CONTENTS

Javier Solana
3 The Washington Summit: NATO steps boldly into the 21st century

Jorge Domínguez
7 Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic partner

Dick Zandee
10 Civil-military interaction in peace operations

Pol de Witte
14 Fostering stability and security in the Southern Caucasus

Luc van der Laan
17 NATO-Russia cooperation in air defence

Documentation
18 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December
20 Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brussels, 8 December
21 Statement on Kosovo, Brussels, 8 December
21 Statement on CFE, Brussels, 8 December
23 Chairman’s summary of the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Brussels, 8 December
26 Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, Brussels 9 December
27 Statement of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, Brussels, 9 December
27 Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Brussels, 17 December
31 Defence expenditures of NATO countries (1975-1998)

1998 Index
34 Contents listed by issue
35 Principal articles listed by author

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The Washington Summit:
NATO steps boldly into the 21st century

Javier Solana
NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council

In April, Alliance Heads of State and Government will gather in Washington to commemorate a historic event: NATO’s 50th anniversary. In the same room in which the North Atlantic treaty was signed, they will pay tribute to a most remarkable achievement: five decades of preserving peace and security in Europe. But the Summit is not only about celebrating past achievements, or renewing vows. It is also about preparing for the future. It is about ensuring that the Alliance is ready and equipped to face the security challenges of the next 50 years - many of which will be different in nature and origin than those of the past. The decisions of the Washington Summit will guide the evolution of the Alliance into the next century.

The new Euro-Atlantic Security Environment

The face of European security has changed immeasurably over the past ten years, and largely for the better. The ideological wall that divided Europe is gone for good and, for the most part, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are seeing a remarkably peaceful transition to democracy, manifested by free elections and the rule of law.

Despite these very positive developments, however, the challenges to European security remain. We have also seen instances of minority and ethnic conflict, refugee flows, and systematic human rights violations. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is also of growing concern.

Since 1991, NATO has been adapting to meet these new security challenges effectively by adjusting its internal structures and taking on new missions. At the same time, the Alliance has been establishing cooperative relations with countries across Europe to help shape the security environment and create a framework of stability across the continent. All these adaptations will be highlighted at the Summit.

The Washington Summit

The most prominent adaptation will be obvious in Washington simply by the increased number of national flags flying: 19 instead of 16. By April, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland will formally be members of the Alliance. Through this round of enlargement we will demonstrate clearly that there are no more dividing lines in Europe.

Moreover, this round of enlargement is only part of an ongoing process. The door to NATO membership will remain open to countries ready and willing to contribute to allied security, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. We are now working on a “package” of measures designed to bring partner countries closer to the Alliance and to help those countries that aspire to future membership in meeting NATO standards. The Summit is the occasion when this “package” will be formally unveiled.

At the same time, we will continue to enhance our relations with non-member countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. We wish to expand the climate of trust and confidence throughout the region by using the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to its fullest potential. This institution brings the representatives of 44 countries together around the NATO table on a regular basis. The EAPC is evolving into a significant consultative forum, which has proven its worth most recently in connection with the crisis in Kosovo and will take on an increasing role in future in such areas as disaster relief and civil emergency planning.

We will also develop specific measures to enhance the Partnership for Peace. Now entering its fifth year, PfP has proven a very successful means to help restructure armed forces and to help them find their appropriate place in modern democratic societies. PfP has also provided the means by which the 27 partners and the 16 allies have engaged in new patterns of practical, military-to-military cooperation. Without PfP, for example, it would have been impossible to put together the multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a short time.

Involving partners more

To enhance PfP even further, we are working with our partners on developing a political-military framework for NATO-led crisis response and peace support operations, which will give partners a greater say in planning and conducting such operations. Some of the ideas on the table include PfP training centres, multinational formations within PfP, and the use of simulation techniques to improve our capacity to work together. In short, NATO leaders and their counterparts in partner countries will use the Washington Summit to continue the substantial progress made towards a Europe where military forces cooperate with, rather than confront, each other.

We are also working hard to finalise the revision of the Strategic Concept, as mandated by NATO’s Heads of State and Government at the last Summit meeting in Madrid in 1997. This revision will take account of the many changes that have taken place in Euro-Atlantic security since the current concept was endorsed at the 1991 Rome Summit.

A strong relationship with Russia

One very significant change in Euro-Atlantic security is the new, positive relationship that is being built between NATO and Russia. Our view is that Russia’s constructive engagement is fundamental to the emerging new European security order and we are determined to pursue that engagement.

For more than a year now, we have had an extensive relationship of consultation and cooperation that would simply have been unimaginable during the Cold War. Built on the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, the Permanent Joint Council is now a prominent forum in which Allies and Russia exchange views on current security issues such as Bosnia and Kosovo, bring experts together on a range of defence and military-related subjects, and look to deepening the areas of practical cooperation. The year ahead promises even greater consultation and cooperative activity.

The Kosovo crisis has proven the value of this new relationship. Since the crisis began, NATO and Russia have continued to consult each other in the Permanent Joint Council and are both working to help resolve this conflict peacefully.
Enhancing cooperation

We also look forward to expanding and deepening other elements of our cooperative security activities. The Work Programme developed under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, for example, is contributing to peace and stability in Europe, and the Summit will recognise the value of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. We will also acknowledge the work of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which brings together NATO and six participating countries of the Mediterranean region in an evolving programme of contact, consultation and cooperation.

New command structure

The Washington Summit will also put the finishing touches on the range of internal adaptations the Alliance has made to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. We are implementing a reformed command structure which is streamlined and more flexible, and therefore better able to carry out peace support and crisis management missions. We are also planning a defence-capabilities initiative to improve interoperability, mobility and sustainability among Alliance forces. Put simply, Alliance forces need to be on the same wavelength and be able to cover distances quickly, and then be supplied properly in the field. They must be able to communicate with each other, service to service, ally to ally, in a world where computer and information technologies are becoming part of a modern soldier’s kit.

Meeting new challenges

The security environment in Europe is very different from what it was just a decade ago. There is no longer a requirement for heavy, static NATO forces and headquarters. Today, challenges can come from any direction, in a variety of forms, and can lie beyond Alliance borders. Peacekeeping in Bosnia, crisis management in Kosovo — these serve as vivid examples of the complexity and range of NATO’s new missions.

In Bosnia, the NATO-led Stabilisation Force has helped consolidate peace by providing a secure environment in which the difficult, but essential, task of reconstruction and reconciliation can take place. Moreover, the Alliance has forged new relations with various international organisations and agencies working to re-build the country, thus putting into practice our concept of mutually reinforcing institutions as an important source of synergy in peacekeeping and peace-building.

In Kosovo, the impending humanitarian crisis and escalating violence has caused intense concern in the international community, which has sought to put diplomatic pressure on the parties to stop the fighting and find a political settlement. Diplomatic pressure has had, however, to be backed up by the threat of military force. The Alliance has taken the necessary decisions to provide for this possibility. At the same time, NATO has carried out detailed operational planning and preparation for implementing the international
military aspects of a possible peace settlement. This shows that crisis management today requires a close coordination between political objectives and the means of arriving at and sustaining them. It also shows that we need to rise to the challenge posed by such rampant ethnic conflicts if we are truly to realise our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

At the same time, we are addressing other new challenges. It is of growing importance to Alliance governments, for example, to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. Still, we must be prepared for the fact that weapons of mass destruction pose a risk not only to our national territories but also to our troops involved in peacekeeping missions.

NATO is preparing proposals for the Washington Summit for an initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address this challenge appropriately and effectively. In addition to sharing information on the WMD problem among allies, we could foresee coordinating Alliance support for non-proliferation efforts.

Even as NATO is adapting, so is Europe. The European Union has adopted a common currency and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is only natural that NATO reflects and helps support this evolution. That is why I foresee an Alliance with a stronger European identity — a goal which all allies support.

New arrangements are helping shape a stronger European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. The adjustments made to the command structure now allow for European-led NATO operations and the Combined Joint Task Force initiative, soon to be fully implemented, will allow European allies to use NATO assets without necessarily involving the North American allies directly.

By making sure that the development of a robust European Security and Defence Identity remains firmly within a transatlantic framework, NATO will be able to ensure the indispensable material support of North America to European operations. This in turn will contribute to a more mature transatlantic relationship, where roles and responsibilities are shared more equally. The key elements of this new relationship, too, will be in place by the Summit.

Achieving the Alliance’s full potential

The Washington Summit will mark a historic stage in the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance. For the first 40 years, NATO was mainly preoccupied with collective defence against a unitary challenge. Over the last decade or so, the Alliance has been adapting to meet the rapid changes taking place in Euro-Atlantic security.

The Summit represents the culmination of that process and brings us closer than ever to achieving the full potential of the Washington Treaty as foreseen by its early fathers. In Washington, we will put the finishing touches to the new NATO: an Alliance committed and designed to enhancing stability and security for the entire Euro-Atlantic area through new mechanisms, new partnerships and new missions, well into the 21st century.
Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic partner

Jorge Domínguez
Minister of Defence of the Argentine Republic

Although geographically distant from Europe, Argentina too felt the effects of the East-West conflict and now seeks to participate fully in the new post-Cold War environment of international cooperation that has replaced it. In concrete terms, this is manifest in its participation in international peacekeeping operations, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is in this respect, Mr. Domínguez argues, that there is a natural convergence of interests between Argentina and NATO; this is why, in their shared pursuit of peace and cooperative security, Argentina strives to become NATO’s South Atlantic partner.

The end of the Cold War clearly had an immediate impact on continental Europe, where mutual distrust and antagonism had become firmly entrenched. The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolised the evaporation, virtually overnight, of the confrontation between East and West. The North Atlantic Alliance adapted to the transformation of the security environment in the early 1990s by opening a dialogue and promoting confidence-building measures with former Warsaw Pact countries, particularly through the Partnership for Peace programme. This process also led eventually to special partnership mechanisms with Russia and Ukraine.

These developments did not go unnoticed in South America, which may not have been on the frontline of the Cold War but did not escape its effects. In our part of the world, those were years of institutional instability, and on more than one occasion, internal political struggles mirrored the overarching ideological confrontation prevailing in the world. Key events in recent Latin American history were directly attributable to, or heavily influenced by, the Cold War paradigm.

A new era for Argentina

In the first half of the 1980s, Argentina, along with many other Latin American states, regained its democratic institutions after years of military rule. Inevitably, this process involved the fundamental redefinition of the role of the military, which gradually learned to exercise its specific functions under democratic control. These internal changes were underway at
the same time as global politics and security issues were being transformed. One of the salient features of Argentina’s new foreign and security policy — and an element in the redefinition of the mission of its armed forces — was an emphasis on participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world.

Fully consistent with Argentina’s longstanding commitment to this global organisation, this initiative signalled the beginning of a new era in terms of my country’s international involvement.

Argentina provided several battalions to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and went on to contribute troops and observers to a number of other operations, including those in Croatia, Haiti, Angola, Mozambique, Guatemala, Western Sahara, Kuwait, Lebanon, Eastern Slavonia and Cyprus. According to a recent summary of troop contributions to peacekeeping operations, Argentina is currently the eighth largest troop contributor in the world. Overall, almost 15,000 Argentine soldiers have participated in international operations.

In keeping with Argentina’s commitment to international peacekeeping, President Carlos Menem promoted the establishment of the Argentine Centre for Joint Training in Peacekeeping Operations (CAECOPAZ), which has been operating since 1995. Courses and seminars are provided to troops from around the world on a wide range of topics related to modern peacekeeping theory and practice, including military observers, force commanders and sub-commanders, military police and the disposal of landmines and explosives.

A directive on joint military planning stipulates that Argentine involvement in international peace operations is not limited to UN-sponsored activities, allowing for the possibility of taking part in other multinational efforts in cases where international peace and security are threatened. Argentina therefore decided to join the multinational coalition that confronted the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, sending warships, transport planes and 600 commissioned and non-commissioned officers to the Gulf area. Later, Argentine forces also joined in the successful normalisation mission in Haiti (1994), which helped prevent the crisis there from destabilising the entire Caribbean basin. Argentina has also supported the establishment of the Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade, known as the SHIRBRIG, an initiative of the Danish government aimed at ensuring the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions.

These decisions to send troops and resources to conduct difficult operations in distant places reflect Argentina’s fundamental political commitment to play an active role in the preservation of peace, as a responsible member of the international community. The new security environment makes the building of bridges of cooperation between like-minded countries essential for tackling the intricate security challenges in the post-Cold War era. More than ever, concerted action is the key to defence and security.

Argentina’s new defence policy is characterised by a cooperative approach to international security and we have sought to expand regional endeavours. Parallel to Argentina’s ongoing pursuit of economic integration through the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), military cooperation with its Brazilian, Uruguayan and Paraguayan partners has increased substantially. A significant programme of joint manoeuvres with Brazil and Uruguay is currently underway and a new series of exercises was also recently launched with Chile. This favourable conjunction of economic growth, commercial integration and political dialogue with its neighbours has in fact strengthened Argentina’s ability to continue supporting peacekeeping operations abroad.
It would of course be presumptuous to assert that this part of South America is free and protected from the uncertainties and challenges facing other areas of the world. However, the present climate of transparency and confidence-building between neighbours does provide a sound basis for stability in the western hemisphere as a whole, as well as lending credibility to Argentina’s participation in international operations.

In recognition of Argentina’s ongoing commitment and contribution to international peace and security, the United States government formally granted my country the status of major non-NATO ally in February 1998. This is the first time that this status has been accorded to a country in the Western hemisphere.

From dialogue to cooperation with NATO

NATO’s evolution and its openness to establishing mechanisms of cooperation and liaison with countries sharing the will to establish a peaceful and stable international order has been demonstrated by the Partnership for Peace programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the system of periodic conferences with selected states. At the same time, our decision to participate actively in peacekeeping and peace-building around the world has naturally led us to explore ways to establish a dialogue with NATO, an Alliance that includes 16 — soon to be 19 — countries with which Argentina enjoys good relations and shares the basic principles of democracy, respect for human rights, civil liberties and economic freedom.

Contacts between Argentina and NATO were initiated when the Foreign Minister of Argentina presented the central aspects of our international security policy to the Permanent Representatives of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in 1992 and again in 1994. These initial contacts led to further dialogue and visits, including my own visit to NATO Headquarters in September 1998.

There have also been contacts at the expert and working levels, including a seminar on global security we organised in Buenos Aires in 1993, which was attended by a number of experts and high level representatives from NATO and the allied nations. Discussion and exchanges focused on issues such as the new role of NATO in the post-Cold War world, global and regional security, and military aspects of global security. The convergence of views that emerged during the discussions reinforced the conviction that there was indeed a good basis for exploring more concrete avenues of cooperation, consistent with NATO’s own commitments and Argentina’s priorities and regional context.

The first concrete opportunity for closer cooperation with NATO came with our decision to participate in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the new Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU). The function of the MSU is to address the perceived security gap between the military level and that of the local police, who were not carrying out their responsibilities due to a series of factors inherent to the complexity of the situation on the ground. This situation was threatening the viability of the delicate process towards peace established by the Dayton peace agreement. The MSU was proposed as a preventive measure, operating under the direct command of SFOR with the military capabilities and police experience typical of national guard or gendarmerie-type organisations.

Argentina has contributed a company from its National Gendarmerie, an internal security force that already had extensive experience in international operations through its participation in the successive mis-

riage sponsored by the United Nations and the Organisation of American States in Haiti. More importantly in the context of SFOR, the Argentine National Gendarmerie also had previous experience in the former Yugoslavia, where many officers from the force had served as members of the International Police Task Force.
The Argentine gendarmes were trained and equipped in record time, and thanks to the cooperation of the lead nation in the MSU, Italy, the Argentine contingent was deployed in time for the September elections in Bosnia. Since then the MSU has worked efficiently to help guarantee the implementation of important aspects of the Dayton peace agreement and provide the security environment vital to fostering reconciliation and a return to normal life among the local population.

The presence in SFOR has also proved valuable to Argentina from a political viewpoint, providing the opportunity to participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in its SFOR configuration. It is our sincere hope that this presence will facilitate dialogue on security matters which, though focused on the specifics of Bosnia, would also allow for wider exchanges between NATO and Argentina.

**Civil-military interaction in peace operations**

Dick Zande
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, “Clingendael”

The international community is increasingly involved in supporting the transition from war to peace in situations of internal armed conflict. When military forces are deployed as part of the peace implementation effort, an effective interface is needed on the ground with the various civil organisations that carry out political, humanitarian and socio-economic tasks, as with NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author argues, however, that a structural approach to civil-military interaction needs to be introduced at the higher political level, to help better coordinate civil-military interaction at an early phase, something that should be incorporated into the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept when it is adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999.

In this interdependent security environment, Argentina — a country with a distinct Atlantic profile, which enjoys peace and harmony in its region and is a seasoned contributor to several multilateral endeavours around the world — has a significant contribution to make to the preservation of international peace and security. As part of this network of countries of common values and a shared vision, we recognise NATO as one of the indispensable driving forces in international security.

It is in this spirit that Argentine soldiers have joined forces with NATO and its partners in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same commonality of views and purpose shall guide us in future interaction with our friends on both sides of the North Atlantic. Argentina will continue to serve in the unique capacity of NATO’s South Atlantic partner, facing the common challenges of the future together.

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1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

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This article is based on the author’s book Building Blocks for Peace. Civil-Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies (available from the Clingendael Institute – tel: 00 32 70 324 53 84).

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of schools. Industrial production dropped to a mere 10 per cent of pre-war levels and the total cost of damage to the country is estimated at US$ 30-40 billion.

Each intra-state conflict has its particular characteristics but common denominators can be identified. They are often fuelled by ethnic, religious and historical-cultural factors. In most cases, the power of the state is eroded, with severe impacts on essential areas of civil society: the disruption of law and order and increasing violence; the disintegration of macro-economic structures and the growth of shadow economies, corruption and organised crime; and increasing violations of civil and human rights often leading to war crimes, including the extreme of genocide as in Rwanda and Bosnia.

In short, intrastate conflicts result in collapsed states and fractured societies. The deeper the wounds, the longer it takes to rebuild civil society. Frequently, the most serious damage is of a mental or psychological nature and overcoming the hatred and emotions generated during the conflict can take years, perhaps even generations.

Robust military forces

In the early 1990s, peacekeeping forces were often deployed during conflicts that were ongoing. While they performed a useful task in assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid, they were usually less successful in ending armed fighting. More importantly, United Nations “blue helmets” were frequently drawn deeper into the conflicts, risking attack, being taken hostage or even murdered. These experiences contributed to a growing reluctance to deploy ground forces in situations of ongoing internal armed conflict. The focus shifted to “post-conflict peace operations”: situations in which the parties have agreed to a negotiated settlement brought about by the international community, which then assists in its implementation.

Yet, even when the parties to a conflict have signed a peace agreement, robust military forces are often required to keep the peace. Both IFOR/SFOR(2) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995) and UNTAES(3) in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia (1996-98) operated under the mandate of Chapter VII(4) of the UN Charter (and SFOR continues to do so). These forces were structured and equipped to enforce compliance with the provisions of the peace agreements if necessary. Post-conflict peace operations demand, on the one hand, impartiality, the minimum use of force and diplomacy and, on the other, deterrence, robustness and the authority and capacity to enforce compliance with the provisions of the agreement if need be.

Civil operations

Ultimately though, successful civil implementation is the key to establishing sustainable peace. Usually many different international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are involved and, unfortunately, the resulting organisational complexity can easily lead to tensions, clashes between different bureaucracies and the waste of resources.

Civil institutions do not function like military staffs and the recruitment of personnel takes a long time. There are no ACTWARS, ACTREQS or ACTORDS(5) for civilian operations. They often have to be mounted from scratch, since there are no mechanisms for activating the necessary resources in advance to be ready for deployment should the need arise. In most cases, mission planning takes place after mission start, not before. In situations where a rational division of tasks and responsibilities is lacking at the strategic level, it will persist in the field to the detriment of effective peace implementation.

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(2) Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force.

(3) United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium.

(4) Action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. (Articles 39-51).

(5) Activation Warning, Activation Request and Activation Order, respectively, are NATO terms describing the steps leading up to activation of a military operation.
French and Hungarian SFOR engineers help rebuild the historic Mostar bridge in Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 1997. (Belga photo)

Efforts to improve civil preparedness and coordination are underway in the United Nations and other international organisations, as well as within some nations. For example, UN Headquarters has developed improved selection procedures and training programmes for civilian police and proposals have been made to establish a UN Standby Police Force. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Reform Programme of July 1997 also calls for improved coordination structures between all UN Agencies but no miracles should be expected. The concept of a single civilian command chain remains somewhat utopian and tensions between the many civil institutions involved are likely to persist.

Civil-military cooperation or CIMIC has proved essential in post-conflict peace operations for two main reasons. First, without security being guaranteed by the military, civil implementation tends to be very difficult and may even fail completely. Secondly, the skills, knowledge and assets of the military can play an important role in supporting the work of the parties and the civilian organisations. Without military support, civil implementation in complex situations is basically inconceivable, as has been underlined many times by the Office of the High Representative, as well as representatives of other international organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

NATO’s military authorities have already drawn many lessons from their experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In simple terms, the focus of CIMIC has shifted since the end of the Cold War era, from that of planning civil support for military operations to that of providing military support for civil peace-building operations. Doctrine and planning are being developed, training programmes have been set up, force proposals have been made, and nations are considering more structural ways of contributing to CIMIC.

The role of CIMIC should neither be overestimated nor underrated. First, it does not replace civil implementation — rather it supports civil efforts. Nevertheless, it has an essential role to play in filling the gap until the parties and civil organisations are in a position to carry the peace process forward by themselves. Secondly, CIMIC represents much more than the simple rebuilding of schools and hospitals in local communities, though these activities are clearly important and contribute to the generation of local support for the troops. CIMIC has a key role to play in nearly every aspect of civil implementation, whether it be the return of refugees and displaced persons, the restoration of law and order, economic reconstruction, rebuilding infrastructure, organising elections or estab-
lishing new institutions. It is the cement that holds the building blocks for peace together.

Lastly, in setting up future CIMIC requirements, the IFOR/SFOR experience must not be taken as the only yardstick. Each conflict has its specific context and peace agreements are made on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, in most post-conflict peace operations a wide range of similar civil activities has to be carried out with support from the military. There is a clear need for common CIMIC arrangements and structures but they must be flexible, so that they can be adapted to the situation at hand.

A broader framework

NATO CIMIC has been developed at the military level, both in the field and at the military-strategic level of NATO’s Military Authorities at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). However, this is not where decisions are made about peace agreements, about the various roles of international organisations in the implementation process and about the organisational relationship between them. Such decisions are taken at the higher political level.

The Alliance could contribute to the further improvement of peace implementation processes by developing a framework for civil-military interaction at this higher level. Such a framework could provide the context for a network of mutually-reinforcing relations between NATO and other international organisations involved in peace operations. Rather than creating new overarching bureaucratic structures, it should consist of liaison arrangements, which can be activated or expanded as required.

Routine links between international organisations could be used to share practical information on the capacity, structure and organisational characteristics of various international organisations, and to discuss and coordinate inputs to the drafting of peace agreements. This would help bridge the gap of cultural differences and misconceptions and contribute to rationalising tasks and the more efficient use of scarce resources. Coordinated contingency planning could be set up, reducing the time needed to prepare for peace implementation or other operations. Finally, this network could also be used to organise integrated training programmes, seminars and exercises.

The new Strategic Concept

NATO is currently redefining the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which is due to be presented at the Washington Summit in April. This concept will reflect the new tasks of the Alliance in leading peace operations, such as those that have been implemented together with partner countries in Bosnia and Herzegovina with such success. Given the essential role of civil-military interaction in these operations, it seems logical to include this element in the definition of NATO’s new tasks. It would demonstrate its political importance and provide the basis for developing more detailed arrangements and procedures, which could be incorporated in a broader framework for civil-military interaction at the strategic-political level.
The Southern Caucasus, comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is situated between the Black Sea to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east, bordering Russia, Turkey and Iran. Lying on the edge of great empires, the region has been of considerable geostrategic importance through the ages and it continues to be so today. Known since antiquity as a crossroads of peoples and cultures, there is probably no other area in the world of comparable size where so many languages are spoken.

The early 21st century appears to offer positive economic opportunities to the three countries of the Southern Caucasus, primarily because of their vast untapped potential. Azerbaijan is developing its energy resources in the Caspian Sea and the entire area has a stake in the existing or planned pipelines to pump oil and gas from the Caspian region.

Recognising the area’s potential, the European Union (EU) is sponsoring an initiative to encourage the revival of the ancient “Silk Road” through the planned Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia Corridor (known as “Traceca” for short). This corridor, which will offer the shortest and possibly cheapest route between Europe and the Far East, will be of great importance, not only to the countries of the Southern Caucasus but also to those of Central Asia and the Black Sea region, some of which are landlocked. The Traceca project should also help boost regional cooperation in the area.

The three Southern Caucasian countries have been through difficult times in the recent past. Fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh — an area within Azerbaijan inhabited essentially by ethnic Armenians — ended with an agreed cease-fire in May 1994. Since then, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the “Minsk Group” in particular, have been trying to find a workable political solution to the dispute.

Georgia has for its part had to cope with demands for autonomy from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The conflict in South Ossetia seems to be moving towards a settlement. As regards Abkhazia, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces have been patrolling the line separating Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia since the cease-fire in May 1994, which is being monitored by UN Military Observers. Recent bilateral and UN-sponsored talks showed progress towards a compromise acceptable to both sides.

This movement towards political stability offers all three countries the chance to regain economic momentum, which was severely compromised by the violence. There were sharp falls in industrial output in 1990-1993 and production did not begin to recover until 1995. In the same period, government expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) was extremely high in each of the three countries due to the heavy burdens of defence spending, refugees and subsidies to state enterprises.

More peaceful conditions have been accompanied by an upturn in output and a dramatic slowdown in the rate of inflation in all three countries, also making it possible to reduce military spending and revive taxable activities. The countries of the Southern Caucasus are similar in terms of their economic structure and state of development. Their economic integration is not in prospect but trade is increasing and economic ties are being forged.

Fostering political stability

Against a background of growing economic opportunities, it will be extremely important over the next few years for stabilisation and structural reform policies to be implemented, supported by investment and assistance from abroad. Alongside other international organisations — such as the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe — and without duplicating their efforts, NATO will continue to support the Southern Caucasian countries in their efforts to enhance political stability and in this way improve their prospects for economic development.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have long shown interest in cooperating with NATO. They signed up to
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and started to engage in concrete cooperation soon after the initiative was launched in 1994. In 1997, they were also closely associated with the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and took advantage of the new opportunities provided by an enhanced PfP. In spite of financial constraints, each of these three countries has developed a substantial “Individual Partnership Programme” with NATO, established a diplomatic mission to NATO Headquarters, and assigned an officer to the Alliance’s Partnership Cooperation Cell in Mons.

Stability in the Southern Caucasus is of great interest to Alliance member countries and to NATO as a whole, as demonstrated by Secretary General Javier Solana’s visits to the region in 1997 and again last autumn. NATO’s PfP programme along with other “Outreach” activities, particularly those focusing on scientific and environmental cooperation, are the Alliance’s main conduits for cooperating with the area. These programmes offer opportunities to create a more favourable environment for stable development in the whole Euro-Atlantic area. EAPC further enhances the potential for cooperation and confidence-building by providing a multilateral forum for the exchange of views on security matters of common concern and for discussion of proposals and initiatives in the framework of PfP.

NATO and the three countries are cooperating on a range of issues, including scientific collaboration and civil emergency planning. Armenia has benefited greatly from civil emergency planning activities and from NATO’s Science Programme. One project that NATO is helping to finance, which is of particular importance to Armenia, aims to link up the information systems of its institutes for seismological analysis with those of institutes in Greece, Italy and the UK.

Azerbaijan has intensified its cooperation with NATO over the last few years and developed a Partnership course at the Military Academy in Baku. The country will also host a meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group with partner countries in May 1999.
For its part, Georgia took the initiative to host an EAPC seminar on regional security in the Caucasus (described in more detail below), and organised a workshop on landmine clearance and bridge classification under the PfP armaments cooperation programme. Good use is also being made of the opportunities afforded Georgian scientists under NATO’s Science Programme.

Promoting regional security cooperation

Participation in the EAPC has already led to tangible practical results for the Southern Caucasus. The first ever EAPC regional security seminar was held in Gudauri, Georgia, in October 1998, attended by over 60 experts from more than 20 countries. Focusing on practical approaches to regional cooperation in the Southern Caucasus, the seminar covered a wide range of topics and included presentations by NATO staff on the Alliance’s cooperation with partner countries in areas such as science and environment, civil emergency planning and armaments cooperation.

Experts from NATO member states outlined bilateral assistance programmes in areas including defence resource management, the clean-up and conversion to civil use of former military sites, and the disposal of ammunition and explosives. Presentations by experts from partner countries focused on topics such as Baltic regional cooperation, the planned regional resource management training centre in Brasov (Romania), the downsizing of the Hungarian armed forces, international cooperation by the Russian Ministry of Emergency Planning (Emercom), and environmental cooperation between south-eastern European states. There was also open and constructive discussion among all participants of wider issues and challenges to security.

It is clearly up to each country in the Southern Caucasus to define the approach to security cooperation that is most appropriate to its particular regional environment but there are obvious advantages to pursuing security cooperation in the broader framework of the EAPC. Opening discussions to include all interested EAPC partners fosters confidence and security among nations, which should encourage countries to refrain from meeting in closed clubs. Moreover, the EAPC offers the countries the opportunity to learn from the experiences of other regions, which may have faced similar problems in the past. Last but not least, extending cooperation to a broader group of participants can often lead to economies of scale.

From high risk to high potential

The countries of the Southern Caucasus need to exploit their comparative advantages to promote their common welfare and transform the region from a zone of risk to one of opportunity. The region has abundant energy resources, a wealth of human resources, both at home and in the diaspora, and a location that provides invaluable links with the Black Sea countries to its west, Russia to its north, Central Asia to its east, and Turkey and Iran to its south. The region’s rich culture and its coastal and mountainous areas also lend it great potential for tourism.

During his trip to the region last autumn, Secretary General Solana encouraged leaders to fully exploit the potential of the EAPC and PfP, to make full use of NATO’s Science Programme, and to actively pursue regional cooperation. Hopefully, the themes addressed at the EAPC seminar in Georgia and the examples of cooperation outlined by participants from allied and other partner countries will serve to inspire the countries of the Southern Caucasus to explore ways of working together to foster security and stability.
Last October, NATO and the Russian Federation began a series of practical exercises in the area of air defence, with the aim of testing the compatibility of their equipment and procedures, in the context of possible future joint peace support operations. These tests are part of a broader programme of cooperation on offer to Partnership for Peace partners in the field of air defence.

The series of joint tests with Russia began with static loading exercises with Russian transport aircraft and NATO oversized air defence equipment, and will be followed by air-to-air refuelling tests later this year. These exercises are particularly opportune since they address aspects of two issues recently studied by the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC): the first concerns the transport means for airlifting oversized air defence equipment; the second looks at the contribution of air-to-air refuelling to air defence operations. These two support functions have become of higher importance to air defence in the new security environment, where mobility and greater endurance are required to cope with increased unpredictability, short timelines, reduced force levels and peacekeeping operations.

The first static loading test took place from 13 to 15 October 1998 at Kayseri air force base at the invitation of Turkey. A mobile NATO air defence radar (AN-TPS-64) was loaded into a Russian Iluyshin-76 transport aircraft employing the Russian loading technique of using trolleys to lift the load — a technique that turned out to be very efficient. The professionalism of the Russian and Turkish teams enabled the loading process, including the tie-down, to be completed within 90 minutes with practically no prior preparation.

The second static loading test involved a ground-based air defence weapon system and took place at Manching airbase from 8 to 10 December 1998 at the invitation of Germany. A Patriot radar set and launcher — together weighing more than 50 tonnes — were driven into an Antonov-22. The flawless operation took less than one hour, clearly demonstrating the professionalism of the two teams, who had never met before.

A third test is now being considered for later this year, involving a short-range ground-based air defence unit and an Antonov-124. This would complete the range of representative static loading tests.

Tests in the other key area of the programme, air-to-air refuelling, are scheduled to take place at Brize Norton in July at the invitation of the United Kingdom and at Mont de Marsan at the invitation of France. Ground tests involving French, British and Russian specialists with Iluyshin-78 tanker aircraft and exchanges on procedures and techniques are planned, as well as in-flight demonstrations of the interoperability of French and UK tanker and fighter assets.

This practical series of exercises, should lead to further cooperation in the area of air defence, contributing to the ability of NATO and Russia to work together in the field in possible future peace support operations. But it also serves as an example of the partnership potential between the Alliance and Russia in their shared interests of security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic area.
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Final Communiqué, Brussels, 8 December 1998

1. At our meeting today, we discussed preparations for the Alliance’s next Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999. At this Summit, which will mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, we will celebrate the historic achievements of NATO as a strong, united and successful Alliance and will welcome the three invited countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland - as members of the Alliance. The Summit will also provide an opportunity to define the Alliance’s role for the future, including ever closer relations with Partner countries. Accordingly, we recommend to our Heads of State and Government that at the Washington Summit they set out their shared vision of the Alliance in the years ahead - an Alliance adapted, renewed and ready to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

2. We were pleased with the successful completion by all Allies of the ratification process for the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Washington Treaty. We welcome the progress made in preparations for membership by the invited countries, and encourage them and the NATO Military Authorities to accelerate their efforts towards completion of the relevant minimum military requirements of the Alliance. The membership of these countries will contribute to an overall strengthening of the Alliance and to enhancing security and stability in Europe. We look forward to welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as our new Allies before the Washington Summit.

3. We reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with Paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. Taking into account a report on the intensified dialogue on membership questions, we reviewed this process, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government, in preparation for the comprehensive review which they will carry out at their meeting in Washington. We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalise our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.

4. We received a comprehensive report describing the progress made in our internal adaptation, to which we continue to attach great importance. The fundamental objectives of this adaptation are to maintain the Alliance’s military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defence capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. Implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept and preparations for implementation of the new command structure are well in hand. Our aim is to have the necessary preparations completed to enable the Council to take a single and irreversible decision on the activation requests of all headquarters of the new NATO command structure by the beginning of March 1999, and we tasked the Council in Permanent Session accordingly.

5. We reviewed the progress made in building the ESDI within NATO and welcome the close cooperation and consultation with the WEU in this regard. Regular meetings of the NATO and WEU Councils in Joint Session and of subordinate bodies, and arrangements for close consultation on the planning and conduct of WEU-led operations and exercises involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities, are important elements of the development of ESDI within the Alliance. Preparation within the Alliance for WEU-led operations making use of Alliance assets and capabilities is now well advanced. In this context, we welcome the results of the joint workshop on the NATO-WEU consultation process and look forward to a crisis management seminar in February 1999, leading up to a joint NATO-WEU crisis management exercise in 2000. We appreciate the steady strengthening of cooperative links between NATO and the WEU which was reaffirmed at the WEU Council of Ministers held in Rome on 16th-17th November.

6. We reviewed the ongoing work on the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. This work must ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance’s new security environment. It should reaffirm our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link; take account of the challenges the Alliance now faces; and present an Alliance ready and with a full range of capabilities to enhance security and stability for countries in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership, and, where appropriate, non-Article 5 crisis response operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. We instructed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue this work vigorously so that the new text is available by the time of the Washington Summit.

7. We welcome the EAPC’s substantial updated Action Plan for 1998 - 2000 which includes exploring new issues. In the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues, these would include arms control, political and defence efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles, and arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers and means of encouraging de-mining.

We welcome as a positive development the inauguration last June of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which has already coordinated emergency aid for relief operations in Albania and Ukraine.

The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defence-related cooperation across a wide range of issues.

We note with satisfaction the ongoing discussions with Partners on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PFP operations. This will enhance future cooperation by establishing a basis for
Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making, command arrangements and operational planning for NATO-led non-Article 5 operations. The political-military framework will be a key element in future cooperation and will provide for an increased role of Partners in one of the Alliance’s major new tasks. The intention is to finalise this work, in tandem with the Strategic Concept, by the Washington Summit.

We welcome the Concept for PIP Training Centres, which will advance the broad politico-military goals of PIP’s overall education and training efforts, particularly in supporting enhanced military cooperation and interoperability.

We are pleased that a substantial number of interested Partner countries are taking up the opportunity, provided under the expanded Planning and Review Process (PARP), to adopt initial Partnership goals in Spring 1999. This is an important effort towards closer Partner cooperation with Alliance structures and procedures, in particular by enhancing interoperability, a priority for the Alliance.

We welcome the increased attention given to multinational formations as a means to enhance military cooperation between Allies and Partners, as in IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We tasked the Council in Permanent Session to put together, with Partners, the initiatives above and other work now underway to form a coherent package of measures intended to reinforce PIP’s operational capabilities for the Washington Summit.

Partnership for Peace programmes can also play an important role in contributing to Alliance efforts in reinforcing regional stability, such as in the Balkans. In this context, the Alliance has promoted, with participation of Partners, a substantive programme of assistance to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

8. We are encouraged by the developing process of consultation and practical cooperation with Russia under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council (PIC) and remain committed to working together with Russia to achieve a strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of common interest, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

The crisis in Kosovo has confirmed the value of the PIC as a consultative forum. The ongoing SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a valuable example of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

We are pleased that military-to-military cooperation is progressing well, and that agreement has been reached on the establishment of a NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow by the end of this year.

We look forward to signing with Russia a Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Protection and to establishing as soon as possible a NATO Information Office in Moscow. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee, which recently held its inaugural meeting in Moscow; agreement on the establishment of an Information and Consultation Centre in Moscow on the retraining of retired military personnel; and Russian participation in the PIP exercise “Cooperative Assembly”. We will continue to work closely with Russia to develop an updated and substantial Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) to include a wide range of practical defence-related and military-to-military cooperative activities.

9. We reaffirm our view that Ukraine has a key role to play in European security. We attach importance to the development of strong and active practical cooperation and political consultations with Ukraine, under the aegis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter. We welcome the announcement by the President of Ukraine of a “State Programme of Cooperation with NATO to the Year 2001” as a tangible signal of Ukraine’s commitment to a productive relationship with NATO.

We intend to utilise as fully as possible the potential offered by Ukraine’s active participation in enhanced PIP and the agreed NATO-Ukraine Work Plan for 1999. We also note with satisfaction the growing military cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The newly established NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is a unique partnership programme.

We welcome the agreement to be signed tomorrow on the appointment of two NATO liaison officers to Kyiv to enhance mutual cooperation. We will continue to support an active information effort in Ukraine through the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv.

10. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We therefore give great attention to our Mediterranean Dialogue which is part of the Alliance’s cooperative approach to security, contributes to building confidence with participating countries and mutually reinforces other international efforts towards this end. We look forward to the positive contribution that the newly designated Allied Contact Point Embassies will have in fostering the Dialogue. We are committed to further improving the political, civil and military aspects of our Dialogue. We encourage Partners in the Dialogue to take full advantage of all its possibilities, including in the military field. We are ready to consider possibilities to enhance cooperation with participating countries in preparation for the Washington Summit.

11. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Missions has opened a new stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE. Through the close coordination with the OSCE over the past months in the planning and establishment of these missions, and our continuing cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have further demonstrated in practice our ability to work together in crisis situations.

We also welcome the strengthening of relations between NATO and the OSCE over the past year, in the spirit of the OSCE’s Common Concept for the Development of Cooperation between Mutually Reinforcing Institutions. We continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, worthy of adoption at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. We welcome the outcome of the OSCE Oslo Ministerial of 2nd-3rd December 1998.

12. We continue to consider the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security. We are committed to a successful adaptation of the Treaty. We will play our full part in seeking to complete this by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. To this end, we will support efforts aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues and the start of drafting work in the first months of next year. To assist this process, the North Atlantic Council and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have today issued a separate statement entitled “Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Restraint and Flexibility.” Pending Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty, we regard continued strict implementation of the current Treaty and its associated documents as vital.

13. We welcome the communiqué of the five nuclear weapons states on 4th June this year affirming their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call on Russia to ratify the START II Treaty without delay. This would pave the way for considerable reductions of nuclear arsenals and would allow negotiations on a START III Treaty aiming at further far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles. We remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and call upon all countries to accede to and implement the Treaty in due course. We support the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

14. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. We note the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation regarding the activities of the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. The Alliance and its members remain committed to preventing proliferation and to reversing it, should it occur, through diplomatic means. At the same time, we recognise that proliferation can pose a direct threat to the Alliance. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation, we are prepared to expand NATO’s efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat. We therefore task the Council in Permanent Session to prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.
15. We underline the risk to international and regional stability posed by the spread of NBC weapons. In particular, we urge all countries to accede to and fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation régime.

16. We are determined to achieve progress on a legally binding protocol including effective verification measures to enhance compliance and promote transparency that strengthens the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We re-emphasise the importance of universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

17. We call on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the Open Skies Treaty without delay.

18. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism and reaffirm our determination to combat it in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation.

STATEMENT ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December 1998

1. NATO continues to support the efforts of the international community to help Bosnia and Herzegovina develop as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. This remains achievable only through the full and unconditional implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which the Alliance is fully committed. SFOR continues to play a vital role in maintaining a secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We reaffirm our readiness to work constructively with all Parties that support the Peace Agreement and seek to implement it.

2. Much has been achieved over the past three years in the task of re-building Bosnia and Herzegovina. The September elections were an encouraging step in this direction; they were peaceful and democratic and demonstrated a trend towards greater pluralism and tolerance. Freedom of movement and large exists; there is a common currency, a new flag and other necessary symbols of nationhood. We welcome the recent opening of Tuzla International Airport and the progress made in establishing normal civilian air traffic at Sarajevo and Mostar.

3. There nevertheless still much to be done to reinforce the fragile democracy taking root in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rule of law has yet to be established throughout the country as a whole. The common institutions so vital to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single state have not advanced sufficiently. There is inadequate progress with regard to ethnic integration, dismantling illegal institutions and eradicating widespread corruption. We expect the newly elected leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina to assume their full and active responsibility for peace implementation. A peaceful, stable and prosperous future for Bosnia and Herzegovina will only be achievable if the Parties fully live up to their commitments under the Peace Agreement.

4. An accelerated return of refugees and displaced persons in particular to minority areas is a key task for 1999. We confirm that SFOR will continue, within means and capability, its efforts to contribute to conditions conducive to achieving this objective. We call on the Parties and the democratically elected representatives at all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill their responsibility to ensure an effective returns process.

5. Economic reconstruction is still at an early stage; the reforms necessary for achieving sustained economic development and growth are not yet in place. The Parties must introduce liberal and modern mechanisms within their economic institutions and markets to ensure a self-supporting economy.

6. Progress in these areas, for which the Parties are primarily responsible, is important for creating the conditions in which peace is self-sustaining and a NATO-led military presence is no longer needed.

7. We underline our full and continued support to the High Representative in his role of coordinating and guiding the strategy of the international community for civil implementation. We support his efforts to improve coordination and harmonise the different areas of responsibility of the various international organisations involved in the peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8. We look forward to the meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Madrid on 15-16 December, 1998, which will give further guidance to the efforts by the international community to secure lasting peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9. We noted with satisfaction the unique contribution of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in providing, within its means and capabilities, broad support for civil implementation of the Peace Agreement of 1995. The Multinational Specialised Unit, which we created last May, enhances the effectiveness and flexibility of SFOR. We commend the men and women of SFOR for their outstanding service in the cause of peace. SFOR continues to make an important contribution to stability and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10. SFOR will continue, within means and capability, to assist and coordinate closely and efficiently in particular with:

- the High Representative in the implementation of the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement;
- the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as a matter of high priority, in the phased and orderly return of refugees in particular to minority areas;
- the UN International Police Task Force in the reform and restructuring of the local police;
- the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia including by detaining and transferring prisoners indicted for war crimes to The Hague and by providing security for exhumations; and
- the OSCE in providing support for the building of democratic institutions.

SFOR will also provide support to entity armed forces in conducting humanitarian de-mining as a key contribution to civil reconstruction and rehabilitation.

11. However, SFOR’s presence cannot be maintained indefinitely nor does it reduce the responsibility of the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the stability of their country, which is best secured through full implementation of the Peace Agreement. In reviewing the size and shape of SFOR, we have decided that, at present, there is no scope for major changes, nor should its mission be changed. We note, however, that there is scope for short-term efficiency measures. We have also endorsed the commissioning of a study of options for possible longer term and more substantial adjustments in the future size and structure of SFOR. Decisions on future reductions will be taken in the light of progress on implementation of the Peace Agreement.

12. We strongly support the continuing implementation of confidence-building measures at the local and regional level. We look forward to the beginning of arms control negotiations, as provided for in the Peace Agreement, with the goal of establishing a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia, including appropriate verification arrangements. We call on the Parties to commit themselves to the promotion of confidence and cooperation between their armed forces within the framework of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.
STTATEMENT ON KOSOVO
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 8 December 1998

1. NATO’s aim has been to contribute to international efforts to stop the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, end the violence there and bring about a lasting political settlement. NATO’s decisions in October made a crucial contribution to the withdrawal of forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from Kosovo and helped to avert a humanitarian disaster. The Alliance’s enhanced state of military readiness continues.

2. The security situation in Kosovo remains of great concern to us. Since the beginning of November, violent incidents provoked in some cases by Serbian security forces and in others by armed Kosovar elements have increased tension. These incidents show that both the Belgrade authorities and the armed Kosovar elements have failed to comply fully with the requirements set out in UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203. We call upon the armed Kosovar elements to cease and desist from provocative actions and we call upon the FRK and Serbian authorities to reduce the number and visibility of MUP special police in Kosovo and abstain from intimidating behaviour.

3. We insist that both sides maintain scrupulously the ceasefire and comply fully with the UN Security Council resolutions. We also expect them to facilitate the war crimes investigations by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In this connection, we deplore the denial of visas to ICTY investigators. Continued violence between FRY and Serbian forces and armed Kosovar elements jeopardises prospects for a political settlement for which an opportunity now exists.

4. We remain firmly convinced that the problems of Kosovo can only be resolved through a process of open and unconditional dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and representatives of the Kosovar leadership. We therefore strongly urge all parties to move rapidly in a spirit of compromise and accommodation to conclude the negotiating process led by Ambassador Hill in which they are engaged. We reafirm our support for a political solution which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration, and which preserves the territorial integrity of the FRY, and safeguards the human and civil rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo, whatever their ethnic origin. We believe that stability in Kosovo is linked to the democratisation of the FRY and we support those who are genuinely engaged in that process. In this regard, we condemn recent actions taken by President Milosevic to suppress the independent media and political pluralism in Serbia. We welcome the steps the Government of Montenegro has taken to protect the independent media, promote democratic reforms and ensure respect for the rights of all of its citizens.

5. We will continue the Alliance’s air verification mission, Operation “Eagle Eye”, in accordance with the agreement between the FRY and NATO, and communicate periodically to the UN Secretary-General NATO’s views on compliance.

6. We intend to cooperate fully with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The security and safety of the OSCE verifiers is of the utmost importance to us. We call on the FRY government to meet its responsibilities in this regard, as set out in UNSCRs 1199 and 1203 and the OSCE-FRY agreement of 16th October. We expect the FRY and Serbian authorities, as well as the Kosovar communities, to cooperate fully with the OSCE KVM, in particular by respecting its freedom of movement and right of access and by ensuring that its personnel are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind. We also expect the FRK and Serbian authorities to continue to allow unhindered access to international relief organisations including by issuing the necessary visas.

7. The North Atlantic Council has authorised an Activation Order (ACTORD) for a NATO-led Extraction Force, Operation “Joint Guarantor”. We will quickly deploy the standing elements of this force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to provide the ability to withdraw personnel of the OSCE KVM in an emergency. We greatly appreciate the cooperation and support of the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in providing facilities for the basing of NATO forces.

8. We welcome the willingness of Partner countries to join with NATO in contributing to the solution of the Kosovo crisis either by participating in the NATO-led air verification mission or by offering the use of their airspace or other facilities in support of NATO’s efforts. We will continue to consult closely with all Partner countries on the Alliance’s actions in respect of the Kosovo crisis.

STATEMENT ON CFE
Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the Three Invited Countries, Brussels, 8 December 1998

ADAPTATION OF THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE): RESTRAINT AND FLEXIBILITY

The North Atlantic Council and the Representatives of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland stated on behalf of the 19 Governments represented the following:

1. The CFE Treaty will continue to be a cornerstone of European security. The States Parties have an historic opportunity and responsibility to adapt this legally-binding document to meet new security realities and ensure the Treaty’s long-term effectiveness.

2. We, the North Atlantic Council, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are committed to seek early and balanced progress on all outstanding Adaptation issues. Our objective is the signature of an Adapted Treaty by Heads of State and Government at the next OSCE Summit in 1999. We call on all other States Parties to contribute actively to realizing this goal.

3. Consistent with this objective, we reaffirm our commitment to maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with our legitimate security needs, taking into account our obligations under international law. We have no intention of using the adaptation Negotiations to secure narrow political or military advantages. CFE Treaty Adaptation should enhance the security of all States in Europe, whether or not they are members of a political military Alliance.

4. In Vienna, we have put forward a comprehensive series of detailed proposals dealing with all aspects of adaptation. These are designed to ensure continued predictability and transparency as well as a greater degree of stability in the European military environment and a further lowering of holdings of Treaty Limited Equipment among the CFE States Parties, consistent with the requirement of conflict prevention and crisis management.
5. In the context of a suitably adapted and legally binding CFE Treaty whose provisions meet our security needs, including our requirements for flexibility, we will continue to exercise restraint in relation to the levels and deployments of our conventional armed forces in all parts of the Treaty’s Area of Application. This statement sets out how we would use the proposed mechanisms of an Adapted Treaty:

- Our military posture would reflect our common determination that, in the current and foreseeable security environment, we will carry out our collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial ground or air combat forces.

- There would be significant reductions in permitted levels of Treaty Limited Equipment for many of us.

- Consistent with our previous proposals and in the context of comparable restraint from others in the region, many of us in and around Central Europe would not increase our Territorial Ceilings - the total levels of tanks, artillery and ACVs permitted on a permanent basis on our territories.

- Moreover, any temporary presence of Treaty Limited Equipment on our territories would be directly governed by the relevant legally-binding provisions of the Adapted Treaty.

- We and all our Treaty Partners would undertake broad and unprecedented transparency and predictability in our military activities.

- We would continue to pursue opportunities for cooperative efforts, not just among ourselves but with our partners, in crisis management and conflict prevention.

- We expect all other CFE States Parties to exercise comparable restraint, and working together as partners, to strengthen this new pattern of cooperative security in Europe as we continue our work on the complex task of adapting the CFE Treaty to better meet new security challenges.

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### On Ceilings and Holdings

6. An important goal of CFE Treaty Adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) permitted in the Treaty’s Area of Application. States Parties have already agreed to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure of the original Treaty with a new system of limitations based on National Ceilings (NCs) and Territorial Ceilings (TCs). This system will be more constraining than the Treaty’s current structure of limits on the amount of equipment that may be located in large geographic zones.

7. Many of us have already indicated in Vienna the intention to accept limits on national equipment entitlements that are more restrictive than under the current Treaty. This was an early signal of the restraint with which we are determined to approach the adaptation process. Some Allies, in the context of a satisfactory Treaty package, are prepared to consider further reductions where possible.

8. The system of Territorial Ceilings itself ensures strict limits on deployments across national boundaries. Our proposals make clear that we see adjustment of Territorial Ceilings as a procedure to address long-term shifts in security needs, and not as a means to achieve tactical flexibility. Consistent with that approach we have proposed that all adjustments to Territorial Ceilings above a specified equipment level be agreed by consensus of the Treaty Parties. We reaffirm our proposed “specific stabilising measures” which, inter alia, would require certain States Parties to set their Territorial Ceilings no higher than current maximum national levels for holdings and not revise them upward. In this context, some other nations may be prepared, in the framework of a satisfactory Treaty package, to renounce the flexibility of adjustment of ceilings, also subject to review at a specified time.

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### Stationing

9. On 14 March 1997 the North Atlantic Council stated that: “In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces’. The governments of the 16 members of the Alliance reaffirm and the governments of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland associate themselves with this Statement, in its entirety.

10. This Statement covers ground and air combat forces. It does not relate to headquarters or other military support activities needed to meet our military requirements for reinforcement, interoperability or integration. We will provide further evidence of our intentions as to any future stationing through increased transparency with regard to our defence plans and programmes.

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### Treaty Mechanisms

11. The long-term nature of the Treaty, the fundamentally constraining function of the system of National and Territorial Ceilings, the existence of security uncertainties, and the difficulty of predicting the future, all make it important that States Parties can manage crises within the framework of the Adapted Treaty. The proposed System of Temporary Deployments above TCs is designed to meet this need. In fulfillment of our commitment to restraint, we will make use of the Temporary Deployment provisions of an Adapted Treaty only in a manner consistent with strengthening overall and regional stability in Europe. Any such deployment used for crisis management purposes should have a stabilising effect. Its size, structure and composition will be geared to the crisis situation underlying its immediate tasks. While reserving the right under an Adapted Treaty to use fully such flexibilities as Exceptional Temporary Deployments above and headroom below Territorial Ceilings, in order to meet future contingencies, in the current and foreseeable security environment, we do not expect circumstances requiring deployments on the Territory of any State Party in excess of the TLE levels we have proposed for Exceptional Temporary Deployments. In addition, we will seek to prevent any potentially threatening broader or concurrent build-up of conventional forces. We expect other States Parties to exercise similar restraint. To this end, we declare:

- It is not, and will not be, our policy to use Temporary Deployment provisions for the purpose of permanent stationing of combat forces.

- Without prejudice to the national right to use headroom under TCs, we will exercise restraint with regard to the levels of any equipment temporarily deployed. We undertake to use fully any headroom, where available, prior to any implementation of the Treaty’s Temporary Deployment right to exceed TCs. This will have the effect of minimizing the actual amount of any equipment temporarily in excess of the TC.

- Similarly, our use of Exceptional Temporary Deployment (ETD) provisions under an adapted Treaty will not be routine. In the current and foreseeable security environment, we do not envisage circumstances requiring frequent resort to ETDS. Nor do we see the concept of such deployments as directed against any specific country.

- Because such an occurrence would be unusual, it will be accompanied by appropriate political measures, within the OSCE, through which the nature of the exceptional circumstances having given rise to any ETD might be explained. We have proposed that the Adapted Treaty include significantly enhanced opportunities for transparency and verification in connection with any such deployment.

- We will ensure that our use of Treaty flexibilities does not result in TLE in excess of a Territorial Ceiling by more than the amount permitted for an ETD.

12. Increased transparency will be essential in providing the basis for our approach to the above issues and should provide greater opportunities to monitor compliance to match the spirit of openness prevalent in Europe today. We are also taking parallel action in Vienna to provide greater transparency concerning new or substantially improved military infrastructure and, more broadly, militarily significant activities and developments.
1. The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) met in Brussels today. The Secretary-General of the Western European Union also attended the meeting.

2. The Secretary General of NATO informed the EAPC about the results of the North Atlantic Council meeting earlier on that day.

3. Ministers exchanged views on “Future Security Challenges and NATO-Partner Cooperation in the context of EAPC and PfP”. They discussed in particular the situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. They underlined the importance of the consultations that had taken place with Partners on Kosovo to inform them of the status of NATO’s contingency planning, and welcomed the expanded opportunities that the EAPC provides for such detailed consultations. In particular, Ministers underscored the urgent need for finding a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo and the necessity for the parties in the conflict to comply fully with relevant UNSC Resolutions. Ministers noted NATO’s supporting role and close co-ordination with the OSCE in helping re-create stability and security in the region. On Bosnia, Ministers welcomed the continued supportive role of SFOR in support of full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.

4. On the basis of a comprehensive report, Ministers reviewed progress achieved on the implementation of the EAPC Basic Document and on the enhancement of the Partnership for Peace. They exchanged views on effective ways to further intensify cooperation within the EAPC/PfP framework.

5. Ministers exchanged views on the continuing work on the development of a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP Operations that addresses the participation of Partners in operational planning, in command arrangements and Partner involvement in political consultations and decision-making. They endorsed the aim to finalise work on the framework by the time of the Washington Summit. They welcomed the first steps that have been taken to implement the expanded and adapted PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). Ministers welcomed the valuable contribution to the Partnership that has been made by the 39 Partner Officers selected to serve in international positions in the 8 PfP Staff Elements at selected NATO Headquarters. Ministers also took note of a concept for PfP training centres, which will contribute to enhancing training, education and interoperability, and of the development of a policy framework for PfP internships on NATO’s International Staff. Ministers welcomed the beginning of discussions on multinational formations as an additional element of the more operational partnership now taking shape.

6. Ministers endorsed and agreed to make public an updated EAPC Action Plan for 1998-2000, worked out jointly by all EAPC member states. As laid out in the Action Plan, and following established practice, EAPC Ministers agreed that their Ambassadors should establish a schedule of priority consultations and cooperation activities to be carried out in the period leading up to their next meeting.

7. Ministers welcomed continuing work on practical security cooperation in the EAPC, and underlined the valuable contribution that regional cooperation can make to the overall security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. They exchanged information on a number of regional cooperation efforts.


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**UPDATED EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) ACTION PLAN 1998 - 2000**

**SECTION I**

**SHORT-TERM PLANNING**

Organisation of EAPC work (Inter-Ministerial work schedule, including political and security-related consultations and practical cooperation)

As a follow-up to each regular meeting of EAPC Foreign Ministers, EAPC Ambassadors will establish a work schedule for consultations on political and security-related issues as well as on practical cooperation activities under the EAPC Action Plan, leading up to the following Ministerial meeting. Topics to be discussed in that period will be dictated by political and security-related developments and take into account the Ministerial meetings just completed, including the EAPC Defence Ministers’ meeting. The schedule may be adjusted as necessary. Other meetings such as in Alliance+ and other formats will be scheduled on a case-by-case basis. The EAPC will be kept informed by its Chairman on relevant developments within the Alliance.

According to the EAPC Basic Document, specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult in the framework of the EAPC, may include but not be limited to: political and security related matters; crisis management; regional matters; arms control issues; nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) proliferation and defence issues; international terrorism; defence planning and budgets and defence policy and strategy; security impacts of economic developments. There is also scope for consultations and cooperation on issues such as: civil emergency and disaster preparedness; armaments cooperation under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); nuclear safety; defence related environmental issues; civil-military coordination of air traffic management and control; scientific cooperation; and issues related to peace support operations.

As a working method, open-ended groups of EAPC members may prepare, on an ad-hoc basis, discussion papers on specific issues or regional security cooperation matters to stimulate focused and result-oriented discussions in the plenary session of the EAPC. The EAPC plenary would pass on ideas and suggestions for practical cooperation developed in this framework to relevant committees for any appropriate follow-up. The EAPC will consider, based on evolving practical experience, whether these working methods would need improvement, adaptation or extension.

In the period leading to April 1999, preparatory work for the planned meeting of the EAPC leaders held in conjunction with the NATO Washington Summit will be part of the work schedule.
SECTION II
LONG-TERM PROGRAMME FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION

Political And Security-Related Issues

Topics
1. Regional matters
2. Cooperation with the OSCE and other international institutions on security issues
3. Practical cooperation issues
4. Other topics to be defined

Activities
1. Seminars, workshops, expert meetings, briefings and exchange of information on Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo
2. Discussion on the role of PfP training centers and PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes in future EAPC/PfP cooperation

Events planned for 1999
1. Two seminars/workshops on regional security cooperation
2. Meetings of NATO Regional Experts with experts from Partner countries (dates t.b.d.)

Committee support
- EAPC in Political Committee session
Staff Support
- International Staff, Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate

Policy Planning

Topic
1. Mid- and long-term foreign and security policy issues

Activities
1. Meetings of NATO’s Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in EAPC format

Events planned for 1999
1. One meeting of APAG in EAPC format to be held in Azerbaijan

Committee support
- EAPC in Political Committee session
Staff Support
- International Staff, Political Affairs Division, Political Directorate

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues

Topics
1. Arms control
2. Political and defence efforts against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles.
3. Arms trafficking, control of small arms transfers, and means of encouraging de-mining

Activities
1. Consultations and expert meetings

Events planned for 1999
1. One meeting of EAPC/PC with disarmament experts (date t.b.d.)
2. Ad hoc consultations on proliferation

Committee support
- EAPC in Political Committee session
Staff Support
- International Staff, Political Affairs Division; Defence Planning and Operations Division

Implementation of arms control agreements

Topics
1. Conventional arms control, implementation and verification

Activities
1. Consultations and expert meetings, seminars, workshops
Events planned for 1999

1. Seminar in Skopje on "Infrastructure Relationship and Transfrontier Economic Cooperation in South Eastern Europe" (March 1999)
2. Seminar in Vilnius on "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Defence Spending" (May 1999)
3. Annual NATO Economics Colloquium (June 1999)
4. Seminar in Riga on "Economic Aspects of Military Base Management" (October 1999)
5. Meeting on "Financial Assessment and Planning of Defence Budgets and Expenditures" (date to be determined)
6. Seminar in Vienna on "The Role of the Private Sector in Defence" (to be confirmed – date to be determined)
7. Exchange on "Real Cost of Defence as Measured in Purchasing Power Parities" (format to be determined)
8. Examining how computer networks can facilitate contacts and promote more effective cooperation among scientists through the use of experts;
9. Distribution of NATO video footage and photos

Committee support
- EAPC in Economic Committee Session

Science

Topics
1. Participation in the Science for Peace Programme
2. Cooperation in other NATO science programmes involving primarily, but not exclusively, priority areas to be determined annually in consultation with Partner countries

Activities
1. Supporting applied science and technology projects that relate to industrial, environmental or security-related problems;
2. Meeting of Science Committee in EAPC format at least once a year;
3. Participation of scientists from partner countries in Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) and Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), as well as the holding of such meetings in Partner countries;
4. Participation of scientists from Partner countries in Collaborative Research Grants, Linkage Grants, Science Fellowships and Expert Visit Grants;
5. Sending proceedings of NATO’s scientific meetings to a central library in each eligible Partner country and disseminating other literature on the Science Programme to scientists in Partner countries;
6. Sponsoring visits of experts from Partner countries when invited by project directors in NATO member countries;
7. Assisting Partners through the use of NATO’s network of referees and experts;
8. Examining how computer networks can facilitate contacts and promote more effective cooperation among scientists through the use of Networking Infrastructure Grants and Networking Supplements to Linkage Grants

Committee support
- Science Committee in EAPC format

Information

Topics
1. Contribution to increased understanding of NATO and its policies and to a more informed debate on security matters
2. Exploration of expectations including public expectations of the information programme

Activities
1. Information about NATO and its policies will be made available to target audiences in cooperation partner countries, including selected institutions and organizations, inter alia through embassies of NATO member countries serving as contact points and other diplomatic liaison channels
2. Continue and further intensify information-related cooperation with institutions established in cooperation partner countries interested and able to provide the necessary facilities, support personnel and services
3. Visits to NATO by target groups
4. Sponsorship of a number of experts from cooperation partner countries to attend security-related seminars in Allied countries
5. Co-sponsorship with cooperation partners of seminars/workshops in cooperation partner countries
6. Presentations by NATO speakers in cooperation partner countries
7. Fellowships for academics (individual and institutional support)
8. Increased dissemination of NATO documentation and information materials in languages of cooperation partners, and dissemination of information by electronic means
9. Distribution of NATO video footage and photos
10. Press tours to NATO and Partner countries

Events planned for 1999
1. One meeting of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) with EAPC partners (date t.b.d.)
2. NATO’s 50th Anniversary
3. Conference to celebrate 5 years of PfP hosted by Romania.

Committee support
- Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) in EAPC format

Staff Support
- International Staff/Office of Information and Press
SECTION III

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Topics
1. Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness

Activities
1. Further development of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response capability
   (This effort will include cooperation with UN bodies responsible for disaster relief)

Committee support
- Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in EAPC format

Staff Support
- The EADRCC, International Staff/Infrastructure, Logistics and Civil Emergency Planning Division, NMA’s as appropriate

SECTION IV

PFP AREAS OF COOPERATION

As stipulated by the EAPC Basic Document, Partnership for Peace in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within the flexible framework created by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. PFP will maintain the Alliance+1 character reflected in the Individual Partnership Programmes, as well as the principle of self-differentiation. In that context, PFP will provide increased scope for regional cooperation activities.

Topics and activities undertaken in the PFP are included in the PFP Partnership Work Programme which is a separate document. Below are listed the generic agreed areas of cooperation that will be updated every two years.

1. Air Defence related matters (ADF)
2. Airspace Management/Control (ASM)
4. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP)
5. Crisis Management (CRM)
6. Democratic Control of Forces and Defence Structures (DCF)
7. Defence Planning, Budgeting and Resource Management (DPB)
8. Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence Procurement Programmes and International Cooperation in the Armaments Field (DPM)
9. Defence Policy and Strategy (DPS)
10. Planning, Organisation and Management of National Defence Research and Technology (DRT)
11. Military Geography (GEO)
12. Language Training (LNG)
13. Consumer Logistics (LOG)
14. Medical Services (MED)
15. Meteorological Support for NATO/Partner Forces (MET)
16. Military Infrastructure (MIF)
17. NBC Defence and Protection (NBC)
18. Conceptual, Planning and Operational Aspects of Peacekeeping (PKG)
19. Operational, Materiel and Administrative Aspects of Standardisation (STD)
20. Military Exercises and Related Training Activities (TEX)
21. Military Education, Training and Doctrine (TRD)

STATEMENT OF THE NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION

Meeting at Foreign Ministers’ level, Brussels, 9 December 1998

The NATO-Ukraine Commission met today in Foreign Ministers’ session at NATO HQ in Brussels. Ministers witnessed the signature by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Foreign Minister of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk of a Memorandum of Understanding between NATO and Ukraine on the appointment of two NATO Liaison Officers in Kyiv. These officers will work both to facilitate Ukraine’s full participation in PFP and to enhance contacts between NATO and Ukrainian authorities. NATO expects to appoint the two Officers in early 1999.

Ministers reviewed the wide range of projects undertaken in 1998 to implement the NATO-Ukraine Charter and discussed and approved the way forward for activities to be implemented in 1999. Ministers agreed that these undertakings are indicative of the further development and improvement of the distinctive partnership between NATO and Ukraine.

NATO Ministers welcomed the announcement of Ukraine’s “State Programme of Cooperation with NATO to the Year 2001” recently approved by the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma as a tangible signal of Ukraine’s commitment to a productive relationship with NATO.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the continuing work of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, which was established earlier this year to facilitate on-going reforms in the Ukrainian defence establishment. They welcomed the fact that the NATO-Ukraine Commission will meet in Defense Ministers session on 18 December 1998 to review the achievements and priorities in the defence field.

The Commission also held a political consultation on the question of conflict prevention and crisis management, with particular attention being paid to lessons to be drawn from the common experience in the former Yugoslavia. Ministers discussed a broad range of problems related to security and stability in Europe, and substantial convergence of views emerged among its members. NATO Ministers appreciated Ukraine’s contribution to SFOR and in the NATO Kosovo Air Verification Mission.

Ministers agreed that the first Commission meeting at Summit level should be held in Washington in April 1999 in the context of the events planned to mark NATO’s 50th Anniversary.
THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL

Meeting at ministerial level, Brussels, 9 December 1998

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) met at the level of Foreign Ministers on Wednesday, 9 December 1998 in Brussels.

Ministers emphasized the importance of the fundamentally new relationship initiated by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and welcomed progress made so far in developing a strong, stable and enduring partnership on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency. They stressed in particular the useful role the PJC had played to promote consultations, coordination and joint action, and the need to further develop its potential to deepen cooperation between NATO and Russia.

In reviewing the implementation of the 1998 PJC Work Programme since their last meeting, Ministers noted, among others, the consultations held on the contribution by NATO and Russia and the role of the PJC in creating a security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic region, on non-proliferation issues, on disarmament and arms control, on information activities, on military aspects of measures to promote cooperation, transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia as well as on infrastructure development programmes.

They welcomed the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Russia Joint Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee held on 19 November 1998 in Moscow, and reviewed the ongoing work at experts level in the field of peacekeeping. They emphasized progress made in exploring possible arms-related cooperation and welcomed the recent agreement on the creation of a joint NATO-Russia Information and Consultation Centre in Moscow on Retraining of Discharged Military Personnel.

Ministers discussed the ongoing negotiations on an adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). They are determined to undertake all necessary steps to complete as soon as possible the adaptation of the Treaty in accordance with the Declaration issued by the OSCE Ministerial Council in Oslo.

They agreed a detailed Work Programme for the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for 1999, outlining a broad range of issues for consultations which will continue to promote transparency and confidence between NATO and Russia in the political and defence-related fields, as well as a number of practical cooperation activities, such as projects in the fields of civil emergency planning and defence-related environmental cooperation.

Ministers reviewed the situation in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina. They called on all parties to the Peace Agreement to increase their efforts to implement the agreement in full, and thus to create the conditions for a peaceful, stable and prosperous future. They emphasized the value of continued NATO-Russia military cooperation in SFOR on the ground as well as the regular consultations held in the PJC framework in this respect.

In the same context, Ministers discussed the situation in Kosovo. They stressed the need for a political settlement of the conflict and called for close coordination of the efforts of international and regional organisations involved in the process. They highly valued the intensive consultations held in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council, which helped clarify the positions of both sides. Ministers expressed their concern about continuing breaches of the ceasefire and stressed the need to see immediate and full compliance with the UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 by all parties to the conflict.

Ministers were pleased with progress of military cooperation between NATO and Russia, including the participation by Russian units in the exercise “Cooperative Assembly” which took place in Albania in August. They welcomed progress made in the negotiations on the establishment of NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow and noted with satisfaction the successful port visit by NATO’s Standing Naval Force (Atlantic) to St. Petersburg.

NATO review

MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN DEFENCE MINISTERS SESSION

Final Communiqué, Brussels, 17 December 1998


2. We look forward to the Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Washington on 24th and 25th April 1999. On this historic occasion the Alliance will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty which laid the foundation for a unique and enduring partnership between the European and North American Allies. Our Heads of State and Government in Washington will set out a shared vision of a renewed Alliance to meet, with enhanced effectiveness, the security challenges of the 21st century.

3. We are resolved to play our full part in putting this vision into practice and in enabling the Alliance to continue to fulfil the full range of its missions. Today, we reviewed the progress achieved in the implementation of the decisions of the Madrid Summit in the defence field, discussed our defence capabilities, and gave guidance for additional work in preparation for the Washington Summit. We also took stock of developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo.

4. We reviewed the future of SFOR against the background of the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council at its meeting in Madrid on 15th-16th December 1998. While progress has been made over the last months in the implementation of the civil aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, we are concerned that much still needs to be done. In particular, we endorse the call for an accelerated return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to minority areas. As Defence Ministers, we remain committed to helping to achieve a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and call on its authorities to play their full part in achieving this goal. The presence of SFOR does not reduce their obligation to ensure the stability of their country. A culture of dependency must be avoided. As the Peace Implementation Council has made clear, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must increasingly assume greater responsibility for conditions for a peaceful, stable and prosperous future. They emphasized the importance of continued NATO-Russia military cooperation in SFOR on the ground as well as the regular consultations held in the PJC framework in this respect.

5. We do not intend to maintain SFOR’s presence at current levels indefinitely. At our meeting last June, we mandated the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to conduct a series of comprehensive reviews at not more than six monthly intervals, in consultation with other troop contributors, on the future of the force. Last week, Alliance Foreign Ministers addressed the first of these reviews and today we have endorsed its results. In reviewing in particular the size and shape of SFOR, we have
decided that, at present, there is no scope for major changes, nor should its mission be changed. However, we agreed to take steps to begin to streamline SFOR. We have also instructed our military authorities to examine options for possible longer term and more substantial adjustments in the future size and structure of SFOR. Decisions on future reductions will be taken in the light of progress on implementation of the Peace Agreement.

6. We reviewed progress in the security cooperation programme between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has the aim of contributing to stability in the region and promoting reconciliation within the Bosnian defence community, including through the development of central defence mechanisms such as the Standing Committee for Military Matters.

7. SFOR continues to play an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability and the provision of a secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus contributing significantly to achieving progress in the task of rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state. We noted the sustained and effective support provided to the implementation of the civil aspects of the Peace Accords including the assistance given to the High Representative and to other international bodies, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN International Police Task Force, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. SFOR also provides support to entity armed forces in conducting humanitarian de-mining as a key contribution to civil reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Multinational Specialised Unit has provided a useful means of enhancing SFOR’s flexibility and effectiveness. We express our deepest thanks to the men and women of SFOR who have unstintingly carried out their duties in the cause of peace and reconciliation.

8. With regard to the crisis in Kosovo, we welcome the agreement concluded between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and NATO which established the air verification mission, complementing the OSCE ground mission, to verify compliance with UNSCRs 1199 and 1203. Sustained pressure by the international community was instrumental in achieving these results and averting a humanitarian catastrophe, as was, and still is, the threat of the use of NATO airpower. We intend to maintain this pressure. NATO, with the participation of Partners, will continue to verify compliance through the conduct of the air verification mission over Kosovo, Operation “Eagle Eye.” We welcome the initial deployment of the OSCE verification mission and note with satisfaction the close cooperation and coordination with the OSCE in this task, including arrangements for sharing information that will enable the OSCE Permanent Council and the NAC to receive timely and accurate reports on the situation in Kosovo. NATO will communicate periodically to the UN Secretary General its views on compliance.

9. We remind the FRY authorities of their responsibilities, including for the security and safety of the verifiers in Kosovo. Nevertheless, in order to provide the ability to withdraw verifiers in an emergency, NATO is deploying an Extraction Force, Operation “Joint Guarantor,” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We greatly appreciate the cooperation and support of its government for providing facilities for NATO’s operations.

10. We are concerned at the continuing violence in Kosovo, particularly in the light of recent incidents, and call on all parties to cease all forms of violence and provocative behaviour, to comply strictly with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and to resolve the crisis in Kosovo by free and open negotiations with international involvement undertaken in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation. We join Alliance Foreign Ministers in expressing our support for a solution which provides an enhanced status for Kosovo and a much greater degree of autonomy and self-administration while at the same time ensuring the territorial integrity of the FRY and safeguarding the human and civil rights of all Kosovars whatever their ethnic origin. We believe that stability in Kosovo is linked to the democratisation of the FRY and we support those who are genuinely engaged in this process.

11. We welcome the ratification by all Alliance Parliaments of the protocols of accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and look forward to the accession of our new Allies before the Washington Summit. Since our last meetings further steps have been taken to involve the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as closely as possible in Alliance activities. The three invited countries are continuing to prepare themselves for the military responsibilities and obligations of Alliance membership. They are making progress in implementing the Target Force Goals developed for them. Through in particular the process of fulfilling these planning targets, which address NATO’s priority military requirements, the three invited countries are working with the NATO Military Authorities to ensure that their armed forces and military structures will meet Alliance requirements in key areas in preparation for membership.

12. We, as Defence Ministers, reaffirm that the door remains open to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration. We considered a report on the intensified dialogue on membership questions. The Council in Permanent Session will develop for the Washington Summit a comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process, operationalise our commitment to the open door policy and underscore our willingness to assist aspiring countries in meeting NATO standards.

13. We endorsed a comprehensive report describing progress made in recent months in the internal adaptation of the Alliance, which is focussed on the following interrelated areas: the Alliance’s new military command structure; the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept; and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The fundamental objectives of this adaptation are to enhance the Alliance’s military effectiveness for the full range of its missions, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the ESDI within the Alliance. NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

14. We approved a detailed plan submitted by the NATO Military Authorities for the implementation of the new NATO military command structure. This plan constitutes an important milestone for the transition to the new command structure which was agreed last year. Our aim is to complete the necessary preparations for a single, irreversible decision by the Council to simultaneously approve the activation requests for all 20 headquarters of the new command structure as a whole by the beginning of March 1999. We tasked the NATO Military Authorities to pursue their work vigorously to enable the Council to take this decision at the envisaged time. The new command structure will be fully functional, militarily efficient and cost effective. It will also enable us to provide European command arrangements able to prepare, support, conduct and command WEU-led operations.

15. Combined Joint Task Forces constitute an essential element of the Alliance’s internal adaptation. They will provide the military flexibility required to deal with a wide range of contingency operations. They will also facilitate the involvement of nations outside the Alliance in NATO-led operations. In addition, the provision of CJTF headquarters for WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities represents an important vehicle for developing the ESDI within the Alliance. The second phase in the implementation of the CJTF concept, which takes account of the lessons learned from the first two CJTF trials, is now under way. It will result in a thorough assessment of the Alliance’s capability to deploy small- and large-scale, land- and sea-based CJTF headquarters and of the need to designate additional partner headquarters for CJTF headquarters nuclei. The results of this work, due by March 1999, will provide the basis for the third and final phase of the implementation of the Alliance’s CJTF concept.

16. Much has already been accomplished in building the ESDI within NATO, as mandated by Ministers at their meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996. Preparations for WEU-led operations making use of Alliance assets and capabilities are now well advanced. This important work is carried out in close cooperation and consultation between NATO and the WEU. Consistent with the principle of separable but not separate capabilities, recent work has focussed on:
Partnership for Peace. The process launched at Sintra in May 1997 is evolving into account the guidance which the updated Strategic Concept will provide. Mobility, sustainability, survivability, and effective engagement, taking into account communications, address capabilities which are critical to the successful development of military capabilities appropriate to the full range of Alliance missions.

17. As the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance is taking shape, NATO-WEU cooperative relations aimed at ensuring detailed coordination between the two organisations are being steadily strengthened including through consultations in the NATO-WEU Joint Council. We welcome the important contribution made by the WEU Council of Ministers in Rome on 16th-17th November to the development of the European Security and Defence Identity.

18. We directed the Council in Permanent Session to pursue vigorously further work on the outstanding issues relating to the Alliance’s internal adaptation and, more specifically, to ensure that the key elements of ESDI are in place, as set out in the report submitted to us, by the time of the Washington Summit. We also expect the Council to make recommendations on how best to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI within the Alliance, including the contribution made by all European Allies, beyond the Washington Summit.

19. We noted the progress that has been achieved on the examination, and updating as necessary, of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, as mandated by our Heads of State and Government at their Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997. This work must ensure that the Strategic Concept is fully consistent with the Alliance’s new security environment. It should reaffirm our commitment to collective defence and the transatlantic link, and ensure that the Alliance is ready, and has a full range of capabilities, to improve the security and stability environment for nations in the Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century, including through dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate, non-Article 5 operations, such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the possible participation of partners. The Council in Permanent Session has been tasked to pursue this work vigorously, the results of which will be presented to our Heads of State and Government at their Summit meeting in Washington in April of next year. As Defence Ministers, we attach particular importance to ensuring that the updated Strategic Concept provides guidance for the development of military capabilities appropriate to the full range of Alliance missions.

20. To support the ability of the Alliance to undertake the full range of its missions, work has been set in train to develop proposals for an initiative on defence capabilities which could be adopted at the Washington Summit. Building on progress to date, such an initiative could aim at developing a common assessment of requirements for the full range of military operations and, with a particular emphasis on technology and interoperability, especially in such areas as logistics and command, control and communications, address capabilities which are critical to the successful execution of joint military operations, such as readiness, deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability, and effective engagement, taking into account the guidance which the updated Strategic Concept will provide.

21. We received a comprehensive report detailing further progress made in implementing the EAPC Basic Document and the enhanced Partnership for Peace. The process launched at Sintra in May 1997 is resulting in a more effective consultative forum and a more operational Partnership, thus improving the ability of Allies and Partners to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability through political consultation and practical cooperation.

22. The EAPC also confirmed its value as a forum for political consultation on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre which was created last Spring to help enhance practical cooperation in the field of international disaster relief, has already taken part in the coordination of emergency aid for relief operations in Albania and Ukraine. We support the updated EAPC Action Plan for the years 1998-2000, endorsed by Foreign Ministers with Partners last week, which builds on and expands the cooperative activities which are already being successfully implemented under EAPC.

23. The Partnership for Peace continues to be the focal point of our efforts to build with Partners new patterns of practical military and defence-related cooperation across a wide range of issues. Partners are playing an increasing role in planning and executing PIP activities and exercises, and in the further development of the Planning and Review Process (PARP). The introduction of PARP Ministerial Guidance and the initial Partnership Goals will play an important role in the further development of a more operational PIP. Partnership Staff Elements (PSEs), which have now been established, provide further opportunities for military cooperation with Partners. Increased regional cooperation is gaining momentum, and we fully support the Alliance’s work with Partners to develop a political-military framework for NATO-led PIP operations, which is intended to be finalised, in tandem with the Strategic Concept, in time for the Washington Summit. In building on the experience of IFOR/SFOR, the potential of multinational formations and the principle of multinationality of military formations among Partners, as well as Partners and Allies, will be investigated with a view to reinforcing PIP’s operational capabilities.

24. We noted the progress on initiatives to enhance further PIP education and training. These are designed to support a higher level of cooperation, and to provide Partners with a greater role in the development of collaborative approaches. The concept for PIP training centres will further enable Allies and Partners to contribute to all Partners’ PIP-related education and training and to help promote interoperability. It represents a rationalised approach which encourages common initiatives and avoids duplication of efforts. Other promising developments that we noted were the initiation of activities through the PIP Consortium of Defence Academies and the PIP Simulation Network. The Council in Permanent Session is tasked to put together, with Partners, the initiatives above and other work now under way to form a coherent package of measures intended to reinforce PIP’s operational capabilities for the Washington Summit.

25. NATO/PIP assistance programmes are rapidly becoming an important means used by Allies and Partners in projecting stability in sensitive areas such as the Balkans, and for developing closer links between PIP countries. As Defence Ministers we strongly support the decision of the Alliance to develop for 1999 a substantial programme of assistance to Albania. NATO is also assisting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in developing its armed forces. These programmes underline NATO’s continued determination to promote stability in the countries neighbouring Kosovo and are at the same time an example of the contribution which PIP can make to the security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

26. We took stock of the implementation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. At tomorrow’s meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) at the level of Defence Ministers we will renew our support for the important work of the Council on the basis of the principles of common interest, reciprocity and transparency. It has also been a useful forum for consultations on the crisis in Kosovo and the ongoing SFOR mission in which NATO and Russia cooperate successfully. A substantial work plan for cooperation under the auspices of the PJC has been agreed within the framework of the PJC work programme for 1999. We look forward to the opening of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow. As Defence Ministers, we remain committed to the strengthening of practical
military cooperation with Russia. Where possible we will make use of the cooperative mechanisms afforded by PIP which remain key to enhance practical cooperation, such as a range of crisis management and peacekeeping operations, training, seminars and visits, the strengthening of the military dialogue, and activities related to armaments cooperation.

27. The second meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Defence Ministers tomorrow will deal with substantial Ukrainian proposals for the further implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Charter. We confirm our intention to intensify through PIP practical military cooperation with Ukraine, on the basis of the political-military provisions of the Charter, the agreed work plan for 1999, and Ukraine’s participation in SFOR. Work in the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform is being taken forward expeditiously at various levels. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and NATO regarding the two NATO Liaison Officers to be sent to Kyiv will provide practical support to our distinctive partnership with Ukraine in important areas such as civil-military relations, defence resource planning and management, and officer and NCO professional development.

28. We attach great importance to stability in the Mediterranean area, based on the principle that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in that region. Within the Alliance’s overall cooperative approach to security, we continue to value NATO’s enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue. After completion of the first work programme in 1998, we welcome the fact that the 1999 work programme will again include a substantial number of military activities and that Contact Point Embassies have now been designated. As Defence Ministers we are committed to the further improvement of the political and military aspects of the Dialogue. This will contribute to confidence-building and mutual understanding between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Like Foreign Ministers, we are prepared to consider possibilities to enhance cooperation with participating countries in preparation for the Washington Summit.

29. The establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission has opened a new stage in cooperation between NATO and the OSCE and demonstrates our ability to work together in crisis situations. This strengthening of relations between mutually reinforcing institutions is important for the role of security organisations in the future European security architecture. In this context we continue to support the efforts of the OSCE to develop a Document-Charter on European Security, based on the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council of 2nd - 3rd December 1998.

30. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery continues to be a matter of serious concern for the Alliance. In this context, the principal goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring, or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. We continue to attach the utmost importance to full implementation and rigorous verification of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes which remain essential instruments in this field. We nevertheless recognise that proliferation can continue to occur despite our preventive efforts and can pose a direct threat to Allies’ populations, territory, and forces. It is therefore equally important to continue to improve the Alliance’s defence posture against NBC weapons by providing the necessary capabilities to our forces and adapting our doctrine, plans, training and exercises to reflect more fully the risks posed by these weapons. We are determined to prepare our forces to succeed in the full range of missions that they might have to face despite the threat of use, or actual use, of chemical or biological weapons. In this context, we are also exploring opportunities for an exchange of information and practical cooperation between Allied civilian and military authorities. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation, we are prepared to expand NATO’s efforts to address the evolving proliferation threat. We join Alliance Foreign Ministers in tasking the Council in Permanent Session to prepare for the Washington Summit proposals for an initiative to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery.

31. We recall the importance which our Governments attach to the arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests. Terrorism constitutes a serious threat to peace, security and stability which can threaten the territorial integrity of States. We therefore reiterate our condemnation of terrorism. We reaffirm the determination of our Governments to combat it in all its forms, in accordance with our international commitments and national legislation. Close international cooperation is an essential means of preventing and suppressing this scourge.

32. We continue to consider the CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of European security both today and in the future. Our overall aim is enhanced security, stability, and predictability, not only for each CFE Party but also for Europe as a whole. We are committed to a successful adaptation of the Treaty and will play our full part in seeking to complete this by the time of the OSCE Istanbul Summit. To this end, we will support efforts aimed at the resolution of key outstanding issues and the start of drafting work in the first months of next year. In this regard, we reaffirm the Alliance’s proposals put forward in Vienna and we associate ourselves with the statement on CFE restraint and flexibility issued by our and the Czech, Hungarian and Polish Foreign Ministers on 8th December. Pending Entry into Force of the Adapted Treaty, we regard continued strict implementation of the current Treaty and its associated documents as vital.

33. We continue to place great importance on the need for effective NATO armaments cooperation and in this context we noted that our National Armaments Directors are currently undertaking a comprehensive review of NATO’s future role in the armaments field. We look forward to their report on ways to improve the armaments process. We further noted the progress made in the Alliance Ground Surveillance programme to obtain an overall system composed of a NATO-owned and operated core capability supplemented by interoperable national assets. We took the opportunity to reaffirm the need for such a capability to support political and military decision-making, particularly during crisis management.

34. Important steps have been taken by the NATO Air Defence Committee, and approved by the Council, to adapt its planning to take full account of new air defence requirements while still ensuring the maintenance of existing capabilities. In particular the agreement on a policy for the future adaptation of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System will support an effective extended air defence contribution to collective defence and peace support operations within an enlarged Alliance, and promote greater air defence flexibility and an enhanced level of integration with maritime forces. The Alliance’s long term Air Defence Programme is being revised to take account of possible future air threats.

35. With regard to the Year 2000 date change problem, we are taking determined action to secure the continued effectiveness of NATO’s political consultation processes, crisis management, and military command and control. We strongly support testing and verification for Year 2000-compliance and formulating plans for those systems which cannot be made compliant in time.

36. The integration of the three invited states into the Alliance, NATO’s operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo, NATO’s new command structure and other initiatives undertaken by NATO underline the diminished importance of the military common funded programmes. They are tangible manifestations of cooperation and cohesion among Allies. Joint projects and common funding could also take on added value and importance in the context of any Summit initiative on defence capabilities. We remain determined to ensure that sufficient resources are made available to maintain the ability of the Alliance to perform the full range of its missions. We welcome further steps taken to give greater transparency to the budgetary process and to enable Council to take a broader, more strategic overview of NATO’s military common funded expenditure.
The figures given in table 1 represent payments actually made or to be made during the course of the fiscal year. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditures. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets. For countries providing military assistance, this is included in the expenditures figures. For countries receiving assistance, figures do not include the value of items received. Expenditures for research and development are included in equipment expenditures and pensions paid to retirees in personnel expenditures.

France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure and does not participate in collective force planning. The defence data relating to France are indicative only.

Iceland has no armed forces.

**READER’S GUIDE**

To avoid any ambiguity the fiscal year has been designated by the year which includes the highest number of months: e.g., 1996 represents the fiscal year 1996/1997 for Canada and U.K. and the fiscal year 1995/1996 for U.S. Because of rounding, the total figures may differ from the sum of their components.

Conventional signs: e estimated - nl not available // not applicable | break in continuity of series

### Table 1: Defence expenditures of NATO countries

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### Table 2: Gross domestic product and defence expenditures annual variation (%)

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The figures given in table 2 represent changes between the fiscal years indicated above. They are based on the NATO definition of defence expenditures. In view of the differences between this and national definitions, the figures shown may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by national authorities or given in national budgets. For countries providing military assistance, this is included in the expenditures figures. For countries receiving assistance, figures do not include the value of items received.

Defence expenditures for research and development are included in equipment expenditures and pensions paid to retirees in personnel expenditures.

NATO review Summer 1999
### Table 3: Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product

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**NATO review** Spring 1999
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NATO review Spring 1999**
**CONTENTS LISTED BY ISSUE**

### Nº 1 (Spring 1998)

**On course for a NATO of 19 nations in 1999**  
Javier Solana  
3

**Security in south-eastern Europe and Bulgaria’s policy of NATO integration**  
Nadezhda Mihailova  
6

**NATO’s new military command structure**  
General Klaus Naumann  
10

**We are not adversaries, we are partners**  
Marshal Igor Sergeyev  
15

**WEU celebrates 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty**  
José Cutileiro  
18

**Building a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina**  
General Wesley Clark  
19

**Civil-military cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia**  
Colonel William R. Phillips  
22

**The Atlantic Treaty Association: Renaissance and challenge**  
Theodossis Georgiou  
26

**Taking partnership to a new level in NATO’s Defence Support community**  
Norman Ray  
27

**The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative**  
Nicola de Santis  
29

**Documentation (special insert)**  
1

| North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 16 December 1997 | 1 |
| North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Final Communiqué, 2 December 1997 | 10 |
| Defence expenditures of NATO countries (1975-1997) | 14 |

### Nº 2 (Summer 1998)

**NATO and WEU: Turning vision into reality**  
Letter from the Secretary General  
3

**WEU’s challenge**  
Apostolos Tsohatzopoulos  
4

**The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO**  
Lluis Maria de Puig  
6

**Sustaining a vibrant Alliance**  
Lt. General Nicholas Kehoe  
10

**Towards a new political strategy for NATO**  
Rob de Wijk  
14

**NATO’s next strategic concept**  
Jan Petersen  
18

**Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for Peace**  
George Katsirdakis  
22

**SFOR continued**  
Greg Schulte  
27

**NATO Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina**  
David Lightburn  
31

### Nº 3 (Autumn 1998)

**A year of solid achievements for NATO’s partnerships**  
Letter from the Secretary General  
3

**A year after Sintra: Achieving cooperative security through the EAPC and PfP**  
Ambassador Sergio Balanzino  
4

**Ukraine’s contribution to security and stability in Europe**  
Volodymyr Horbulin  
9

**Ukraine-NATO cooperation in civil emergency planning**  
Valentin Kalchenko  
13

**The NATO-Russia relationship a year after Paris**  
Ambassador András Simonyi  
20

**Getting on board the moving train of NATO**  
Ambassador Andras Simonyi  
21

**A Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability**  
Francesco Palmeri  
24

**PfP crisis management activities: Enhancing capabilities and cooperation**  
John Kriendler  
28

**Force planning in the new NATO**  
Frank Boland  
32

**Documentation (special insert)**  
2

| Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg, 28-29 May 1998 | 2 |
| Defence Ministers meet in Brussels, 11-12 June 1998 | 9 |
| Other Council Statements | 16 |

### Nº 4 (Winter 1998)

**A firm anchor for both allies and partners**  
Letter from the Secretary General  
3

**Baltic security is European security**  
Algirdas Saunargas  
4

**NATO’s parliamentary arm helps further the aims of the Alliance**  
Simon Lunn  
8

**From Madrid to Washington - Slovenia’s quest for membership**  
Ernest Petrič  
13

**Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force Concept**  
Lt. General Mario da Silva  
16

**Taking another look at NATO’s role in European security**  
Michael Rühle  
20

**Strengthening cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO’s contribution**  
Alberto Bin  
24

**Educating leaders for the 21st century - A snapshot of the Marshall Center for Security Studies**  
Robert Kennedy  
28

**The NATO Training Group - Enhancing Alliance capabilities**  
Lt. Colonel Rainer Scholl  
32
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BALANZINO, Sergio</td>
<td>A year after Sintra: Achieving cooperative security through the EAPC and PIP</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN, Alberto</td>
<td>Strengthening cooperation in the Mediterranean: NATO’s contribution</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLAND, Frank</td>
<td>Force planning in the new NATO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLARK, General Wesley</td>
<td>Building a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUTILEIRO, José</td>
<td>WEU celebrates 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA SILVA, Lt. General Mario</td>
<td>Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force concept</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE PUIG, Luis Maria</td>
<td>The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE SANTIS, Nicola</td>
<td>The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE WIJK, Rob</td>
<td>Towards a new political strategy for NATO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIU, Theodossis</td>
<td>The Atlantic Treaty Association: Renaissance and challenge</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORBULIN, Volodymyr</td>
<td>Ukraine’s contribution to security and stability in Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KALCHENKO, Valentin</td>
<td>Ukraine-NATO cooperation in civil emergency planning</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATSIROUKIS, George</td>
<td>Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for Peace</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEHOE, Lt. General Nicholas</td>
<td>Sustaining a vibrant Alliance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENNEDY, Robert</td>
<td>Educating leaders for the 21st century - A snapshot of the Marshall Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLAIBER, Klaus-Peter</td>
<td>The NATO-Russia relationship a year after Paris</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRIENDLER, John</td>
<td>PIP crisis management activities: Enhancing capabilities and cooperation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHTBURN, David</td>
<td>NATO Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUNN, Simon</td>
<td>NATO’s parliamentary arm helps further the aims of the Alliance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIHAIOLOVA, Nadezhda</td>
<td>Security in south-eastern Europe and Bulgaria’s policy of NATO integration</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAUMANN, General Klaus</td>
<td>NATO’s new military command structure</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALMERI, Francesco</td>
<td>A Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETERSEN, Jan</td>
<td>NATO’s next strategic concept</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETRIČ, Ernest</td>
<td>Taking partnership to a new level in NATO’s Defence Support community</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILLIPS, Colonel William R.</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAY, Norman</td>
<td>Taking another look at NATO’s role in European security</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUDARGAS, Algirdas</td>
<td>Baltic security is European security</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOLL, Lt. Colonel Rainer</td>
<td>The NATO Training Group - Enhancing Alliance capabilities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHULTE, Greg</td>
<td>SFOR continued</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERGEYEV, Marshal Igor</td>
<td>We are not adversaries, we are partners</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMONYI, András</td>
<td>Getting on board the moving train of NATO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLANA, Javier</td>
<td>On course for a NATO of 19 nations in 1999</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOHATZOPoulos, Apostolos</td>
<td>WEU’s challenge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>