Response Force (NRF), not least because they will draw on the same forces, with the NRF representing a far more immediate response capability than the larger ERRF, which is in effect a robust follow-on force. The rush to demonstrate European capabilities in far-away and dangerous places without recourse to NATO assets could backfire.

The tragedy of Iraq has been the legacy of ill will and the increased tendency of too many to make political points at the expense of EU-NATO cooperation

It is therefore of concern that certain states still effectively block substantive discussions and meetings between EU and NATO officials, as though the two organisations are in competition with each other. The two institutions do, of course, go through the ritual of cooperation. The North Atlantic Council meets the EU Political and Security Committee, the NATO Military Committee meets the EU Military Committee and various meetings take place between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative. Unfortunately, however, all too often these meetings appear to resemble summer diplomatic garden parties in which polite, small talk is exchanged while the weeds growing in the corner are ignored. There needs to be far more intensive interaction between officials of the two organisations on a day-to-day basis across the security spectrum.

Future relations

So how should the EU-NATO relationship develop? There are three key areas, strategic dialogue, operational planning and command and defence investment, that must form the backbone of future EU-NATO cooperation and which would build upon and re-energise December 2002’s EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.

The strategic dialogue between the EU and NATO has been much strengthened by agreement of a European Security Strategy. The European Union’s strategy is, in effect, a pre-strategic concept and provides both a focus and a framework for a continuing dialogue vital to Euro-Atlantic security. Particular emphasis must be placed on harmonising the EU strategy and NATO’s own evolving Strategic Concept.
EU-NATO cooperation in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation will be particularly important.

Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and the hand-over from NATO to the European Union was a logical reflection of the latter’s role in the wider effort to bring stability to that country. International cooperation helped bring about the Framework Agreement and showed what can be achieved by consistent and determined application of all the instruments available to the Euro-Atlantic community. The key to success was political will and the effective coordination of EU and NATO political and military structures through complementarity of effort and a form of “command shadowing” throughout the command chain.

Supreme political control was exercised by the Council of the European Union through the European Union’s Political and Security Committee, which remained in close consultation with the North Atlantic Council. The Deputy SACEUR was designated Operational Commander with the EU Military Committee working closely with NATO’s Military Committee and the EU Military Staff liaising closely with the Operational Headquarters, which comprised an “EU Command Element” embedded in SHAPE. This enabled the EU Operational Commander to provide guidelines to the Force Commander. The dynamism inherent in this structure is vital because it affords both the European Union and NATO a planning and command focal point without undermining political autonomy. To that end, plans are in place for component commands to ensure the planning and operational effectiveness of larger EU operations, including a land component command, air component command and a maritime component command. This is surely correct.

Defence investment is at the core of the European defence dilemma. The aim here must be to ensure convergence between American network centrism and European muddy bootism. A focus on cost-effective and resource-efficient means to ensure that Americans and Europeans can work together in the field should help facilitate cooperation without affecting political autonomy, which is the balance the new NATO must strike. The events of the past few years have demonstrated that the trans-Atlantic security relationship will be far more informal than it was during the Cold War, with the result that special emphasis will have to be placed on interoperability and cooperation. To that end, the work of the European Union’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) must be progressively harmonised. Greater cohesion is still needed between the European Union and NATO to prevent the ECAP and the PCC evolving in such a way as to become competitors. The capabilities benchmarking, which is implicit to both, must be clearly linked. It would be a significant advance if EU and NATO officials working in this area met on a more structured basis with the representatives of the National Armaments Directors of EU and NATO nations in attendance.

The tragedy of Iraq has been the legacy of ill will and the increased tendency of too many to make political points at the expense of EU-NATO cooperation. The only people who gain from what US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns called the Alliance’s “near-death experience” are the likes of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. To those of the “NATO-is-dying” school, the question is straightforward: what is the alternative? To those of the “European-Union-has-no-role-in-security” school, the question is equally straightforward: how else can Europe develop its own distinct and complementary security culture? To those Americans who see no place for international institutions such as NATO in US security thinking: are you really more secure alone? It is time for Europeans to step forward and for Americans to reflect. Above all, it is time for both Americans and Europeans to reinvest in the EU-NATO relationship in a spirit of realism and transparency. In spite of recent events, EU-NATO relations will become a backbone of Euro-Atlantic and global security governance in the century ahead because of the world in which we live and because of the security goals we all continue to share. So it is time to get on with it. It is simply too dangerous out there.

For more on the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, see www.gcsp.ch

For more on EU-NATO relations, see www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu

For the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, see www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm
General Totskiy: How, if at all, has your perception of NATO changed since you became the first Russian ambassador to be accredited exclusively to the Alliance?

General Totskiy: Before I was appointed to this post, I had never had direct dealings with NATO. That said, the Alliance was a factor that we had to take into account in the Russian Border Service, where I served. Indeed, at one time, the Alliance was the source of a few problems. But times have changed and with them our attitude to NATO. I should point out that the changes that have taken place are part of a two-way process, and we should hope and trust that this process will continue to evolve to our mutual benefit. Before I left for Brussels, Russian President Vladimir Putin asked to see me. On that occasion, he set me a number of tasks in recognition of the fact that NATO is now a serious and important organisation with a visible role to play in international affairs, with which Russia needs to have effective working relations. These instructions were in keeping with my own vision of the Alliance and have helped me prepare for the responsibilities facing me as head of the Russian Mission to the Alliance.

NR: To what extent do Russians today still view NATO in terms of Cold War stereotypes and how might such views be overcome?

GT: I don’t think we should still be talking of Cold War stereotypes and the need to overcome them. The days of confrontation are past and Russians no longer associate NATO with the enemy. Quite the reverse. In recent years, people have come to understand that the common threats and challenges of the modern world call for ever-closer cooperation. Moreover, our cooperation within the international coalition against terrorism has clearly shown how effectively Russia can combine forces with Alliance member states in the face of a common threat.

There are, nevertheless, aspects of our relations with the Alliance that cause us concern, including, first and foremost, NATO’s eastward expansion. Here, we believe that Russia’s legitimate security interests must be taken into account. We realise that the seven states invited to join NATO will not increase the Alliance’s overall military capabilities by much. But in terms of infrastructure and geography, the potential for NATO deployments is increasing. Moreover, NATO membership for the Baltic countries, which border Russia, brings with it a host of unresolved issues that directly affect our interests. At present, for example, there are no force-deployment limitations in the Baltic Republics under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. In effect, this means that this territory could become an “arms control-free zone”. I think that the way Russians view NATO will largely depend on how this issue is resolved.

NR: What do you hope to achieve as Russia’s ambassador to NATO?

GT: First and foremost, I see my task as ensuring that projects launched in the first year of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) are successfully implemented. To this end, we have already prepared the necessary groundwork and organisational and financial issues are being worked out. The NATO Allies and Russia are in the mood to get down to work and this makes me sure that we shall succeed. I would rather not make predictions about the longer-term future. But I hope that, given the positive way our relations with the Alliance are evolving, we will be able to meet the task set by our respective leaders at the Rome Summit, namely to make the NRC...
an effective means of responding to common security challenges. I believe that one of the main tasks is to raise confidence on both sides to such a level that the rapprochement and cooperation process will become irreversible.

GT: The main areas of NATO-Russia cooperation are well known and were set out by our leaders in Rome. Every one is a priority for us and solid achievements have already been made in all of them. We have created a good basis for responding jointly to crises; dialogue on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is progressing; and cooperation in civil-emergency planning is expanding. A number of specific military projects are also underway, in particular in the areas of search and rescue at sea, military reform and air traffic control. And missile defence is proving a promising area for cooperation. We are convinced that by further enhancing NATO-Russia cooperation across the entire range of areas set out in the Rome Declaration, we will be able to make a major contribution to the evolution of a new security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, I am sure that the NRC will be one of the leading elements of such an architecture.

NR: Where are the priorities for defence reform in Russia and can you see a role for NATO in the process?

GT: The priorities for the current phase of defence reform cover major re-armament, improving the recruitment system, and improving the very structure of the Armed Forces. They also include improving the social security system for military personnel, as well as their social status and the prestige attached to military service. For a country like Russia, given the size of its territory, military reform is an extremely complex and multifaceted business, particularly at a time of socio-economic transition.

Anyone who thinks that the military organisation of the state can be reformed simply by reducing personnel numbers, or leaving the job entirely to the military, is making a big mistake. In practice, since the mid-1990s, a raft of economic, socio-political and military measures has been introduced in respect of military development with the aim of radically transforming the country’s military organisation.

Given the importance and urgency of this issue, the NRC has placed it among the highest priorities of NATO-Russia cooperation. There are, however, no universal solutions to the problem of rationalising the structure of a military organisation and ensuring that armed forces have a solid material and technical base, when resources are limited. Although every country is unique and the experience of other countries should not be copied in an area as sensitive as military security, we are prepared both to study carefully the approaches of other NRC members and to share our own experience of different aspects of military development.

We think that the NRC Ad Hoc Working Group on Defence Reform, which was set up at the end of 2002, is doing a good job of coordinating cooperation in this area. This year’s cooperation programme is being implemented strictly according to schedule. The expert working groups on manning in the armed forces and on macroeconomic and social aspects of military reform were highly praised by those who took part. And two Russian military researchers began working at the NATO Defense College in Rome in September.

That said, I think we should lay special emphasis on practical cooperation. Seminars, conferences and exchange visits are well and good, but will only deliver results in the future. For this reason, we attach special significance to projects
like retraining discharged military personnel to equip them with civilian skills and destroying surplus stockpiles of Russian anti-personnel mines. I believe it is on the basis of these projects, as well as new projects of a “hands-on” nature, that NATO’s role in developing cooperation on military reform will be judged.

NR: Russia was the largest non-NATO contributor to the Alliance’s Balkan peacekeeping operations until it withdrew forces last summer. What lessons has Russia drawn from the experience of working together with NATO forces in the Balkans and when will Russian soldiers serve alongside their Alliance peers again?

At present, Russian experts are working with their NATO peers to prepare a joint assessment of the experience of peacekeeping operations in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo. I think that this exercise will result in a substantial document reflecting our experience to date, and, most importantly, containing recommendations on how NATO-Russia peacekeeping cooperation can be made more efficient and effective in the future. I don’t wish to pre-empt the findings of the experts’ assessment. However, I can already say that when our peacekeepers have clear tasking and are working under a UN Security Council mandate, they are perfectly capable of operating effectively together in the most difficult conditions. Russian soldiers and commanders, who worked shoulder to shoulder with their NATO colleagues, have fond memories of the spirit of camaraderie and cooperation, which frequently provided a source of support during the difficult days of the Balkan operations.

As for possible future joint operations, there are no specific plans as yet. That said, we are already preparing the groundwork for future cooperation in peacekeeping on the basis of equal partners. At the political-legal level, the NRC Working Group on Peacekeeping has prepared a joint document entitled Political aspects of the generic concept of NATO-Russia joint peacekeeping operations which is now to be tested in so-called “procedural exercises”. At the military level, a programme for improving interoperability between NATO and Russian peacekeeping units has been approved and is being implemented. In the event of a political decision to launch a joint operation — which, in Russia’s case, would have to be taken by the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly — I am sure that our peacekeepers would be ready to carry out their tasks with distinction.

NR: NATO has taken responsibility for peacekeeping in and around Kabul in Afghanistan and has helped Poland put together a force to provide security in part of Iraq. Does Russia see a future role for itself in either of these missions and would Russia in principle be prepared to participate in other NATO-led operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area?

GT: Problems such as Afghanistan and Iraq require the input of the entire international community. Various international mechanisms and institutions are involved here, including NATO. We take the view that the United Nations should play the lead role in these affairs, and that, under such circumstances, Russia, as a permanent Security Council member, would not remain on the sidelines. Concerning the issue of whether Russia is prepared in principle to conduct joint operations with NATO, even outside the Alliance’s traditional area of responsibility, we cannot rule out this possibility. Our primary concern here would be to coordinate political approaches to a particular situation requiring joint action and to ensure that such action has a proper, international legal basis.

NR: NATO has enlarged to bring in both former members of the Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics and is forging ever-deeper relations with former Soviet republics in both the Caucasus and Central Asia. How does Russia look on these developments and the desire of more former Soviet republics to become Alliance members?

GT: We do not consider NATO’s further enlargement to be a cause for celebration. As things stand, we could be facing new military bases, military units and other infrastructure of a powerful military alliance appearing on our borders. In my opinion, this approach to security is an echo of the past, a relic of the Cold War. That said, every sovereign state is entitled to decide for itself how it wishes to ensure its own security, including by joining various international alliances and organisations. Nevertheless, we cannot welcome this turn of events. We favour more universal security mechanisms for the Euro-Atlantic area — such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

NR: What are the chances that one day Russia will become a member of NATO?

GT: This question has been answered a number of times. President Putin has said that Russia has no aspirations to join NATO. I do not think that the issue of membership is especially relevant. What is more important is the way in which relations between nations, or alliances of nations, are built, and on what basis; the aims they pursue in their cooperation; and the benefit this cooperation brings to others. We believe that NATO-Russia relations form a natural part of Europe’s evolving security architecture and that the NRC is becoming a pillar of international relations. NATO and Russia have taken on a serious commitment for the future of Europe. And as far as this Mission is concerned, it makes no difference whether we join the Alliance or cooperate on a different basis.

For more on NATO-Russian relations, see www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia
NATO is at an historic crossroads. Immensely successful in fulfilling the mission for which it was created, the Alliance now faces new challenges and risks in an evolving international security environment. With risk, there comes opportunity and NATO has embarked upon an ambitious transformation and renewal process to ensure that it is as equipped to deal with today’s and tomorrow’s challenges as it was with those of the Cold War. This includes the streamlining of the NATO Command Structure and the creation of a NATO Response Force.

The international security environment is continually evolving and new threats are emerging that are qualitatively and quantitatively different from the conventional and traditional challenges of the 20th century. In recognition of threats such as those posed by radical fundamentalism, international terrorism and transnational criminal networks, Allied leaders agreed at the Prague Summit in November 2002 to implement sweeping and historic changes to the way that NATO operates.

The transformation process that was set in motion at Prague represents a new vision for NATO and a radical shift away from the Alliance’s original core objective, namely the defence of Western Europe from the Soviet threat. As the nature of the threat has changed from that posed by the Soviet Union’s enormous conventional and nuclear forces, it has become necessary to restructure Alliance militaries and to prepare them for the unconventional and asymmetric threats NATO members face today. In the words of former NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson: “This is not business as usual, but the emergence of a new and modernised NATO, fit for the challenges of the new century.”

This necessary transformation bridges the physical and conceptual differences between two different eras of warfare. During the Cold War, the Alliance focused on mass and firepower in preparation for the expected war of attrition — any unit or capability offered by a member state would have helped deter the enemy. Today’s forces have to be agile, proactive and manoeuvrable on a battlefield with no clear front lines. During the Cold War, Allied forces would have fought close to home and relied on national logistics located only a short distance from the battlefield. Today, NATO forces must be prepared to deploy to, and sustain themselves in, any location in the world.

A new Command Structure

One of the Prague Summit’s most important decisions was to streamline the NATO Command Structure to provide “a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions”. NATO deactivated the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, based in Norfolk, Virginia, and vested all operational responsibilities under the Allied Command for Operations (ACO), formerly the Allied Command Europe, based in Mons, Belgium. The new Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) was simultaneously activated in Norfolk, Virginia, and is responsible for the Alliance’s military transformation. In addition, a third Joint Headquarters was created in Lisbon, Portugal. This was formally inaugurated in March 2004 and will form the basis for a sea-based Combined Joint Task Force. Twelve subordinate regional headquarters are to be deactivated in the next few years.

The results already emerging from these changes are impressive. Overlapping and confusing lines of authority have been cleared up as all operations now fall under the ACO. A clear division of labour has been established between the ACO and the newly formed ACT: ACO defines the standards that units will have to meet for service in a NATO command and ACT develops the necessary training for these units. Both ACO and ACT will certify whether units meet necessary standards. By vesting all operational responsibilities in one Command and focusing the second Strategic Command on the challenges of ongoing transformation and improving the interoperability of member nations, NATO has postured itself for continuous transformation to meet the ever-evolving challenges of today’s security environment.

NATO Response Force

The second groundbreaking change arising from the Prague Summit was the decision to create a NATO Response Force.
(NRF), that is a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force. It was to include land, sea and air elements and be ready to move quickly wherever it was needed, as decided by the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest decision-making body. This clear guidance – something any military commander wants to receive – provided Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) with the authority to craft the NRF into a truly transformational force and one which gives the Alliance significant new military capabilities.

Once the NRF is operational, NATO will for the first time in its history have a standing, integrated force with sea, land, air and special operations components under a single commander. This force will train together, be certified together, and if necessary, deploy together. The NRF’s very high-readiness element will have the capability of beginning deployment within five days of receiving its notice to move and of sustaining itself for up to 30 days. Given the Alliance’s new global mind-set – manifested in its assumption of responsibility for the international peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force – the NRF must be ready to deploy and sustain itself anywhere in the world.

One important aspect of the NRF’s transformational nature is that it will be a standing force. Unlike other NATO forces created for a specific mission when the need arose and which often required mobilisation, the NRF will be available for immediate use for any mission deemed appropriate by the North Atlantic Council. In that sense, the NRF will be similar to NATO’s Airborne Early Warning Force and the Standing Naval Forces. But unlike those two forces that are focused primarily on one component – air and maritime respectively – the NRF will possess units and capabilities from all components, as well as being a truly integrated, joint, and combined force from its inception.

The Alliance inaugurated the first prototype NRF rotation force, the so-called “NRF 1”, at Regional Headquarters North in Brunssum, the Netherlands, on 15 October 2003. The first two NRF rotations, while operational, are experimental. They have been designed to be small and limited in scope. SHAPE, ACT and the Regional Headquarters are experimenting with this force to develop the necessary doctrines, training and certification standards, operational requirements, and readiness reporting requirements to ensure the NRF’s success when it reaches its initial operational capability in October 2004. It will become fully operational in October 2006.

Proactive capability

Once this occurs, the Alliance will possess an important new military capability, namely the ability to act proactively. This represents a significant and historic change in the Alliance’s ethos and culture, since during the Cold War NATO was simply reactive. At the time, the Article 5 commitment to collective defence was clear, defence plans were already prepared and large standing forces were stationed along the Iron Curtain.

Being proactive does not always mean rapidly resorting to the use of force, however. As important as it is for the NRF to be able to operate effectively at the high end of the inten-
sity spectrum, its agility and expeditionary nature could help forestall conflict in the first place. In addition to being able to participate in peacetime engagement programmes that will help strengthen national institutions, the NRF’s agility and expeditionary nature gives the Alliance the military capability to insert a small force onto the ground during the deterrence phase of a deteriorating situation. The presence of this force, during a humanitarian crisis, for example, could help stabilise a situation before it escalates and might even help bring about the conditions for an eventual political settlement without a significant loss of life occurring first. With a humanitarian crisis in particular, it is better to deploy in advance of a potential disaster rather than waiting until it has occurred and having to deal with the consequences.

NATO’s experience in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* between August 2001 and March 2003 illustrates the potential of a proactive approach. In August 2001, at the request of the Skopje government, NATO deployed a relatively small number of soldiers in a confidence-building capacity. This mission, Operation Essential Harvest, facilitated the disarming of the rebel ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army and made possible a reconstruction process. A smaller NATO force then remained in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* in Operation Amber Fox to protect teams of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe monitoring implementation of a framework peace agreement. These actions on the part of the Alliance in large part facilitated the peaceful resolution of this situation, prevented the escalation of the crisis, and undoubtedly saved countless lives.

The agility of the NRF and its ability to deploy rapidly will give the Alliance the institutionalised military capability to conduct similar operations in the future. Moreover, the NRF will also have the ability to perform other missions as directed by the North Atlantic Council, to include humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, direct-action missions to include forced-entry operations, and still have the capability of performing high-intensity operations, if required.

**Changing force structure**

In addition to providing the Alliance with a proactive capability, the NRF will also serve as a vehicle for changing the NATO force structure and the force structures of individual member nations. This is necessary since the Alliance retains too many structures and capabilities that date back to the Cold War when NATO relied on mass and firepower to perform its mission and large numbers of soldiers and huge arsenals of equipment were essential. As an example, 279 brigades exist within NATO members’ force structures, of which 169 were declared to NATO in 2002. Yet the NATO 2004 Force Goals’ requirement is for just 102 brigades. In other words, member nations collectively possess 177 extra brigades, or approximately 55 divisions, that the Alliance does not need. Yet most of the force structure promised to the Alliance is of little use in dealing with the threat that member nations face today, since the units are not sufficiently mobile, deployable, or sustainable.

A good way to understand this problem is to compare NATO to a company that is forced to downsize because of changes in the market environment. The company has too much capacity for what it used to do in the past and not enough capacity for what it must do in the future. In order to retool effectively, tough decisions must be made in order to free up resources to invest for the future.

The Alliance is now taking steps to downsize and retool as it adapts to face its changed security environment. NATO is conducting a troops-to-task analysis – using the NRF as its basis – that will define the minimum number of troops and capabilities needed for NATO to carry out its 21st century missions. With the completion of this statement of requirements, each member nation will then be asked to contribute whatever troops or capabilities they believe they are in a position to provide. After meeting NATO requirements, member nations can decide for themselves what additional military forces they wish to possess beyond those required for the Alliance. As nations adapt to the rotational and continual requirements of the NRF, it will serve as an impetus for the transformation of member nations’ militaries.

Writing in 1921, Italian air-power theorist Giulio Douhet noted that: “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.” More than 80 years later, his words remain as poignant as when he wrote them and illustrate the importance of the NATO transformation agenda set out at Prague. However, transformation does not occur by magic and still requires a great deal of hard work.

In spite of numerous challenges to overcome before the fielding of a fully operational NRF, progress made since Prague provides grounds for optimism. The Alliance has successfully enacted significant changes in its Command Structure and has brought the NRF from a concept to a reality in less than a year – remarkable achievements considering the challenges involved in changing any military organisation and culture. The Alliance has a glorious history and did a magnificent job during the Cold War. Today it is doing an equally impressive job as it simultaneously conducts operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean. By fulfilling the vision of the Alliance agreed at Prague, I’m confident NATO’s best days still lie ahead.

---

For more on the NATO Response Force, see www.nato.int/issues/nrf
Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani is NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) as well as Commander of the US Joint Forces Command, both of which are headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. As Commander of one of NATO’s two Strategic Commands, Admiral Giambastiani leads the transformation of NATO military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines to improve the military effectiveness of the Alliance. As Commander of the US Joint Forces Command, Admiral Giambastiani is responsible for maximising future and present military capabilities of the United States by leading the transformation of joint forces through enhanced joint concept development and experimentation, identifying joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training and providing ready US forces and capabilities – all in support of US combatant commanders around the world. A much decorated officer and former submarine commander, Admiral Giambastiani served as senior military assistant to US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before taking up his current post.

NATO Review: One of the greatest changes to NATO’s command structure has been the creation of Allied Command Transformation in place of Allied Command Atlantic. What is the significance of this change and how is the new Command structured?

Admiral Giambastiani: The change to NATO’s Command Structure is the most significant in the last 50 plus years and has proven to be a catalyst for the historic changes that have followed the Prague Summit in November 2002. This historic Summit resulted in an agreement providing for a truly remarkable set of changes for the Alliance, transforming the 50-year-old organisation to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The key to understanding these changes is to concentrate on the goal of NATO’s leaders to create two new Strategic Commands, one focused on the daily operations of NATO’s military, Allied Command Operations, and one focused on the future of NATO’s military and how to get there, Allied Command Transformation.

Allied Command Transformation is to be the forcing agent for change within the Alliance and to act as the focus and motivating force to bring intellectual rigour to the change process. We also stimulate transformation in national forces, and those of NATO’s Partners. We believe we have two key sets of customers – Allied Command Operations and the member nations of the Alliance. As a functional Command, we look at long-term developmental issues from a military perspective. We articulate the future context for Alliance forces so that nations are in a better-informed position to provide the military capabilities the Alliance will need in the future. Our transformation efforts provide a framework for national efforts so that we are able to deploy coherently joint forces in an integrated battle-space capable of dealing with the new security challenges. Our framework also brings together NATO agencies and national centres of excellence and adds coherence to their programmes, allowing us to leverage their efforts. We ensure the infusion of research and technology to address long-term capability shortfalls. We experiment to test and develop new concepts and capabilities. We develop doctrine to take advantage of new technologies and capabilities to fight better as a combined and joint force. We influence the curriculums of NATO schools to reflect the latest in doctrine and tactics and conduct realistic training that reflects the latest lessons learned in Allied and coalition operations – a close harmony of doctrine, education and training. While much has happened in a very short period of time, the work of transforming NATO continues as we now focus on product, process and the culture of transformation.

NR: What role will Allied Command Transformation’s regional centres in Europe play?

AG: While we have our Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, working closely with my US Command – Joint Forces Command – and completing the very important transatlantic bridge between North America and Europe, we also have several key elements situated throughout Europe. The Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, was established in October 2003 and serves as Allied Command Transformation’s implementing agent. It trains NATO Response Force (NRF) commanders and other NATO operational headquarters staffs in the latest warfighting and operational techniques while incorporating innovative concepts from our experimentation efforts and lessons learned from ongoing operations. On this basis, the Joint Warfare Centre can begin to respond to the full range of military operations with tailored mission rehearsals and training for operational commanders and their staffs – in effect fighting the battle before likely operations ever begin.

The newly opened Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, will have a distinct and unique role in focusing on joint and combined training at the tactical level. In particular, it will conduct joint tactical training to achieve joint interoperability at the key tactical interfaces – a key area for improvement identified in all of our lessons-learned activities in both my US and my NATO Commands.

The Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) located in Monsanto, Portugal, is NATO’s central agency for conduct-
ing the analysis of real-world military operations, training, exercises and experiments, and for establishing and maintaining an interactive managed lessons-learned database. Members of JALLC have been deployed with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, as well as assisting NATO forces operating in Kosovo. Creating this real-time dynamic lessons-learned process will yield key dividends in our effort to rapidly improve the quality of our operational training while identifying material capability shortfalls that require rapid prototyping solutions.

The NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC) located in La Spezia, Italy, conducts research and integrates national efforts to support NATO’s undersea operational and transformational requirements. NURC is actively engaged in the delivery of transformational products for naval mine counter measures, rapid environmental assessment, military oceanography and littoral anti-submarine warfare.

In addition, Allied Command Transformation interacts closely with many NATO agencies and national/multinational centres of excellence to develop concepts and capabilities, develop doctrine, conduct experiments and support research and acquisition of new capabilities to deliver improved interoperability, standardisation and qualitatively transformed capabilities. Allied Command Transformation coordinates with the various NATO education institutions and Allied Command Operations to design, develop, evaluate, and approve new and improved courses for NATO. By working with our educational partners and influencing course content, Allied Command Transformation avoids duplication in training and provides the most efficient form of training to Alliance leaders, specialists, and key headquarters staffs, enabling them to operate effectively in a combined/joint environment.

NR: What are your current priorities?

AG: Our number one priority is to improve the military capability of the Alliance. Paramount in this is to embrace transformation, taking the strategic vision of NATO, determining requirements, looking to concepts, developing and experimenting with solutions, and turning proven ideas into a fielded capability. Secondly, we must never lose sight of the present as we look to the future by preparing today’s forces to meet the challenges they face in ongoing NATO operations. Thirdly, the NRF will be the transformation engine that drives much of the transformation NATO will realise in the coming years. Allied Command Transformation will work with Allied Command Operations and NRF commanders to ensure they get the support needed to implement the capabilities outlined in their charter. Fourth, in order to realise the full transformational potential of Allied Command Transformation, NATO must remain committed to fully resource the Command, both with people and money. Lastly, Allied Command Transformation is committed to working with all nations who wish to partner with the Alliance to develop their individual military capabilities.

NR: Military transformation is a complex concept. What do you understand by it?

AG: The biggest challenge of transformation is cultural and takes place in the minds of people. Intellectually, transformation requires adopting an attitude that seeks to continuously innovate and experiment – in order to deliver usable capability to the front line – and to act quickly on the lessons learned. Culturally, it means rewarding risk-taking, identifying processes and individuals capable of implementing change and working to inject a joint culture down to the lowest practical level. Many Allies have been engaged in this process for many years. The United States, for example, began what I consider to be its modern transformation with the adoption of the all-volunteer force in 1973 and the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Act in 1986. Transformation has accelerated here over the past decade with the organic development of US Joint Forces Command – now fully committed to its functional role as the forcing agent for change for the US Armed Forces.

As we begin our work, it’s important to recognise that transformation doesn’t have a beginning or an end. It is a continuous process – driven by and responsive to the accelerating changes in the global security environment. In working through this process, Allied Command Transformation has fairly rapidly established a coherent way ahead. This begins with a military assessment of the future nature of Allied operations, which we’ve captured in what we call a strategic vision. This strategic vision is a keystone document that seeks to align all of our transformation activities. Working with Allied Command Operations, the nations and a host of partners, we’re addressing force interoperability concepts, policies, doctrine and procedures by determining the future operating environment. This overarching strategic vision will drive the transformation process throughout the organisation and will directly influence defence planning for the Alliance.

Determining the future capabilities needed to accomplish the strategic vision through the defence-planning process is very important. As capabilities are identified, the concept development and experimentation process will explore the means to achieve them. This goes beyond new weapons systems – platforms like ships, tanks and aircraft – to include doctrine, procedures, organisational prototypes and collaborative mechanisms. This approach provides for an open forum of ideas, some of which will prove worthy of further study through experiments and prototypes in existing exercise and training events, as well as new, “purpose-built” events.

A key part of the transformation process is education and training, ensuring that the war fighter is educated and trained.
in the new concepts or processes. The focus of our immediate training efforts is the Joint Task Force commander and his staff. Getting them trained and ready for real world operations – such as NATO’s mission in Afghanistan – not only adds value to Allied Command Operations right now, but is a key driver for injecting transformational thinking in Allied military leaders. This will ensure success for the Alliance in ongoing operations as well as planting the seeds for future success in transforming our capabilities.

The final piece of this transformational puzzle is to evaluate ongoing operations. As mentioned previously, Allied Command Transformation’s Joint Centre for Lessons Learned is embedded in ongoing operations to ensure that there will be constant feedback to help further define the vision, defence planning and future capabilities, thus achieving full integration and understanding throughout the Alliance. Although I’ve described the transformation process as a series of steps, they are in fact interconnected and work in parallel in real time as we continually assess our requirements, revise our vision as necessary, develop new concepts, test and evaluate through prototyping and exercises and deliver even better capability in the future. As I said, transformation has no beginning or end.

NR: How are NATO’s Transformational and Operational Commands working together in practice?

AG: General Jones, SACEUR, and I are old personal friends and professional comrades. We are completely in step, both in the direction we want to take and how we want to get there. We talk often and our two staffs meet regularly to address a wide range of issues worked on by both Strategic Commands. As we like to say in the United States, there is little daylight between our two Commands and the day-to-day working relationship is very strong. The differing roles of Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations is well understood between the two staffs. Allied Command Transformation is responsible for promoting and overseeing the continuing transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. Allied Command Operations is responsible for all Alliance operations. I view Allied Command Operations as one of our two main customers and we are going to do our best to provide General Jones and his staff with the tools and training they need to run NATO’s operations. I see the nations themselves as our other customer and we will assist them in their transformational activities at their request and in the manner most useful to them.

NR: How is Allied Command Transformation contributing to the creation of the NATO Response Force?

AG: The NATO Response Force is both the product and the process for transformation. What I mean is that the NRF provides for a rapidly deployable, coherently joint trained and equipped force that is expeditionary and self-sustainable and can act across the full spectrum of military missions from low-intensity operations up to and including major combat. The NRF will also provide a means to implement new and emerging concepts and so is the process of transformation.

Allied Command Transformation was charged with developing a leader education and training programme for NRF commanders and their staffs and we have developed a dynamic and comprehensive programme at the Joint Warfare Centre that will deliver all the necessary training to certify commanders and their staffs to assume the responsibility of leading an NRF. We are also working closely with Allied Command Operations to develop training and certification criteria for the NRF. These criteria will be updated frequently to reflect our growing body of knowledge and will be key drivers for transforming national forces, which will be trained to these standards. Finally, our concept, development and experimentation efforts will focus on ways to improve the capabilities of the NRF. Here we will be able to test new concepts, new technologies and evaluate them in qualitative and quantitative ways never before available to NATO.

NR: Given the differences in military spending between the United States and its NATO Allies, is it possible to bridge the capabilities gap? And, if it is, how will the new Allied Command Transformation seek to achieve this?

AG: There is a clear recognition throughout NATO that this gap as you describe it cannot afford to grow and must, in fact, be bridged. We have seen in coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq the overwhelming power of joint and combined military operations. One of the key lessons the United States has taken away from these campaigns is the need for capable allies with whom we can operate across the spectrum of military tasks, from major combat operations to transition, stability and reconstruction operations. It has taken a focused and dedicated effort within the US Department of Defense to achieve the level of jointness displayed in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Much has been made of the military spending gap between Europe and the United States. I prefer to focus instead on what Allies are spending their hard-earned defence funds on, rather than just the magnitude of their spending. This is why our defence-planning efforts, led by my planning staff at Mons, Belgium, are so critical to bridging the gap. We have engaged in a very detailed analysis of NATO requirements and have identified to the nations both the capability gaps that need to be filled and the national capabilities that are now surplus to NATO requirements. A sensible programme of defence reinvestment, focused principally on key enabling capabilities such as command and control, combat support and combat service support, will go a long way to bridging the perceived gaps between the United States and our NATO Allies.
In addition, the military success witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq was in part, the result of a dedicated concept development and experimentation programme at US Joint Forces Command. We found that by introducing new ideas and rapidly moving them from concept to experimentation to prototyping and, when proven, a fielded capability, this process led to success on the battlefield. NATO’s civilian and military leadership fully understand this and have supported the creation of a nascent experimentation programme at Allied Command Transformation that will help NATO close the “intellectual capital” gap. Through the NRF, we will seek solutions that make sense for NATO. In time, with prudent defence reinvestment and robust experimentation, we will bridge the capability gaps that exist between member nations and ultimately allow all Alliance militaries to work together effectively in the modern battle-space.

NR: In what ways might technology help the Alliance combat the threat posed by terrorism?

AG: We now envision the future from an information-age perspective where operations are conducted in a battle-space, not a battlefield. We are eliminating the artificial boundaries that were established to de-conflict areas of responsibility between services and are transforming to a seamless battle-space to create a coherently joint force – massing effects when and where we choose rather than massing personnel and equipment as dictated by geography and boundaries. In my view, information and the means to collect, analyse and distribute it will make decisive decisions within this multidimensional battle-space will serve as the greatest technological weapon in the global war on terrorism.

NR: You head both Allied Command Transformation and US Joint Forces Command. How do the two Commands interact in practice?

AG: I am fortunate to be part of two great Commands that are dealing with the threats and complexities of the 21st century. I am also fortunate to have two staffs who are made up of the best in the business and who wake up every day asking themselves how they can work to better their respective organisations. Allied Command Transformation was established and organised using the lessons learned over the past decade by US Joint Forces Command. This huge transfer of intellectual capital was just the first step in building a transatlantic bridge of ideas that will be the foundation of success for Allied Command Transformation.

The ACT-USJFCOM relationship is a vibrant and powerful linkage, which is output-oriented and forms the foundation for common understanding and synchronisation of transformation across the Alliance. A fully functional, transparent relationship is the cornerstone of vital engagement with the United States, other Alliance nations and Partners for NATO’s transformation and for the imperative of multinational interoperability in the future. An institutionalised unity of effort between the two evolving, co-equal Commands is the common goal with the synergy of efforts benefiting both Commands by taking advantage of the unique strengths that each brings to the process, sustained by numerous direct, cooperative, reciprocal links.

NR: How might NATO improve its defence-planning and force-generation processes to ensure that the Alliance has the right capabilities available when they are needed?

AG: As I’ve mentioned before, Allied Command Transformation is now responsible for the defence-planning process of the Alliance. Our planning challenge is to deliver capabilities-focused requirements rather than a traditional threats-based set of requirements. Furthermore, we must seek to integrate long-term force-planning processes with shorter-term force-generation processes. In both of these endeavours, Allied Command Transformation’s defence planners have made remarkable progress in the past two years.

First, the Defense Requirements Review 2003 – the essential product of our defence planners – went a long way towards a capabilities-based approach from a threats-based approach. It identified key Alliance capabilities needed for the expeditionary, sustainable force we are looking to build for the future and mapped national capabilities to Alliance requirements while identifying shortfalls. This has been a very effective round of defence planning, with lots of good news in the arena of combat forces, with key shortfalls identified in enabling capabilities.

Second, we are working with NATO’s International Staff, NATO’s International Military Staff and the nations on expanding the Defence Requirements Review to include other NATO planning disciplines beyond the force-planning efforts we are responsible for at Allied Command Transformation. Including command and control, logistics and armaments planning will help eliminate duplication and allow Alliance leaders to better assess risk against the stated level of ambition for our forces. This will allow the Alliance and the nations to better spend their defence resources and understand how to mitigate risk.

Finally, we are working right now to find a mechanism to link force planning and force generation to make both processes relevant, predictable and useful for both Allied commanders and for national resource planners. This is a challenging task, but we think we are making good progress. I think that defence planning and force generation are key “business tasks” of the Alliance and spend a great deal of effort working with General Jones and the Allied Chiefs of Defence on these issues. With effective processes in these two areas, we can succeed in delivering the right capabilities at the right time to our NATO soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. And that’s the bottom line measure of success for an Alliance that is increasingly called upon to meet security challenges around the globe.
At the Prague Summit, Alliance leaders committed themselves to transforming the Alliance. As part of this they directed that NATO's military command arrangements should be streamlined to provide “a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure with a view to meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions”. Seven months later – following intensive work by the Military Committee, the Senior Officials’ Group from the nations and the Strategic Commands – the revised command arrangements were agreed by Alliance defence ministers. The resulting new NATO Command Structure marks what is perhaps the most important development in the Alliance’s military organisation since NATO’s creation more than 50 years ago.

The existence of a comprehensive military command and control structure continues to distinguish NATO from all other multinational military organisations. Fully operational in peacetime, the NATO Command Structure permits the Alliance to undertake the complete spectrum of military activities, from small-scale peacekeeping tasks to large-scale high-intensity operations. Of equal importance, it provides the essential foundations that underpin such activities. These include not only developing the combined (multinational) and joint (multi-service) doctrines, procedures and plans for the conduct of operations, but also the key enabling elements which ensure that forces from Alliance and Partner nations can operate together in a truly integrated fashion. In short, the NATO Command Structure provides the means for melding an otherwise disparate collection of people and equipment drawn from many different nations, into a cohesive, integrated and effective military instrument capable of undertaking any mission, no matter how demanding.

The new NATO Command Structure is replacing a command structure that was itself considered a major step forward when introduced in 1999. Based on early post-Cold War experiences, the 1999 NATO Command Structure was designed to cope with the expanding range of Alliance missions, including in particular peacekeeping; to promote the development of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept; to foster links with strategic partners and to help facilitate the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. Based like all of its predecessors primarily on a geographic division of responsibilities, it divided the Alliance’s area of responsibility into two Strategic Commands with broadly comparable tasks: Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT). Subordinate to the Strategic Commands were seven second level-of-command headquarters. Allied Command Europe also possessed a third level of command with a total of 11 headquarters, each with geographic affiliations. And it was divided into two regions: AFNORTH and AFSOUTH, each of which contained a subordinate Air Component Command and Naval Component Command, plus a number of Joint Sub-Regional Commands (three in the Northern Region and four in the Southern Region). Allied Command Atlantic was divided into three regions: EASTLANT, WESTLANT and SOUTHLANT, and had two Combatant Commands STRIKFLTLANT and SUBACLANT. The 1999 NATO Command Structure consisted of 20 headquarters, which was, nevertheless, a marked reduction from the previous total of 65 and an important advance.

However, it soon became apparent that further major organisational development was needed. The Alliance’s growing territorial security reduced static defence needs, while NATO’s increasingly proactive approach to crisis management demanded enhanced deployability, flexibility, responsiveness and robustness (that is the extent to which a headquarters is able to undertake operations from within its own peacetime resources). Inter-related with this was the recognition that NATO had areas of interest beyond its traditional area of responsibility. Force-structure developments (particularly the creation of land force and maritime high-readiness headquarters), the evolving relationship with the European Union and the need to close the capability gap between the United States and its Allies added further reasons for change. At the same time, growing budgetary and manpower pressures increased the need to improve efficiency through institutional reform. All this was dramatically reinforced by the paradigm shift in the strategic outlook in the wake of 9/11, NATO’s subsequent participation in the US-led war on terror and its growing concern with the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was the
cumulative impact of such factors that led to the watershed Prague Summit. The elaboration of the Prague framework into the new NATO Command Structure marked an almost total departure from previous organisational approaches and set NATO development on a far more ambitious trajectory than at any stage in its history.

**Functionality rather than geography**

At the heart of this organisational metamorphosis has been the concept of using functionality rather than geography as the basic rationale for Alliance command arrangements. Geographic approaches to organisation in any context carry the basic rationale for Alliance command arrangements. Geographic approaches to organisation help to promote integration, harmonisation and cohesion. They eliminate the risk of unnecessary duplication and replication within the organisation, streamline workflows and focus and expedite staff action. This in turn permits a greater workload to be managed by a smaller workforce. During the Cold War, when conditions were static and communications limited, a functionality-based approach to NATO command arrangements was impractical. However, in today’s far more dynamic, fluid and resource-conscious strategic environment, in which secure, real-time, global, mass data transfer is readily available, such an approach is essential.

By using a functionality-based approach to elaborate the Prague framework, NATO has produced a fundamental realignment, rationalisation and re-distribution of its military tasks in light of the new security environment. Like the 1999 NATO Command Structure, the 2003 NATO Command Structure is framed around two Strategic Commands. That, however, is largely where the similarity ends. All NATO’s operational functionality is concentrated into just one Strategic Command – Allied Command Operations or ACO – now responsible for all of the NATO area of responsibility. But in a fast-moving world it is never enough to concentrate solely on the “here and now”; it is essential to look to the future. That is the role of Allied Command Transformation or ACT, which has the lead for military efforts towards transforming the Alliance. In practice, the division of functionality is not as clear-cut as this simple generalisation suggests. Indeed, the capabilities of both Strategic Commands are integrated and intrinsically inter-dependent. Leadership responsibilities are shared between the Strategic Commands, but for almost every issue or task, one Strategic Command is in the lead, while the other acts in support. A special task force was given the job of elaborating this groundbreaking functional realignment into organisational terms. Adapting for military usage advanced business process review techniques taken from best industrial and commercial practice, the task force produced in six months the internal structures and personnel requirements for virtually all the new NATO Command Structure entities. The outcome will be a far more rational distribution of tasks between and within the Strategic Commands, a truly integrated Bi-Strategic Command organisation and a major reduction in staff, particularly in the higher ranks.

At first glance, Allied Command Operations resembles its principal predecessor, Allied Command Europe. It continues to have three levels of command; to be headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium; and to be commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). That said, the reference to Europe in both SHAPE and SACEUR is now taken to imply in Europe, rather than for, Europe, reflecting the much wider geographic responsibilities. Moreover, the radical realignment of functionalities between the levels of command makes Allied Command Operations very different from Allied Command Europe.

Under the new arrangements SHAPE’s overriding focus is to provide strategic advice “upwards” to NATO Headquarters, and strategic direction “downwards” to the ACO second level-of-command headquarters. This in itself marks an important step forward, removing an ambiguity originally created in 1995 when the IFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was controlled directly from Mons. SHAPE will now direct the three new “operational” headquarters at the second level of command that will be responsible for controlling all future Alliance operations. These are the two Joint Force...
Commands headquartered at Brunssum, The Netherlands, and in Naples, Italy, respectively and the Joint Headquarters based in Lisbon, Portugal. Each Joint Force Command must be capable of undertaking the complete spectrum of Alliance operations, including the provision of a land-based CJTF headquarters. In contrast, the Joint Headquarters, a more limited but still robust headquarters, will be focused on operations, including the provision of a land-based CJTF. The NATO Response Force (NRF) will also act as a key driver for Alliance transformation. As a result, both Strategic Commands are engaged in NRF development.

Functional rationalisation within Allied Command Operations will extend far beyond the major organisational blocks and, indeed, will be intrinsic throughout the organisation. All ACO headquarters will transition to the same, so-called “J-code” division of staff responsibilities and organisational structure to ensure mutual compatibility and streamlined workflows between the levels of command, and each will draw upon the expertise of the others. This will have the greatest impact at SHAPE, which at present is not organised along “J-code” lines. Functionality is being driven down to the lowest practical level of command, leading to a major reduction in the SHAPE staff and a major growth in the “robustness” of the operational headquarters.

Transformation represents an extremely demanding challenge for the Alliance. Although the basic task of transformation is to expedite Alliance capability development and interoperability, it is far more ambitious – in terms of scale, scope and pace – than any similar programme in Alliance history. In developing the transformation concept, the Alliance used as its starting point the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) model, the internal change engine for the US forces. Drawing on this, NATO defined the following five main transformation “pillars”: Strategic Concepts, Doctrine and Policy Development; Requirements, Capabilities, Planning and Implementation; Joint and Combined Future Capabilities, Research and Technology; Joint Experimentation, Exercises and Assessment; and Joint Education and Training.

The first four pillars are intended to work together to identify, develop and document transformational concepts and strategies. Of these, the second pillar will be the delivery vehicle for selected transformational concepts, while the fourth and fifth pillars will coordinate and implement the outputs from the other pillars in training and exercises. NATO’s transformation will not be a one-time event; it will be an ongoing development process to ensure that the Alliance remains at the military “cutting edge”.

Perhaps the greatest single operational initiative being taken is the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). Up to brigade size in terms of its land force element, and with complementary-sized air and naval components, the NRF is being established to give the Alliance an unprecedented crisis response capability. Commanded by a Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters, the NRF will permit NATO to make a rapid military response and thus perhaps defuse a developing crisis during its early stages. Failing that, an NRF once deployed could be “grown” into a much larger and more sustained CJTF if the situation demanded. Moreover, by setting stringent deployability and responsiveness requirements to the NATO nations, and also demanding much enhanced capabilities in many areas, the NRF will also act as a key driver for Alliance transformation.
Hence the importance of having a dedicated Command tasked with leading this effort. The second Strategic Command, Allied Command Transformation, is headquartered in the United States in Norfolk, Virginia, a location that not only helps to keep the transatlantic link strong, but also permits it to engage directly with USJFCOM, which is headquartered nearby. An entirely new organisational structure – consisting of four main elements – has been developed to allow Allied Command Transformation to support the various transformation pillars. The Strategic Concepts, Policy and Requirements element, is being undertaken partly by the newly established ACT Staff Element in Europe. Joint Concept Development, the second main ACT element, will be centred on the Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, linked to the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal, and the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland. The Future Capabilities, Research and Technology Development element includes the Undersea Research Centre in La Spezia, Italy, but will also link into other national and international research institutions. A NATO maritime interdiction operational training centre in Greece, associated with ACT, is also envisaged. The final element – Education – includes the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Communications and Information System School at Latina, Italy. Each of these elements will be integrated into the head office organisation in Norfolk, Virginia. Through that, they will be linked into both those NATO agencies and bodies and the various National “Centres of Excellence” involved in promoting Alliance transformation and USJFCOM.

**Speeding change**

Early delivery will be a key criterion for success of the new NATO Command Structure, and thus implementation is now proceeding apace. Allied Command Transformation and Allied Command Operations were formally inaugurated on 19 June and 1 September 2003 respectively. 19 June 2003 also saw the transfer of the former ACLANT operational headquarters to (the then) Allied Command Europe, and tasking authority for the NATO School to Allied Command Transformation. These were the simplest aspects of what will be an extremely challenging task. Many headquarters from the 1999 NATO Command Structure will have to be deactivated, while several entirely new entities must be created, some from scratch. The massive functional realignment that must take place will be realised initially through cross-staff working in which management chains will change but people will remain in their current locations. The use of seconded “Voluntary National Contribution” personnel will help to bridge the gap, but the pressure is on to complete the transition to the new NATO Command Structure within three years. Ultimately, a progressive migration of personnel will take place, within and between the various headquarters. As with any organisation, NATO’s most important resource is its people, and a major effort is being made to smooth the transition and reduce to the minimum the inevitable disruption that will flow from such a far-ranging reorganisation.

That all this must be accomplished without degrading NATO’s capability to conduct current operations (including those in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), while also promoting further partnership initiatives and integrating seven new members, is an indication of the scale of the challenge that the Alliance has set itself. That challenge is both real and unavoidable. If NATO is to remain relevant, it must keep pace with rapidly evolving international defence and security needs. As the only international organisation capable of undertaking the full spectrum of military operations it has a unique role to play in ensuring security, one which will arguably be even more important in the future than it has been to date. That role benefits not only its member nations and Partners, but also the wider international community by providing the means needed for forces from many nations to operate together effectively. It can only do that if both the organisation itself and the nations of which it is composed, embrace fully this transforming challenge. In the meantime, both Strategic Commands are driving hard to ensure the most rapid transition to the new structure and the earliest practical delivery of the products required of it.

For more on the new NATO Command Structure, see www.nato.int/issues/military_structure/command/index-e.htm
At a time when NATO is engaged in four operations – in Afghanistan, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in the Mediterranean – is supporting a fifth – the Polish-led Multinational Division in Iraq – and is expecting to support the Olympic Games and European Football Championships in Greece and Portugal respectively, a number of respected observers are suggesting that the Alliance should take on even more operational commitments. Such suggestions clearly reflect the perception that, alone among international organisations, NATO has the ability to organise, mobilise and resource major military operations involving countries from both sides of the Atlantic and potentially countries from across the globe. But that, perhaps flattering, perception depends on a very basic assumption: that NATO is able to deliver the right forces at the right time with the right capabilities and in the right number to support our operational ambitions. The steady growth in Alliance operations, however, raises questions about the adequacy of the forces and capabilities with which they are to be conducted. Against the backdrop of the upcoming NATO Summit in Istanbul, it is worth asking some hard questions about the Alliance's progress in developing capabilities to match NATO commitments, both current and future, and in making those capabilities available.

Achieving the right match between capabilities and commitments requires a clear understanding of our strategic requirements. For the first 40 years of its existence, NATO was exclusively focused on the goal of collective defence, that is maintaining the military forces required to deter and, if necessary, defeat any strategic attack against the territory of any Ally by the Warsaw Pact. To achieve this, NATO needed to possess large numbers of predominantly heavy conventional and nuclear forces held at high readiness and optimised for a short high-intensity campaign on the territory of member states, primarily along the Alliance's eastern borders. Since most forces were pre-positioned along those borders, expected to fight in place and benefited from extensive host-nation support structures, the deployability and sustainability of forces beyond national boundaries were not significant considerations for most nations.

The importance of this latter development was further underlined in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC not only led NATO to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history, but also served as a catalyst for the adoption of a new concept for defence against terrorism and agreement among Allies that NATO should be able to move forces quickly whenever and wherever they are needed.

Today, NATO requires forces that are modern, deployable, sustainable and available to undertake the full range of Alliance missions, including high-intensity operations far from home bases. Allied forces need to be agile and interoperable, well-equipped, well-trained and well-led, and capable of operating in complex environments and applying force in a discriminating manner. Since Alliance operations can last for years, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the ability of nations to sustain deployed forces over the longer term has also become important. NATO now puts greater emphasis on the quality and usability of forces than on their quantity and, in contrast to the Cold-War era, not all forces need to be maintained at high readiness.

Improving capabilities

Having defined the Alliance's capability requirements, what are NATO and its member states doing to deliver them? The Alliance's force and command structures have been reshaped radically since the end of the Cold War. Allies have reduced conventional and especially nuclear force levels (and defence budgets). Forces were pulled back from...
what had been the line of confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and many Allies re-cast their forces as expeditionary units for crisis-management operations. The Defence Capabilities Initiative, launched in 1999 at the same time as NATO’s new Strategic Concept was agreed, also sought to improve Alliance capabilities.

While positive, these past efforts did not yield all the required capabilities. This prompted an even greater focus on the requirement to transform Alliance military forces, which was reflected in many of the initiatives coming out of the Prague Summit of November 2002. Prague saw the launch of three key military transformation initiatives: the Prague Capabilities Commitment; the NATO Response Force; and the new NATO Command Structure. There was also agreement on a package of measures to strengthen NATO’s ability to contribute to the struggle against terrorism, approval of a set of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, and agreement to begin a new NATO Missile Defence Feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.

With the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO leaders made specific, individual commitments to improve national capabilities as quickly as possible in four key operational areas of critical importance to the full spectrum of Alliance operations, including the defence against terrorism. These were defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks; ensuring command, communications and information superiority; improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and sustainability of combat forces.

A number of multinational project groups have been created to improve capabilities in areas where it would be difficult or impossible for Allies acting alone to acquire what is needed, such as airborne ground surveillance systems, strategic sea-lift, outsize strategic airlift, and air-to-air refuelling. Some notable successes have been achieved. These include the establishment of the NATO multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Battalion in December 2003; the signature of a Multinational Implementation Arrangement, also in December 2003, by nine defence ministers to provide their nations with a strategic sea-lift capability; the agreement of 13 nations in March 2004 to develop an assured access contract for AN-124 transport aircraft services; as well as the April 2004 decision to pursue an Alliance Ground Surveillance capability for a mixed fleet of manned and unmanned air platforms with their associated interoperable ground stations, supplemented by interoperable national assets.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) was established in October 2003. When the NRF reaches its full operational capability in 2006, it will have dedicated capabilities to include a brigade-size ground force, fighter aircraft, ships, vehicles, combat support, combat service support and communications systems. The NRF is not only intended to provide a
quick-reaction joint force with a global reach prepared to tackle the full spectrum of missions, but also meant as a catalyst for continuing improvements in Allied forces.

The third major capability initiative from the Prague Summit, the implementation of the new NATO Command Structure, began in June 2003 with the creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, in the United States. ACT has already delivered concrete results in training the command elements of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and NRF rotations. This represents an important achievement since developing the required capabilities for NATO operations is not just a matter of new equipment or sufficient personnel, but also one of doctrine and training.

One of the fundamental tools employed by the Alliance to ensure that nations generate the necessary military forces and capabilities is the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is a comprehensive long-term process, encapsulating several planning disciplines including armaments, civil emergency, C3 (command, control and communications), logistics, resource, nuclear and, of course, force planning. Its keystone document, Ministerial Guidance, establishes the Alliance level of ambition in military terms and sets the goals for many of the planning disciplines. Subsequent elements of the process, most notably in force planning, set specific requirements to nations and assess the nations’ success in meeting the assigned targets. This process has served the Alliance well over the years but no system is perfect. A review to update the process to make it even more responsive, efficient and coordinated, and to make sure it receives even greater political support in capitals, is due to be completed in time for the Istanbul Summit.

Assessing progress

So are these initiatives and tools sufficient to ensure that NATO will have the necessary military forces and capabilities to meet its commitments and successfully execute the full spectrum of tasks that might arise? Sadly, the answer to this question is not an unqualified “Yes”. Success, ultimately, is a matter of political will.

Some nations have embraced the concept of transformation and have implemented the necessary changes to their force structures to ensure that they can contribute substantial modern, deployable, and sustainable forces able to undertake the full range of Alliance missions. Others have yet to follow this lead in full. And while some Allies fully endorse the tenets of transformation, a significant part of their military structures are still focused on the defence of national territory or other national tasks and are not in practice deployable. We are also facing the situation in many cases where nations possess the necessary military assets and deployable capabilities required by the Alliance, but are unable or unwilling to commit them in support of Alliance operations, sometimes because of cost considerations, sometimes because of political considerations, and sometimes because of other engagements.

Due to these imbalances among Allies, several ideas are being considered in preparation for the Istanbul Summit to enhance the Allies’ collective ability to provide the necessary military forces for the Alliance, now and into the future. NATO is studying the idea of establishing politically agreed “usability” and “output” targets. Such targets could specify, for example, that nations agree to be able and willing to deploy and sustain a certain percentage of their structures on Alliance operations. Similarly, nations are examining the concept of “reinvestment goals”, that is specific commitments to disband non-deployable military elements to release the resources to create new or improve existing deployable assets. The Alliance has also undertaken a comprehensive review of the force-generation process so that it is better suited to support the needs of multiple and enduring operations. The end point of this work must be a greater degree of assurance that, when Allies agree to undertake a particular mission, there is a high level of assurance that the forces will be made available to NATO’s military commanders to undertake that mission successfully.

In summary, capability requirements stem from roles and missions. As NATO’s role has expanded over the years, and may well continue to do so, and as the spectrum of its operations continues to broaden, the very nature of the military forces and capabilities the Alliance seeks has also changed fundamentally from the days of the Cold War. For the Allies themselves, this is likely to mean more operations, more interoperability, more defence reform, and, of course, more appropriate capabilities.

The Alliance embarked on the road to military transformation a long time ago. NATO has made a great deal of progress and, as a politico-military organisation, is second to none in this regard. But the road to develop the necessary capabilities appears never-ending, with twists and turns and a few bumps. The initiatives and tools described above will assist the recently enlarged Alliance and its member nations to stay on track.

NATO’s success is, and will in the future ultimately be, a function of the willingness and ability of the member nations to make the necessary changes and the necessary investments in personnel, equipment, doctrines and training. Some nations already appear to be making all the required changes and there are encouraging signs that many others are actively considering such changes – but there is a long way to go before one can confidently say that NATO has successfully balanced its roles and missions with its capabilities. The work must, therefore, continue.
FOR AND AGAINST: Debating Euro-Atlantic security options
Publication bringing together and reproducing the debates that appeared in the on-line edition of NATO Review in 2002 and 2003

NATO Transformed
A comprehensive introduction to NATO describing how the Alliance works and covering its ongoing transformation

NATO in the 21st Century
Introductory brochure on the Alliance, giving an overview of its history, policies and activities

NATO Briefings
Series examining topical Alliance issues, including NATO’s role in Afghanistan, crisis management, Operation Active Endeavour and the NATO Response Force

Cooperation case studies
Series illustrating NATO’s practical cooperation with Partners, including building the Virtual Silk Highway, disposing of anti-personnel mines in Albania, flood prevention in Ukraine and limiting the damage from earthquake-induced disasters

Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement
Brochure examining the process and impact of NATO’s historic fifth round of enlargement

Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation: A Reader’s Guide
A comprehensive overview of the decisions taken at the Alliance’s landmark Prague Summit of 21 and 22 November 2002

NATO Handbook
A comprehensive guide to NATO’s aims and activities, its current policies and structures, including a chronology of Alliance history

All enquiries and orders for print copies should be addressed to:
Public Diplomacy Division – Distribution Unit
NATO, 1110 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: 00 32 2 707 5009
Fax: 00 32 2 707 1252
E-mail: distribution@hq.nato.int

Electronic versions of these publications are available on NATO’s web site at www.nato.int.
The web site also publishes official statements, press releases and speeches, NATO Update, a weekly update on Alliance activities, NATO Review and other information on NATO structures, policies and activities, and offers several on-line services.