Cover: Outgoing NATO Secretary General Javier Solana waves to the Kosovars gathered to greet him in Prizren, during a one-day visit to Kosovo in September. (AP Photo)

Focus on NATO

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Message from the Editor

After seven years at NATO Review, the last three as Editor, I am stepping down at the end of September 1999 to re-enter the private sector. I would like to thank all the loyal readers of the magazine for your support and wish my successor all the best.

Keir Bonine

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Letter from the Secretary General

An Alliance fit for the 21st century

This will be my last letter to the readers of the NATO Review. After four years as Secretary General of NATO, I will be leaving to become the Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Given the growing importance of creating a European Security and Defence Identity in NATO, I consider my new job as a logical continuity of the old. By working towards a Europe that acts more coherently on security matters, I will in many ways be working on a more mature transatlantic relationship as well.

This transatlantic relationship will remain at the heart of NATO and of Euro-Atlantic security. Indeed, in these four years that I had the pleasure to be Secretary General of this Alliance, the dynamism of our transatlantic community has, if anything, increased even further. It has enabled NATO to accelerate the adaptation it embarked upon after the Cold War had ended. In these four years, we have changed the face of NATO and of Europe:

• We have invited three new members while keeping the door open for future accessions;
• We have established bilateral relationships with Russia and Ukraine, to draw these important nations into the emerging security architecture;
• We have created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), allowing our Partners to participate fully in the building of our future security and intensifying political consultations with them;
• We have continuously enhanced the Partnership for Peace to make it even more operational;
• We have created a new command structure, with the full participation of Spain, to enhance our crisis management capabilities, strengthen the role of the European Allies and thus set the stage for a more mature transatlantic link;
• We have adopted a new Strategic Concept that strikes a new balance between NATO’s traditional task of collective defence and its new missions in crisis management;
• And, perhaps most importantly, we have engaged ourselves in the challenging task of bringing lasting peace and stability to the Balkans, first in Bosnia, and now in Kosovo.

Today, at its 50th anniversary, we can proudly say that NATO is well prepared for the 21st century.

It is impossible to sum up all the many fascinating developments I have been privileged to be a part of, but perhaps the central lessons I may draw are these:

First, security in the 21st century is what we make of it. The future can be shaped if there is a common vision, the means, and the solidarity to implement it.

Second, security policy, like any policy, must be value-based. A policy that does not reflect humanitarian concerns and protects the rights of the individual misses the mark. In Kosovo, where our values were being threatened, we decided to act — and we prevailed.

Third, an Atlantic approach to security remains our best hope to shape the future. Kosovo has demonstrated this fact with utmost clarity. Together, Europe and North America can overcome any challenge.

And yet one final observation may be in order here: NATO’s dynamism is not generated by abstract political processes or military structures. It is generated by the people who work in it. Thus, my final thanks go to the people at NATO Headquarters, SHAPE and SACLANT, and to those in Allied and Partner nations. My very special thanks go to our men and women in Bosnia and Kosovo. They are building a better future for us and for the generations that will follow.

Javier Solana
Taking responsibility for Balkan security
Lamberto Dini
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy

The Kosovo crisis provided a new urgency in European security and defence, while at the same time demonstrating the primacy of human rights in international politics. Foreign Minister Dini argues that the intersection of these two realities has broad implications for NATO and for the entire system of international institutions. These institutions, with the United Nations in the forefront, must become more effective and more inclusive if we are to prevent future Kosovos from breaking out.

The Balkans are part of the still unfinished history of the three great fault lines of our century: two World Wars and the collapse of the Communist system. Old and new strains of nationalism are seeking protection against growing pressure from a new, changing, but above all alien, world. And they are being fuelled by the unprecedented liberty we enjoy today. In the Balkans, people still feel centuries-old events as if they had taken place yesterday. They live out their history, even their ancient history, like a recent past that is still closely bound up with the present.

After having been for so many years under the influence of the great empires of European history — Ottoman, Hapsburg and Soviet — the countries in the Balkans need a higher authority which will force them to live together in peace and enable their societies to advance in a civilised manner. They are asking NATO to defend them not so much from some external enemy but from themselves, from their own temptations, and from their own ghosts. They are asking the European Union to lead them to the promised land of a healthy economy and democracy.

Kosovo’s lessons

There are many lessons for Atlantic security and European defence to be taken from the unprecedented experience of the Kosovo war, in terms of substance, relevance and complementarity. The psychological value of the conflict — the first to involve the Atlantic Alliance in its 50 years of existence — stems from its geographic location, the circumstances which justified the casus belli, and the manner in which it was brought to an end. Only the Korean war had a comparable impact on Euro-Atlantic security. It was after that war that NATO’s integrated structure was created, an attempt was made, albeit unsuccessful, to establish the European Defence Community; the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the Alliance; and a new doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons, known as “massive retaliation”, was formulated.
Today, having come to terms with the collapse of the Berlin Wall ten years ago and undertaken the first large-scale deployment of Allied forces, we are faced with an equally radical change of direction. This new departure was already partly codified at the NATO Summit in Washington last April and by the European Council in Cologne the following June. The Kosovo war coincided with the final drafting of the new strategic doctrine which has enabled NATO to redefine its roles, purpose, geographic boundaries, modalities for operating in relation to the other institutions, and its decision-making powers and internal equilibrium.

**Primacy of human rights**

Looking ahead to the reconstruction of the whole region I would like to sum up the lessons we have learned from the Kosovo crisis in the following terms: the primacy of human rights in government policies; the need for an updated Alliance strategy; the evidence of Europe’s broader ambitions; and the establishment of a new stability through the leading international institutions.

With the Kosovo war over, it will now become increasingly evident that the principles of the United Nations put the individual at the centre of everything, and that the protection of the individual is the real raison d’état in our times. We must certainly improve our prevention capability considerably. And we must more finely tune the instruments for enforcement.

Only a few weeks ago the Italian Parliament ratified the convention establishing the United Nations International Criminal Court. It will be one of our top priorities to urge other countries to do likewise, so that we can soon reach the required 60 ratifying states, allowing the Court to be officially established.

Human rights are paramount, then, but at all times the scale of violations of those rights in terms of their gravity should be kept in mind, as well as the need to bring the culprits to justice, which will sometimes be a quite lengthy process.

**Europe’s responsibility**

As was again apparent from the Stability Pact Conference in Sarajevo on 30 July, Europe is taking primary responsibility for the post-war situation in Kosovo and in the Balkans. Of course, without the United States the war could not have been won. But it falls above all to Europe to build the peace. This will...
perhaps be the first real touchstone of a common foreign policy, without which the European Union will never come of age.

The Kosovo crisis has highlighted the need to shift the balance in favour of Europe for the future of Euro-Atlantic security by creating a credible common foreign and security policy to give the Union a political language of its own, backed up when necessary by force. The declarations issued by the Cologne European Council must therefore be followed up in practice. Italy and the United Kingdom approved a common document at the recent bilateral Summit in London, under which it was agreed that a Joint Council of Foreign and Defence Ministers would be convened at least twice a year. Looking still further ahead, the Europeans will need to ensure much closer coordination of their research, the structure of their forces and their deployment abroad.

Will the European Union prove itself capable of becoming a *de facto* political and economic guardian of the Balkans? Will it be able to contribute to ensuring free elections, rebuilding the civil institutions and financing the reconstruction?

The first affirmative and specific answers to these questions are emerging, firstly from Sarajevo at the end of July and then from Bari in early October at the Summit for the Reconstruction of the Balkans.

### The Alliance’s new missions

Kosovo was the first time that the Alliance intervened militarily to put an end to wholesale violations of human rights, repressions and expulsions, which had provoked horror and indignation throughout the world, generating a strong sense of moral solidarity with the victims. And herein lies the crux of the new missions which form part of the broader concept of “enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area”, which is of prime importance because it defines the future scope of action of the Alliance. These new missions are the natural outcome of updating the mission of collective defence developed by the Alliance throughout its 50-year existence. And they are missions that constitute a dynamic, modern defence which is better able to confront threats that are no longer static or easily identifiable, as was the case during the Cold War.

These new missions are to be carried out within a clearly limited strategic boundary, deal with new types of risks (the proliferation of arms of mass destruction, regional and even local conflicts), and are set within the precise legal framework of the United Nations Charter or international law. In the transition following the end of the Cold War, these new missions, particularly the use of force to protect human rights, are bound to broaden the social consensus within the Alliance. This will confirm NATO’s specific character as a community of values, values which it is capable of imposing on others.

Affluent Europe is taking responsibility for a piece of the Continent which would otherwise be cut adrift, to demonstrate to those people that there is a future for them after the war, to indicate the path that will also lead the southern Slavs into Europe, although not immediately. Some people might be astonished to hear the governments of Europe now making such bold promises to such backward countries, despite the slow progress made towards the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. But the war has had the effect of accelerating and changing the timing of European construction, and it has also shown how fragile an edifice can be, when its foundations are economics and currency concerns alone.

### International institutions

The tragedy of Kosovo has given a whole new lease of life to the system of international institutions. Even at the height of the war, the future of the Balkans was already being debated and when it was over, the debate took the form of the Stability Pact and led the United Nations to take on responsibilities for reconciliation and reconstruction. But similarly, the world economic architecture that has guaranteed our welfare for half a century was launched at Bretton Woods in 1944, well before the Second World War was won. It was a measure of the Allies’ far-sightedness that, even without the certainty of victory, they were already preparing the path to lasting peace.
From the failure of Rambouillet to the resumption of negotiations through the G8\(^{(1)}\), the Atlantic Alliance was the only international institution involved in the Kosovo crisis. It was thanks to the G8, and at its initiative, that the combination of force and diplomacy was possible, reviving prospects for a political solution and, in the longer term, for bringing Yugoslavia back into the fold of democratic nations.

Recourse to the G8 confirmed that it would have been a grave blunder to have kept Russia out of the process of defining the shape of Europe. Russians, like Serbs, are Europeans, but the empires from which they have both descended were only European in part. The Russians and the Serbs are the two luckless nations of post-Communist Europe, traumatised and wounded in their pride through the collapse of the political systems that they had imposed on others.

But it is precisely because Moscow is no longer ruled by a totalitarian regime that it would have been wrong to push Russia to the sidelines of the Continent, ignoring its security interests and its wish to participate in taking decisions that affect Europe. While the negotiations were triggered by the G8, they were concluded within the context of the United Nations. It was the United Nations that set the seal of a higher authority on the ensuing peace.

**More effective, more inclusive**

There are two considerations I believe to be important for the future. First of all, the G8 is playing an increasingly prominent role as an instrument for international crisis prevention and management. We saw this in Kosovo, but it has been seen previously in the conflict between India and Pakistan, and in future we may well be seeing it in other unresolved conflicts.

Secondly, the Alliance is right to intervene in crisis situations, and it must be able to act promptly and unhampered by unwarranted UN Security Council vetoes. Yet in the longer term, any lasting peace must inevitably be modelled around the universally accepted rationale of the United Nations. During the Kosovo crisis, it was very instructive to see the way in which the G8 was able to dovetail its work with that of the Security Council.

And this brings us to the last lesson we should learn from Kosovo: the need to push ahead with the reform of the United Nations to enhance its effectiveness and make it more inclusive, particularly with regard to the institution with primary responsibility for ensuring international peace and stability: the Security Council.
The Washington Summit initiatives:
Giving NATO the “tools” to do its job in the next century

Admiral Guido Venturoni
Chairman of the Military Committee

The initiatives taken at last April’s Washington Summit, which are now being implemented, provide the “tools” the Alliance needs to undertake its new missions. While reaffirming its primary function of collective defence, Alliance leaders also endorsed NATO’s new roles in crisis management and stability through partnership, as well as an initiative to facilitate greater effectiveness in multinational operations. Kosovo is the first to benefit from these initiatives, which hold the key to solving future security challenges in Europe.

G"ive us the tools, and we will finish the job”.
Winston Churchill’s famous words may have been spoken in completely different circumstances over 60 years ago, during the early days of the Second World War, but they aptly describe the sentiments of the Allied nations that came together at the Washington Summit earlier this year to endorse the new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. While the Kosovo crisis was far from an ideal backdrop to the Summit, nevertheless, some truly remarkable achievements were made in Washington. The basis for a new dynamic is evolving rapidly within the Alliance — and Kosovo is actually the first to benefit.

As the traditional concept of inter-state conflict between nations gives way to more urbanised, intrastate aggression, the Alliance continues to develop new ways to further peace, stability and security through international cooperation in crisis management. The Washington Summit signalled a new era in the conduct of NATO military operations. With broader perspectives and new initiatives, the tools needed to do the job are emerging and being moulded into shape by NATO.

As Chairman of the Military Committee — the link through which the political and military interests of the Alliance are brought to bear — I am currently focused on ensuring on the military side the successful outcome of a variety of initiatives stemming from the Washington Summit. After my first few months in office, I felt it timely to share my thoughts and views on the future of the Alliance with the wide readership of our flagship publication, NATO Review.

The Summit initiatives

This has been a crucial year for the Alliance. There are three new members, the growing prospect of peace in the Balkans, and a recent positive resumption in our relationship with Russia. But it is nevertheless from the Summit initiatives that we will draw perhaps the greatest inspiration for the future.
in Europe. However, the Washington Summit has now launched the Alliance into a new era. The new initiatives provide fresh impetus for the member nations, are destined to interest an even wider range of partners and nations, and will hopefully convince former rivals of the mutual benefits to be gained through joint missions and cooperative projects.

The new Strategic Concept

The new Strategic Concept that came out of the Washington Summit recognises that maintaining a strategic balance is no longer paramount in the current security environment. In framing our future defence needs, we will continue to move away from the old planning tools of strategic parity, concentrating instead on the functional characteristics and ‘sufficiency’ in military force needed for credible deterrence and timely and effective crisis management.

NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo has shown that amid the sometimes conflicting motivations of the common good and individual nations’ self-interest, NATO has the potential to be a catalyst for progress beyond its traditional role of collective defence. I believe that collective defence balanced with comprehensive crisis management — in other words, blending self-defence with crisis force projection — is the key new dynamic resulting from the Washington Summit. Much remains to be done and the Alliance may not yet have all the answers, but the crucial, initial building blocks were put in place at the Washington Summit. Kosovo is the proof that it is possible to generate the common will to achieve this goal.

The Strategic Concept also outlines the requirement for future Alliance military operations, including crisis management responses in non-Article 5(1) situations. The actions to plan for are likely to be on a smaller scale than the scenarios envisaged during the Cold War. But they may last longer, in some cases require greater cooperation at lower levels of responsibility, and take place concurrently with other operations. This change in the way the Alliance expects to work makes crucial new demands on military forces and, specifically, the force structures that sustain them.

The requirement to react with joint forces simultaneously in a variety of theatres has already been partly addressed with the advent of the new Command Structure, which provides for regional commands and flexible joint operations. However, the need to satisfy force levels and bring force structures into line, so that we are able to react efficiently and effectively, remains the highest priority for the Military Committee.

The Defence Capabilities Initiative

The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) — another innovation of the Washington Summit which aims to enhance NATO’s military capability — was a breakthrough for the Alliance. It will spearhead greater
effectiveness in future multinational operations and will permeate through the full spectrum of Alliance missions. It will encourage cooperation at lower levels of responsibility and place a special focus on interoperability between Alliance, Partner and other nations as they operate in the field, whether it be in collective defence or in crisis response operations such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, or elsewhere. Operation Allied Force, the air campaign directed against Milosevic’s forces, showed that the military does have the potential to manage difficult, politically sensitive crises. Including Partners and non-Allied nations at every step of the way in the search for solutions to the Kosovo crisis also set a new benchmark for international cooperation.

But combining languages and cultural diversity under one banner presents considerable challenges to the Alliance. Procedures need to be developed to provide greater interoperability at a tactical level. Maintaining interoperability of Allied forces in an era of rapid technological change is one of the purposes of DCI. KFOR is already showing that this is possible.

Greater cooperation, in particular between governmental and non-governmental organisations, is also essential to achieve complex military goals. These can only be achieved within the framework of a clear political strategy that draws together many diverse strands of activity, both civil and military, which need to operate freely at a tactical level.

Facilitating European military operations

Special prominence was given at the Summit to the realisation that the Alliance must further adapt itself to the exigencies of a new security environment, especially in Europe. With the realities of Kosovo unfolding in the background, Allied leaders agreed to move forward and develop the core values of an increasingly flexible defensive posture, which would be able to react more swiftly to non-Article 5 crisis management needs. This capability — which is at the heart of the concept for a European Security and Defence Identity — is based on a re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship. It will offer the prospect of effective European-led operations, supported by selected elements of NATO assets and infrastructure.

The new NATO Command Structure and the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept will be among the military tools which provide the basis for this initiative. While much work remains, the most important hurdle is to muster the politico-military will within Europe to focus nations on a unified approach to collective defence and crisis management. This is vital if the transatlantic link is to be enhanced, and nations are to be able to provide a green light for European military operations, in which the Alliance may not be engaged as a whole.

In other areas, as well as broadening our technical infrastructure, such as secure integrated computer net-
works, moves toward a common NATO policy on training and evaluation are planned. We need to understand that more exercises do not necessarily lead to better training for our forces, and that ways must be found to improve work practices and make more efficient use of manpower.

In the area of intelligence gathering, NATO — which has few intelligence assets of its own and is already dependent on its member nations for intelligence contributions — must solicit its members for considerably more input than previously. This implies the acquisition of additional intelligence platforms to complement the concept of Alliance Ground Surveillance, which provides seamless in-depth surveillance at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

NATO has the tools to do the job

All these Washington Summit initiatives stand to improve our crisis management capabilities. I view the developments stemming from the Summit with considerable optimism. They will lead to progress in force planning, changes to force structures and a re-balancing of force levels, which will ensure that member nations are able to confront future threats to their collective defence, while remaining responsive and alert to the requirements of effective crisis management. From a military standpoint the new Strategic Concept is a bold step forward and — with the experience gained by the conflict in Kosovo — will ensure that NATO has the wherewithal to evolve and to remain adequately equipped to cope with future risks.

On the ground, numerous challenges face KFOR and it is likely that the nature of the force will change, as it steadily transforms itself from an Alliance force into an international military enterprise. Already, 39 nations including Russia are participating in KFOR, and more nations outside NATO are offering assistance: evidence that the building blocks of a truly international endeavour are firmly in place.

It is encouraging that these developments were broadly envisaged prior to Washington. The Summit decisions aim to equip NATO for the present and future challenges of an uncertain security environment, and the Allies have defined the “tools” for the achievement of its missions. Now, we must ensure their delivery and get on with the job of moving the Alliance into the
In committing itself to rebuilding Kosovo, the international community took on an enormous challenge. It is not just the recovery of a lost peace and the return of a war-ravaged displaced people, but the rebuilding of a shattered society, the creation of a democratic environment, the development of a crippled economy, and the rebirth of a subjugated culture.

With the assistance of the NATO-led Kosovo security force, KFOR, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo — known as UNMIK — has begun to lay the groundwork for meeting those objectives. And I must underline that the excellent relationship we have with the KFOR Commander, Lt. General Sir Mike Jackson, and his team, is key to the success of this mission. By 21 September, KFOR had demilitarised the region and all the former combatants had complied with the deadline for handing in weapons.

The measure of the mission’s success, however, will not come from whether those objectives were achieved in the shorter term, but whether the democratic values and structures this mission is attempting to define for this region leave an indelible legacy.

The situation in Kosovo today is not satisfactory. How could it be? The mission and KFOR are going through an extremely sensitive and dangerous period, which is to be expected following the end of conflict. There continue to be security concerns for the minorities, particularly the Serbs; the population is still without adequate infrastructure; and the region remains economically impoverished. And after years of oppression and numerous massacres and atrocities, the situation cannot be expected to be much better here, nor can the mentality of the people be changed overnight.

Our job is not impossible. But it takes time. UNMIK is a unique operation set up by the United Nations Security Council to prepare Kosovo for elections — scheduled for next spring — and then self-government. To reach that target, UNMIK is acting as a transitional administration for the region, which means it performs, and coordinates with the people of Kosovo, all the basic administrative functions such as policing, banking, customs, health service, education, and post and telecommunications.

In this way, and by working with the people of Kosovo, UNMIK is overseeing the development of democratic self-governing institutions, as well as economic reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. To meet these objectives, UNMIK is working with other international organisations, as full partners under UN leadership, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU).

Key tasks ahead

We have substantial key tasks ahead of us, among them facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo’s future.

The Head of UNMIK is the most senior international civilian official in Kosovo. The authority of my position comes from the UN Security Council, which established UNMIK on 10 June 1999 under resolution 1244, and which also authorised KFOR to enter Kosovo. Ultimately, our job is to provide this region with a vision. UNMIK is trying to do that through its “four pillars”: four international organisations and agencies working together in an unprecedented structure under the umbrella of the UN. They implement, together with the Kosovo people, the civilian aspects of rehabilitating and reforming the region.
Recently recruited police cadets from both the Kosovar Albanian and Serb communities, with manuals in hand, assemble for the first day of training in Vucitern, Kosovo, on 7 September. (AP photo)

Dr. Kouchner and KFOR Commander Lt. General Sir Mike Jackson give a joint press conference in Pristina on the situation in Kosovo on 25 July. (Reuters photo)

These four pillars are: civil administration, under the United Nations itself; humanitarian assistance, led by the UNHCR; democratisation and institution-building, under the OSCE; and economic development, managed by the EU. At the same time, UNMIK works closely with KFOR in coordinating their joint efforts. I meet daily with KFOR Commander General Jackson.

Working with the people of Kosovo

Significant gains have been made in the past 11 weeks in all these areas, and we have set up structures to include the Kosovo people, not only to provide expertise but also to share responsibility and accountability for the development and future of the region. Leading this is the Kosovo Transitional Council, established on 16 July, which meets weekly in Pristina. This council is the highest political consultative body under UNMIK. It gives the main political parties and ethnic groups — including the Kosovo Democratic League, the Kosovo Liberation Army, members of the Serb, Bosniac and Turkish communities, independents and other Kosovo representatives — an opportunity to have direct input into UNMIK’s decision-making process. It is also a forum for achieving consensus on a broad range of issues related to civil administration, institution-building and essential services. The fact that this multi-ethnic council was established within weeks of the end of the conflict in Kosovo can be regarded as a significant achievement.

Policing Kosovo

UNMIK is deploying 3,150 armed UN civilian police in the region from dozens of countries. The two main goals of the UN International Police (UNIP) are to provide temporary law enforcement, and to develop a professional and impartial Kosovo Police Service (KPS), trained in democratic police work.

As of 1 September, there were 866 international police in Kosovo, of which 713 had been deployed. Of these, there were 360 in Pristina, 38 in Mitrovica, 25 in Pec, 31 in Prizren, and 25 in Gnjilane. More than 150 were undergoing induction training. UNIP has deployed 84 border police and a further 26 are used for KPS training. The first permanent police station has opened in Pristina and sub-stations have been set up in parts of the capital designated as “high-risk” areas. UNIP officers have begun joint patrols with KFOR and UNIP is taking over KFOR’s detention duties.
UN: Civil Administration

Already, the Civil Administration has, among its achievements, provided stipends for thousands of public employees — including judges, prosecutors, health workers and custom officials; opened border control points on the Albanian and Macedonian borders, including customs offices; established a legal Advisory Council to review existing legislation and draft new laws which would eliminate discrimination; set up a trust fund for small-scale “quick impact projects” that will help Kosovo’s people return to normal life; assisted in the return to work of Serb railway workers; started radio broadcasts from Radio-Television Pristina; reopened the main Post and Telecommunications office and five sub-offices in Pristina; and, set up a garbage collection and disposal system in Pristina. International civil administrators and staff are working throughout the five regions of the territory — Pristina, Pec, Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Prizren — which cover 29 municipalities.

UNHCR: Coordinated humanitarian assistance

The UNHCR, responsible for the second pillar of UNMIK, is coordinating the work of the humanitarian community, ensuring that Kosovo’s people will have adequate shelter, food, clean water and medical assistance. A priority of UNHCR is to drive the preparations for winter. The lead humanitarian agency has helped deliver tents, mattresses, blankets, soap, kitchen sets, jerry cans and stoves to the people of Kosovo, and as part of its “winterisation programme” it is providing tools and materials to residents of damaged homes, so that families have at least one weatherproof room for shelter this winter. Also, UNMIK is planning a special “cash for housing” scheme in which it will provide money to individuals ready to do their own immediate housing repairs.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has completed an assessment of 718 schools, and found 446 have been damaged, of which 113 have been completely destroyed and 147 have been severely damaged. But from 1 September, 383 schools reopened throughout Kosovo, with more than 100,000 students attending classes. Working with implementing partners, UNICEF is also rehabilitating school buildings and has already supplied many schools with several thousand notebooks, pencils, chairs and desks. The World Health Organisation (WHO), along with UNICEF and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), has distributed drug kits for distribution throughout the territory, and WHO has been a crucial player in the reintegration of the Pristina hospital.

OSCE: Democracy and institution-building

Under the third pillar of UNMIK, the OSCE has set up a police school to train members of the new Kosovo Police Service. It is also monitoring human rights, organising the judiciary system and media development, and training local administrators. Because security has been an urgent concern, the setting up of UN International Police and establishing the KPS have been priorities. Candidates for the KPS have been recruited from Kosovo’s different ethnic communities. The new OSCE-run KPS School at Vucitrn opened on 21 August and the first multi-ethnic intake of 200 male and female trainees began basic training in early September. OSCE is also deploying human rights officers to monitor the human rights situation throughout Kosovo. They have unhindered access to all areas to investigate human rights abuses.
EU: Developing the economy

The fourth pillar of UNMIK, run by the EU, is working on creating a modern, well-functioning market economy. This includes constructing and operating a budget that allows for basic public functions to be performed; instituting a payments system; dealing with issues such as the use of multiple currencies and exchange rates; creating an appropriate regulatory environment for the banking system; kick-starting industry with grants and credits; ensuring that charges are collected for public utilities; and, setting up regulators in sectors such as telecommunications to grant licences.

The fourth pillar is also addressing immediate needs for shelter, power and water supplies during the coming winter and coordinating the efforts of donors in these areas. It is progressively taking over from the humanitarian pillar, particularly in reconstruction of damaged housing, and from KFOR in public utilities, notably power and water. A major donor is the European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, which has established a “Task Force in Kosovo”, with a budget of $150 million in 1999, of which the first tranche of $48 million has already been allocated to the most urgent projects. A detailed damage assessment, including a study of infrastructure problems in various sectors, will be the basis for a medium-term development programme. This will be presented at a donors’ conference in October.

Rebuilding lives and restoring hope

Substantial progress has been made on the civilian side, and KFOR is making commendable efforts under extremely problematic conditions to provide a safe security environment. In fact, the number of cases of harassment, beatings, murders and other crimes has diminished in the past month. Those crimes were occurring at a much higher rate in the first few weeks of the mission’s deployment, when the region was swamped by an enormous return of refugees and displaced persons, many bent on revenge. However, crimes still occur and they cannot be controlled until we have an effective policing system. For that we require ongoing international involvement in both support and training.

Kosovo’s security and prosperity, however, will depend not only on the success of KFOR and policing efforts. It will also depend on ensuring that the workforce has jobs; that the young return to school and university; that people have the means by which to grow and develop; and that they have reason to hope. It will be a slow process, and it will emerge only after the heavy cloud of intolerance darkening this region finally clears.
KFOR entered Kosovo from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1) on 12 June (“D-Day”), with a force of 20,000 troops split up into six brigades led by France, Germany, Italy, the US and two from the UK. Within six days all lead elements had entered Kosovo in an operation that demanded considerable skill and professionalism from the staffs and soldiers of HQ KFOR and the multinational brigades.

Serious challenges faced KFOR upon arrival in Kosovo. Yugoslav military forces were still present in large numbers. The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), too, were armed and highly visible. Fighting was still going on. Nearly a million people were refugees outside Kosovo. Those who remained lived in daily fear for their lives. There was little electricity or water. Homes were destroyed, roads were mined, bridges down, schools and hospitals out of action. Radio and TV was off the air. Ordinary life in Kosovo was suspended.

The immediate priority was to ensure that no security vacuum should be allowed to develop between the outgoing and incoming forces that could have been filled by the UCK or any other armed group. In 11 days, the operation achieved the stated aim: the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and their replacement by KFOR as the only legitimate military force under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. All this took place in a volatile and fast-moving environment, where the eyes of the world’s media were watching and recording every move.

Events leading up to D-Day

It is worth reflecting briefly on the events leading up to D-Day that suddenly turned an apparent strategic impasse into tactical military action on the ground. A breakthrough had seemed increasingly unachievable.

(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
throughout the early spring and we had seriously begun to consider the possibility of winter operations.

Fortunately, during the last weeks in May — as NATO’s air campaign continued and nations built up KFOR force levels in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, the European Union’s envoy, and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin persisted with their shuttle diplomacy between Moscow, Helsinki and Belgrade. The terms of a peace deal developed by the G8(2) were presented to President Slobodan Milosevic on 2 June, and ratified by the Serbian parliament and the Federal Yugoslav Government the following day.

For KFOR, this was quickly followed by days of intense discussions with representatives of the Yugoslav Armed Forces (VJ) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) at Blace and Kumanovo on the border between Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The outcome on 9 June was a Military Technical Agreement (MTA) that set out in detail what was to be in effect a “relief in place” between the withdrawing Yugoslav forces and the advancing KFOR troops.

One day later, on 10 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 which formalised the mission for the International Security Presence, provided by the NATO-led KFOR, and the International Civilian Presence known as UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo).

Synchronising deployment with Serb withdrawal

The MTA called for a phased withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from three pre-determined zones out of Kosovo through four designated gates into Serbia proper (see map, p.18). This was to happen within 11 days and was to be fully synchronised with the advancing KFOR troops. Following a Yugoslav request for a 24-hour delay in the KFOR advance, the VJ was given two days for preparatory work and the withdrawal of logistics troops before KFOR moved in at 5 a.m. on 12 June.

The French Framework Brigade (FFB), crossed the border on D-Day just north of Kumanovo. Their task was to occupy the eastern area of Zone 1 around Gnjilane until relieved by the US Brigade, then move north to Kosovska Mitrovica and expand into what is now known as Multinational Brigade (MNB) North. The brigade now includes troops from Belgium, Denmark, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The German 12th Panzer Brigade, with a Dutch Artillery battery already under command, used two axes of advance. One was up Route FOX north into Kosovo, heading for what was to be their final headquarters location in Prizren. The other axis took one battalion through Albania in a wide south-westerly sweep to enter Kosovo through the Morina crossing-point, that had previously achieved notoriety as one of the main exit points for the expelled Kosovar Albanian refugees. The brigade is now known as MNB (South), based on a brigade headquarters provided by Germany and comprises troops from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey and Russia.

The UK’s 4th Armoured Brigade had been joined just before D-Day by the UK’s 5th Airborne Brigade, which provided much needed additional forces to KFOR. On D-Day, the 5th Airborne — with one parachute battalion and a Gurkha battalion — deployed by helicopter to secure the strategically vital Kacanik defile on Route HAWK. Elements of this brigade, including the headquarters, subsequently moved on to Pristina airfield. This allowed the 4th Armoured Brigade to deploy forward to the northernmost point of Zone 1 and secure the provincial capital of Pristina. The UK continues to provide the framework for what is now MNB(Central). With its headquarters in Pristina, it includes troops from Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Once the UK and German Brigades were firm, the Italian Garibaldi Brigade moved through the Kacanik defile on its way into the devastated area of western Kosovo. The brigade now forms the core of MNB (West) with forces from Italy, Spain and Portugal. The headquarters is established in Pec and is responsible for the mountainous border with Albania and Montenegro.

The US Brigade based on Task Force Falcon (TFF) moved into eastern Kosovo on the second day of the operation, to begin to relieve the FFB who moved north into Zone III. The US now forms the core of

(*) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

(2) The Group of 7 industrialised nations plus Russia.
MNB (East) that comprises a US brigade headquarters in Gnjilane and forces from the US, as well as Greece, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

On 20 June at 5.25 p.m., the full withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was confirmed, over six hours ahead of schedule.

Welcome Russian participation

It is now a matter of record that the lead UK troops were met at Pristina Airfield by Russian soldiers, who had deployed overland through Serbia from Bosnia. This naturally attracted a great deal of media and political attention, but had no significant military effect on the operation.

Following the Helsinki Agreement on 18 June, a Russian air force unit assumed joint responsibility for running the Airfield alongside a NATO contingent, which has the responsibility for air movement. Both work under the KFOR Director of Kosovo Air Operations. The airfield formally opened for military traffic on 26 June and now accepts military and humanitarian aid flights.

The main body of the Russian contingent is deployed to the areas of Kosovska Kamenica with the US-led MNB (East), Srbsica with the French-led MNB
(North), and Malisevo and Orahovac with the German-led MNB (South). The Russian troops are an integral part of KFOR and we particularly welcome their participation, given the vital part that Russia played diplomatically in bringing about the end of the conflict.

**UCK’s undertaking to demilitarise**

At 10 minutes past midnight on 21 June, “K-Day” — just after the Yugoslav withdrawal was complete — at the KFOR tactical headquarters just outside Pristina, Hashim Thaci, the Commander in Chief of the UCK, signed the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation which I, as COMKFOR, received on behalf of NATO. This is a voluntary statement of the UCK’s intent to comply with the requirements of UNSCR 1244 to demilitarise, which also contains their aspirations for a future role in Kosovo, and laid out a path towards full demilitarisation which is now complete.

On 21 September the UCK ceased to exist. Some members are being assimilated back into society, as part of a resettlement programme designed to provide ex-soldiers with the skills needed for civilian employment. Others are joining recruits from all communities to form the Kosovo Protection Corps, which will play an important role in reconstruction tasks in Kosovo.

At the time of writing KFOR has been in Kosovo for 15 weeks. The intervening period has seen dramatic changes and Kosovo is a very different place to that which greeted us on 12 June. The VJ and MUP have withdrawn and KFOR is in place. The demilitarisation of UCK has been achieved in accordance with the terms of the Undertaking. But perhaps most significant of all, in the first few weeks nearly 750,000 people returned to rebuild their homes and their lives, in an overwhelming display of confidence in KFOR and the international presence in Kosovo.

KFOR’s arrival also coincided with a pretty brutal shift in the balance of power. The atmosphere was extremely volatile. KFOR’s advance was carefully synchronised with the withdrawing Yugoslav forces to avoid a military vacuum, but it was not so easy to fill the void left by the departing civil administration.

**Handing over to the UN Civil Authority**

UNSCR 1244 gave KFOR full responsibility for Kosovo until the arrival of the UN Civil Authority. While primarily concerned with providing security and law and order, it was vital that KFOR begin to rebuild the shattered infrastructure and prepare the way for a speedy return to normality. KFOR troops have cleared large areas of mines and unexploded munitions with the priority being schools, hospitals and other public facilities. Bridges and radio transmitters damaged during the conflict are being repaired. Military engineers have brought the main “Kosovo A” power station on line, and much of the railway has been reopened.

In each of the brigade areas, soldiers have been responsible for repairing ambulances and fire engines, organising refuse collection and generally restoring vital community services. With the onset of a Balkan winter in mind, much of the emphasis has been on repairing villages in the high mountains. These are not tasks ordinarily associated with classical soldiering. But, as was apparent during the Easter refugee crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, international organisations need time to get established and the military is often the only organisation capable of providing such support in the initial stages.

But the Civil Authority in the form of UNMIK is now established. It comprises four pillars:

- **Humanitarian** provided by UNHCR,
- **a UN Civil Administration**,  
- **OSCE Institution Building**, and  
- **Reconstruction** by the EU.

It has begun to take over much of the work started by KFOR, but most importantly the UNMIK police have begun to assume police responsibility for areas of Pristina. The establishment of a civilian police force is vital for any democratic society and the formation of the locally recruited Kosovo Police Service will take this one stage further.

**“Fortune favours the bold”**

The military manoeuvre phase of the operation is now over. It has not been an easy task, but one which the officers and soldiers of KFOR have performed very professionally and with great skill and perseverance. There are now over 40,000 KFOR troops deployed in Kosovo from 39 nations. They continue to provide the secure environment within which the people of Kosovo have the opportunity to build a better future.

There will undoubtedly be challenges ahead as Kosovo looks to establish itself as a truly free, open and democratic society. The onset of winter is not far away and there is much to be done. In October, I will be handing over the reins to General Klaus Reinhardt, my successor as Commander of KFOR. The next chapter in the history of Kosovo is being written. I hope it ends well. *Audentis Fortuna Iuvat.*
Reconstructing Kosovo:
On the right track — but where does it lead?

One reason to consider NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a success is the mass return home of the Kosovar Albanian refugees. No sooner had the first troops of the NATO-led international security force (KFOR) moved into Kosovo on 12 June than the refugees started flooding back. By early September, more than 95 per cent of those who had been driven from the country or displaced within Kosovo had returned to their homes — a speed of repatriation unmatched in twentieth-century Europe.

Yet NATO failed in its declared aim of preventing a humanitarian disaster — genocide and expulsion — in Kosovo. A military objective of this kind cannot be achieved by air strikes alone, but only if ground troops are also used. It is true that the withdrawal of all Yugoslav troops and the arrival of KFOR created conditions in Kosovo where the effects of genocide and persecution could be at least partially reversed. Houses, roads and bridges are being repaired, and those driven from the country have been able to return. But, the loss of human life is something that cannot be put right. The fact that thousands of Kosovar Albanian civilians were killed by Serb soldiers and paramilitaries means that the “balance sheet” of the NATO and KFOR commitment in Kosovo will always be negative.

It is also too early to say whether the deployment of international troops in Kosovo under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June will be a success. Unfortunately, like the bombing campaign, the efforts of the peacekeeping force began with a failure: KFOR could do no more to prevent the expulsion of up to 200,000 Serbs and gypsies since June, than NATO was able to do to prevent the expulsion of some 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians in the preceding months. However, the chances of Serbs and gypsies returning en masse are poor, so, sadly, this second expulsion is likely to be more permanent.
In seeking to arrive at an interim balance, we must not lose sight of the fact that the root cause of the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was the ruthless pursuit of a nationalistic apartheid policy by the Belgrade regime. The effects of that policy may have been exacerbated by Western hesitation and strategic miscalculations by the Allies during the air campaign, but the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia were primarily triggered by the repressive policy of President Slobodan Milosevic to which Kosovo was subjected for over ten years. Structurally incapable of compromise and an inevitable source of further violent conflict, this policy will not change as long as Milosevic remains in power.

### Legal uncertainties

This provides serious food for thought. Under international law, Kosovo remains a part of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia even if de facto, and probably for many years to come, the province will be under the control of KFOR and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The resulting legal uncertainty impedes the establishment of civil structures in Kosovo. The Serb domination over Kosovo has collapsed, leaving nothing behind that can be put to any good use. The situation is one of relatively orderly anarchy. Which laws are supposed to govern the country? Who applies them? Which authority carries most weight? Who will ensure public order? Who will guarantee water and electricity supplies, waste disposal and road repairs? Who is going to maintain and improve infrastructure?

Kosovar Albanians rightly rejected the discriminatory legislation of the Serb regime, and judges and courts were still unable to function three months after the war ended. UNMIK and the interim advisory council that has been set up with representatives of the different ethnic groups in Kosovo have only a temporary borrowed authority with no democratic legitimacy. Already, there are clear parallels in Kosovo with the Western commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Already, there is a danger that the same mistakes will be made.

### The civil effort is lagging behind the military

Delivering humanitarian assistance is obviously the first priority. People need some kind of roof over their heads — even in September (at the time of writing), the nights in the uplands of Kosovo are noticeably chilly, and the bitter cold winter is not far off. Food supplies are also needed, since most of the harvest was lost. KFOR is making a major contribution in this area, alongside The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and many non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Unfortunately, as in Bosnia, the civilian aspects of restoring peace to Kosovo are lagging behind the military aspects. The withdrawal of the Serb forces and the deployment of KFOR went according to plan. Even the demilitarisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was achieved on 21 September, despite a number of complications. But too little has been done to set up new civilian structures. If KFOR had not taken on some of the civilian and humanitarian duties, the present chaos would have been even worse. KFOR has had to act as a police force, arresting and incarcerating criminals, carrying out border controls, providing security for schools and public buildings and, where possible, protecting threatened minorities.

By early September, the new civil police force was only embryonic. The police officers, civil servants, judges, etc., which were promised by the international community, have been slow to materialise, if at all. Whereas a military organisation like KFOR can act and react swiftly, thanks to its command structure, civil bureaucracies take far too long to keep their promises.
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo — headed by former OSCE Ambassador to Albania Daan Everts from the Netherlands — has the task of expediting the establishment of a democratic civil society in Kosovo. The most important task is the preparation and organisation of elections due to take place in April 2000. To this end the OSCE is currently engaged in the arduous task of registering voters — a task that is further complicated by the lack of personal identification papers, which were confiscated by Serb authorities during the conflict. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is responsible for monitoring respect for human rights in Kosovo.

Working for the UN, German politician Tom Koenigs, previously municipal treasurer of Frankfurt, is responsible for setting-up civil administrative structures. His team’s immediate priority is to restore the judicial system and the municipal and regional administrations.

Responsibility for the European Union’s economic reconstruction effort in Kosovo lies with the British EU official, Joly Dixon. The main issue here is to learn from past mistakes in Bosnia, where the economy is still barely moving forward nearly four years after the end of the war. The problem there was that too much was spent on reconstructing infrastructure and not enough on supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises. In Kosovo, the international community’s financial resources should, first and foremost, be used to help kick-start the economy, for example by providing loans at favourable interest rates to enable the people themselves to become actively involved in the reconstruction effort. This point needs to be borne in mind at the donors’ conference on Kosovo and the Stability Pact due to take place at the beginning of October.

Stability in South-east Europe

The international community’s commitment in Kosovo is an integral part of the overall efforts to bring stability and prosperity to the whole of South-east Europe. To this end, a high-level steering group was set up to coordinate the reconstruction of the entire region. The steering group, jointly chaired by the EU and the World Bank, includes the finance ministers of the G7 industrialised nations, Bernard Kouchner, as head of UNMIK, and the special coordinator for the “Stability Pact for South-east Europe”, Bodo Hombach, former head of the German Federal Chancellery.

Launched by EU foreign ministers on 10 June, the Stability Pact is an attempt, ten years after the end of the Cold War, to finally end the division of the Continent and further the process of European integra-
A British KFOR officer sifts through a pile of Kosovar Albanian passports and ID cards, which had been confiscated by Serb forces and were found on 13 June. The lack of ID papers is complicating the OSCE’s task of registering voters.

Kosovo: a test case for the Stability Pact

Kosovo can be seen as a test case for the Stability Pact as a whole. Without a stable post-war order in Kosovo, there is no prospect of lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. The Stability Pact’s economic cooperation “roundtable” has therefore been assigned a working group on reconstruction in Kosovo, headed by the Belgian Marc Franco and the EU Commission’s reconstruction agency for Kosovo.

It is unclear as yet what institutional form the Stability Pact will take. The first summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July was largely symbolic, and while a final declaration in very general terms was issued, no concrete promises of aid were made. A separate donors’ conference for the Stability Pact will be held in Italy during the autumn.

Experience gained in Bosnia and the wider impetus provided by the new Stability Pact could provide an opportunity for Kosovo. From Bosnia we have learned that UNMIK must push on more resolutely with setting-up civil structures and administering Kosovo almost like a protectorate until elections are held. Its coordinating role must be combined with comprehensive powers. Another lesson from Bosnia is that independent economic activity needs to be promoted during the process of reconstruction, in particular, by providing access to loans.

But, as the Stability Pact recognises, only a comprehensive regional approach can bring lasting peace to the Balkans, and growth and democracy to Southeast Europe. Finally, as the wars in the former Yugoslavia have shown, the threat of force, or even the
Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention?

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NATO’s intervention in Kosovo aimed to reverse the Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing in the province and ensure the safe return of Kosovar Albanians. Fundamental principles of international relations — state sovereignty, non-use of force, and respect for human rights — were brought into conflict with each other, sparking off considerable public debate. The author argues that there is an urgent need for a doctrine on humanitarian intervention to be formulated, building on the emerging international norm that gives precedence to the protection of human rights over sovereignty in certain circumstances, and that NATO should take the lead on this.

During the Allied bombing campaign against strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there was a conspicuous absence of legal argumentation in defence of the NATO position from NATO itself. When a group of international law students from Stockholm University visited NATO headquarters in Brussels in April 1999, they were told that there was no consolidated NATO position, but that it was up to the governments and capitals of the participating member states to assess the international law situation and produce the justification(s) they saw fit.

From a political and legal point of view, this was not satisfactory at the time, nor is it now — when the NATO campaign has achieved its goal of establishing an international presence in Kosovo for the protection of human rights in the province. NATO as an organisation, or its members acting jointly, should — for the benefit of the international community — formulate the rationale behind this collective action, which probably will go down in history as a case of humanitarian intervention.

Any group of states that detracts from the fundamental non-use of force principle of the United Nations Charter(1), will find itself expected to explain its position legally. The question is whether NATO’s action should be looked upon as illegal, or as:

Having been forced out of Kosovo by the Serbs, Kosovar Albanian refugees in the northern Albanian border town of Kukes are transported to safety further south by NATO peacekeepers on 25 May. (AP photo)
an exceptional deviation from international law

an action based upon a new interpretation of the UN Charter in line with modern international law

an attempted shift of international law to a new position where, in humanitarian crises, the sovereignty of states has to yield to the protection of peoples.

It is in the interest of NATO (and, I submit, of the international community as a whole) that the illegality view should not prevail. In whatever way the NATO action may be explained, as deviating from the law, as conforming to the law, or as progressively developing the law, the international community has so far not received a clear answer. By producing such an answer, NATO could influence the legal situation. It has already contributed in practice, but it still needs to articulate the principle behind it. “Quiet diplomacy” is an unfortunate method in this case, since it risks giving the impression that NATO itself perceives its action as illegal, and — although it successfully fought what was termed a “just war” — is not prepared to fight the intellectual battle for a more human rights-focused international order that harbours the concept of humanitarian intervention.

An emerging international norm

Most international lawyers would agree that the current law of the UN Charter does not accommodate the bombing of Yugoslavia, since the action was neither based on a Security Council decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nor pursued in collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter — the only two justifications for use of force that are currently available under international law.

Nevertheless, many of these same lawyers would also agree that there is a trend in today’s international community towards a better balance between the security of states, on the one hand, and the security of people, on the other (as the Carlsson-Ramphal Commission on Global Governance also recommended in its report Our Global Neighbourhood in 1995).

Recent statements by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also support this view. Addressing the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on 7 April — in the early days of NATO’s bombing campaign — and referring to the “universal sense of outrage” provoked by the repression of Kosovar Albanians by Milosevic’s regime, he stated: “Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of sovereignty”, and that the UN Charter should “never [be] the source of comfort or justification” for “those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights”.

The issue of protecting human rights is growing steadily in importance. But there is a need to concretise the meaning of that protection. The main security threats in today’s world are not to be found in the relations between states, but concern threats from governments towards their own citizens. International law is slowly adapting to these developments by establishing new global and regional structures for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The enunciation of new doctrines for the use of these structures would be helpful in the progressive development of the law.

“Uniting for Peace” resolution

The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council has been questioned in its present form. During the Korean War (1950-53), the then Western majority of the United Nations did not accept that the Security Council could be blocked out of action and influence by the use of the veto by the Soviet Union, at a time when peace was being threatened or broken. The so-called “Uniting for Peace” resolution, adopted by the UN General Assembly in
November 1950, allowed a qualified majority of the Assembly to assume responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whenever the Security Council was unable or unwilling to do so.

During the Kosovo crisis — when both Russia and China threatened to veto any enabling Council resolution — NATO could have appealed to the General Assembly under the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism for approval of its armed intervention. Since the Kosovo debate did not generate any North-South division (a Russian anti-NATO proposal was rejected in the Security Council on 26 March 1999 by, among others, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia and Malaysia), a qualified majority supporting and legitimising NATO action might well have been possible.

Law is often referred to as “a process”, and international law as “a world social process” that encompasses concrete state practice, other governmental positions, group expectations, and value demands from different participants in the world community, including intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental (NGOs). The outcome of this process is influenced by the authority and persuasive arguments of the participants. Upcoming sessions of the UN General Assembly and other international fora will provide states with the opportunity to either accept or reject attempts to legitimise or criticise the Kosovo intervention. In the interest of the progressive development of international law, NATO and/or its member states should take part in this process by enunciating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention, in an objective attempt to make sense of the past for the benefit of the future.

A precedent for intervention

NATO officials may so far have been reluctant to consider NATO as a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, out of concern that such a categorisation would imply additional obligations in the UN context. This concern is unfounded. Chapter VIII codifies the legitimacy and usefulness of regional security organisations and arrangements, but imposes no obligations other than those that already lie upon states under the UN Charter (inter alia, under Chapter VII). NATO, as an organisation for collective self-defence, should accept itself as a regional security organisation in the collective security sense of Chapter VIII, which could be used as a platform to define its Kosovo action as a case of humanitarian intervention.

In this way, though not authorised by the Security Council as required by Article 53 of Chapter VIII, the Kosovo action could be described as a precedent for collective (not unilateral) humanitarian intervention conducted by a regional organisation after a process of collective decision-making. This precedent could also be characterised as one of non-passivity in humanitarian crises — a reflection of the need for international law to be related to international morality. A population in immediate danger of genocide should not be left alone to face its fate.

The General Assembly “Friendly Relations Declaration” (1970) reaffirmed “a duty to cooperate” as part of the Charter system. A modern interpretation of this principle should oblige states to do their utmost — including armed action, as a last resort — to avert a humanitarian crisis. A “duty” to intervene with armed force in such crises (“un devoir d’ingérence”, as French Foreign Minister Dumas argued in relation to the Iraqi Kurds in 1991) is hardly conceivable. But a “duty to act”, even in situations when the Security Council is veto-blocked, should make itself felt in the international community. An option for regional organisations to intervene when there is the political will and
military capacity to do so, should be part of modern international law. Whenever necessary, the “Uniting for Peace” precedent should be used to put the matter before the General Assembly to mobilise UN approval outside the Security Council framework.

### Setting strict conditions for intervention

As a number of legal scholars\(^5\) have made clear, strict conditions for any forcible intervention in the absence of Security Council authorisation need to be set out in an emerging doctrine on the subject. The following requirements should be included:

- it has to be a case of gross human rights violations amounting to crimes against humanity;
- all available peaceful settlement procedures must have been exhausted;
- the Security Council must be unable or unwilling to stop the crimes against humanity;
- the government of the state where the atrocities take place must be unable or unwilling to rectify the situation;
- the decision to take military action could be made by a regional organisation covered by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, using the “Uniting for Peace” precedent to seek approval by the General Assembly as soon as possible; or the decision could be taken directly by a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly in accordance with the “Uniting for Peace” procedure;
- the use of force must be proportional to the humanitarian issue at hand and in accordance with international humanitarian law of armed conflict;
- the purpose of the humanitarian intervention must be strictly limited to ending the atrocities and building a new order of security for people in the country in question.

### NATO members should take the lead

There is a ground-swell of opinion in the international community in favour of intervention in cases of gross and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such acts cannot go unchallenged 50 years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

The formulation of a doctrine on humanitarian intervention would be the desirable legal outcome of the Kosovo crisis and would represent a huge step forward in the international order. NATO countries should take the lead in this worthy endeavour by setting out the issues involved and bringing them to the appropriate international fora.

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The need to set up a NATO Defense College was identified by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in a cable sent back to Washington in April 1951:

“...[T]here is a high priority requirement to develop individuals, both on the military and civilian side...who are capable of adapting themselves to this new environment and who find it possible in a reasonably short time to broaden their outlook and to grasp the essentials of this challenging problem sufficiently to shoulder the responsibilities inherent in this new field.... These considerations have brought me to the conclusion that it is highly desirable to establish...a NATO Defense College for the training of individuals who will be needed to serve in key capacities in NATO Organisations.”

The NATO Defense College was founded later that year. The vision and noble sentiments are as relevant now as they were nearly 50 years ago. In those days, the Alliance was in its infancy, facing the challenges of the revolution in geopolitics that emerged with the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. Today, NATO is adapting to the risks and opportunities of an international security environment that has been in a state of flux since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Every year, some 500 representatives from NATO member states and countries participating in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue come together at the College to attend an increasingly wide range of courses. Key Alliance and geo-strategic issues are analysed with the help of top political, military and civilian leaders, as well as outstanding international academics. Many of the key players in the Alliance today, both military and civilian, are graduates of the College. Future leaders pass through our doors every year.

The new College is larger and, with its multipurpose conference facilities and up-to-date technology, better equipped. Not only have facilities been improved, but a recent review of the curriculum led to the definition of a new mission for the College by NATO’s Military Committee:

“To contribute to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance by developing and conducting:

- strategic-level courses on politico-military issues, designed to better prepare selected officers and officials for important NATO or NATO-related appointments;
- other programmes in support of NATO initiatives and interests.”

In pursuit of understanding and cooperation

The success of our courses is widely recognised. Each provides a platform for information exchange and consensus-building, and promotes better understand-
ing and cooperation between NATO and our PfP and Mediterranean partners. The team spirit generated during the courses in turn evolves into a useful network of contacts between NATO and Partner participants. This esprit de corps, especially within the various committees, breaks down pre-existing barriers and strengthens trust between nations. In the words of a senior Russian officer who participated in one of the College’s courses earlier this year: “If more military and civilian leaders attended the NATO Defense College, the world would be a much safer place.”

The core activity of the College’s overall programme is the strategic-level Senior Course for Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, which lasts five and a half months and is run biannually. Up to 10 PfP participants are invited per course. The course covers key developments in international politics generally and NATO/PfP politico-military issues. A two-week Integrated PfP/OSCE Course is built into this course, which then encompasses roughly 35 nations.

The College’s flagship course is the two-week General and Flag Officers’ (GFO) Course, which is also run twice a year and aims to improve understanding of current Alliance politico-military issues among nationally selected NATO GFOs. One of the GFO courses is also open to PfP and Mediterranean partners. The College also runs a NATO Reserve Officers Course and International Research Seminars — the latter are co-sponsored by either a PfP or Mediterranean Institute. Twice a year, an Academic Fellowship is offered to PfP participants in the field of security studies. Next year, Mediterranean participants will be offered the same opportunity.

Finally, the annual Conference of Commandants brings together the heads of senior training establishments throughout NATO and many of its Partner countries. This conference has enormous potential as a forum for discussion, the exchange of information and establishment of best practice, which we will try to exploit to the full in future years.

Adapting to the new security environment

The success of the NDC educational programme is the product of continual adaptation and scrutiny of the new strategic environment. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has witnessed the growth of large multinational units, the opening and enlargement of our Alliance, and the setting up of ad hoc coalitions when necessary. Operations are increasingly multinational and joint. At the same time, new missions have appeared such as conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-support operations. Finally, international organisations, including non-governmental organisations, have a more important and diversified role to play in NATO’s present and potential activities.

As a consequence, military education has had to adapt itself to meet the need for

- Senior officers and officials to understand, and correctly interpret new politico-military events;
- A high level, multinational education;
- Commonality of approach through learning;
- Analysis and reasoning.

The operational framework has changed too, shifting from a unidirectional to a multidirectional risk strategy, which involves a far broader definition of security and the respective roles of politicians and the military.

To accommodate these requirements, the curricula are built around the following five points: consensus-building, information-processing, developing the concept of common values and interests, broadening outlooks, and language proficiency.

The advent of the information age, with the increased role of technology and the growth of global networking, is also revolutionising higher defence and security education, which is set to undergo permanent and ongoing change. This calls for closer cooperation between institutes in this field to prepare tomorrow’s military and civilian élite. Our Conference of Commandants provides an excellent forum for such linkage.

Reflecting the new Strategic Concept

The focus of the College in the coming years will be determined by two interrelated “drivers”. The first is the updated Strategic Concept, which provides the five fundamental security tasks around which the
College must centre its teaching, discussions and exercises: security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management, partnership. Courses aim to give participants a broad perspective and a particular emphasis is placed on crisis management, including a major three-day negotiation, mediation and decision-making exercise. The latest proposals for establishing a new security and defence role for Europe, underpinned by the transatlantic link, are also treated in depth.

The ramifications of the updated Strategic Concept will be integrated into our courses, which broadly speaking cover:

- The Alliance’s shared values and interests, current and prospective missions, politico-military concept, policies, organisation and working methods;
- The potential risks to the security of the Alliance and its members;
- The political, security, defence and socio-economic systems and the interests of Alliance members and Partners; their capabilities, limitations and prospects in international relations, particularly in the fields of defence and security, and their cultural diversity;
- The role and interaction of other key Euro-Atlantic security-related international organisations;
- NATO’s defence planning and resource management;
- Academic research and expert evaluation and discussions on security issues.

Boosting cooperation with Partners

The second “driver” of our activities in coming years will be the need to further develop our outreach capability. Indeed, the NATO Defense College has become an essential pillar of the new, open NATO, as is reflected in the PIP Training and Education Enhancement Programme(1) and the enhanced Mediterranean Programme, which were endorsed at the Washington Summit.

This autumn, we welcome Czech, Hungarian, and Polish participants as regular NATO members, some of whom previously participated as Partners in the Senior Course. Soon, our team will be augmented by our first Faculty Advisers from Poland and Hungary, who will lead committee work, study periods, and short courses. These developments should allow us to invite increased participation from Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The College seeks to promote the total integration of NATO participants with Partner and Mediterranean participants, reinforced by improving communication through English and French language-training.

We intend to engage the best possible international speakers to stimulate our strategic dialogue. Many valuable lessons can be learnt from high-level exchanges of views on common security issues and different practices, and our aim is to ensure that the Conference of Commandants becomes one of the key platforms for constructive debate within NATO and Partner countries.

Practical priorities

On a more practical level, the College will concentrate its efforts on fully developing the new premises in order to offer a wider scope of activities, especially for participants from Partner countries, and to respond rapidly to new educational requirements.

The College will also prioritise the complete development of its research and information/technology branches. In particular, it will capitalise on its new research capability by publishing, where appropriate, material stemming from the International Research Seminars, Fellowship Programmes and course activities. In addition, the information/technology branch will provide the impetus to improving a whole range of communication and automation equipment for the new premises, including an improved web site. As a result, the internal systems for participants and staff will be upgraded, as will our service to NATO HQ, its subordinate HQs, and the many national institutions which work with the College. Both in research and IT, we will seek to boost cooperation with other colleges and strategic institutes.

Serving the new NATO

Serving the Alliance at the NATO Defense College has always been a challenge, but a rewarding one. As I have outlined above, the challenge is greater still today. First, we need to ensure that NATO’s senior staff, both military and civilian, have a strategic and intellectual understanding of the fundamental security tasks set out in the new Strategic Concept.

Secondly, the College will play a key role in addressing the growing need for greater cooperation and integration with new Partners. This need was highlighted recently in a letter sent to me by the Ukrainian Ambassador to NATO:

“The Kosovo crisis underscores the importance of the efforts of the NATO Defense College in promoting better understanding and cooperation among NATO member states and EAPC partner countries.”

The new NATO Defense College will continue to strive for excellence in pursuit of its central mission of contributing to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance and its Partners, as “Your College”, in the twenty-first century.
PfP Training Centres: Improving training and education in Partnership for Peace

Burak Akçapar
of NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division

Deepening cooperation within Partnership for Peace (PfP) to encompass more operational elements is increasing the demand for qualified human resources. At the same time, according to Dr. Akçapar, we must face the challenges posed by multinationality at lower levels of command and force structures and the requirements for greater interoperability between Partner and NATO forces. For these reasons, Allied leaders launched the Training and Education Enhancement Programme at the Washington Summit last April — a structured approach to improving and harmonising NATO and Partner training and education activities, particularly through the establishment of PfP Training Centres.

The Concept for PfP Training Centres

Both Allies and Partners need to concentrate energy and resources, while collecting and sharing lessons learned, and establishing best practice. The TEEP highlighted that one way of achieving this is through setting up PfP Training Centres to offer high-quality training and education activities to all Allies and Partners.

A promising start has been made already through the Concept for PfP Training Centres, which was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 16 November 1998. It set the ground rules for associating national institutions with the NATO-PfP framework, introducing a uniquely collaborative approach to the essential investment in human resources needed to support the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership launched at the Washington Summit. Through this Concept, Allies and Partners took a significant step towards fostering a greater role for national training facilities within the Partnership.

The Concept underlines the growing importance of education and training in enhanced PfP, and underscores the potential role that the PfP Training Centres...
can play in the common endeavour to improve training and education, promote regional cooperation and contribute to interoperability.

Any national training facility seeking to be designated as a “PfP Training Centre” needs to satisfy the basic principles set out in the Concept. Each application is forwarded by the host country and subjected to careful screening by a NATO Team — made up of members of the International Staff, the International Military Staff and Major NATO Commands — before official recognition is granted by a Council decision.

To date, six high quality national training establishments have been designated PfP Training Centres by the Council, several of them with a well-established track record and international reputation. These centres are already demonstrating what the designation “PfP Training Centre” stands for: quality, transparency and collaboration. Indeed, one of the main reasons for a training establishment to apply for the official PfP designation is to be recognised as being part of a family of prestigious training establishments.

**Designated PfP Training Centres**

The foundation for the emerging network of PfP Training Centres was laid at the inauguration of the centre in Ankara in 1998. This centre provides quality training and education support to Partner nations and assists Partners in reaching the interoperability levels required for participation in NATO-led PfP operations and exercises. It offers operational and strategic level courses, while also coordinating and steering the tactical-technical level courses of other Turkish military schools. The centre offers the full benefits of training in an Allied country, covering nearly the entire range of Interoperability Objectives established by NATO for Partner armed forces.

The PfP Training Centres already designated in Partner countries are described below:

**Yavoriv Training Centre, Ukraine:** This was the first Partner facility to be recognised as a PfP Training Centre, and has a long track record of PfP and similar exercises.

**Almnas PfP Training Centre, Sweden:** With excellent facilities and accommodation for 80 participants, this centre aims to enhance PfP cooperation generally, as well as more specifically promoting PfP cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Activities include simulations, PfP planning, pre-mission and PfP exercise training, staff officers courses and language training, and other courses and seminars. An outdoor training area offers possibilities for unit training and smaller field exercises. The Swedish Centre participated in the PfP Simulation Network demonstration conducted on the margins of the Washington Summit.

**Bucharest PfP Training Centre, Romania:**

Established in 1997 to conduct joint training activities and promote a better understanding of common NATO/PfP related issues, this centre offers “army brigade”, “joint service”, “peace support operations” and other courses in English. Training activities are conducted with guidance from an Allied nation in accordance with NATO standards, offering a good example of bilateral cooperation between Allies and Partners in establishing high-quality national training facilities.

**Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland:**

This international foundation with NATO/PfP members was created within the framework of Swiss participation in PfP. Its core missions are training, research and conferences for diplomats, military officers and civil servants from the foreign and defence ministries of NATO/PfP countries. It also promotes cooperative networking with all NATO/PfP countries, institutions and experts working in international security policy.

It runs a nine-month International Training Course (ITC) and a three-month course on European Security Policy, which include classes in the fields of international security policy, preventive diplomacy and arms control. The GCSP also contributes to the Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Policy Institutes in PfP member countries in collaboration with the US-German Marshall Center and the NATO Defense College(3) in Rome.

**Austrian International Peace Support Command:** Successor to the former Austrian Training Centre for Peacekeeping, with extensive experience in peacekeeping and well-established facilities, this centre specialises in training civil and military personnel and units for peace-support operations.

**Pioneering the way**

Less than a year into its implementation, thanks to the Concept for PfP Training Centres, there is already a network of institutions pioneering the way for the emergence of a larger and wider family. These centres familiarise participants with NATO’s command, staff, operational and logistic procedures, and the procedures required in multinational and joint operations. This supports the development of interoperability between NATO and Partner forces for NATO-led PfP operations, and helps enhance the operational character of PfP. The centres also offer significant potential for cutting costs by conducting training and education locally.

A great start has been made on the work to develop the Training and Education Enhancement Programme mandated by the Washington Summit and to raise the level of highly qualified human resources essential for the increasingly operational Partnership.
Only a decade ago, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were ideologically driven by Marxist theory, dominated strategically by Moscow, and their armies part of the Warsaw Pact. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989-90, these independent states immediately made clear their wish to “return to Europe” and their aspirations to join both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. The first half of this wish was realised when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland took their places on the North Atlantic Council as full members of NATO on 12 March 1999.

Enlargement for the wrong reasons?

Some have argued that their successful accession came about for the wrong reasons: that the move to enlarge NATO was motivated by either Western feelings of charity, or a perceived need to exploit a temporary window of opportunity; and that the three were chosen subjectively, thanks to US diplomatic pressure, in spite of their militaries being in serious need of reform and a lack of any true commitment to NATO.

In my view, these charges are without merit. Indeed, the three new members are vital to defining NATO’s new role on the Continent and, in particular, they have a unique contribution to make in improving Alliance relations with other non-member countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Reforming the military

Soon after the political tidal wave of 1989-1990, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland all took drastic steps to change the nature of their armed forces, starting with the renunciation of aggressive strategies and radical reductions in force levels. Subsequent moves included an increased commitment to having officers learn NATO’s official languages (English and French) and to formulating new missions for their forces. At the same time, attempts were made to gradually move away from absolute reliance on Soviet-era equipment. In this respect, greater emphasis was laid on achieving compatibility with NATO in communications and airspace management, among other areas.

The Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative played a key role in this process, enabling the forces of these countries to practise operational procedures alongside NATO and other Partner states. As a result, all three countries were able to make significant contributions to the implementation of the Dayton Accords which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the contingents they each sent to...
IFOR/SFOR and, in the case of Hungary, through its ongoing provision of staging areas and transit rights for units deploying into and out of the former Yugoslavia.

Each country has been more or less successful in creating the framework for and gradual implementation of democratic, civilian control of the military. Nevertheless, we should remain realistic and recognise that serious challenges do remain regarding military reform generally. The more obvious of these constraints is financial. The defence budgets of these three countries currently stand at around two per cent of GDP. Current budget levels are insufficient to equip forces with military assets that are in good working order, interoperable with NATO and preferably Western. It is also proving difficult to attract potentially good officers into the ranks, as well as build up a qualified cadre of civilians with the skills needed in the uncertain security environment at the end of the 1990s.

Some of the criticism levelled at these states may have been justified as regards their military reform efforts. But it is easy to underestimate the magnitude of the unprecedented set of tasks facing former Communist countries wishing to join NATO. Not only are they having to manage the transition towards a market economy — remember, even some Western states are still struggling to balance free market principles with the requirements of the modern welfare state — they are also having to anchor their return to Europe by firmly re-establishing democratic principles. It would be foolish to expect advances in the field of defence reform to outstrip progress made in the areas of general democratic and economic reform. A credible and confident defence community cannot be created and maintained in a vacuum, isolated from the society which nurtures it.

Whatever criticisms may be made as to the extent of the modernisation and reform of their armed forces, one thing is clear: the break has been made with Communist ideology and aggressive military strategy, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are unquestionably headed in the right direction. It may be true that the Warsaw Pact fostered a mentality among its officers that is not particularly conducive to interoperability with Western forces, and that all three countries still rely heavily upon Soviet-era military hardware. But, at a very early stage, their governments made a political commitment to moving closer to the Alliance and promoted the learning of NATO’s official languages and the adoption of NATO standards and concepts.

**Contributing to the Alliance**

There are several ways to assess the three new members’ military contributions to the Alliance. These countries have at their disposal in peacetime a total of nearly 350,000 active armed personnel. Even before acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty, both the Czech Republic and Hungary were practically ready to deploy up to a brigade-sized unit each for exclusively NATO-led, non-Article 5(2), peace missions. Poland will be able to contribute two to three times as many troops. The fact that only ten years ago these same forces were pledged to destroy the North Atlantic Alliance and defeat the liberal democracies of the West makes the military contributions of the three new members to the Alliance today all the more significant.

**Training and peacekeeping experience**

All three countries inherited large training facilities from the Cold War period, which have already won great favour with NATO troops. This is an important asset, given the tighter political and environmental constraints some Allies are facing in using their domestic facilities. Two of the three countries — Hungary and Poland — also have their own peacekeeping training facilities, dedicated to creating a cadre of men versed in the special requirements of “Operations Other Than War”, something not all Alliance states can boast.

Hungary also gained valuable experience hosting IFOR and SFOR troops prior to their deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The recent Kosovo crisis...
clearly demonstrated that a considerable part of NATO’s future work will probably involve operations like SFOR and the Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR), which call for stable staging areas close to the region concerned, as well as personnel trained to manage such logistically challenging operations as peace-keeping and humanitarian support.

**Military-industrial capacity**

Another significant military asset these states bring to the Alliance is their indigenous military-industrial capacity. Poland has a substantial military-industrial complex with which it can supply itself and other states in several areas, helicopters being one of its strengths. The Czech Republic also has a strong reputation for quality military products, including training aircraft, munitions and small arms.

Hungary may be the weakest in this field but its potential should not be ignored. In the last few years, groups of dedicated designers and engineers have developed new defence-oriented products such as small arms, various innovative ordnance items, and even a Fast Attack Vehicle (the Szocske) — a type of vehicle much in demand with NATO special forces. These achievements are all the more impressive given the size of the country, the constraints of the post-Cold War period and the perennial drive for peace dividends.

Beyond purely domestic capabilities, there are also favourable developments in regional cooperation among the three. The best example to date is the joint Czech-Hungarian endeavour to field a new Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), a venture which is completely in line with modern tactical trends in Western Europe and North America.

**Pioneering the way towards integration**

The area in which the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland may have the most to offer concerns the need to promote stability in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. The vast majority of former Communist countries are united by the common goal of eventual NATO and European Union membership: the prime mover behind their gradual progress towards market democracy and more stable relations with neighbouring states. This puts the three new members in a rather unique position. They are pioneering the way towards integration with Europe. On the security side of matters, they have achieved their long-awaited goal. Economically and politically, they have achieved recognition as stable countries, satisfying the requirements of “market democracy”, and attracting considerable foreign investment, leading them to be invited to begin accession negotiations with the EU.

But they, too, had to start practically from scratch after several decades of Communist rule. It is this shared past with other states in the region that leaves the new members best placed to assist prospective members to move towards closer integration with the Alliance, since they have first-hand insight into the necessary reform process.

So, it is clear that the new members can contribute significantly to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region in both political and military terms. As the front runners in the regional push to establish secure market economies and liberal democracies with credible defence assets, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are exceptionally well-placed to assist their neighbours in Eastern Europe and the Balkan region, who are seeking to take the same path to Europe. The new Alliance of the post-Washington Summit environment needs to recognise this fact and exploit it early on, as it works towards promoting the continental sta-