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NATO in the new millennium

Lord Robertson
NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

In his first article in NATO Review, the new Secretary General sets out his vision of the Alliance and his main priorities at the start of his tenure, building on the achievements of his predecessor. As its essential foundation, the Alliance must maintain a healthy transatlantic relationship, based on shared values and a common commitment to uphold them. To achieve this goal, the new NATO must be better balanced, with a stronger European contribution within a more militarily capable Alliance. And the new NATO must remain open — open to new members, open to deepening cooperation with its Partners, and open to creative ways to bring peace and security to the Euro-Atlantic region.

Let me begin by stating how honoured and pleased I am to have been selected for this position. NATO has been and remains today the most effective Alliance on earth. No other organisation has done more over the past half-century to preserve the peace, freedom and democracy of its members. And in recent months, the Alliance has proved it is fully up to the most demanding security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Much of the credit for this success in recent years is due to my predecessor as Secretary General, Dr Javier Solana. During his four-year tenure, the Alliance faced enormous challenges:

- the first NATO peacekeeping mission beyond its territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- the first enlargement of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War;
- historic agreements with Russia and Ukraine;
- deepening Partnership with 25 Central European and Central Asian countries;
- internal reform, including the new command structure; and, of course,
- the massive challenge of the 78-day air campaign to stop the human suffering in Kosovo.

All these challenges were met successfully, thanks to the leadership of Javier Solana and to the remarkable cohesion of the Alliance, as well as its ability to adapt. The Alliance has evolved from a passive, reactive defence organisation into one which is actively building security right across Europe. NATO’s agenda over this past decade has been so successfully implemented that the Alliance itself is more relevant and more indispensable than it has ever been. NATO’s foundations as it enters the 21st century are rock solid.
Stabilising the Balkans

First, NATO will have to continue to play its full role in the stabilisation of the Balkans. We must not only consolidate the peace we are building in Kosovo, but also contribute to the wider efforts of the international community to build lasting stability and prosperity across South-eastern Europe. We must ensure that the future of this region does not remain a prisoner of the past.

We have already made real progress in Kosovo. The air campaign achieved our objectives of reversing the ethnic cleansing, and forcing President Milosevic to withdraw his forces. A secure environment is slowly being restored. Over 800,000 refugees have returned home. The UN has established its presence, and 1,800 UN police are on the streets.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) has been disbanded, and a civil emergency force has been created. A multi-ethnic transitional council meets weekly, setting the stage for a multi-ethnic political future. And preparations are underway for elections sometime next year. This is real progress, when one remembers the chaos and violence the Kosovars were suffering under the Yugoslav regime, just a few months ago.

There is still much work to be done. The immediate goal of the international community, including NATO, is to help every citizen of Kosovo enjoy the peace and security that we all enjoy. Over time, we must also foster democracy, and begin to create the conditions in which Kosovo can thrive economically. This will require real commitment, but we will persevere. We won the war — we must not lose the peace.

Bosnia shows the benefits to be derived from patient engagement. This country has made real progress since NATO deployed in 1995, and continues to improve. This year, some 80,000 refugees returned home — twice the rate of last year. More and more moderates are being elected to government because Bosnians want peace. In fact, the security situation has improved to the point that the Alliance is able to reduce the numbers of troops in Bosnia by one-third, to about 20,000. Our long-term goal is getting closer: self-sustaining peace in Bosnia.

But to reinforce our success in these two trouble spots, we must look beyond them, to South-eastern Europe as a whole. Throughout the Kosovo campaign, our Partners from South-eastern Europe showed their solidarity with NATO’s actions, supporting the Allies despite the economic hardships and domestic troubles they face. They should be able to count on our support now.

The EU-led Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is a major step forward. It acknowledges the need for a more comprehensive approach to the whole region, focusing on three areas: democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction, development and cooperation; and security issues.

NATO is actively supporting the Pact in the security field. The key is the South East Europe Initiative that we launched at the Washington Summit last April. This initiative brings together the Allies and seven countries of the region to develop practical cooperation. We will work with these Partners to encourage regional cooperation. And, as part of NATO’s enlargement process, we will help aspirant countries from South-eastern Europe to prepare their candidacies for NATO membership.

My goal is to help build a Balkans that is inside the European family of democratic values, not a problem for it. This will be one of my priorities during my tenure as Secretary General.
Boosting defence capabilities and interoperability

Both Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated the value of diplomacy backed by force. If we need the same in future, we must ensure that adequate force is available. In this respect, the Kosovo crisis was not just a success but also a wake-up call. It made crystal clear that NATO needs to improve its defence capabilities. We have to make changes today, to be ready for an unpredictable tomorrow.

During the air campaign, the United States bore a disproportionate share of the burden, because the other Allies did not have all the military capabilities and technology needed. Clearly, we must rectify this imbalance and work to ensure that all the Allies have the technology necessary to be militarily effective, and to cooperate effectively together.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative, which we launched at the Washington Summit, is a big step in the right direction. This project will help ensure that all of NATO’s Allies develop certain essential capabilities. It will also take steps to improve interoperability between Allied forces. This is not just a question of spending more — it is also about spending more wisely.

Promoting interoperability with NATO’s Partners is also a key priority. We have seen both in Bosnia and Kosovo how important they have become in the conduct of peace-support operations in Europe.

A more balanced Alliance

I also intend to help reinforce the European role in NATO. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is not just an attractive idea: it is an urgent necessity. Simply put, the burden of dealing with European security crises should not fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the United States. We need to create a more balanced Alliance, with a stronger European input.
Europe recognises this — and is starting to do something about it. It now has to build the necessary capabilities, as well as institutions, to allow it to play a stronger role in preserving peace and security. NATO supports that process.

For my part, I will work to ensure that ESDI is based on three I’s:

- Improvement in European defence capabilities;
- Inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies; and
- the Indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on our shared values.

ESDI does not mean “less US” — it means “more Europe” and a stronger NATO. I very much look forward to working on this project with Mr Solana, in his new post as “Monsieur PESC”.

Getting NATO-Russia relations back on track

Another of my immediate priorities will be to work to establish a deeper cooperation with Russia. I welcome the fact that Russia is once again participating in meetings of the Permanent Joint Council, including at the military level. But we must move beyond just discussing Bosnia and Kosovo, and resume work on the full range of cooperative activities agreed under the Founding Act.

The reason is simple — security in Europe requires cooperation between NATO and Russia. There is no way around it. Both Russia and NATO share common interests: keeping the peace in the Balkans, arms control, non-proliferation, and cooperation in science.

It is to our mutual benefit to cooperate in areas where we agree, and to continue talking even when we disagree. I intend to work hard to build this kind of strong, practical relationship.

**Strengthening links with our other Partners**

I also want to strengthen still further the links between NATO and its other Partners. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, NATO’s Partners have demonstrated clearly that they are no longer standing on the sidelines of security. They are key players.

The countries neighbouring Kosovo provided invaluable assistance to the tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the brutality of Serb security forces. They were staunch supporters of NATO operations to bring the violence to a halt. And now, as in Bosnia, over 20 Partners are sending troops to Kosovo to help keep the peace.

Through these major contributions, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have demonstrated their value in developing a cooperative approach to security across the Euro-Atlantic region. I want them to become even more operational and relevant to the security needs of our Partners. That is why I intend to support fully the improvements we have recently made to PfP to improve interoperability, and to give our Partners more say in planning and conducting NATO-led peace-support operations.
The next round of enlargement

Finally, one of my key responsibilities will be to prepare NATO for the next round of enlargement. NATO’s Heads of State and Government are committed to considering further enlargement by no later than 2002.

Between now and then, we must utilise the full potential of the Membership Action Plan and give all aspirant countries as much support as possible in meeting their targets. The door to NATO will remain open.

Taken together, this is a broad and ambitious agenda, and it will require a lot of hard work to accomplish it. But as I look to the future of this great Alliance, I am very confident.

Today, NATO remains the centrepiece of Europe’s collective defence, with new missions, new members, and ever-deepening partnerships. It is essential to ensure that NATO continues to make its unique and vital contribution to Euro-Atlantic security well into the next century.

Profile of the Secretary General

Lord Robertson (53) succeeded Dr Javier Solana as Secretary General of NATO on 14 October 1999.

Born in Port Ellen on the Isle of Islay in Scotland, he is a graduate in Economics of the University of Dundee. Following his studies, George Robertson worked as a full-time official of the General, Municipal and Boilermakers’ Union from 1968 to 1978, where he was responsible for the Scottish Whisky industry.

He then entered political life and served as a Labour Party Member of Parliament for Hamilton (latterly Hamilton South) from 1978 to 1999. He was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Social Services in 1979.

After the 1979 General Election, he was Opposition Spokesman, first on Scottish Affairs (1979-80) and then on Defence (1980-81). From 1981 to 1993, he served in various capacities as Opposition Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, including as Deputy Opposition Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1983), and as Principal Spokesman on European Affairs from 1984 to 1993. He joined the Shadow Cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland in 1993, a position he held until the Labour Party came back into power after the May 1997 General Election.

Mr Robertson then served as Secretary of State for Defence until his appointment as NATO Secretary General.

He has served in an advisory capacity on numerous bodies and received a number of awards, including being named joint Parliamentarian of the Year in 1993 for his role during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.

[The full curriculum vitae of the Secretary General is available on the NATO web site at: www.nato.int/cv/secgen/robert-e.htm]
ATO faces a radically different world in its 50th anniversary year from that which existed for the first 40 years of the Alliance’s history. The end of the Cold War marked a dramatic transformation in the strategic environment, both in Europe and globally. And accelerating globalisation and increasingly significant transnational phenomena continue to transform the international context. Threats to security are more complex now than ever before. A wide range of new issues that transcend borders — mass migrations, ethnic conflict, organised crime, disease, pollution, overpopulation and underdevelopment — can have peace and security implications, as much as the traditional threats of interstate aggression.

The human security dynamic

In this changing environment, conceptions of global peace and security based primarily on national security are no longer sufficient. Most conflicts during the last 15 years occurred within states, rather than between states. And most of the casualties have been civilian. The safety of individuals — “human security” — is increasingly coming to the fore in our definitions of peace and security. These new conflicts are often also accompanied by large-scale atrocities, violent crime and terrorism.

While the security of states, and between states, remains a necessary condition for the security of people, our understanding of security has of necessity become much broader in recent years. The new conflicts we are witnessing are highly complex and spring from a variety of factors. Their solutions, too, are complex and rely on a variety of instruments — political, civilian and military.

The crisis in Kosovo, and the Alliance’s response to it, is a concrete expression of this human security dynamic at work. First and foremost, the conflict in Kosovo has made it painfully clear how individuals are increasingly the principal victims, targets and instruments of modern war. The indelible images of the conflict in Kosovo — the forced exodus and the brutal, indiscriminate use of force — all underscored the fact that there were no accepted international mechanisms to protect civilians from an aggressive, tyrannical state. The Allies’ response demonstrated how the defence of human security has become a global concern: it was the humanitarian imperative that galvanised NATO into action. Our Alliance had both the means and the determination to act, and I have no doubt it will do so again, if need be.

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to take strong action in every region of the globe. In Central Africa, East Timor and Sierra Leone, civilians have...
The new security agenda

What is new is the changing paradigm. The concept of human security establishes a new measure for judging the success or failure of national and international security policies, namely: do these policies improve the protection of civilians from state-sponsored aggression and civil, especially ethnic, conflict?

This is not to say that national security, traditionally defined, is any less relevant. On the contrary, security between states remains a necessary condition for the security of people. And yet, the security of a state cannot in itself guarantee the security of its people. The concept of human security not only helps us evaluate the effectiveness of our security policies, it also highlights the importance of preventive action to reduce vulnerability and points the way for remedial action, where prevention fails.

This new security agenda therefore integrates both traditional and human security approaches, and in practice leads to new ways of assessing policy responses. Such a new security approach encourages policy-makers to examine the human costs of strategies for promoting state and international security, and to question, for example, whether the security benefits of anti-personnel landmines outweigh the human cost of lost limbs and lost lives.
Seen through the optic of human security, the promotion of human rights, democracy and development is a safeguard against unstable states and internal conflict. Multilateral cooperation is all the more essential to addressing transnational challenges to the safety of people. Indeed, in the last decade, an array of new international instruments has been developed to address cross-border organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and environmental degradation, all of which increasingly affect the lives of ordinary citizens. But what is new — as has been demonstrated in the crises in Kosovo and East Timor — is the international community’s determination to use coercion, including sanctions and military force, to deal with grave threats to human security.

A growing appreciation of human security makes it all the more imperative to strengthen operational coordination both internally and with other international players, in order to bring together all facets of complex peace-making, peace-building and peacekeeping operations into a coherent, efficient and effective whole.

**International action**

The new security agenda has already achieved some important successes. Last March, the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction” came into force. The Ottawa Convention now has 136 signatories and has been ratified by 89 states. At its signing in December 1997, countries pledged half a billion dollars for mine action. The Canadian Government allocated $100 million and we have put this money to work in some of the most severely affected states — Cambodia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Peru, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. One of Canada’s mine action priorities is to prevent new mines from being used in future conflicts, and we have begun working in concert with our NATO Allies to achieve this goal by helping countries to destroy their stockpiles of anti-personnel mines.

Allies and Partners are coordinating action to remove mines that have already been laid, through the “Global Humanitarian De-mining” initiative that was launched in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NATO teams of experts are also currently assisting the Albanian military by training specialists to clear unexploded munitions, and advising on issues related to the stable, safe and secure storage of ammunition.

The agreement to establish an International Criminal Court was another important step taken by the international community. The Court will help deter some of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) — a forerunner of the International Court — is contributing significantly to restoring justice in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Increasing cooperation between NATO and the ICTY in recent years is further testimony to the growing recognition that security is truly indivisible.

**Tackling the root causes of conflict**

Many other challenges to human security remain, of course. Small arms and light weapons — cheap and easy to transport, smuggle and hide — have become tools of the trade for warlords, drug traffickers, international terrorists
and common criminals. Canada is pursuing the control of the use and spread of small arms along three interlocking tracks: arms control, crime control and peace-building. This integrated approach targets both supply and demand, and helps eliminate surplus stocks of weapons left over after conflicts have ended. The problem of small arms has to be tackled as an integral part of conflict prevention and management, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. Peace operations are that much more dangerous in regions where there is an illegal and unregulated flow of small arms. NATO and the EAPC have a duty to deal at source with such contributing causes of conflict. I therefore welcome the initiative that was launched last March in the EAPC to assist in the control of small arms and weapons, and to strengthen operational aspects of Partnership for Peace programmes in this regard.

The new security agenda and NATO

This new concept of security is central to the new NATO. All of the Alliance’s new partnership and cooperation activities are based on the belief that the values which have united the Alliance for 50 years — democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law — are also the key to lasting peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The crises in the former Yugoslavia have put those values to the test. Alliance leadership of peace-support operations and its willingness to intervene in Kosovo shows the extent to which NATO’s new roles are, in fact, all about protecting human security and projecting stability. When thousands of civilians were forced to flee the rising tide of oppression and violence in Kosovo, NATO stepped in to provide basic services and shelter in hastily constructed refugee camps, until civilian organisations were in a position to take over. And, it was NATO troops who secured the way for those same refugees to return to their homes.

Today, NATO and Partner troops are actively engaged in helping to rebuild societies in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Their mission is as much about building bridges between communities as it is about preventing violence. They are engaged in everything from providing medical care and emergency services, to rebuilding schools, or the painstaking but essential task of de-mining. The NATO mission also supports the ICTY in its investigations and the search for evidence to prosecute war crimes. Kosovo is a clear example of how military power can support human security objectives.

Prevention is better than cure

But, as the old saying goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. NATO has a role to play in responding to emerging threats with a view to preventing conflict. Indeed, the successful Partnership for Peace programme is about extending democratic structures and, by extension, human security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies and Partners meet regularly in the EAPC to share expertise and cooperate in tackling some of the new transnational risks. The recent EAPC initiatives in the area of de-mining and the prevention of illicit small arms traffic are just two examples of how NATO’s expertise is helping address threats to human security.

But there are some more traditional threats to human security that also require new approaches. In light of the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, Allied foreign ministers in December set in train a process to review Alliance policy options in support of confidence- and security-building measures, certification, non-proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. Ministers will discuss a report on these issues in December 2000, and I will be looking for concrete recommendations as to how NATO can contribute more to arms control and disarmament.

NATO has, in practice as much as in theory, already integrated a broader appreciation of security in its response to the new international environment. Security, for the new NATO, is a continuum, comprising both state and individual human security concerns. Only through a wider and deeper recognition of the importance of human security to peace and stability will NATO retain its relevance and effectiveness in facing the diverse challenges of the coming century.
Redefining NATO’s mission in the Information Age

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Dean of the Kennedy School of Government,
former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1994-95)

Kosovo is a dramatic example of a larger problem — how should NATO define its mission in the Information Age? During the Cold War, containment of Soviet power provided a North Star to guide NATO policy. NATO’s official job was simple and well-defined: deter the Warsaw Pact from launching an invasion against member states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, what should be the limits of NATO’s mission? With the Kosovo crisis, NATO fired its first shots in anger in a region outside the Alliance’s treaty area, on declared humanitarian grounds. What criteria might NATO draw on to guide policy on the threat, or use, of its force in the new strategic environment of the 21st century?

The world in the Information Age

We need first to have a clear sense of the distribution of power in the Information Age. Some people see the end of the bipolar world leaving multipolarity in its stead, but that is not a very good description of a world in which one country, the United States, is so much more powerful than all the others. On the other hand, unipolarity is not a very good description either, because it exaggerates the degree to which the United States is able to attain what it wants.

Instead, power today is distributed like a three-dimensional chess game. The top military board is unipolar, with the United States far outstripping all other states. The middle economic board is multipolar, with the United States, Europe and Japan accounting for two thirds of world product. However, the bottom board of transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of governments has a more dispersed structure of power.

This complexity makes policy-making more difficult. It means playing on several boards at the same time. Moreover, while it is important not to ignore the continuing importance of military force for some purposes, it is equally important not to be misled by military unipolarity into thinking that US power is greater than it is in other dimensions. The United States is a preponderant, but not dominant, power.

Another distinction to keep in mind is that between “hard power” — a country’s economic and military power to coerce — and “soft power”, the ability to attract through cultural and ideological appeal. The Western democratic and humanitarian values that NATO was charged with defending in 1949 are significant sources of soft power. Both hard and soft power are vital but, in the Information Age, soft power is taking on more importance.

Massive flows of cheap information have expanded the number of transnational channels of contacts across national borders. Global markets and non-governmental actors play a larger role. States are more easily penetrated and less like the classic realist model of solid billiard balls bouncing off each other. As a result, political leaders find it more difficult to maintain a coherent set of priorities in foreign policy issues and more difficult to articulate a single national interest.

Different aspects of the Information Age cut in different directions in terms of NATO members’ collective interests. On the one hand, a good case can be made that the information revolution will have long-term effects that benefit democracies. Democratic societies can create credible information because they are not threatened by it. Authoritarian states will have more trouble. Governments can limit their citizens’
access to the Internet and global markets, but they will pay a high price if they do so. Singapore and China, for example, are currently wrestling with these problems.

The “CNN effect”

On the other hand, some aspects of the Information Age are less benign. The free flow of broadcast information in open societies has always had an impact on public opinion and the formulation of foreign policy, but now the flows have increased and shortened news cycles have reduced the time for deliberation. By focusing on certain conflicts and human rights problems, broadcasts pressure politicians to respond to some foreign problems and not others. The so-called “CNN effect” makes it harder to keep some items off the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority. Now, with the added interactivity of activist groups on the Internet, it will be harder than ever for leaders in democracies to maintain a consistent agenda of priorities.

Global parochialism

Another problem is the effect of transnational information flows on the stability of national communities. The Canadian media guru, Marshall McLuhan, once prophesied that communications technologies would turn the world into a global village. Instead of a single cosmopolitan village, they may be producing a jumble of global villages, with all the parochial hatreds that the word “village” implies, but also with greater awareness of global inequalities. Global economic forces are disrupting traditional lifestyles, and the effects are to increase economic integration and communal disintegration at the same time.

This is particularly true of weak states left in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the old European empires in Africa. Political entrepreneurs use inexpensive information channels to mobilise discontent, provoking the emergence of either sub-national tribal communities, repressive nationalism, or transnational ethnic and religious communities. This in turn leads to increased demands for self-determination, increased violence, and violation of human rights — all in the presence of television cameras and the Internet. The result is to put a difficult set of issues on the foreign policy agenda.

Different classes of security risks

William Perry and Ashton Carter have recently suggested a list of risks to US security, which can also be profitably applied to NATO’s strategic interests:
The “A list” of threats on the scale that the Soviet Union presented to Western survival;

The “B list” of imminent threats to Western interests (but not survival) such as was seen in the Gulf War;

The “C list” of important contingencies that indirectly affect Western security, but do not directly threaten Western interests, such as the crises in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

It is striking how the “C list” has dominated the US foreign policy agenda and that a “C list” crisis precipitated NATO’s first military action in its 50-year history. Carter and Perry speculate that this is because of the foreground because of their ability to command attention. But a human rights policy is not a strategic policy; it is an important part of foreign policy. During the Cold War, this often meant that the West tolerated human rights abuses by regimes that were crucial to balancing Soviet power — for example, in South Korea before its transition to democracy.

But the greater attention being devoted to humanitarian concerns often diverts attention from “A list” strategic issues. Also, since moral arguments are used as trumps, and pictures are more powerful than words, arguments about trade-offs are often emotional and difficult.

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The problem with such cases is that the humanitarian interest that instigates the action often turns out to be a mile wide and an inch deep. For example, the American impulse to help starving Somalis (whose food supply was being interrupted by various warlords) vanished in the face of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. This is sometimes attributed to a popular reluctance in America to accept casualties. But that is too simple. Americans went into the Gulf War expecting some ten thousand casualties, but there was more at stake then than simply humanitarian issues. More properly expressed, Americans are reluctant to accept casualties when their only interests are unreciprocated humanitarian interests.

Ironically, the reaction against cases such as Somalia may not only divert attention and limit willingness to support “A list” interests, but may also interfere with action in more serious humanitarian crises. One of the direct effects of the Somalia disaster was the failure of the United States, along with other countries, to support and reinforce the United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda that could have limited a true genocide in 1994.

Lessons for the Alliance

There are no easy answers for such cases. We could not simply turn off the television or unplug our computers, even if we wanted to. The “C list” cannot simply be ignored. But there are certain lessons to be drawn and prudently applied that may help integrate
The official memorial site dedicated to the victims of genocide in the village of Ntarama, Rwanda, where 5,000 people were killed in April 1994 (Reuters photo).

such issues into the wider strategy for advancing the national interest.

First, there are many degrees of humanitarian concern and many degrees of intervention such as condemnation, sanctions targeted on individuals, broad sanctions, and various uses of force. NATO should save the use of force only for the more flagrant cases.

Second, when the Alliance does use force, it is worth remembering some principles of “just war” doctrine: the cause should be just in the eyes of others; we should be discriminating in our choice of means to avoid unduly punishing the innocent; our means must be proportional to our ends; and, there should be a high probability (rather than wishful thinking) of good consequences.

Third, NATO countries should generally avoid the use of force, except in cases where our humanitarian interests are reinforced by the existence of other strong strategic interests. This was the case in the Gulf War, where the West was concerned not only with the aggression against Kuwait, but also with energy supplies and regional allies.

Fourth, public reaction to humanitarian crises may differ from one democracy to the other. Therefore, NATO should welcome the idea of combined joint task forces that would be separable, but not separate, from the Alliance and encourage a greater European willingness and ability to take the lead on such issues.

Fifth, we should be clearer in our definition of, and responses to, genuine cases of genocide. The West has a real humanitarian interest in not letting another Holocaust occur. Yet, we did just that in Rwanda in 1994. We need to do more to organise prevention and response to real cases of genocide. Unfortunately, the Genocide Convention is written so loosely and the term so abused for political purposes, that there is a danger of it becoming trivialised. But a strict historical interpretation based on the precedents of the Holocaust and Rwanda in 1994 can help to avoid such pitfalls.

Lastly, NATO countries should be very wary about intervening in civil wars over self-determination. The principle is dangerously ambiguous; atrocities are often committed on both sides (“reciprocal genocide”); and the precedents can have disastrous consequences.

None of these criteria solve the problem of how to determine NATO’s mission in the Information Age. But better consequences will flow from a starting point in which the Alliance’s values are related to its power, and in which any humanitarian mission is rationally pursued within prudent limits.
ever since we gained our independence in 1991, Slovenia has had to cope with the negative spillover from the ethnic tensions, political unrest and developmental problems that have come to characterise and threaten to destabilise the Balkan countries in the region to our south-east. We had for a long time been voicing concern over escalating tensions in the region and had warned in advance of the risks of long-lasting armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the aggravation of relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

Slovenia, a Central European country, already fulfils its national security, political and economic interests within the wider framework of existing European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Yet, we recognise that our long-term security and economic development depend to a great extent on promoting stability and prosperity in the countries of the region to our south-east.

The Stability Pact

We therefore welcome the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which was agreed at the European Union’s ministerial conference in Cologne on 10 June 1999, and the Declaration endorsed by the Heads of State and Government of more than 26 European and non-European countries at their meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999. This is one of the international community’s most significant achievements in the last few years. Slovenia is participating actively, as an equal partner, in this international, comprehensive approach to help the region tackle its political and economic challenges.

Through the Stability Pact, the international community expressed its determination to take concerted, positive action to eliminate the root causes of South-eastern Europe’s characteristic instability. Strategic direction is being provided by a common political plat-
form of participating states and international organisations, through roundtable discussions addressing the regions security, economic, humanitarian and social problems.

Political, economic and security issues require different methods and institutions for their settling, but they are inseparably connected and intertwined. The Stability Pact builds on this interdependence. Its comprehensive and integrated approach offers hope that the desperate living conditions of people in this part of Europe will finally be alleviated. It also offers a promising formula for addressing the complex ethnic, developmental, social and political tensions that have been seething there since the end of the Cold War.

The Stability Pact aims to support countries in South-eastern Europe in their struggle to achieve overall social prosperity and peace, and stresses that this will be possible only if democracy and respect for human rights are fostered, along with economic development. A strong civil society must be established and national minority issues must be settled. This approach is fully consistent with the position and values of my country.

**Slovenia's active involvement**

Slovenia’s shared history with the countries of South-eastern Europe and our experiences — both positive and negative — of dealing with them, gives us a unique, in some ways privileged, position in this common endeavour. Our knowledge of the former Yugoslavia — our insight into the different peoples’ mentalities and languages — and our traditional economic links provide major opportunities for us to play a constructive role in the stabilisation process.

In the Stability Pact’s various roundtable discussions, Slovenia has already proposed several projects aimed at promoting democracy and creating conditions conducive to the peaceful co-existence of peoples of various cultures and religions, as well as projects for the region’s economic reconstruction and development.

In the context of discussions in the meeting of the “Working Table on Democratisation and Human Rights”, we have recommended, among other things, that a centre be set up to monitor inter-ethnic relations in South-eastern Europe. A proposal for the establishment of institutions, effective administration and effective management has been drawn up by several ministries. We have also proposed the founding of an international centre for studies on South-eastern Europe and an international university for the region. And RTV Slovenia — our national radio and television broadcasting company — has offered to assist media democritisation in Kosovo and in South-eastern Europe.

Several projects in this field are already underway. Slovenia has agreed to host a number of international conferences. The first aimed to identify appropriate constitutional solutions to contribute to democratisation and the effective protection of human rights, and was organised together with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe at the end of November. The second, at the beginning of December, was organised within the framework of the Royaumont Initiative on cross-border cooperation between European cities and local communities. A third conference on national minorities is planned for February 2000 in cooperation with the Council of Europe.

In the meeting of the Pact’s “Working Table on Economic Reconstruction, Development and Cooperation”, Slovenia has put forward a proposal to educate managers from South-eastern Europe at the Brdo Educational Centre. And in the context of the “Working Table on Security Issues”, Slovenia is supporting moves to extend the activity of the “International Trust Fund for De-mining and Mine

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Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek (left) meets the then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana at NATO headquarters on 1 June 1999. Slovenia was the first Partner country to open its airspace to NATO planes at the start of Operation Allied Force. (Belga photo)

Extending NATO’s security umbrella

It is essential that — in addition to the projects organised under the Stability Pact — all South-eastern European countries be encouraged to participate actively in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and clear prospects for their admission to the Partnership must be drawn up. Security, stability and confidence in the region will be achieved only through building mutual confidence and cooperation within the framework of this programme for promoting cooperative security in the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

Our own participation in PfP led to our commitment to adapt the country’s security and military structures and develop appropriate democratic control over the armed forces. Our admission to the Partnership is the best proof that Slovenia is developing in the right direction, and has good prospects for membership of the Euro-Atlantic structures — a goal that is shared with many of the countries to our south-east.

Slovenia now enjoys both internal and external stability and seeks to transfer this stability to the wider region through regional initiatives. We believe that interregional cooperation is of key importance for achieving long-term stability in South-eastern Europe. The inclusion of Slovenia in the next wave of NATO enlargement would give an important signal to the countries of the region. Not only would it offer hope for their own eventual integration, but the enlarged NATO would also help promote security and stability beyond its own territory to the countries in its immediate vicinity.

From our perspective, of course, the current instability in South-eastern Europe — though it does not threaten us directly — strengthens arguments in favour of Slovenia seeking to safeguard and consolidate its national security within the North Atlantic Alliance’s collective defence system. Already, Slovenia has proved to be a reliable regional ally to NATO by our support for the Allied intervention in Kosovo, in defence of the values upon which NATO is founded and which Slovenia upholds. At the start of Operation Allied Force, we were the first Partner country to provide NATO with access to our airspace within 24 hours. We were also deeply involved in the political dialogue during the intense efforts to find a political solution to the Kosovo crisis.

I am convinced that Slovenian experience and knowledge of the region will also be of value to NATO in our active participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council fora, namely: the “Consultative Forum on Security Matters on South-Eastern Europe” and the “Ad hoc Working Group on South-Eastern Europe”.

Realising Slovenia’s strategic goals

The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo and the international community’s responses mirror two of the main features of the post-Cold War revolution in geopolitics:

Victims Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ITF) to include Croatia and Kosovo.

Slovenia is active in a range of other international endeavours to promote security and stability in South-eastern Europe. These include SFOR and the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) in Bosnia, KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the WEU-led Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), and the Royaumont Process. Over 100 members of the Slovenian armed forces are participating in these operations, and civilian experts are active in Kosovo and Albania.
the emergence of inter-ethnic conflicts as one of the new international security risks; and the emergence of more intense international cooperation to address these new security challenges. The uniquely comprehensive approach of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe is mobilising the resources of a wide range of actors in the international community. The experience gained may help establish best practices for a fast and effective response in similar cases throughout the world.

The Pact has also confirmed the significance of the EU and NATO for stability on the European continent, and underlines the importance of close cooperation between them. Slovenia is aware that full membership of both organisations would guarantee our long-term security. We are engaged in the activities of both, and are ready to embrace the challenges of membership.

Slovenia’s active involvement in the work of the Stability Pact contributes significantly towards realising our strategic goals. It brings us closer to European and Euro-Atlantic structures, offering an opportunity for our country to strengthen its international position. But more importantly, the Stability Pact improves the prospects for Slovenia’s long-term security by offering the hope of bringing lasting peace, democracy and prosperity to the countries of South-eastern Europe — a region that has been the tinderbox of Europe for too long.
A dangerous trend has been arrested in this last year of the present century. Too often the conflicts in South-eastern Europe became the conflicts, or even the wars, of Europe. Equally, Europe too often carried out proxy wars in the Balkans. This time, the conflicts in the region were controlled. In the Kosovo crisis, through joint effort, a dangerous conflict was successfully limited and isolated. On the eve of the new millennium that is a great political success.

This success demands commitment from all of us: the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the political framework for maintaining it. A policy of realistic steps is being developed, involving integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO. One goal is that of a European Union expanded by the addition of the countries of South-eastern Europe. The countries of the region must have the possibility to come a bit nearer to this reality each day.

Peace and stability require economic recovery, just as economic recovery requires peace and stability. This is where the Stability Pact comes in, with its perspective of integration, and its three equal “Working Tables” addressing democratisation and the promotion of civil societies, economic development, and questions of internal and external security.

At the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo at the end of July, Finnish President Ahtisaari correctly spoke of the Stability Pact in terms of a marathon. I would add that we want to set ourselves targets along the way to our goal, so that we can measure ourselves by our achievements at the intermediate stages.

To be politically responsible we must not awaken hopes which cannot be fulfilled. But the Stability Pact must use concrete successes, based on steering a clear course, to maintain acceptance and motivation. People’s lives must become a little bit better each day.

The challenge of Yugoslavia

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains a central problem and challenge. People in Yugoslavia should know that the Stability Pact is not building a wall around them. On the contrary: as soon as Yugoslavia has solved its political problems, it can and should become a participant in the Stability Pact with full rights. Until then, the Stability Pact will reach out to the democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro.

President Milosevic’s policies have driven his country to political and economic ruin. Aggressive nationalism, despotism and the preservation of his personal power have, over the last decade, engulfed South-eastern Europe in blood, hate and expulsions. Europe has not accepted this policy, nor will it be tolerated in the future.

Against this background, and spurred by the systematic deportation of the Albanian population from Kosovo, the West took a stand against the regime in Belgrade. At stake were the European system of values and peace in the region, which was also endangered by the destabilising movement of tens of thousands of refugees into neighbouring countries.

Seldom have such difficult decisions relating to post-war Europe been required. During the air strikes, all politicians carrying responsibility in NATO countries grappled with the best approach. The flagrant abuse of human rights, unrestrained terror, brutal
expulsions, and the danger of war engulfing the region could not go unchallenged. Yet, it is impossible to entirely protect the innocent from the effects of a military campaign.

**Mobilising initiatives and resources**

The Stability Pact can mobilise initiatives and resources, accelerate processes and create political momentum. It does not have its own implementing structure. For that it is dependent on its participants. As a framework for coordination and political impulses, it must call on its participants to act, and to channel existing activities. The Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo with 40 Heads of State and Government, and heads of international organisations, made clear the firm will of the international community to work together with all the countries of the region to implement the Stability Pact with concrete actions.

We do not want to reinvent the wheel. We want to build on what already exists: the varied levels of development of the countries of the region; the initiatives and programmes already started; and the expertise of NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the United Nations, international financial institutions, NGOs, and many others.

The Stability Pact differs from previous ways of approaching matters in the region, because it has a vision for the region, a coherent policy of preventive diplomacy, and custom-designed decision-making structures.

The Stability Pact’s vision is that of a South-eastern Europe with its future founded on peace, democracy, economic prosperity, and internal and external security — South-eastern Europe which will eventually be integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Looking back on this century, this vision is something radically new… something that we would not have dared believe possible even a few years ago.

Up to now, policy approaches concerning the Balkans have been directed at symptoms and crises. The Stability Pact is the first attempt at addressing the political and economic structural deficits in the countries of the regions through a comprehensive approach of preventive diplomacy. An innovative aspect is that it fully draws in the countries of South-eastern Europe as equal partners, indeed as owners of the stabilisation process.

Above all, this approach makes use of the most successful concepts of European post-war history: EU integration unified Western Europe; the Helsinki Process helped overcome the division of our continent. We do not have better instruments than these.

The Stability Pact is a type of Helsinki Process for South-eastern Europe. Its decision-making structures, which consist of a system of three “Working Tables”, the results of which are brought together at the “Regional Table”, reflect closely the “Baskets” which
Background to the Stability Pact

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted at a special meeting of Foreign Ministers, representatives of international organisations, institutions and regional initiatives, in Cologne on 10 June 1999. The Pact represents a political commitment by all the countries and bodies concerned to a comprehensive, coordinated and strategic approach to the region, replacing crisis management with preventive diplomacy.

The Stability Pact provides the framework for all relevant existing actors to achieve the common objectives in the fields of democratisation and human rights, economic development and reconstruction, and external and internal security.

A Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact is foreseen in the document agreed at Cologne to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Pact. Mr Bodo Hombach, formerly Minister in charge of the German Federal Chancellor’s Office, was appointed to the post in July 1999.

There are 29 participants in the Stability Pact: the 15 EU Member States, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Turkey, United States of America, the European Commission, the OSCE Chairman in Office, and the Council of Europe.

In addition there are 11 facilitators and five regional initiatives supporting the aims of the Pact and taking part in its structures: Canada, Japan, the United Nations, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, NATO, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Western European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the Royaumont Process, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the Central European Initiative, the South East Europe Cooperation Initiative, and the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process.

At the 16 September 1999 meeting of the “Regional Table for South Eastern Europe” the following observers were present: the Czech Republic, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Ukraine. The following Guests of the Chair were also present: Montenegro, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Office of the High Representative, and the European Parliament.

(*) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Concrete work is underway

Concrete work is well underway. The meeting of the “Regional Table” on 16 September concluded the work plan for the “Working Tables”. It also agreed on a system of chairmanship and co-chairmanship for the “Working Tables”, all of which had their first meetings in October. The system of co-chairmanship means that the countries in the region will be hosting meetings of the “Working Tables”, as well as playing a key role in their preparation and follow-up.

On the substance of the Stability Pact’s work, important progress has been made in a number of key areas. For example, an investment charter has been drawn up, which includes firm commitments by countries in the region to improve their investment environment. A business advisory council has been created, composed of senior business executives from Stability Pact countries, including those in South-eastern Europe, which will be closely involved in the implementation of the investment charter. In a division of labour between the international banks, the World Bank is preparing a comprehensive approach to regional development; the European Investment Bank is leading...
An SFOR soldier keeps watch from the tower of the Sarajevo Olympic stadium, where the Stability Pact Summit is held on 29 July. "NATO clearly has a key role to play in a number of important aspects of the Pact’s work." (Belga photo)

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on prioritising regional infrastructure projects; and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is preparing a programme for private sector development in the region.

An anti-corruption initiative has been launched as part of an overall effort to fight organised crime. And a series of task forces are developing integrated action plans on good governance, education, freedom of the media, gender, ethnic minorities and refugees.

On the defence side, work is progressing well on confidence-building measures, such as improved military-to-military contacts, control of arms sales and reducing the amount of small arms in circulation, as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The next meeting of the “Working Table on Security” will take place in Sarajevo in early 2000.

A key date for the Stability Pact will be a regional financing conference which will be held in the first quarter of 2000. This will provide the resources necessary for many of the projects to be implemented. We are now entering the next phase of practical implementation, in which projects will be turned into construction sites.

Working with NATO

In taking forward the work of the Stability Pact, I look forward to continuing with Lord Robertson the close working relationship established with NATO under his predecessor, Dr Javier Solana. The complexity and scale of the tasks we face is such that no one organisation or country can handle them alone. But NATO clearly has a key role to play in a number of important aspects of the Pact’s work. Together, we have the chance to build a stable and prosperous future for South-eastern Europe.
Swiss security policy and partnership with NATO

Martin Dahinden
Deputy Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO

For centuries, Swiss security policy relied on autonomous self-defence and neutrality. But dramatic changes in the strategic environment in Europe and the conflicts in the Balkans have led the Swiss to adapt their traditional security stance. For the foreseeable future, security will need to be strengthened primarily through cooperation with other nations and with security organisations like NATO. Switzerland does not intend either to join the Alliance or abandon its status of neutrality. It therefore has a pivotal interest in the lasting success of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and in a more substantive role for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

NATO and the security of Switzerland

After the Second World War, Switzerland’s security improved significantly when its neighbours — France, Germany and Italy — became part of an alliance committed to democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. For the first time in centuries, Switzerland was no longer situated at the crossroads of hostile big powers. The North Atlantic Alliance has played a major stabilising role on the whole continent, by tying the security of Europe to the security of the United States. Now, following the end of the Cold War, NATO remains a guarantor against the re-nationalisation of the security and defence policies of Western European states.

The Swiss welcomed the opening of NATO and its adaptation to the changing security environment as an effective way of promoting greater security and stability in the wider Euro-Atlantic region. PfP made it possible for Switzerland to establish normal relations and engage in a regular dialogue with NATO, building on its close political, economic and cultural relations with individual NATO member states.

Impact of the crises in the former Yugoslavia

Only time will tell what long-term impact the events in the former Yugoslavia will have on Swiss foreign and security policy. In relation to its size, no other Western European country hosted as many refugees from the former Yugoslavia. Switzerland was particularly affected by the crisis in Kosovo. About 170,000 Kosovar Albanians — nearly 10 per cent of the population of Kosovo — came to stay in Switzerland. During the crisis, every second refugee in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared neutrality, but the Swiss now seek to strengthen their security through cooperation with other nations and with NATO, in particular through Partnership for Peace (PfP). And while domestic legislation at present prevents the Swiss from sending armed units abroad, this is now the subject of public debate. Mr Dahinden of the Swiss Mission to NATO outlines the importance to his country of participating in PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, calling for cooperation in both to be strengthened.

Swiss Foreign Minister Joseph Deiss talks with a Kosovan Albanian refugee during his visit to the Spitalla refugee camp near Durrës, part of Tirana, Albania, on 16 May. The Swiss reacted swiftly to the Kosovan crisis by sending humanitarian aid to the region. (Belga photo)
Switzerland as their preferred final destination, should their return to Kosovo not be possible.

The massive influx of refugees is not the only consequence felt in Switzerland of almost ten years of conflict in the Balkans. The country is also being affected by illegal arms traffic, organised crime, and trouble between different ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia living in Switzerland.

The Swiss reacted swiftly to the Kosovo crisis with its traditional instruments of foreign policy. Extensive humanitarian aid and reconstruction programmes were launched. In 1999 alone, some US$ 200 million were spent in the region, making Switzerland a major donor country.

Cooperation between Switzerland and NATO deepened to an unprecedented level during the crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. At the end of 1995, the Swiss opened their air space, rail and road networks to IFOR troops. The Ministry of Defence started bilateral assistance programmes with the armed forces of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Today, these programmes are being coordinated under PfP with NATO and with other nations. The experience gained has been very positive.

As hundreds of thousands of people started fleeing Kosovo, Switzerland launched bilateral humanitarian assistance programmes in the region. Transport helicopters from the Swiss armed forces were also provided to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition to this assistance, and at the request of several European foreign ministers, Switzerland — together with Greece, Russia and, later, Austria — launched a support programme (FOCUS) for the people displaced within Kosovo. Support was also given to victims of the armed conflict in Serbia. This operation could not have been carried out without close cooperation with the political and military authorities of NATO. Previous experience gained through PfP proved most helpful.

Domestic legislation prohibits the Swiss government from sending armed units abroad. Nevertheless, the Swiss government decided to provide an unarmed support unit to the Austrian battalion in KFOR. About 140 Swiss soldiers are now deployed in Kosovo. In the meantime, a public debate has started in Switzerland as to whether this prohibition against sending armed troops abroad should be lifted, as well as other legal obstacles hampering international cooperation.
Preparing missions together

Careful preparation is the key to successful military cooperation. The experience gained during operations like SFOR, AFOR, and KFOR becomes the driving force for further development of both the Partnership as a whole and individual countries’ Partnership programmes. This results in more challenging exercises, more effective training and additional efforts to increase interoperability.

During the early days of Swiss participation in PIP, there was no participation in troop exercises or any operations, other than civil emergency planning. But participation in various staff exercises and in the annual NATO crisis management exercise has led to better

knowledge of the structures and working methods of NATO, its members and other nations.

It was only recently that interoperability of armed forces became a part of the cooperation, and it will become more important with participation in KFOR. Since 1999, Switzerland has participated in the PIP Planning and Review Process (PARP). The benefits of this go well beyond the Partnership with NATO, and have also proven useful in cooperation with other armed forces in bilateral undertakings.

Swiss added value

The Swiss government was determined to make a net contribution to the Partnership, when it decided to
participate in PfP. This contribution is made in areas such as search and rescue, civil emergency, dissemination of international humanitarian law, security policy education, democratic control of forces, medical education, and arms control and disarmament, rather than in core military activities.

In early 1999, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy — an international training facility financed by the Swiss government — was certified as one of the first PfP Training Centres by the North Atlantic Council. Another Swiss PfP initiative is the International Security Network (ISN) — an institution that promotes the use of modern information technology in the area of security policy. One of the ISN projects involves indexing information to facilitate key-word searches of NATO’s web site.

Confidence-building

Since the days of the League of Nations, Switzerland has favoured international action to address the causes of conflicts and prevent dangerous escalation. Today, conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and confidence-building are still considered priorities.

PfP has generated a new generation of pragmatic confidence-building measures, while avoiding extensive conceptual debates. The daily contacts and practical collaboration among the political, military and civilian representatives of NATO and Partner nations are a form of confidence-building that goes far beyond the classic measures developed during the Cold War. In this way, PfP has significantly improved the image of NATO in non-member nations — even in Switzerland, which has always enjoyed good relations with the Alliance and its members.

Clearly, it will take more than this sort of cooperation to resolve certain important European security issues, which are still the subject of fundamental dissent. But the experience gained and the trust built through joint activities improves the conditions for reaching solutions, and helps avoid false perceptions that could lead to dangerous escalation.

The future role of the Partnership

Partner nations pursue very different objectives within the Partnership. Some seek to improve their capabilities, with a view to eventual membership of the Alliance. For others, the Partnership is an institutional door to the Euro-Atlantic community. Switzerland considers the Partnership as a framework for political consultations and practical cooperation with NATO. But, irrespective of these different aspirations, there is still considerable unused potential in the Partnership, particularly in the area of crisis management, the better use of the EAPC, and practical cooperation under PfP.

Crisis management

As early as the 1997 Madrid Summit, the Head of the Swiss Delegation, Federal Councillor Ogi, stated that the EAPC is particularly well-suited to deal with the practical and operational aspects of conflict management. This still holds true today. Switzerland supports the development of capacities to make it possible for NATO and Partner nations to react swiftly together in emergencies, other than collective defence. The EAPC should primarily focus on military aspects of crisis response, peacekeeping, humanitarian support actions and disaster relief. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) to support civil rescue efforts with military means was a significant step. And the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) that was launched at the Washington Summit provides a blueprint for improving the practical and operational aspects of crisis management.
One of the lessons learned from the Balkan crises is that crisis management is becoming increasingly complex. There are no clear-cut structures and procedures, and different organisations, concepts and instruments operate in parallel. Crisis management strategies tend to be developed during crises themselves. And, these difficult conditions will probably prevail in future emergencies.

In this context, the EAPC can and should play an important role to encourage more coherent action by NATO and Partners in future crises. For such a role to be carried out effectively, it will be important to reflect on recent experiences, and have an open discussion on gaps in the EAPC’s work and on what improvements need to be implemented.

**Strengthening the political role of the EAPC**

Since its inception in 1997, the EAPC has provided a valuable framework for political consultation, in particular with regard to Kosovo and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, there is room for improvement. Often, the political discussion is not as substantive as it could be. The EAPC must become more of a starting point for substantive initiatives. A good start has been made with initiatives in the areas of global humanitarian mine action, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and regional security cooperation in South-eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It is up to the Partner nations themselves to come up with proposals for appropriate concerted action on issues of particular concern to them, and to make better use of the EAPC’s potential.

**Enhanced practical cooperation under PfP**

One of the uncontested qualities of the PfP programme is the direct military-to-military cooperation among Allies and Partners in operations, exercises, training and education. Europe’s armed forces are generally facing streamlined budgets, while at the same time being charged with additional tasks that require international cooperation. This also applies to the Swiss army.

Steps were taken at the Washington Summit to respond to those challenges. The “Enhanced and more Operational Partnership” provides for a better integration of Partners in joint emergency operations with NATO, other than collective defence. Switzerland looks forward to making its own particular contribution to this common endeavour.

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**Additional sources of information:**
- Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (http://www.spn.ethz.ch/)
- Switzerland and Partnership for Peace (http://www.pfp.ethz.ch/index.cfm)
- Swiss Mission to NATO (http://www.nato.int/pfp/ch/home.htm)
- International Relations and Security Network (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/)
- Geneva Centre for Security Policy (http://www.gcsp.ch/)

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**New Permanent Representative of Denmark**

Ambassador Niels Englund (53) has succeeded Ambassador Gunnar Riberholdt as Permanent Representative of Denmark to the North Atlantic Council.

Mr Englund attended the Army Language School (1965-67) and served part-time as a First Lieutenant (Reserve) with the Royal Life Guards from 1967 to 1971. He then studied History, Russian, and Political Science, respectively, at the Universities of Copenhagen and Århus, Denmark, and at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium.

Having completed his studies, he started his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. His first foreign posting was as First Secretary to the Embassy in Washington DC from 1976 to 1980. Upon his return, he served as Counsellor to the Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament Affairs until 1982, when he became Deputy Head of the NATO Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1985, he was posted to Bonn as Minister Counsellor and Deputy Chief of Mission.

He returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen in 1987 and was appointed Head of Department, First of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs, and Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, then of relations with North and South America, Western Europe, European Political Cooperation, and Policy Planning (1989-91); and lastly, of relations with NATO and the Western European Union, disarmament questions in the UN, and European Political Cooperation and Policy Planning (1991-92).

In 1992, he was appointed Ambassador, Under-Secretary and Political Director, i.e. member of the European Union’s Political Committee. From 1994 until taking up his present appointment in October 1999, he served in the Prime Minister’s Office as Chief Advisor on Foreign and Defence Policy.
As the Alliance has transformed itself, so has its civil Science Programme. Set up 40 years ago to strengthen science and technology within the Atlantic Community, the NATO Science Programme today actively builds non-military links between the Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that participate in Partnership for Peace. In 1999, over 13,000 Alliance and Partner scientists collaborated with each other through joint research, participation in workshops and study institutes, and holding NATO science fellowships.

Describing the transformation of the NATO Science Programme in recent years, Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs Yves Sillard explains “The unifying theme is the promotion of interaction and confidence between scientists of the 44 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council countries to help stabilise scientific communities in Partner countries ... By creating and reinforcing links with the international scientific community we contribute to the future of stability and peace.”

Mr Sillard has headed up the Science Programme since early 1998 and has been spearheading a major intensification of scientific cooperation with Partner scientists. Accompanied by members of the Science Committee, he travelled to Moscow in November 1998 to forge an agreement outlining areas of common research interest between Alliance and Russian scientists. Their work was undertaken in the framework of a Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between NATO and the Russian Ministry of Science and Technology, signed by the then NATO Secretary General, Dr Javier Solana, and the Russian Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, Vladislav Nichkov, in Luxembourg in May 1998. Areas identified for scientific cooperation include plant biotechnology, plasma physics, and the prediction and prevention of catastrophes.

Other initiatives are also underway, such as a programme of industrial partnerships intended to speed the transfer of technology from academic institutions to industry; an agreement with scientific leaders in
Bulgarian and German scientists discuss their experiment in the laboratory at the Faculty of Physics, Sofia University. An NATO grant made possible their joint research into problems related to the stability of high frequency discharges in the industrial use of plasma-based technologies. (NATO photo)

Ukraine for enhancing Ukrainian participation in the science programme, and a plan to include Partner scientists on the Programme’s peer-review panels which make recommendations for proposals.

In October 1999, the Science Committee met in Bucharest. There, the Committee members and Romanian experts discussed advances in such areas as optoelectronics, laser physics and high-resolution spectral analysis. Romanian President Emil Constantinescu expressed to Mr Sillard his strong interest in increasing the level of participation in the Science Programme by Romanian scientists.

Partner-Alliance cooperation

The Programme first opened its scientific grants to applications from Partner scientists in 1992, but the transition to almost exclusively Partner-Alliance cooperation was not completed until January 1999. This move was due in part to a 1997 review of the Programme’s activities by an independent group of renowned scientists. A central finding of this review was that the Science Programme, through its support for the entire spectrum of civil science, was in a unique position to strengthen non-military links between the Alliance and its Partners. Maintaining a dialogue with Partner scientists and helping to provide stability to the scientific communities in Partner countries was seen as making a significant contribution to international security, in an environment where political and military dialogue can be difficult.

Interaction with Partners takes place through four sub-programmes, targeted at the training of young researchers, support for cooperative research, research infrastructure, and applied science and technology. Though the audience targeted and the tools used differ, the sub-programmes have several key points in common: the primary selection criterion is scientific excellence; proposals are jointly prepared by Partner and Alliance scientists; and participation of younger scientists is encouraged. In order to serve the greatest number of scientists, grants cover only travel and partial living expenses, and occasionally include support for key equipment purchases for Partners. Salaries are not supported by NATO scientific grants.

Training young scientists

The Science Fellowships sub-programme is aimed at maintaining the long-term health of the scientific enterprise. It offers opportunities for Partner scientists to pursue their research or to continue their training in a NATO country, and for scientists from NATO countries to do likewise in Partner countries. Though fellows range from Masters-degree level through to senior scientists, the majority are young post-doctoral researchers bound for prestigious academic institutions in Alliance and Partner countries. One objective of the programme is to discourage “brain drain” from Partner countries by insisting that fellows return home at the conclusion of their tenure.

In 1998, the programme supported 487 Partner fellows, over 35 per cent of the total of 1,360 fellows. The proportion of Partner fellows will increase significantly in the coming years, since the North Atlantic Council has mandated a redirection of Fellowship funding, which requires that 75 per cent be used to support Partner exchanges by 2000.

Cooperative research

The sub-programme on Cooperative Science and Technology is aimed at initiating research cooperation and nurturing personal links between scientists in countries that were once separated by political barriers. Researchers in virtually every area of scientific endeavour are eligible for support under a highly competitive system in which only the best proposals are funded. Of the 1,500 proposals received in 1999 for joint NATO-Partner scientist interaction, only one in three can expect to be supported.

Funding recommendations are made by four disciplinary review panels, each composed of about a dozen distinguished scientists and engineers appointed by the Science Committee. Panels convene three times a year to advise Programme staff on the relative merits of proposals under consideration.

The Physical and Engineering Science and Technology Panel — which covers physics, mathemat-
ics, chemistry, information technology, materials science and engineering science — receives the largest proportion of proposals. One example of a typical joint project involves Ukrainian experts led by Professor Sergej Firstov of the Institute of Problems of Materials Science, Kyiv. In collaboration with Canadian and German colleagues, his team is developing multi-layered composites, which are advanced materials used in high-speed computing and aerospace. The project affords the Ukrainian team the opportunity to employ advanced research facilities in Canada and Germany, while the Canadian and German teams are exposed to new research ideas and highly developed scientific capabilities.

The Life Sciences and Technology Panel — which covers biology, agricultural and food sciences, and medical and behavioural sciences — supports collaboration in such diverse areas as cancer research, immunology, veterinary science, archaeology, psychology, and biotechnology. A recent example is that of a Linkage Grant, which supported a joint project between Latvian and German biomedical specialists studying the effect of certain “messenger molecules” on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The project synergised the excellent analytical capabilities and experience in screening genome libraries on the Latvian side with the advanced laboratory facilities on the German side.

The Environmental and Earth Science and Technology Panel — which covers earth and atmospheric sciences as well as oceanography — supports joint research in areas such as technologies for the reclamation of contaminated sites, and for addressing regional environmental problems and natural and man-made disasters. In this regard, the panel supported a September 1997 workshop in Cieszyn, Poland, on how to remedy environmental problems resulting from chemical contamination of sites in Eastern Europe. Co-directed by Professor Pawel Migula of the University of Silesia, Poland, and Dr David B. Peakall of Kings’ College, London, the workshop brought together experts from 17 countries to explore solutions to various contamination scenarios. The panel has also supported a series of projects aimed at increasing the understanding of the complex processes of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea ecosystems.

The Security-related Civil Science and Technology panel is concerned with security-related nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional disarmament science and technology; hazardous waste storage and disposal; risk assessment, detection science and technology; and security issues associated with nuclear power plants. A June 1999 workshop on “Nuclear Physical Methods in Radioecological Investigations of Nuclear Test Sites” — co-directed by Dr Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the United States, and Dr Yuri Cherepnin of the National Nuclear Center, Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan — evaluated existing methods for measuring radioactive contaminants based on large-scale investigations at the Semipalatinsk test site.

Support for Infrastructure

The Research Infrastructure Support sub-programme supports Partner countries in developing the research infrastructure of their scientific organisations, focusing on computer networking capabilities. Infrastructure support takes the form of Computer Networking Grants and Science and Technology Policy Grants.

Since the inception of a computer networking programme in 1994, NATO has played a key role in developing intra- and Internet communication among scientists in Partner countries, serving over 50,000 Partner scientists in over 200 institutes. NATO Computer Networking Infrastructure Grants enable Partners to buy equipment and telecommunications services, which provide reliable and rapid access to researchers throughout the world.

In contrast to the programmes described above, infrastructure support is one-way, being channelled from NATO to Partner countries and institutions. As a first initiative, the Programme might send a networking consultant to a Partner country to help identify needs. Subsequent efforts might involve the preparation of proposals to buy networking equipment and provide start-up funding for durable computer networks.
In every case, proposals must involve several institutes, demonstrate a need by a large number of users, fully incorporate existing Internet facilities, and provide a plan for future self-sustainability.

Another important area of cooperation, Science and Technology Policy, addresses issues such as the organisation and administration of research programmes, the transfer of research ideas to industry, patents, creation of small and medium-sized enterprises, and intellectual property concerns. It has evolved, in part, from requests from Partner scientists and officials for assistance in reintegrating formerly closed defence communities; learning how to operate in the absence of a strong top-down pyramidal structure; and how to organise a more effective peer-review system.

As in the area of computer networking, Partner countries may ask for a consultant to advise on the initial review of their organisation of science policy. Other initiatives include a new internship programme, in which officials from Partner countries gain experience in similar institutions in NATO countries.

### Applied science and technology

The Science for Peace sub-programme is aimed at facilitating Partner transition toward market-oriented and environmentally-sound economies. These are applied science projects, which typically address industrial or environmental problems, and they must become self-sustaining by the end of the 4-5 year period of the grant.

Partner scientists have shown an intense interest in this sub-programme. Of the more than 1,500 proposals received in the first three calls, fewer than eight per cent could be supported with the available funding.

Science for Peace projects include a number of industrial-related projects, such as one on “Laser-Based Clean Technologies for Smart Sensor Fabrication” involving Hungarian, Belgian and Romanian researchers. Other projects focus on the environment, such as one concerning “Catalytic and Electrochemical Processes for Sodium Dioxide and Nitrogen Oxide Emission Abatement” involving Russian, Greek, US, Danish and Romanian teams.

### An integral part of NATO’s transformation

Two of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s priorities in taking the Alliance into the 21st century are to establish closer relations between NATO and Russia, and to further strengthen the links between NATO and its other Partners. By promoting dialogue and redirecting capabilities sustained for military purposes during the Cold War to collaborative pursuits, the NATO Science Programme is helping meet these goals.

Complete information — including downloadable application forms — is available on the NATO Science web pages at: http://www.nato.int/science.
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A brass plaque commemorating NATO's 50th anniversary is unveiled at NATO headquarters by Allied Chiefs of Staff on 9 November.