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A defining moment for NATO: The Washington Summit decisions and the Kosovo crisis

Javier Solana
Secretary General of NATO

At April’s 50th anniversary Washington Summit, Alliance leaders took a series of key decisions to better prepare NATO for the security challenges it may be confronted with in the next half-century. The fact that these issues were tackled in the midst of Europe’s most serious crisis since the Alliance’s inception attests to NATO’s willingness to act in the face of a serious threat to stability on the continent. In responding to the Kosovo crisis, the Alliance has sent a strong signal that it will defend the basic values of the Atlantic community: liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

NATO’s 50th year has already become one of the most important in the history of this Alliance.

In the last months alone, the Alliance has successfully conducted a complex and intensive air campaign in the Balkans and is now leading a multinational Implementation Force in Kosovo (KFOR), on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. These operations have been in pursuit of a single objective: to reverse the Belgrade regime’s horrific policy of ethnic cleansing and allow the displaced Kosovar Albanians to return to their homes in peace and security.

At the same time, the Alliance is continuing to advance significantly our project of adapting NATO for the 21st century.
Separately, each of these activities would be demanding enough. Together, they illustrate how challenging the Alliance’s political agenda has become, as we enter the second half-century of NATO’s existence.

It was therefore very timely that the Washington Summit took place in April. For the Summit provided Allied Heads of State and Government with the opportunity to reflect on Kosovo and on adapting the Alliance. On both issues, our leaders wholeheartedly endorsed the course of action that NATO has taken.

I believe that NATO’s efforts to bring lasting peace to Kosovo were — and continue to be — the right and just response to a policy of indefensible repression and brutality in the closing months of the 20th century. The Alliance could not stand aside and watch while the Yugoslav Government carried out its deliberate and terrible actions against the Kosovar Albanians — ethnic cleansing, mass killings, eliminating the identity of an entire people. These atrocities could not go unanswered as long as we had the power to act.

From the outset of the Kosovo crisis, no effort was spared by the international community and by NATO to reach a peaceful solution. Military operations began as a last resort, after the Belgrade regime had rejected all proposals for a political settlement. It was then that the Alliance launched its military actions — aimed solely at ending the violence and reversing the repressive policies of the Yugoslav leadership. They were never aimed at the Serbian people.

Today, with the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the deployment of KFOR, there is hope anew for the people of Kosovo. Our unity and resolve forced President Milosevic to meet the demands of the inter-
national community: to stop the violence; to withdraw
Serb forces from Kosovo; to deploy an international
security force; to return the refugees to their homes;
and to find a durable political solution for Kosovo
based on autonomy within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.

The conflict has now ended in Kosovo. Hostilities
by Serbian armed forces and police against the
Kosovar civilians have ceased, apart from a few isolat-
ed incidents. And the deployment of KFOR is in full
swing. At full strength it will amount to some 50,000
men and women. KFOR will provide security for the
internally displaced civilians in Kosovo, for the return-
ing deportees and refugees, and for the international
humanitarian agencies supporting them. It will also
uphold the rights of all the people of Kosovo, whatev-
er their ethnic origin.

The Kosovar refugees in the makeshift camps in
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia(1) are beginning to return. These people, vic-
tims of President Milosevic’s repressive policies, have
been expelled by the hundreds of thousands. The
Alliance has been helping these two countries and oth-
ers surrounding Yugoslavia to maintain their stability
— in fact, we began providing assistance as early as
last summer, when the first signs of possible destabili-
sation appeared. NATO’s humanitarian actions were
crucial in providing emergency relief to the seemingly
endless streams of refugees pouring over the borders.
And as KFOR troops deploy, they are doing everything
possible to meet the immediate needs of the thousands
of internally displaced persons in Kosovo, until civil-
ian relief agencies are in a position to take over.

We were able to conclude the air campaign suc-
cessfully because Belgrade realised the Alliance would
not yield on the conditions set by the international
community. The Washington Summit reinforced our
message to Belgrade — NATO would continue until
the job was done.

However, the Summit was not only about Kosovo.
It was also a working meeting at which new initiatives
were adopted and earlier ones completed — all with
one aim: to prepare NATO for the security challenges
ahead.

A long-term vision
for South-eastern Europe

The Summit provided an opportunity to launch
work on a set of initiatives to enhance security in
South-eastern Europe. These initiatives will comple-
ment other efforts underway in the European Union
and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). NATO has a variety of means at its
disposal to assist in this effort. We have created new
consultative arrangements between the Alliance and
the states neighbouring Yugoslavia on matters related
to South-eastern Europe. We will also build on the
existing mechanisms of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to
give substance to our promise of assistance. For exam-
ple, we will promote regional cooperation in the EAPC
and set up special NATO security cooperation pro-
grammes for the countries in the region. And we will
give our PfP activities and exercises a stronger region-
al focus.

These measures, complementing the political and
economic assistance of other institutions, are a further
demonstration that the international community is not
only concerned with the current crisis, but also with
what happens afterwards. We will strive to ensure that
the Balkans are not condemned to perpetual volatility.

Turkey recognises the
Republic of Macedonia
with its constitutional
name.
Enhancing NATO’s military capabilities

Kosovo demonstrates the need for diplomacy to be backed by credible military force. To have a decisive impact on a crisis, without inflicting undue harm on civilians or putting our own troops at unnecessary risk, requires a unified command and modern equipment. NATO has both, and the Summit has ensured that the Alliance will continue to have the right assets and capabilities to do the job.

NATO’s new command structure, optimised for the full range of Alliance missions, including crisis management — and able to incorporate contributions by our Partner nations — will make sure that the Alliance remains capable of reacting quickly and effectively to any challenge. Our new Defence Capabilities Initiative is specifically designed to address the challenge of maintaining the interoperability of Allied forces in an era of rapid technological change. This Initiative will help preserve NATO’s technological edge. The Alliance’s revised Strategic Concept — also adopted at the Washington Summit — strikes a new balance between NATO’s traditional task of collective defence and its new missions of crisis management. In this way, it will ensure that the Alliance remains an effective instrument for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Building more operational Partnerships

Kosovo is a challenge for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. All nations have a stake in maintaining security and stability in the area and all should be able to make their contribution. That is why NATO has created mechanisms — such as the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council — to draw all countries of this continent into a common approach to security. These mechanisms are demonstrating their relevance now. NATO is providing humanitarian assis-
tance to Partner countries bordering Yugoslavia to take care of the Kosovars purged by Yugoslav security forces.

The continued stability of these countries remains essential to the wider stability of Europe. The Summit has endorsed improvements to PfP to give Partners a stronger role in NATO-led crisis response operations and to make our joint cooperation more operationally effective. Similarly, the EAPC has been accorded a more operational dimension, particularly through the facilitation of humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

Enhancing dialogue and cooperation

As part of the Washington meetings, Allied leaders met with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma — the first NATO-Ukraine Summit. Even if Russia did not choose to attend the meetings, Allied leaders expressed their desire and interest in maintaining strong patterns of consultation and cooperation with Russia through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. They made clear that NATO and Russia are too important to ignore each other. NATO’s relationship with the six Mediterranean Dialogue countries was also given a boost, with new initiatives to deepen cooperation in the Mediterranean region.

Widening NATO’s zone of stability

Kosovo demonstrates that this continent still suffers from divisions that must be overcome. We remain determined to erase any remaining dividing lines, as was demonstrated by the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance. This process will continue and the door to NATO will remain open for future members. To this end, the Summit unveiled a Membership Action Plan: a series of measures that will help aspirant countries to better prepare themselves for future membership. In this way we will ensure that NATO’s enlargement process con-
continues to create incentives for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and therefore towards Europe’s long-term stability.

**Building a European Security and Defence Identity**

NATO’s future will also require a stronger role for the European Allies and a re-balancing of the vital transatlantic relationship. That is why, at the Summit, NATO’s leaders welcomed the new impetus given to efforts to strengthen the European security and defence dimension and reaffirmed the Alliance’s support for these efforts. The Summit recognised the significant progress achieved in building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin in 1996 and directed that it should be further developed. Building on the arrangements developed between NATO and WEU, the Alliance stands ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for close cooperation with the EU as that organisation assumes a greater role in security matters. The involvement of all European Allies in these developments is of particular importance for the Alliance. The new NATO command structure and the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept will provide valuable tools for the Alliance, not only for its own operations, but also to support European operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.

**Maintaining a dynamic Atlantic Community**

The Kosovo crisis demonstrates above all the need for Europe and North America to stand together. Transatlantic unity and resolve remain our most precious assets. It was through unity and resolve that we maintained our security throughout the Cold War; it is through unity and resolve that we have prevailed in the Kosovo crisis, achieving a political solution, and are now working to bring South-eastern Europe back into mainstream Europe. The overwhelming support given to us by our many Partner countries at the Washington Summit confirmed a fundamental truth: the countries of Europe and North America share not only a common heritage, but a common destiny.

Fate does not hold back its surprises until we feel ready for them. Indeed, we would have liked to commemorate the 50th anniversary of this Alliance under different circumstances. We all would have preferred only to highlight NATO’s achievements, rather than be concerned with a crisis in a region where this continent shows its darkest side. But in deciding to become engaged, to make peace and long-term stability in the Balkans our concern, we have sent a strong signal that in our Atlantic community, values have a meaning.

This was the central message of our Washington Summit — a message that will reinforce the many initiatives that this historic meeting has generated for the benefit of stability and security in Europe, a message worthy of our Atlantic community. ✦
In response to the mass expulsion of refugees from Kosovo by Yugoslav forces, NATO has forced a halt to this ethic cleansing through an air campaign against the perpetrators, provided humanitarian assistance to the victims of this tragedy, and will soon begin helping the refugees return home. NATO has worked tirelessly to support the work of the humanitarian organisations in relieving the suffering of the refugees by coordinating the airlift and storage of relief supplies, building shelters and other infrastructure, providing emergency medical care, and much more. As NATO forces start implementing the peace, the challenge will be to help over one million refugees to return home to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, and rebuild their homes and lives.

T
his year, we have witnessed the worst refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. The aggression by Serb military and police forces against Yugoslav citizens of Albanian origin in Kosovo forced more than 1.5 million Kosovars from their homes, nearly a million of whom fled or were forced out of Kosovo. This exodus resulted in untold hardship and suffering for the people of Kosovo and has had a major impact on neighbouring Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1), Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In response, the international community set in motion a major relief effort to provide assistance to the refugees and the most affected countries. This effort, led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has brought about a high level of cooperation among international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), donor nations, as well as neighbouring countries. Most significant has been the major involvement of NATO, its member states and its Partners in the overall humanitarian effort. While NATO is

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(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
not a humanitarian organisation, its considerable capabilities complement those of the relief agencies and can assist in meeting many of the basic needs of refugees.

NATO’s response to the refugee crisis has been threefold. NATO’s air operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which began on 24 March, brought a halt to the Yugoslav aggression which forced so many Kosovars to flee their homes. At the same time, NATO has provided an unprecedented level of humanitarian support to alleviate the suffering of those refugees. Now that Serb forces have finally complied with the international community’s demands to pull out of Kosovo, NATO is leading an international peace implementation force which will help the refugees to return home.

**Coordinated disaster response**

NATO support for the UNHCR-led humanitarian operation in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been coordinated through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The EADRCC began to assist UNHCR back in June 1998, as soon as it was established, well before the latest phase of the refugee crisis. After its initial mission of assisting UNHCR in moving urgently needed refugee relief supplies from Sarajevo to Tirana last year, the EADRCC continued to maintain permanent contact with UNHCR regarding the evolving crisis in and around Kosovo. In doing so, the EADRCC developed a good working relationship with its counterparts in UNHCR — in Tirana, Skopje, Brussels and, most importantly, at UNHCR headquarters in Geneva. When Yugoslav aggression against ethnic Albanians began to generate large numbers of forced expulsions and refugees, UNHCR again turned to NATO for assistance in:

- managing the airlift of relief supplies;
- easing pressure on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by transferring some refugees to NATO countries on a temporary basis;
- off-loading and providing immediate storage of aid cargoes;
- setting up refugee camp sites; and
- providing information regarding numbers and locations of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Now that Serb forces have finally left Kosovo, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is providing basic life support to IDPs and refugees, critical infrastructure repairs and demining.

**Managing the airlift**

The massive expulsions of refugees from Kosovo into Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia prompted many nations spontaneously to
fly relief supplies into those countries. Initially, none of these operations was coordinated with UNHCR. In order to allow UNHCR to develop a more comprehensive picture of what humanitarian assistance was being provided, the EADRCC proposed an arrangement whereby humanitarian aid flights into the region would be given air clearance only after they had been verified and prioritised by UNHCR. The EADRCC brought together the major players in air clearance — Eurocontrol, Regional Air Movement Coordination Control (RAMCC), SHAPE’s Refugee Support Coordination Control and NATO’s Defence Support Division — in order to develop an agreed set of procedures which is being successfully used to coordinate humanitarian and military flights.

The EADRCC also provided direct assistance to UNHCR’s newly established United Nations Air Coordination Cell (UNACC) at UNHCR headquarters in Geneva. Today, almost all of the personnel working in the UNACC are from NATO. Several nations had provided the EADRCC with a number of air operations specialists, but it soon became clear that, unless more personnel could be provided to the UNACC, there would be no UN air operations to support. Therefore, the EADRCC transferred several of its air operations specialists to the UNACC in Geneva.

**Temporary relocation**

NATO countries responded to appeals from UNHCR and the Skopje government by offering to provide temporary asylum for more than 110,000 Kosovar refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. They have provided aircraft to move more than 60,000 people to all 19 NATO member countries. Partner countries also responded by providing tempo-
French soldiers build tents at the Stankovac refugee camp on 30 April to help accommodate some 20,000 Kosovar refugees, who had flooded into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the preceding four days.

To provide temporary asylum to more than 10,000 refugees. Together, NATO and its Partner countries have provided temporary homes for more than 95 per cent of all the humanitarian evacuees to date. This has helped provide the country with a measure of security and stability, make a success of the UNHCR humanitarian evacuation programme and, most importantly, improve the humanitarian conditions in the refugee camps in that country as well as the conditions for the evacuees.

**Logistical support**

Alliance military forces have also made major contributions in support of humanitarian relief efforts in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. NATO military personnel provided direct support at the airports in Skopje and Tirana by off-loading cargo, providing temporary storage and, in many cases, trans-shipping cargo to its ultimate destinations.

In Skopje, NATO personnel provided essential support during the peak of the refugee crisis when large amounts of badly needed humanitarian aid were arriving by air. Now that the most acute phase of the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has passed, UNHCR and other international organisations are better able to assume greater responsibility for the reception and onward movement of their aid cargo. Nevertheless, NATO military personnel stand ready to provide logistical support again if required.

**Operation Allied Harbour**

In order to achieve more effective coordination of civil and military air movements in Albania, the government granted control over its airspace to NATO. NATO military forces therefore took over direct operation of the airfield at Tirana, including management of air traffic control and ground handling of all humanitarian and military flights. NATO and Alliance countries also provided specialised ground handling equipment and teams for the reception and off-loading of aid cargo. NATO teams provide additional temporary storage at the airport as well as security for aid cargo. Finally, NATO provides direct logistical support for the onward movement of vitally needed aid cargo, both by military truck convoys and by helicopter.

Even before Council approval on 15 April of *Operation Allied Harbour* — the NATO operation to support humanitarian relief efforts in Albania — the military forces of individual Alliance countries were already aiding the refugees. Moreover, while NATO forces provided support to previous humanitarian operations, this was the first NATO operation specifically developed for a humanitarian mission. Contingents from NATO and non-NATO nations are participating in this NATO-led operation, coordinating the efforts of military forces in direct support of the Albanian government and UNHCR.

**Building refugee camps**

The unprecedented influx of refugees into the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the large number of ethnic Albanians forced from their homes and stranded in “no-man’s land” overwhelmed the combined capacities of the government in Skopje, UNHCR and the (*)Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
various relief agencies in the country. In order to meet the urgent need to increase refugee shelter capacity, NATO forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were put to work on a round-the-clock basis to rapidly build a number of refugee camps. In a matter of days four major refugee centres were up and running, providing shelter to all the refugees in the country, with a fifth centre established subsequently.

These refugee centres were built by NATO at the request of UNHCR and according to its specifications, and were immediately turned over to the control of the designated NGOs, while NATO continued to provide certain essential technical support until such time that the necessary civilian support capabilities could be brought on-line. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, in publicly expressing her appreciation, cited this as the perfect example of how NATO can best support UNHCR operations.

In Albania, the challenge facing NATO’s Albanian Force (AFOR) was even greater. The refugee population was substantially larger than in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the AFOR Commander, Lt. General John Reith, also had to assume control of various ongoing efforts by individual countries’ military forces to construct the necessary shelter. Like their counterparts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, General Reith and the forces under his command have done an outstanding job in constructing 14 shelters with capacity for 68,000 refugees.

**KFOR and the safe return of refugees**

NATO personnel have clearly demonstrated the Alliance’s commitment to support the refugees in the ultimate humanitarian effort, which is their safe return to Kosovo.

NATO forces fully understand and are prepared to address the complete absence in this ravaged province of civil and economic structures and systems associated with normal life. Restoring tolerable living conditions in Kosovo calls for immediate life-saving aid for those who have been hiding in the hills and forests under appalling conditions; the establishment of law, order and civil administration; and the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure. Once there is a functioning civil administration that no longer needs NATO’s military support — even if still supported by other international and non-governmental organisations — KFOR’s civil-military (CIMIC) responsibilities will end.

Spearheading NATO’s CIMIC efforts will be a Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force (CJCMTF), working directly for the KFOR commander to support the force and the civil environment. The CJCMTF will also liaise with international and non-governmental organisations to facilitate their eventual take-over of projects and responsibilities. All NATO CIMIC operations are planned with the clear understanding that, once immediate needs have been met, civilian organisations are best suited to continue all humanitarian efforts.

I visited the region myself in April and witnessed first hand the refugee situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania. It was the plight of these refugees that strengthened the Allies’ resolve to reverse the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and enable the refugees to return to their homes in a safe and secure environment. With the end of the crisis, an enormous amount of work and reconstruction lies ahead of us today. NATO is determined once again to face this challenge and to succeed in its endeavours to bring peace and stability to South-eastern Europe.
When force is necessary: NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisis

General Wesley K. Clark
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

After months of escalating repression against the Kosovar Albanians and a string of broken agreements with the international community, NATO took a stand against the military machine of Slobodan Milosevic on 24 March 1999. NATO’s air operation sought to force Belgrade to stop its brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, while at the same time NATO forces have been providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of his onslaught. The success of the air campaign forced Milosevic to meet NATO’s demands and laid the foundation for the implementation of peace. A NATO-led international force began to deploy immediately on the heels of the Serb withdrawal, its mission to implement the peace agreement and secure the return of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees.

From the air over Kosovo, at refugee camps in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Allied military forces were confronted daily with the horrific consequences of “ethnic cleansing” — the deliberate violent expulsion of an entire people from their native land. Even from 15,000 feet above Kosovo, the evidence was all too clear: empty, destroyed villages; hundreds of thousands of people on the move; the smoke of thousands of burning homes. On the ground, the stories of cruelty and abuse — summary executions, organised rape and beatings perpetrated on young and old alike — bore even closer witness to the campaign of terror waged by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against its Albanian minority. Operations Allied Force and Allied Harbour were intended to reverse the effects of this crime.

Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
Applying force and lending assistance

These two NATO operations — one applying direct force and the other humanitarian assistance, along with advance elements of a peace implementation force — represented the commitment of military forces to the attainment of NATO’s political objectives. They were the latest in a series of military responses directed by Alliance political leaders that began almost immediately after the Yugoslav government started violently repressing the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

NATO demonstrated its resolve to stem the rising tide of violent repression in Yugoslavia with an Alliance air exercise back in June 1998, a port visit to Durres by Standing Naval Force Mediterranean the following month, and two regional PfP exercises in August and September 1998. The Alliance’s political leaders employed the well-developed planning capabilities of the Allied Command Europe command structure to signal to the Yugoslav government our determination to come to grips with the problem. President Slobodan Milosevic did not heed the message, and by October 1998, the situation had deteriorated nearly beyond salvaging.

As Yugoslav attacks on Kosovo’s civilian population grew in ferocity in the autumn of 1998, it became clear to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that stronger measures would be required. Consequently, following Serb refusal to meet NAC demands for compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, requiring the withdrawal of excess forces from Kosovo, and in light of the pending humanitarian catastrophe, the NAC prepared orders to Allied forces to organise air operations against Yugoslavia. Hundreds of Allied aircraft assembled for the attack and diplomatic initiatives gained momentum from the explicit NATO threat.

Milosevic agreed to a cessation of hostilities, deployment of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ground verifiers, and a NATO air verification mission. After NATO issued an activation order (ACTORD)\(^2\), he was coerced into agreeing to pull back his excess forces and take heavy weapons away from his police, revert to normal peacetime police activities and respond with proportionate force to provocation. The Alliance’s military forces provided essential support to the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) with its own aerial verification mission, a verification coordination center and an extraction force for the OSCE mission.

Escalating violations

True to form though, Milosevic violated even that agreement. By December, it was clear that military reinforcements had moved in: a battalion near Podujevo and another battalion on the line of communication from Stimle. The Yugoslav government billed these movements as routine training exercises but failed to notify the OSCE as previously agreed. These “training exercises” developed into full-fledged offensive operations. In successive meetings in late December in Belgrade, we reminded the new Yugoslav Chief of Defence General Ojdanic and Police Chief General Djurdevic that they were not in compliance with their commitments to NATO.

During January and February, more forces appeared in violation of the October agreement. Even in the midst of meetings and peace talks at Rambouillet and subsequently in Paris, the VJ (Yugoslav Army) and MUP (Special Police) attacked around Vucitrn and Kosovska Mitrovica. All evidence pointed to massive reinforcements, a steady increase in fighting, and deliberate preparations for future operations.

Operation Allied Force

After diplomatic efforts failed to gain Milosevic’s agreement to a peace plan, endorsed by NATO and the Contact Group\(^3\), including Russia, NATO responded on 24 March. Operation Allied Force launched a systematic air campaign to attack, disrupt and degrade Serb military potential and deter further Serb actions. Allied forces faced a formidable enemy, but because of their courage and professionalism, that enemy is much less formidable today than when this conflict began.

Operating on two lines of air operations, the NATO campaign focused at the outset on destroying, isolating...
British Puma military transport helicopters bring KFOR soldiers and equipment into Kosovo on 13 June.
(Belga photo)

and interdicting the VJ/MUP forces inside and around Kosovo, and preventing a continuation of their aggression, or its intensification. At the same time, the Allied campaign pursued an array of strategic target sets. These included logistics forces outside Kosovo with the ability to reinforce or support forces in Kosovo, the integrated air defence system, higher-level command and control, petroleum storage facilities and other targets that feed Serbia’s military and security machine.

As the campaign progressed, it grew in intensity. However, it was not a campaign against the Serbian people. It focused specifically on the forces of repression from top to bottom to coerce a change in their behaviour or, failing that, to degrade and ultimately destroy their means of repression. Allied planners, targeters and pilots worked diligently to prevent injuries and loss of life among the civilian population and to prevent collateral damage.

Aiding their endeavour was precision weaponry, which reduced collateral damage and limited the exposure of aircraft to Serb air defences. The campaign employed the highest proportion of precision weaponry ever used in an air operation. Precision strike weapons were used against point targets and, in some cases, strike aircraft actually attacked individual tanks on the ground with laser-guided weaponry.

With the weather creating unfavourable conditions, pilots often flew through heavy overcast and clouds, hampering their ability to see the targets. Despite cancellation of air strikes and very few days of favourable weather conditions, the results tell the story of the power of the campaign.

Allied pilots flew 37,465 sorties, of which over 14,006 were strike missions. By comparison with previous campaigns, support sorties outnumbered strike sorties. This campaign, facing unpredictable reactions from Yugoslav defences, required protective combat air patrols in multiple locations, on some days up to seven, around the area. The incident involving the two MiGs, shot down by a combat air patrol over Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March, illustrated the need to maintain these patrols and their effectiveness.

Long distances between targets and air bases required a high number of tanker support sorties. Tankers kept our fighters and bombers in the air for extended time periods, enhancing flexibility and maximising their loiter time over Kosovo. The number of sorties also reflected considerable ancillary support: reconnaissance and airborne early warning and control aircraft. In this respect this was the most heavily leveraged air campaign yet seen.

The air campaign’s success

The Yugoslav integrated air defence system had been seriously damaged. Without continued suppression it would have recovered quickly; it was a race of Allied destruction against Serb reconstruction and...
repair. Day by day, Yugoslavia lost its early warning radars, missiles, and fighters; and slowly but steadily the Yugoslav forces lost the ability to maintain situational awareness of the air campaign.

Command and control, the brains behind the brutality, was degraded but was still functional at the campaign’s conclusion. This network, hardened for decades with redundant command and control and facilities, experienced frequent failures. The impact of these failures was reflected on the ground and in disruption of the chain of command’s ability to manage the battlefield. Television stations and transmitters were struck because they were a part of his military machine, prolonging and promoting this conflict.

Regarding other significant strategic targets, the Allied operation hit the Serb electric power system because, like the body’s circulatory system, everything in the military system depends on it. Air strikes also destroyed oil and petrol facilities and stocks needed to keep tanks on the move. Serbia had been importing fuel by ship through Bar and up the Danube to close the gap between what it had and what it needed. Analysts reported temporary disruptions in the Yugoslav supply chain; units in Kosovo were told to cease operations, to hold back, conserve fuel, and wait. Some units had even run out of petrol.

It was vital to cut off the supply routes that allowed Milosevic to keep his forces fuelled and able to continue their missions of ethnic cleansing. Destroyed bridges prevented Serb forces from moving reinforcements into Montenegro, and slowed down reinforcements moving into Kosovo.

As the campaign progressed, Allied forces closed in on Serb forces on the ground in Kosovo — the campaign’s top priority. In favourable weather, these forces felt the full weight of NATO air power. Serb forces were relegated to hiding during the day and manoeuvring at night. When they formed up to fight the UCK, the Kosovar armed elements, they greatly risked NATO strikes. They dispersed into smaller units, which made them more vulnerable to the UCK, whom, after a year of continuous operations, the Serbs could not defeat. This was an army in decline; an army that knew it was losing.

Serb forces were transformed from well-equipped, efficient, and lethal units into isolated forces increasingly weakened in their campaign of brutality. Every day marked another event that highlighted the disruption in their ranks — mass desertions, resignations by senior army officers, and generals under house arrest.

**Humanitarian response**

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, forces from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and ACE Mobile Force (LAND) (AMF(L)) have been addressing the direct results of Milosevic’s actions against Kosovo Albanians — easing the suffering of hundreds of thousands of refugees. In the process, they have foiled Milosevic’s attempts to destabilise Yugoslavia’s neighbours.

As the scale of the humanitarian crisis grew exponentially in early April, the Alliance’s political leaders ordered its reaction forces into action. The ARRC had begun deployment to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during the Rambouillet talks to prepare for immediate introduction as the Kosovo implementation force in the event of a peace agreement. As thousands of refugees entered the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the ARRC swiftly reorganised to deliver food, water and other supplies, build refugee camps and shelters, and transport people away from the border areas. The AMF(L) deployed its headquarters to Albania and, in what became Operation Allied Harbour, took over control of national forces that were rushing to aid the refugees pouring into that country. In both cases, NATO’s reaction forces brought order to chaos within a few days.
The ARRC and AMF(L) saved countless lives and provided an essential emerging response until other agencies, chiefly the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), could arrive on the scene. Although UNHCR has taken over as lead agency today, the ARRC and AMF(L) continue to support humanitarian relief operations in both countries.

**Bringing it to a close**

So, as the Serb regime’s forces were weakened, ours strengthened. The Alliance gained air superiority. Serb planes were destroyed whenever they challenged NATO aircraft. Allied pilots destroyed over 90 Yugoslav aircraft, six in flight. We knocked out large numbers of surface-to-air missile launchers and radars. And with each passing day, NATO dictated events on the ground. By the suspension of the air campaign on 10 June, *Operation Allied Force* had 912 aircraft and over 35 ships — almost triple the forces that the campaign started with.

In summary, the air campaign was a success. We prosecuted the campaign in an effective, methodical, and systematic manner that avoided needless casualties, minimised collateral damage, and achieved its objectives. It was progressive and intensified during its course of 78 days, aided by the arrival of spring and improved weather.

Clearly President Milosevic was willing to absorb a high degree of punishment. But in spite of this, the Yugoslav forces were vulnerable to collapse. Erosion of supporting infrastructure and morale had cumulative effects that could not be hidden for long behind propaganda or his silence to the international community. In error, he banked on the crumbling of the Alliance. Instead, NATO’s resolve and determination strengthened. Milosevic knew he had miscalculated and could not win. This became increasingly clear to his armed forces and the Serb government too, resulting in the signing of the Military Technical Agreement by Yugoslav authorities and NATO on 9 June.

Now NATO is fully occupied with its next task — deploying the Kosovo peace implementation force (KFOR). KFOR began deploying on 12 June on the heels of the withdrawing Serbs. This is a huge operation that is not risk free. Our forces are entering difficult territory but approach this task, too, with courage and professionalism. However, this operation will not be complete without the safe return of the refugees, our central objective. Only then will military commanders count their tasks as successfully completed. Success here means another beginning. The end to racial conflict and ethnic cleansing would mean a turning point toward a new future in the Balkans, where democracy flourishes rather than the evils of intolerance and repression.
Preparing the ground

Alliance Heads of State and Government commissioned an updating of the Strategic Concept at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. Their aim was to ensure that the Alliance’s strategy takes full account of trends in European security and provides the political framework for developments in NATO’s military capabilities to meet the challenges of the new century. This entailed a detailed review of the Alliance’s political and military roles against the background of the profound changes that have taken place since the 1991 Strategic Concept, concentrating on such key issues as the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks, the evolving strategic environment, the growing commitment of NATO to crisis management and conflict prevention, the promotion of security and stability through partnership and dialogue, NATO enlargement, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and arms control.

This thorough examination was carried out in two stages. During the first half of 1998, the Allies conducted a series of conceptual debates on the principal issues to be addressed in the update. This work provided the starting point for a detailed review of Alliance strategy by means of a series of draft texts. The review extended over a period of some 15 months, with the final issues being resolved during the Summit meeting itself on 23 and 24 April 1999.

Core commitments

The Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s essential and enduring purpose as being the commitment to safeguard the freedom and security of its mem-
bers by political and military means. It affirms the Allies’ shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and their determination not only to defend one another but to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

Against this background, the Concept sets out the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks. These represent a balance between continuity and change as compared with the 1991 Concept. Functions such as collective defence have, of course, been at the centre of the Alliance since its establishment. It was, however, also essential to reflect new commitments in the fields of crisis management and partnership that the Alliance now performs in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. The fundamental security tasks of the Alliance are set out in the box on the facing page.

The evolving strategic environment

One of the main purposes of the Concept is to survey the strategic environment and assess foreseeable security challenges and risks. It concludes that in recent years there has been continuing but generally positive change and that the Alliance, among other mutually reinforcing organisations, has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. It reaffirms the conclusion in the 1991 Strategic Concept that, while the threat of general war in Europe has virtually disappeared, there are other risks and uncertainties facing the members of the Alliance and other states in the Euro-Atlantic region. These include ethnic conflict, the abuse of human rights, political instability and economic fragility.

Alliance security can also be affected by other risks of a wider nature. The spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery is, for example, seen as a matter of serious concern. The global spread of technology may also result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities to potential adversaries.

Security in the coming years

One of the distinguishing features of the Alliance’s 1991 strategy was its commitment to a broad approach to security, encompassing complementary political and military means and emphasising cooperation with other states sharing the Alliance’s objectives. This comprehensive approach, while remaining a central feature of the new Strategic Concept, has been substantially developed. It comprises the following essential elements:
The Preservation of the Transatlantic Link: The indivisibility of European and North American security is underlined, together with the importance of a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests which they share.

The Maintenance of Effective Military Capabilities: Adequate military capabilities are called for which will be effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances, from deterrence and collective defence to crisis response operations.

The Development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance: The Strategic Concept confirms that ESDI will continue to be developed within the Alliance on the basis of the decisions taken by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1996 and thereafter, and that the process will require close cooperation between NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: In pursuit of its fundamental security tasks (see box) the Alliance will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict or, if a crisis arises, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting crisis response operations. The Strategic Concept sets out the Alliance’s policy in this field.

Partnership, Cooperation and Dialogue: The Alliance’s determination to pursue its long-standing policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue with all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries is underlined, with the aim of preserving peace, promoting democracy, and contributing to prosperity and progress. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace, the special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue are confirmed as the principal instruments of this policy.

Enlargement: The Strategic Concept confirms that no European democracy whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Washington Treaty will be excluded from consideration for membership of the Alliance. It restates the expectation that further invitations to accede to the Alliance will be extended in coming years.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: The Alliance’s support for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is reaffirmed together with the commitment to seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with NATO’s ability to fulfil the full range of its missions.

To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.
Military guidelines

The final part of the Strategic Concept establishes principles and missions for the Alliance’s forces and is thus the translation of its political purpose and tasks into guidelines for the NATO Military Authorities to develop into detailed concepts and plans. The strategy calls for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis response operations. These include the ability to effectively engage opposing forces, deployability and mobility, survivability of forces and infrastructure, sustainability and interoperability. Flexibility in the ability to generate forces to conduct the full range of Alliance missions is also highlighted, as is the need to be able to operate in multinational and joint formations. The Strategic Concept confirms that, while the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote, they continue to play a key role in preserving peace and preventing coercion and war.

Meeting the challenges of a new century

With the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance has set a clear course for its future political and military activities. It provides a durable conceptual foundation for the Alliance’s role in ensuring the security of its members and promoting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region at large and will be an essential guide as the Alliance prepares to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century.

BACKGROUND TO THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as “The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area”. Developed between October 1949 and April 1950, it set out a strategy of large-scale operations for territorial defence. In the mid-1950s the strategy of “massive retaliation” was developed. It emphasised deterrence based on the threat that NATO would respond to any aggression against its member countries by every means at its disposal, specifically including nuclear weapons.

Discussions of possible changes in this strategic approach began later in the 1950s and continued until 1967 when, following intensive debate within the Alliance, “massive retaliation” was replaced by the strategy of “flexible response”. This concentrated on giving NATO the advantages of flexibility and of creating uncertainty in the minds of any potential aggressor about NATO’s response in the case of a threat to the sovereignty or independence of any single member country. The concept was designed to ensure that aggression of any kind would be perceived as involving unacceptable risks.

The above strategies were enshrined in classified documents, which provided guidance to national governments and points of reference for military planning activities. They were not addressed to the general public. Although the underlying concepts were well known, little public discussion about their details was possible because their effectiveness depended greatly on secrecy. They reflected the realities of the Cold War, the political division of Europe and the confrontational ideological and military situation which characterised East-West relations for many years.

As the Cold War continued, however, the Alliance also sought to reduce its dangers and to lay the grounds for progress towards a more positive relationship with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. The Harmel Report, published in 1967, thus established defence and dialogue, including arms control, as the dual pillars of the Alliance’s approach to security.

With the end of the Cold War era, the political situation in Europe and the overall military situation were transformed. A new Strategic Concept evolved during the two years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was debated and discussed within the Alliance and was completed in November 1991. Bearing little relation to previous concepts, it emphasised cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. It maintained the security of its member nations as NATO’s fundamental purpose but combined this with the specific obligation to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole. In other respects, too, the 1991 Strategic Concept differed dramatically from its predecessors: it was issued as a public document, open for discussion and comment by parliaments, security specialists, journalists and the wider public.

In 1997, NATO leaders agreed that the Concept should be re-examined and updated to reflect the changes that had taken place in Europe since its adoption, while confirming the Allies’ commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link and ensuring that NATO strategy is fully adapted to the challenges of the 21st century. Intensive work was undertaken throughout the Alliance to conclude the revision by the time of the Washington Summit.

In common with all other Alliance business, the approval of the Concept required consensus on both the substance and the language of the document by all the member countries of the Alliance. Against the background of the accession of three new member countries, representatives of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were present from the outset of the discussions. The new Strategic Concept was formally approved by Alliance Heads of State and Government at the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999.
The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door open

Ambassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs

NATO leaders demonstrated their commitment to keeping NATO’s door open to new members by launching a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at their Summit meeting in Washington last April. A complement to existing Partnership structures, the MAP will help aspirants to set practical objectives and planning targets in their quest for membership and in obtaining feedback on their progress towards this goal. The MAP is not an automatic ticket to membership, but it does provide opportunities to strengthen an aspirant’s candidacy for membership and, thus, will help future members climb the steps leading to NATO’s open door.

NATO is an open community, not a closed shop. This has been evident since the very beginning of the Atlantic Alliance, as Article 10 of the Washington Treaty makes clear, and has been demonstrated on several occasions. NATO has admitted new members throughout its history: Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982 and, most recently, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became full members last March, increasing the number of Allies to 19.

The leaders of the three newest Allies were formally welcomed into the Alliance at the Washington Summit meeting on 24 April 1999. At the same time, NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to the openness of the Alliance and pledged that the Alliance would continue to welcome new members. But they went beyond a mere declaration of intent. They also launched a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership.

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. (....)”

Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949

Czech President Václav Havel speaks during a ceremony at the Capitol at the start of the Washington Summit on 23 April, the first formal occasion to bring the leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland together with other Alliance leaders, since the three new members joined the Alliance last March.

(NATO photo)
When the Cold War ended ten years ago, NATO Allies shared one fundamental conviction: Europe could not grow together as long as the main institutions remained closed to the Eastern half of the continent. Not to offer our Eastern neighbours the prospect of joining NATO and the European Union (EU) would have amounted to the continuation of an implicit division of Europe — a division between a self-confident, secure West, and an uncertain, insecure East. The enlargement of NATO was thus both necessary and inevitable.

Yet the Allies also shared the view that for NATO’s enlargement to contribute substantively to European security, the process needed to be managed in such a way as to create no new dividing lines. Moreover, as NATO’s efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis demonstrate, membership in the Alliance entails not only rights and obligations, but also requires concrete military means and capabilities. For this reason, future NATO members would therefore have to undergo a period of “apprenticeship” to bring their forces up to NATO standards. In short, for enlargement to achieve its goals, a structured process was required.

The 1994 Brussels Summit provided a general commitment to NATO’s eastward expansion. This was followed by “The Study on NATO Enlargement” in 1995, which set out the Alliance’s approach in more detail. Based on the study’s findings, the Alliance conducted an “intensified dialogue” on membership questions with interested Partners. This intensified dialogue provided Allies with valuable information on individual Partners’ preparations for membership, and allowed participating countries aspiring to NATO membership to learn more about the workings of the Alliance and the responsibilities and obligations involved.

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO leaders invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the Alliance, thereby delivering on their promise to admit countries able and willing to contribute to the goals of the Washington Treaty. These accession talks were followed by the signing and the subsequent ratification of accession protocols. The formal accession of the three new members took place on 12 March 1999.

Also at Madrid, NATO leaders reaffirmed the openness of the Alliance to other new members in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. They also decided to continue and broaden the intensified dialogues and to review the enlargement process at their next meeting in 1999. From then on, the dialogues with interested Partner countries were conducted in two formats: a series of high level meetings (at the level of Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign and/or Defence Minister) were held with the North Atlantic Council, and a comprehensive dialogue was conducted between senior officials from Partner countries and a team from the NATO International Staffs.

Throughout this process, interested Partner countries had been asking for better practical advice and feedback to assist them in their preparations for eventual membership. The Washington Summit in April 1999 provided a fitting opportunity to respond to this desire. NATO was able to draw upon the experience gained not only during the three years of intensified dialogue meetings, but also through the integration of the three newest members into the Alliance. The result was the Membership Action Plan, which provides assessment and feedback mechanisms for partners aspiring to NATO membership.

**Mechanisms of the MAP**

The MAP comprises the following elements:

- Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national programme on its preparations for possible membership, covering political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal aspects. This programme should set objectives and targets on all issues relevant to membership. It should also provide specific information on steps being taken, respon-
sible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific aspects.

A focused feedback mechanism on progress made by each aspirant on its programmes will be established to provide both political and technical advice. Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format\(^1\) with the North Atlantic Council and other NATO bodies if requested, and with a NATO Team. The NATO Team will include specialists on the specific subjects to be discussed from NATO’s International Staff, the International Military Staff, and the NATO Major Commands. Feedback and advice on MAP issues will be provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use with Partners (for instance in the Partnership for Peace framework), as well as 19+1 meetings and NATO Team workshops. The workshops will be particularly valuable, as they will enable in-depth discussion among experts on the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership.

Annual clearinghouse meetings with each aspirant at 19+1 will help dovetail bilateral and multilateral assistance in the defence/military field to the country concerned with the aim of maximising the effectiveness of assistance programmes.

Planning targets will be elaborated with aspiring countries to cover the areas most directly relevant to nations seeking to align their force structures and capabilities with the responsibilities involved in eventual Alliance membership. These will build on existing Partnership Goals\(^2\) and will be subject to review, allowing for detailed feedback.

Each spring, the Alliance will draw up a report for individual aspirants providing feedback focused on their progress in the areas covered in their individual national programmes. This document will form the basis for an annual spring meeting of the North Atlantic Council with each individual aspirant.

The MAP does not replace the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In fact, participation in PfP for aspiring countries remains essential, as it provides a well-established way of developing progressive interoperability with Alliance forces. Moreover, the Washington Summit put into place a coherent package of measures for a more operational Partnership, to strengthen the ability of Allies and all Partner countries, including membership aspirants, to work together. The provisions of the MAP will complement these activities available under PfP by addressing the broader spectrum of preparations required for eventual membership.

The MAP provides aspiring countries with a variety of opportunities. It is up to them to select and make use of elements of the MAP at their discretion. Like PfP, the MAP is guided by the principle of self-differentiation. Aspirants are free to match their participation with their own national priorities and circumstances and to decide upon their own implementation measures and timetables.

The MAP provides a range of activities designed to strengthen an aspirant’s candidacy for membership. It does not, however, provide a checklist for aspiring countries to fulfil, nor would their participation in the programme prejudice any decision by the Alliance on issuing an invitation to begin accession talks. Decisions on invitations for membership will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis by all Allies and by consensus, taking into account political, security and military considerations.

**Keeping the door open**

NATO’s three new members will not be the last. NATO’s door remains open and the Membership Action Plan is clear evidence of the Alliance’s commitment to continuing the enlargement process. The Allies recognise the great efforts being made by the aspiring countries and the MAP is designed to help them reflect eventual NATO membership requirements in their own national plans and preparations directed at that goal. While the MAP brings no guarantees of eventual future membership, assistance and advice given through the MAP should help aspirants to take the difficult decisions necessary to reform their national armed forces and prepare for possible, future NATO membership. The MAP is thus another step towards a Europe in which each state can find its rightful place.◆

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\(^1\) The 19 Allies plus the aspirant.

\(^2\) Partnership Goals are planning targets developed with Partner countries in the context of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). They address issues related to forces and capabilities Partner countries make available for NATO-led PfP operations.
The Defence Capabilities Initiative arises from the recognition that, in order to meet the challenges resulting from the fundamental changes in the security environment, improvements to the Alliance’s crisis response capabilities are necessary. During the Cold War, NATO planning focused on defence against large-scale aggression directed at Alliance territory. This scenario required pre-determined defence plans and made predictable demands on the capabilities of Allies. The large scale of national contributions and their concentration in a few geographical areas meant that nations provided their own logistic support, though this was often reinforced by the host nation. Transport to deploy forces and equipment could be requisitioned from commercial sources under emergency powers.

Force deployment was to be assisted by host nation support agreements and existing infrastructure, some common-funded by the Alliance. The planning scenario assumed that such a large-scale conflict would be relatively short before a conclusion was reached by military or political means. Consequently there was little need to make provision for sustaining forces over a long period, including through force rotation. The requirement for interoperability between Alliance forces was also relatively limited.

Since then the security environment has changed greatly, as reflected in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept approved at the Washington Summit. NATO will continue to maintain capabilities to deal with large-scale aggression against one or more of its members, though such a threat is unlikely in the foreseeable future and it would probably entail a relatively long warning time. Potential threats to Alliance security are now more likely to arise from regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises, especially on the Alliance’s periphery or beyond. These factors require continued Alliance solidarity and the maintenance of an effective military capability, including greater emphasis on elements commensurate with the new environment, to minimise risks and prevent crises from threatening the Alliance itself.
Rapid deployment

NATO must therefore be prepared for operations outside or on the periphery of Alliance territory where it may not be able to take full advantage of its existing military infrastructure. A demonstrable Alliance rapid deployment capability will be essential for the credible and effective use of the threat of military response to manage crises and prevent escalation. In the event of military operations, rapid deployment of forces would also be required to deny an adversary the opportunity to consolidate his position.

Force contributions by individual Allies (or Partners and other participating nations in the case of crisis response operations) could be relatively small and may be part of multinational units. This requires command and control and information systems in particular to be interoperable at lower levels than in the past. It also calls for a new approach to logistics.

The smaller the individual national force contributions, the less efficient the logistic support provided primarily through national channels and the greater the effectiveness of the operation as a whole if logistic resources are coordinated multinationaly. Operations could be of long duration and more than one operation may need to be conducted at the same time, requiring a logistic support system capable of providing supplies over an extended period and supporting concurrent operations. There will also likely be a requirement to rotate forces during the period of the operation, which will necessitate force structures capable of providing fresh units when required, and have consequences for the retraining of units returning from an operation.

Advanced technologies

NATO’s potential future adversaries will probably not be able to mass the scale of forces that Alliance defence plans were designed to counter during the Cold War. However, the accelerating pace of technological change means that an adversary could, nonetheless, possess weapons capable of inflicting considerable damage on Alliance forces. This calls for the employment of sophisticated defensive and counter-offensive systems by NATO. The Alliance must also possess a greater capability to use military force in pursuit of precise objectives in order to minimise the risk of collateral damage and civilian casualties. And it is important that a wide range of Allies can contribute advanced capabilities to future operations so that the burden does not fall disproportionately on only a few. One effect of employing such systems could be a reduction in the scale of forces needed to fulfil the requirements of the mission.

Future operations involving European Allies and possibly led by the Western European Union (WEU) or the European Union (EU) will face challenges in the management of multinational operations which could be as demanding as those of Alliance operations. The development of more extensive and focused interoperability to underpin multinational operations and the acquisition of advanced capabilities by a wider range of Allies will therefore also contribute to building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance.
Improving Alliance capabilities

Against this background, NATO’s Executive Working Group, reinforced by senior officials from national capitals, examined possible improvements in Alliance capabilities with a particular focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and, where applicable, between Alliance and Partner forces. Work focused on a number of broad areas to identify the steps that might be taken, in both the short and long term, to accelerate progress in existing projects and initiate work on other needed capabilities. Those fields were selected where improvements in capabilities would contribute significantly to meeting the challenges of the future.

The deployability and mobility of Alliance forces were important areas for examination. Among the factors considered were the availability of transport assets, including various options for the use of civilian resources such as shared use, and the level of deployable infrastructure necessary to permit a NATO-led force to deploy in theatre. The sustainability and logistics of Alliance forces was also addressed. It is likely that greater multinationality in logistic support, such as establishing a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre, could enhance the efficiency of operations. We may also need to encourage a different mix of units in national force structures to increase the proportion of support units.

The study also covered the survivability of Alliance forces and their capacity to effectively engage an adversary. Among the issues considered in this context were the need for more — and more capable — reconnaissance and surveillance systems, a combat identification system, precision-guided weapons that can be delivered in day or night in any weather conditions, and capabilities to address the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Improvements in command and control and information systems were also studied to review the scope for greater interoperability and to ensure the availability of increased numbers of deployable communications assets.

All these areas need to be complemented by an increased focus on the development of commonly agreed military concepts, applicable to a wide range of future situations. And they also need to take into account factors such as levels of training, increased standardisation and enhancing the military capabilities and effectiveness of multinational formations. In some cases the Executive Working Group was already able to identify at this early stage how to improve certain capabilities. In others, further work will be required to examine different options and make firm recommendations about improvements to be made.

Next steps

To take this work forward, the Washington Summit established a High Level Steering Group to oversee the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative and to ensure better coordination and harmonisation among the relevant NATO planning disciplines. It will be chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and will be composed of senior officials from national capitals to ensure that the Initiative is taken forward quickly with maximum political support. The Steering Group will work for two years and, in addition to focusing on capabilities needed by Allies, it will seek to include Partners in appropriate areas of its work. The aim is to achieve lasting improvements in capabilities and interoperability to better equip the Alliance for the challenges of the future. ◆
Towards a Partnership for the twenty-first century

Charles J. Dale
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Partnership emerged as a central underlying theme at the Washington Summit. Plans were approved by Heads of State and Government for an enhanced and more operational Partnership which will provide additional tools to support the Alliance’s role in Euro-Atlantic security in the new century. In addition, the updated Strategic Concept adopted in Washington establishes crisis management and Partnership as fundamental security tasks of the Alliance. The strengthened Partnership will also contribute to the effectiveness of two other Summit initiatives, the Defence Capabilities Initiative and the Membership Action Plan. Taken together, these decisions further cement the Partnership’s role as a permanent fixture of Euro-Atlantic security for the next century.

NATO Summit leaders approved an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace in Washington last April, further solidifying the Alliance’s role in Euro-Atlantic security. Partnership, along with crisis management, has become a fundamental security task of the Alliance and remains important in its own right. The Partnership for the twenty-first century that emerged from Washington will also reinforce other Summit initiatives such as NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Partners aspiring to join the Alliance. It supports the DCI in addressing the interoperability challenges associated with future multinational crisis response operations; and it reinforces the MAP by better focusing PfP participation on essential membership-related issues in defence and military fields. In addition, PfP will likely play a key role in fostering security and stability in the Balkan region in the wake of the Kosovo crisis.

Leaders from Allied and Partner countries after meeting in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the Washington Summit on 25 April 1999.

(NATO photo)
Enhancing Partnership

The Washington Summit brought to fruition a number of important enhancements to Partnership for Peace that had been launched at the Madrid Summit in 1997, and which aimed to make PfP more operational and to give Partners a greater role in PfP planning and decision-making. These enhancements represent the cornerstones of the Partnership of the future.

The new Political Military Framework (PMF) for NATO-led PfP operations will provide for Partner involvement in political consultation and decision-making, in operational planning, and in command arrangements for NATO-led PfP operations. The PMF will stand alongside and support the Alliance’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

The expanded and adapted PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) will more closely resemble the Alliance’s force planning process. PARP will introduce Partnership Goals to define forces and capabilities declared by Partners for PfP activities. Ministerial Guidance will help shape these forces and capabilities.

Finally, PfP will continue to develop on the basis of enhanced defence-related and military cooperation, which allows, among other things, for significantly expanding Partners’ involvement in the PfP work of NATO committees, the presence of Partner officers in NATO military structures, and increasing the scope and complexity of NATO/PfP exercises.

Reinforcing operational capabilities

The Washington Summit also heralded a new stage in the continuing evolution of PfP. Allies and Partners demonstrated their commitment to a more operational role for the Partnership by developing a coherent package of measures to reinforce PfP’s operational capabilities.

Our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina has clearly shown how important PfP cooperation is for effective multinational peace support operations. The increased operational dimension of PfP will take into account the lessons learned and practical experience gained in the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia and address the specific challenges to military effectiveness and interoperability that such multinational operations present.

A new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) will be developed within PfP to improve the ability of Alliance and Partner forces to operate together in future NATO-led PfP operations. It will also provide increased flexibility in putting together tailored force-
packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations. The OCC will focus on the forces and capabilities potentially available for such operations. Its enhanced peacetime working relationships between Partner and Alliance headquarters and staffs, and between Allied and Partner formations, will facilitate the integration of these forces into a NATO-led force. Another central feature will be assessment and feedback mechanisms on the operational capabilities of forces declared by Partners.

The future PfP will also include a programme to increase the ability of training and education efforts to meet the current and future demands of Partnership. This programme will strive to improve interoperability and to promote greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.

**Tapping Partnership’s full potential for crisis management**

The decisions taken at Washington mark a further, though not the final, stage in the development of the Partnership. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which itself continues to mature, combines with the enhanced and more operational PfP to provide NATO and its Partners with a powerful set of tools to better contribute to confidence-building, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC has already proved its worth as a forum for political consultations on topics ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the crisis in Kosovo to humanitarian demining.

We have also seen the benefits of our practical PfP cooperation in defence and military fields. The interoperability achieved in the first years of the Partnership was an early dividend and an important factor in the successful integration of Partner forces in IFOR and SFOR. Both the EAPC and PfP will, however, continue to evolve to meet the challenges of the still dynamic security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. Neither has reached its full potential in crisis prevention and crisis management.

Achieving that potential is one of the Partnership’s future challenges. The operational dimension of PfP in particular has largely focused on interoperability, thus providing the capability to field a NATO-led multinational force involving Partners, should that be necessary in crisis. The reinforced capabilities now envisaged will bring this into even sharper focus in future.

PfP has also proved to be a valuable and flexible tool for crisis management. Tailored assistance programmes with Albania, put in place after the internal crisis of 1997, have helped rebuild the Albanian armed forces to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfP operations. The OCC will focus on the forces and capabilities potentially available for such operations. Its enhanced peacetime working relationships between Partner and Alliance headquarters and staffs, and between Allied and Partner formations, will facilitate the integration of these forces into a NATO-led force. Another central feature will be assessment and feedback mechanisms on the operational capabilities of forces declared by Partners.

The future PfP will also include a programme to increase the ability of training and education efforts to meet the current and future demands of Partnership. This programme will strive to improve interoperability and to promote greater cooperation and dialogue among the wider defence and security communities in NATO and Partner nations.

**Tapping Partnership’s full potential for crisis management**

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forces and deal with other consequences of that crisis, notably problems caused by the destruction and looting of ordnance storage sites. The NATO/PfP Cell in Tirana is a visible demonstration of the Alliance’s interest and commitment in the region.

Today, tailored programmes with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1) are integral elements of the Alliance’s overall approach to dealing with the crisis in Kosovo. PfP exercises have provided valuable operational experience in the region, and practical assistance through PfP has helped both countries improve their capacity to patrol their borders and modernise their armed forces.

Strengthening other Summit initiatives

At the Washington Summit, Alliance Heads of State and Government met with the countries of South-eastern Europe and proposed a consultative forum on security matters as part of NATO’s effort to enhance security and stability in the region. PfP tools and mechanisms could help give substance to this proposal, possibly through targeted security cooperation programmes for the countries in the region, thereby demonstrating PfP’s potential to support peace-building in the wake of a crisis.

The inherent flexibility of PfP will also be demonstrated by its role in supporting the defence and military aspects of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for the nations aspiring to join the Alliance. Under the MAP, aspirants will be able to request tailored Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) to focus their PfP cooperation on essential membership-related issues. These tailored IPPs will be built around a core programme of cooperation that would be essential for aspirants. This approach will encourage increased specialisation, assessment and feedback in PfP programmes and, in this way, support the planning targets for aspirants developed within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP. Such cooperation with aspirant countries, while offering core areas of cooperation through the Partnership Work Programme, could potentially broaden the scope of cooperation for all Partners and thereby strengthen the Partnership as a whole.

A “strategic” partnership for the twenty-first century

The Alliance has always viewed its cooperation with Partners as a dynamic process which would evolve progressively as NATO and Partners drew closer. PfP’s first five years of active cooperation between Allies and Partners represent a success that has far exceeded initial expectations. Yet the Partnership still holds a huge untapped potential. Allies and Partners are together building mechanisms for future “coalitions of the able” not only for joint operations, but also for conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. The Partnership envisaged will also work towards a stronger political dimension to complement its more robust defence and military cooperation. This will be the essence of the “strategic” Partnership for the twenty-first century.
The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rationale and aims

Crispin Hain-Cole
Head of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security Section
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One of the innovative policies adopted by NATO leaders at the Washington Summit last April was an Initiative to ensure the Alliance’s ability to address the challenge posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This Initiative, an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing adaptation, will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work on WMD issues and complement other existing international efforts in this area. The centrepiece of the Initiative is the creation of a WMD Centre to facilitate Alliance-wide coordination on proliferation matters.

A specially trained Polish soldier looks out from an armoured vehicle, as Poland prepares to send anti-chemical warfare troops as part of a UN-led effort during the Gulf Crisis. (Reuters photo)

NATO’s revised Strategic Concept points out that, despite positive developments in the strategic environment, the security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks, which are multidirectional and often difficult to predict and assess. In this regard, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery is a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges remain with respect to proliferation. Despite efforts to prevent it through diplomatic means, proliferation continues to pose a direct military threat to the Alliance. Some states, including on NATO’s periphery and in adjacent regions, seek to sell or acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons systems are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have also shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

**Political decisions**

In December 1998, Alliance Foreign and Defence Ministers expressed their determination to prepare NATO’s forces to succeed in the full range of missions that they might have to face despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons.

Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation that were created as a result of the 1994 NATO Summit(1), Ministers indicated that they were prepared to expand NATO’s effort to address the evolving proliferation risk.

Accordingly, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to prepare proposals, in time for the Washington Summit, for an Initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges posed by the proliferation of NBC weapons and their delivery means.

**The Initiative**

The WMD Initiative should be viewed in the context of the Alliance’s existing approach to proliferation.
issues. It seeks to expand the Allies’ understanding of proliferation issues, to focus appropriate attention on WMD risks, and to coordinate the activities of the various NATO bodies involved in proliferation matters. To this end, it will:

- Ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATO leading to strengthened common understanding among Allies on WMD issues and how to respond to them;
- Improve the quality and quantity of intelligence and information-sharing among Allies on proliferation issues;
- Support the development of a public information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of proliferation issues and Allies’ efforts to support non-proliferation;
- Enhance existing Allied programmes which increase military readiness to operate in a WMD environment and counter WMD threats;
- Strengthen the process of information exchange on Allies’ national programmes of bilateral WMD destruction and assistance;
- Enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil populations against WMD risks.

The WMD Initiative will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance work on WMD issues and complement, not supplant, existing international regimes and arms control efforts responding to proliferation.

The WMD Centre

A WMD Centre will be created in the NATO International Staff in Brussels to improve coordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO. It will strengthen political consultations related to non-proliferation, as well as defence efforts to improve the preparedness of Alliance forces and contribute to national efforts to protect civil populations. The Centre will:

- Maintain the Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destruction and Management Assistance Programmes, a database designed to expand information-sharing between member states on national contributions to WMD withdrawal and dismantlement in the former Soviet Union;
- Serve as a repository for information on WMD-related civil response programmes in Allied nations;
- Support the Alliance Groups dealing with WMD proliferation and through them, the North Atlantic Council;
- Develop briefings, fact sheets and other information documents on WMD issues for a wider public audience.

Beyond the Alliance

The WMD Initiative will be implemented first among the 19 NATO member countries, with participation being expanded to Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, where appropriate, as the programme matures.

The Alliance has already held — or is planning — sessions on proliferation issues with various Partner countries under the auspices of the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Mediterranean Dialogue Group.

NATO’s response to proliferation, through the Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction, is an integral part of the continuing adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment. ✦
Construction workers put the finishing touches on the Washington Summit logo hanging from the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, the venue for the event to mark NATO's 50th anniversary.

(Belga photo)