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A year of solid achievements for NATO’s partnerships

Over the past few weeks we have marked the first anniversaries of several NATO initiatives designed to bring the Euro-Atlantic area closer together in security cooperation. I believe we can be proud of what we have achieved to date.

- The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is implementing a far-reaching Action Plan
- The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is bringing partners increasingly closer to the Alliance
- The NATO-Russia Founding Act has launched numerous ongoing consultative and cooperative activities
- The NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership has brought forward new cooperative projects and
- The Mediterranean Cooperation Group is pressing ahead in its Dialogue.

Let me touch briefly on each of these initiatives.

The EAPC — with 44 countries of diverse backgrounds and security traditions — has emerged as an important forum for regular consultation and cooperation on security issues. We have used the EAPC for consultations on the situation in Kosovo, the continuation of the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the prospects for regional security cooperation. We have also broadened the scope of discussions to include international terrorism, defence-related environmental issues, and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A Euro-Atlantic Disaster Coordination Centre has been created in Brussels as part of our enhanced practical cooperation in the field of international disaster relief.

Partnership for Peace — the flagship of our practical day-to-day cooperation — has been enhanced to accommodate closer links between allies and partner countries. The scope and depth of partnership activities have been expanded, reflecting our joint experience in Bosnia and the need for more complex and demanding exercises. Partners now have a greater say in PfP’s evolution and are also participating at various levels of NATO’s command structure.

Turning to the NATO-Russia partnership, the new Permanent Joint Council gives us a workable instrument by which we can develop cooperation in security and defence matters. Issues on which there are already regular consultations and cooperation include peacekeeping, our “in the field” cooperation in SFOR, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defence conversion, and the retraining of retired military personnel. Military-to-military cooperation is underway. In short, the past year has given us confidence that a lasting and productive relationship between NATO and Russia is truly at hand.

The NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) also has wasted little time in producing results. Since its establishment, the NUC has produced a Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and established a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform. It has also decided to assign a NATO Liaison officer to Kyiv later this year to help Ukraine to continue to enhance its role in PfP. These concrete cooperative activities are in addition to the work of the NATO information centre in Kyiv, which provides the Ukrainian public with up-to-date information about the Alliance. These measures will help Ukraine find its rightful place in the new Europe.

The Mediterranean Cooperation Group has also made great headway since its creation a year ago. Exchanges on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean have been held with our Southern Mediterranean Dialogue Partners — Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Activities in the fields of science and information (including the designation of NATO contact point embassies in these countries to strengthen our relations with them), as well as the opening of NATO schools to officers from Dialogue countries demonstrate our commitment to establish friendly relations with our southern neighbours.

Individually, each of these new cooperative mechanisms is breaking ground daily in an ever-expanding range of activities bringing allies and partners together. Taken together, they give us all considerable encouragement that there is indeed a new cooperative spirit at work in the Euro-Atlantic region. Let us continue to explore this rich potential.

Javier Solana

Letter from the Secretary General

A year of solid achievements for NATO’s partnerships

NATO review
A year after Sintra:
Achieving cooperative security through the EAPC and PfP

Sergio Balanzino
Deputy Secretary General of NATO

Since the launch of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and enhanced Partnership for Peace in Sintra last year, the scope and depth of partnership activities have increased considerably, explains Ambassador Balanzino. Some of the more prominent achievements in this regard include expanded partner involvement in decision-making and organisation of partnership activities, the establishment of posts in Alliance military structures for partners, crisis management activities and consultations, and the founding of a joint disaster response capability. On the basis of these two partnership structures, the Euro-Atlantic community is building a common security culture, strengthening stability and preserving peace for all.

Two NATO initiatives — the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace — have significantly added to the cooperative spirit in security affairs that we see today in Europe. Both are integral to NATO’s adaptation and transformation. And both provide allies and partners with an increasing range of instruments to shape the European security environment.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is the core of the Alliance’s practical cooperation with partner countries. Launched in January 1994 at NATO’s Brussels Summit, PfP centres on fostering military cooperation between NATO and non-NATO states. The aims of this cooperation are manifold: facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting, ensuring democratic control of defence forces, strengthening the ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations, and developing military forces better able to operate with those of NATO members. All these objectives are crucial for fostering a common approach to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The successful launch and subsequent development of Partnership for Peace led, almost inevitably, to calls from allies and partners alike to expand the scope and depth of partnership activities. As a result, the Senior Level Group, which I had the honour of chairing, was set up to produce recommendations to NATO Ministers on carrying forward the partnership programme as a whole.

The outcome was the two-fold decision by NATO Foreign Ministers in May 1997 at Sintra, Portugal: first, to enhance the Partnership for Peace programme and second, to create the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as a forum for consultation and cooperation on security and defence-related issues.

Enhanced Partnership for Peace

Behind the decision to enhance PfP were a number of objectives. We wanted to involve partners more deeply in planning and carrying out PfP exercises, thereby giving the partnership a more operational character. We also wanted to broaden the range of cooperative activities to reflect more closely NATO’s new mission of peacekeeping and crisis management. And we wanted to build on the positive experiences gained through the successful cooperation between allies and partners in the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A year after the Sintra decision, we can already see progress in each of these three areas.
Partner involvement in decision-making within PfP is now well established. Over the last few months, partners have helped to develop further the overall Partnership Work Programme (PWP) and worked closely with the Alliance in streamlining their Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs). In addition, partners are more directly involved in the organisation of increasingly complex PfP exercises, especially those hosted by partners. A five-year programme for NATO/PfP exercises has been developed by NATO’s Military Committee, in consultation with partner representatives.

Alliance military structures are opening to greater partner participation. Beginning this summer, 38 officers from partner countries have begun to serve in the first two levels — the Major NATO Commands and the Principal Subordinate Commands — of the Alliance’s integrated military structure, alongside their counterparts from NATO countries. Seven additional positions for partners have been created at the Partnership

Alliance. It seeks to encourage the development of interoperability between partner forces and those of allies for the full range of PfP operations and related training and exercises. Furthermore, the scope of the Alliance’s commonly funded infrastructure programme — the NATO Security Investment Programme — is expanding to include partnership projects. This will help strengthen allied and partner interoperability at the “points of interaction”, such as communications, ports and airfields.

These new features of the programme will help us fulfil PfP’s main objectives even better than before. They will enhance the capability of our armed forces to work closely together, through the development of common concepts and joint training and exercises.

Our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown how important the Partnership for Peace is in preparing, deploying and running complex multinational peace operations. PfP’s “real world” value has

been demonstrated by helping organise the troop contributions of partners to the Implementation and Stabilisation Forces. Without the partnership such unique international military coalitions could not have been set up so swiftly and effectively.

The experience in Bosnia has also clarified the need for developing, in cooperation with partners, a political-military framework for future NATO-led PfP operations. The overall objective here is to involve partners as closely as possible in the political consultations, as
well as actual planning, for peacekeeping or other PfP operations. In a rapidly evolving security environment it is essential that our discussions help us to develop common responses quickly and flexibly.

The EAPC’s first year

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), created one year ago, provides the overarching political framework for all the outreach and cooperation activities among allies and partners to complement the expanded opportunities provided by an enhanced PfP. The EAPC superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which had been NATO’s first means of giving its outreach a systematic structure. After more than five years, however, the need was felt for a new forum, more comprehensive in scope, more flexible in the formats of its meetings and, most importantly, which would allow for deeper consultation between allies and partners.

The first endeavour of the EAPC was to develop an Action Plan spelling out the areas in which EAPC members would pursue enhanced consultation and cooperation. The Plan was agreed by EAPC Ministers at their meeting last December.\(^1\)

Since then, consultations within the EAPC have focused on various security issues, such as the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the crisis in Kosovo, regional security cooperation, international terrorism, defence-related environmental issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of a political-military framework for future NATO-led PfP operations.

Practical cooperation also has a prominent place in the EAPC Action Plan. For example, a highly successful crisis management exercise was conducted in February.\(^2\) The Alliance’s Science Programme has been opened to partners. And in early June of this year, the Secretary General inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters. This centre will coordinate, in close consultation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the response of...
The Partnership Coordination Cell

The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) is a unique Partnership for Peace structure operating under the authority of the North Atlantic Council and based at Mons (Belgium), where the Alliance’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is also located. The PCC’s international staff consists of NATO personnel and, since the beginning of 1998, PfP partner country officers as well, who participate fully in the work of the PCC. NATO and partner national representatives are accredited to, and form an integral part of, the PCC.

The PCC coordinates joint military activities within PfP in concert with NATO staffs, commands and agencies. It also carries out the military planning necessary to implement the military aspects of the Partnership Work Programme, notably for exercises and related activities in the areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and search and rescue, and participates in the evaluation of military activities that have been implemented. Detailed operational planning for peacekeeping and military exercises remains the responsibility of the military commands conducting the exercise.

Seven officers from five partner nations have joined the permanent international staff, including a Bulgarian officer who heads the new Education and Training Branch of the PCC, the first partner officer to serve in a leadership position in a PfP structure.

Together, the EAPC and Partnership for Peace provide important instruments to facilitate the development of responses to concrete security issues. The continuation of the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the response to the crisis in Kosovo are two cases in point.

Partner contributors to SFOR take part in the regular briefings and consultations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels concerning various aspects of the SFOR operation. For instance, consultations took place in the EAPC among allies and partner troop contributors, in preparing the operational plan for Joint Forge, the continuation of SFOR’s mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The EAPC has also provided a forum in which allies and partners can work towards a common approach to such critical security challenges as the crisis in Kosovo. Meanwhile, Partnership for Peace is showing its potential as an instrument to assist in preventing that conflict from spreading. At their recent Luxembourg meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers adopted a number of measures to help two partners—Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of

EAPC countries in the event of a disaster occurring within the EAPC geographic area. (3)
Ambassador Mir-Gamza Efendiev of Azerbaijan, one of the 25 partner countries which have established permanent diplomatic missions to NATO, presenting his credentials to Secretary General Javier Solana on 13 May. (NATO photo)

Macedonia(4) — to address problems associated with the crisis in Kosovo.

The Alliance is utilising PfP to help both countries improve their capacity to patrol their borders, restructure their armed forces, and promote security and stability. Specific measures have included launching NATO-led assistance programmes, scheduling and upgrading PfP exercises, developing the concept of PfP training centres, and establishing a NATO/PfP Cell in Albania.

A new cooperative security community

Although still relatively new creations, the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC testify to a new reality: long-term stability in today’s Europe is best assured through cooperation. This reality is also reflected politically by the fact that 25 partner countries have now opened permanent diplomatic missions at NATO Headquarters. The newly inaugurated Manfred Wörner Building, which houses most of our partner missions, is symbolic of our robust and developing partnership.

The task ahead of us is to perfect these mechanisms of partnership and cooperation. EAPC and PfP will continue to assist interested countries to prepare for possible NATO membership. For others, both mechanisms will afford means by which they can continue to work closely with the Alliance.

Through the EAPC and the enhanced PfP, we are building a common security culture in the Euro-Atlantic region. With the requisite political will, and with the practical ability to work together, we will meet
Ukraine’s contribution to security and stability in Europe

Volodymyr Horbulin
Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine

Since independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has not only pursued the goal of integration into European and transatlantic institutions, but has sought to make a useful contribution to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This, according to Secretary Horbulin, has entailed political and economic reform at home, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad, as well as setting an unprecedented example for the world in giving up nuclear arms.

While Ukraine recognises that there is still a long road ahead and much work to be done, it has positioned itself as a key actor in the emerging European security architecture, helping to maintain security and stability in Europe.

The common destiny of the Euro-Atlantic community also entails taking common responsibility. As we celebrate the first anniversary of one of the more substantive features of our engagement in Europe — the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership — I would like to highlight some of the steps Ukraine is taking to contribute to security and stability in Europe and to outline how we see our role in the Euro-Atlantic community.

At this halfway point in time between NATO’s Madrid and Washington Summits, on the eve of the 21st century, Europe is searching for a reliable security system to bring us closer to a stable, civilised international order. At the core of this international order should be respect for human and national minority rights, and state sovereignty.

European security and stability are of utmost concern to Ukraine, a founding member of the United Nations, and millions of whose citizens were victims of the Second World War and of the totalitarian Soviet regime. Since gaining its independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has sought to make its contribution to the strengthening of European stability. One should not underestimate, for instance, the historic importance of Ukraine’s unprecedented decision to voluntarily renounce its nuclear weapons and join the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. The significance of the complete withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine’s territory and the contribution this represents to reducing the nuclear threat and to the creation of a common security space in Europe was duly noted in the 1996 Lisbon Summit Declaration of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

**A stable Europe requires stable nations**

A precondition for stability in Europe is stability in the states of Europe. Ukraine’s return to the family of democratic European nations and its active engagement in the process of building a new European security architecture has not been easy. But I think we can be proud of our achievements in building a democratic, socially responsible state based on the rule-of-law, despite the difficult circumstances of transition, characterised by the economic legacy of the Soviet empire and the inertia of certain political circles within the country.

Since independence, we have adopted a new constitution fully consistent with European standards of a democratic state governed by the rule of law and guaranteeing civil rights. It provides for a clear system of government, with a President as head of state, a unicameral parliament elected by universal suffrage, called the Verkhovna Rada, a legislative system which incorporates the norms of European law, and a system of local self-governance. Moreover, Ukrainian legislation guaranteeing the rights of national minorities has gained international respect and praise.

The most difficult problem today, however, remains the stabilisation of the national economy, a problem compounded by the heavy burden of repairing the damage from the Chernobyl disaster. Nevertheless, our irreversible course of economic reform puts Ukraine squarely in the category of economies in transition. And, despite the political and social diversity of Ukrainian society, we have managed to implement these reforms exclusively through peaceful, civilised means, with no ensuing mass riots, clashes or resort to force against political opponents during this transition.

Assistance from the international community is crucial to overcoming our economic difficulties, both in the provision of resources and expertise. However, this assistance should not be considered as an act of charity, but rather as a contribution to our common endeavours. Indeed, it is in the entire Euro-Atlantic community’s interest to ensure that Ukraine, a European nation of 52 million people, not be left out in the cold in the face of acute economic problems, inherited social difficulties and the consequences of an ecological disaster of global proportions.

**Good-neighbourly relations**

Since independence, the first priority of Ukrainian foreign policy has been the establishment and legal confirmation of good-neighbourly relations with surrounding countries. The resolution of problems related to national minorities between Ukraine and Hungary in 1991 is a noteworthy example of this engagement and of our commitment to human and national minority rights. More recently, we have achieved a number of breakthroughs in consolidating good-neighbourly relations with nearby states. We concluded basic political treaties with Russia and Romania, signed agreements with Russia on the Black Sea Fleet, concluded a border treaty with Belarus and signed a declaration on reconciliation and unity with Poland. All of these agreements are impor-
Indivisible security through united efforts

Despite facing many problems of its own during the first six years of independence, this has not prevented Ukraine from being an active participant in the international community’s efforts to settle regional conflicts in Europe. Notably, Ukraine is contributing to the international community’s efforts to implement the peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our peacekeepers are serving side by side with NATO and partner forces in the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), providing the necessary preconditions for durable peace, and they will continue to do so under the new mandate which began in June. Ukraine was also among the first to respond to the OSCE initiative in Nagorno-Karabakh by providing some of the observers for the long-term mission.

We are also paying particular attention to the settlement of the conflict in the neighbouring Transdniester region of the Republic of Moldova, where ethnic Ukrainians make up the second largest population group. The fact that Ukraine, together with the Russian Federation and the OSCE, is one of the guarantors in the settlement of the Transdniester conflict shows the international community’s faith in our state’s active contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Europe. We also bring a familiarity with internal regional issues through our successful resolution of the matter of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.

Moreover, through our participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), we are convinced that NATO’s experience and potential in peacekeeping should be used more actively in regions of conflict throughout the EAPC area. In this context, Ukraine welcomes the development of a politico-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations.

Europe of regions

Participation in regional cooperation mechanisms is an important aspect of Ukrainian foreign policy, as evidenced by our initiatives in such regional structures as the Central European Initiative (CEI), Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Carpathian Euroregion and Euroregion Bug. We see considerable potential in these structures for strengthening regional stability and have proposed that the OSCE and CEI combine efforts to consolidate stability and security in the Central and Eastern European region. We also see good prospects for developing cooperation within the triangular Ukraine-Poland-Romania and Ukraine-Romania-Moldova relationships, as well as further potential for our strategic partnership with Poland. Moreover, we have clearly indicated our interest in the activities of the Council of Baltic Sea States and would welcome a form of cooperation with this group.

Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures

Ukraine’s course towards full-scale integration into European and transatlantic structures of cooperation is an integral part of our efforts to contribute to a united and stable Europe. Nevertheless, we recognise the reality of differing speeds of integration and fully support the early accession into Euro-Atlantic structures of those of our Central European partners who are further along in the process. At the same time, we are convinced that more effort should be made to reduce the differences in the levels of economic development and hence in the tempos of integration of individual countries. Narrowing these differences would help to reduce the risk of the enlargement process having a negative impact on the efficiency of these institutions. More generally, we believe it is the only way to ensure a secure and stable Europe, where nations cooperate within transparent structures, share common values and are measured by the same criteria.

We fully share and subscribe to the spirit of solidarity and common values of the Council of Europe, OSCE and the European Union. Ukraine is already a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE and is working actively to join the EU as well. With the entry into force of Ukraine’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU earlier this year, we are working to further develop political, economic, financial, social and cultural ties with the European Union.
We are also seeking closer relations with the Western European Union, which we view as an important component of European security. In June 1997, Ukraine and WEU concluded an agreement providing for the use of Ukrainian long-range airlift capabilities. This agreement, the first of its kind concluded by the WEU, is a practical example of the type of cooperation we are engaged in to strengthen European stability and security. On this basis, we hope to be in a position to establish a more formalised relationship with the WEU in future.

**New NATO Information Officer in Kyiv — NATO Centre celebrates first anniversary**

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has appointed Taras Kuzio as NATO Information Officer and head of NATO’s Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine. Dr. Kuzio (40), a British national, has focused on Ukrainian affairs for most of his career, having written extensively on its political and security policies. Before joining NATO, he was Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, as well as Senior Research Fellow in the Council of Advisers to the Ukrainian Parliament. Prior to this, he worked as a journalist and editor specialising in Ukrainian affairs. Dr. Kuzio takes up his duties in Kyiv in September.

NATO’s Information and Documentation Centre, which is housed in the Institute for International Relations at Taras Shevchenko State University in Kyiv, has just celebrated its first anniversary in operation. The Centre aims to facilitate a two-way flow of information between the Alliance and Ukraine, helping to overcome outdated stereotypes and to provide accurate information about NATO to Ukrainians. Mandated by the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the Information and Documentation Centre is making an important contribution to expanding cooperation between NATO and Ukraine.

**A distinct partnership with NATO**

Of all the Euro-Atlantic institutions with which our country is developing closer relations, NATO has a particular importance for Ukraine. We see NATO as the most reliable and capable pillar of European security and have formalised our relationship in a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, Ukraine, signed at the Madrid Summit in July 1997. This far-reaching partnership does not necessarily mean that Ukraine is seeking to join the Alliance, at least at this stage. We recognise that we are not yet ready to become a NATO member, both in terms of meeting the necessary criteria, and in terms of public opinion in Ukraine.

We are, however, engaged in a large-scale public campaign to explain the mutual benefits of Ukraine-NATO cooperation. I am convinced that in time the Ukrainian people will understand that NATO poses no threat to us, but on the contrary serves as a guarantor of stability in Europe, strengthening our own security as well. This is why we welcome the fact that Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary — two of these countries with which we share common borders — have been invited to accede to the Alliance.

The NATO-Ukraine Charter has opened new vistas of cooperation, providing a firm basis for the further dynamic development of our relations. The most concrete result of the Charter is the creation of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, a forum in which we meet with the 16 NATO allies for consultations on a broad range of political and military cooperation activities. The Commission has now met twice at the level of Foreign Ministers, once at Defence Ministers’ level, and periodic meetings take place at the level of Ambassadors. Our consultations have covered such issues as strengthening cooperation in peacekeeping, the creation of a Joint Group on Defence Reform and the implementation of a Joint Group on Civil Emergency Planning10.

On the military side, the Ukrainian military representative to NATO took up his duties in January and we expect that a NATO liaison officer will be posted to Kyiv in the near future. This will allow us to further cultivate our military ties with the Alliance, providing opportunities to learn more about each other’s armed forces and for Ukraine to gain useful experience relevant to the reform of the military.

But the significance of the NATO-Ukraine Charter is far more profound than the numerous cooperative activities that it facilitates. Along with the Alliance’s enlargement process, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Ukraine Charter plays an important role in filling the vacuum in European stability and security left by the end of the Cold War.

Thus, Ukraine, through the multiple cooperative mechanisms and institutions in which it plays a leading role, and in particular through its distinctive partnership with NATO, has positioned itself as a key actor in the emerging European security architecture and as an important contributor to security and stability in Europe. ♦
The purpose of civil emergency planning (CEP) is to protect civilian populations in emergency situations, such as during war or natural disasters. Civil emergency planning plays an important role in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of cooperation with partners from Central and Eastern Europe because of the practical application of its activities. Ukraine first began participating in CEP cooperation activities in 1992, the first year of its independence. Two years later, after Ukraine joined PfP in February 1994, the Ministry of Emergencies designated two units for CEP cooperation activities, the Mobile Mechanised Brigade of Civil Defence, stationed in Kyiv, and the Specialised Militarised Rescue Unit, stationed in Poltava.

In December 1995, a delegation comprising representatives of the various Ukrainian administrations involved in civil emergency planning paid a visit to NATO Headquarters. That meeting greatly contributed to highlighting both the dramatic changes which had been taking place in the Alliance since the end of the Cold War and the growing importance of several initiatives undertaken in the framework of the broad approach to security adopted by NATO in 1991. As a result, a robust programme with NATO Civil Emergency Planning was agreed upon.

Indeed, the following year we hosted in Kyiv the first meeting of a Civil Emergency Planning Board to take place outside NATO. Also in 1996, NATO’s Civil Protection Committee with Cooperation Partners held a meeting in L’viv, in conjunction with the command post and field exercise Carpathian Safety 96 hosted by Ukraine in the same region. Emergency rescue teams from the United States, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Hungary participated in the exercise.

In 1997, a Ukrainian emergency rescue battalion staff and engineer platoon of the Autonomous Mechanised Brigade of the Ministry of Emergencies participated in the PfP exercise Cooperative Safeguard 97, which took place in Iceland in July, as well as the Sea Breeze 97 exercise hosted by Ukraine the following August. In September 1997, Ukraine hosted a joint seminar with NATO on “Aeromedical Evacuation and Rescue Operations in Emergencies” in Kyiv where over 100 representatives from NATO and partner countries took part in the discussion and training on the current state of the art.

New level of cooperation

These exercises, seminars and other events demonstrate the usefulness of PfP as a framework for undertaking long-term projects and conducting practical exercises between NATO members and partners, in preparation for actual search and rescue operations. However, in Ukraine we felt that we could do more. Thus, in December 1997, we brought the level of our cooperation in the CEP field to a significantly higher level when the Ukrainian Ministry of Emergencies...
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness with NATO. This MOU, one of only two such MOUs signed by NATO in the CEP field, created a legal framework for expanding the Ministry’s coordination not only with NATO as an organisation, but with the individual members of the Alliance as well.

One of the most far-reaching provisions of the MOU is the agreement to develop joint studies aimed at enhancing, through international cooperation, the overall response capability to nuclear accidents. These joint activities, based on a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the Chernobyl disaster, will be carried out in cooperation with the relevant technical committees subordinate to the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee — primarily, the Civil Protection Committee, the Joint Medical Committee, the Food and Agriculture Planning Committee and the Civil Aviation Planning Committee.

This, we hope, will result in deepening the present knowledge of the effects of Chernobyl-like disasters on human beings, agriculture, water supplies and other vital resources.

With regard to emergencies resulting from releases of radioactivity, and taking into account the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ukraine and NATO will cooperate within the NATO Group of Experts on Warning and Detection Systems.

The Ukraine-NATO Working Group on Civil Emergency Planning, established under the aegis of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, was created to implement the Memorandum’s provisions, as well for the planning and coordination of the joint activities. The first meeting of the Working Group took place in Kyiv last March with the participation of senior NATO officials and representatives from the Ukrainian Cabinet of
Ministers and other relevant ministries and agencies. A number of important decisions concerning our future cooperation were taken at this meeting and a joint communiqué was issued.

In particular, as a result of presentations given on that occasion by the Chairmen of the NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee and the Joint Medical Committee, and the in-depth discussions which followed, we have agreed that Ukrainian experts will participate, in order to start sharing information on the Chernobyl experience, in meetings of these two committees to be held in the course of this year, in Vienna and Brussels respectively.

In addition, taking advantage of NATO’s decision to open CEP planning boards and committees to partners, agreement has been reached to gradually increase Ukraine’s participation, not only in the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, but also in its subordinate technical planning boards and committees.

We are particularly hopeful that Ukraine will be able to contribute effectively to the new Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, recently established at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, as well as the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit. The Ministry for Emergencies has experienced personnel which the Unit could draw upon to provide expert assistance to disaster victims, whether in NATO or partner countries. Together with the valuable experience in responding to a nuclear emergency as a result of the Chernobyl accident, we also enjoy outstanding air transportation capabilities. The Ministry and Ukraine’s scientific community are ready and willing to share their knowledge and practical experience with colleagues from NATO and partner countries in the Coordination Centre.

Needless to say, these developments result in an enhanced form of cooperation and in progressive networking of Ukrainian experts in the various areas which civil emergency planning inherently encompasses, thereby fostering a process of integration in the economic and social fabric of the Euro-Atlantic area in which Ukraine is determined to play an important role.

A safer future

We have already worked out some of the necessary cooperative procedures during the international crisis management exercise “CMX-98” held last March at NATO Headquarters. The Ministry for Emergencies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have now agreed on the procedures for the appointment of a representative from the Ministry for Emergencies to the Ukrainian Mission to NATO in order to improve coordination of our efforts with the Alliance. The active participation of a Ukrainian representative in the work of NATO’s Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and its subordinate planning boards and committees will strengthen our cooperation and lead to better coordination between Ukrainian civil emergency planning and that of NATO member countries.

The future is in our hands. Through our practical cooperation in civil emergency planning, we have an opportunity to help ensure a safe, stable and prosperous life for our children, grandchildren and future generations. In Ukraine, we stand ready to maximise this opportunity. ✭

“Ukraine has valuable experience in responding to a nuclear emergency.” Here, a worker operates a drilling machine making tests under the concrete sarcophagus built over the nuclear power plant’s fourth reactor after the 1986 accident.

(Rexfeatures photo)
A little more than a year ago, NATO and Russia signed the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security”. This event, held in Paris a few weeks prior to the Madrid Summit, was more than a diplomatic ceremony. It signified a turning point in the post-Cold War era. By signing the Founding Act, NATO and Russia laid the foundation for a new strategic relationship. There can be no doubt: we have a shared responsibility to shape the new European security landscape well into the 21st century.

We have made great strides in the first year in implementing the provisions of this historic agreement. NATO and Russia have instituted a new form of consultations on security-related issues in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), established under the Founding Act. Through our work in the PJC, we are seeking new, unprecedented, forms of cooperation.

As with any new relationship, it has taken time and diplomatic skill to get used to one another. Many decades of mistrust had to be overcome and misperceptions dispelled. Our working relationship is now developing impressively, though the task ahead remains challenging. We want to make the NATO-Russia partnership a permanent fixture of Euro-Atlantic security.

The broader picture

Of all the changes that have occurred in Europe and at NATO over the last few years, the new relationship between NATO and Russia is revolutionary indeed. Gone are the days when the two military blocs stood face to face in the centre of Europe. Former dividing lines in Europe have disappeared. Most countries in...
Central and Eastern Europe are consolidating their economic and political reforms and are seeking closer ties with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. And Russia is undergoing the most profound change in its recent history.

The same can be said of NATO. In the early 1990s, the Alliance took the fundamental decision that cooperation and outreach to former rivals should be the main tools for achieving security and stability in today’s Europe. NATO therefore adopted a wider role beyond safeguarding the territorial integrity of its member states: that of promoting security and stability throughout Europe.

It was also apparent that building a new European security architecture could not be achieved without Russia, a country of particular weight and importance for stability in Europe. Through the Founding Act, NATO and Russia have created the institutionalised framework to seek common approaches and solutions to common concerns. The NATO-Russia relationship complements the Alliance’s other security-enhancing policies such as enlargement, a distinct relationship with Ukraine, an enhanced Mediterranean dialogue, and close political and military relations between NATO and partner countries through the two central features of our security cooperation — the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace.

A successful year

The first Ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in New York last September put our cooperation on the right track. In December, NATO and Russia agreed on an extensive Work Programme for 1998, covering a wide array of topics of consultation and cooperative activities, such as peacekeeping, defence conversion, defence-related environmental issues and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That same month, we held a successful NATO-Russia workshop on the retraining of retired military officers.

Since July 1997, Ambassadors have been meeting in the PJC format on a regular basis. This February, for example, we exchanged views on combatting terrorism, followed by a review in March of political and defence efforts against the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means. A political-military experts’ group on peacekeeping has also been set up and meets regularly.

In late April, Ambassadors discussed nuclear weapons issues for the first time, including doctrine and strategy and nuclear safety. This meeting demonstrated that NATO and Russia do not shy away from exchanging views on sensitive matters. In May, we
consulted on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes.

In the area of civil emergency planning, NATO and Russia have launched a pilot project on the “Use of Satellite Technology in Disaster Assessment and Response”. We have also opened the new NATO Science for Peace programme to some 1,500 Russian scientists. At the meeting of the PJC at Ministerial level in Luxembourg on 28 May, NATO and Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Scientific Cooperation.

The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers in May and that of Defence Ministers in June, examined future priorities of the PJC Work Programme for 1998 and reviewed the situation in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina, including NATO-Russia cooperation in SFOR, and the international community’s response to the crisis in Kosovo. The Ministerial discussions on the Kosovo crisis as well as two extraordinary Ambassadorial PJC meetings on the same issue in May and June were a particularly striking example of the new level of transparency and cooperation developed over the past 12 months. In response to nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, PJC Foreign Ministers issued a joint declaration at their 28 May meeting in Luxembourg, which also underlined the commitment of NATO and Russia to continue their cooperation in an effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery means.

Military to military contacts

One item that has become a constant feature of the NATO-Russia consultative process is the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Few would have predicted only a few years ago that NATO and Russian troops would one day work side by side in implementing a peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia. Russia’s participation in the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) alongside NATO allies and other partners is living proof of the practical side of our cooperation. And Russia continues to contribute to the NATO-led force in Bosnia following the renewal of SFOR’s mandate last June. This shows that, in the new Europe, NATO and Russia can help shape security together. We must build on the experience gained in Bosnia as we undertake other possible joint peacekeeping missions with Russia, as provided for in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

Beyond Bosnia, NATO-Russia military contacts have increased considerably over the last few months. Meetings of military representatives under the auspices of the PJC occur regularly. Earlier in the year, Lt. General Viktor Zavarzin was appointed the first permanent Russian military representative to NATO. Both sides have agreed to set up military missions in Moscow and Brussels, respectively, before the end of the year. In May, Russia participated in the joint PfP exercise Cooperative Jaguar with allies and partners in Denmark.

We are looking forward to further enhancing such contacts. In particular, we hope that Russia will make full use of the potential for cooperation provided through the Partnership for Peace programme. A special PfP programme, tailored to Russia’s needs and aspirations, is under consideration. It would deepen cooperation between Russia and NATO member states and other PfP members and would provide for increased stability, mutual openness and trust.

Information and public diplomacy

Information and public diplomacy is another important aspect of the new NATO-Russia relationship. Countless Russian journalists, students and government officials have visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels over the last few years. This stream of visitors is likely to grow in the future. Moreover, the North Atlantic Assembly — the parliamentary arm of the Alliance — has been playing a crucial role in fostering contacts between the Russian Duma and the legislatures of NATO member states.
Moscow Workshop commemorates first anniversary of NATO-Russia Founding Act

To mark the first anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a high-level Workshop was held at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION) in Moscow on June 19-20. Jointly organised by the NATO Documentation Centre for European Security Issues, located at INION, and the NATO Office of Information and Press, the Workshop was part of the 1998 Work Programme of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

The Workshop brought together for the first time civilian and military policy practitioners from NATO and Russia with a group of academics from 14 NATO countries and from Moscow and regional Russian universities. Some 90 Workshop participants reviewed the achievements of the first year of NATO-Russia cooperation under the Founding Act and discussed ideas for further cooperation in a wide range of areas, including peacekeeping, science, civil emergency planning, armaments cooperation and retraining of retired servicemen.

Russian keynote speakers included Nikolai Afanasieyevsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Col. General Valery Manilov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence. The principal NATO speakers were Chris Donnelly, the Secretary General’s Special Adviser for Central and Eastern Europe, and Lt. General Nicholas Keloe, the Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee.

The organisers plan a publication as a follow-up to the meeting.

Last February, I had the privilege to help inaugurate the NATO Documentation Centre for European Security Issues, in Moscow. This centre — located on the premises of the prestigious INION Institute — is now making information on NATO and general European security matters available to a wide range of organisations and citizens of Russia. I hope that it will help in disseminating an accurate view of NATO’s policies.

Russia and NATO enlargement

Effective public diplomacy will remain particularly relevant to dispel continuing misperceptions in Russia about NATO enlargement. Our message to our Russian friends remains unchanged: NATO enlargement does not pose a threat to the national security interests of Russia. Rather, through the integration of the Central and Eastern European countries into a system of cooperative security, we are strengthening security and stability for all of Europe, including Russia.

Nor is NATO moving a military machine eastward. In the Founding Act, NATO reiterated its unilateral statement of 14 March 1997, that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. I think this statement speaks for itself. Moreover, NATO allies have also reiterated that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so.

The debate about NATO enlargement has shown that we will not always agree on every given topic. However, occasional differences in opinion should not detract from the wider picture: the genuine commitment of both sides to build confidence by working together.

The track record of NATO-Russia relations has proven wrong those critics who maintained that improved relations with Russia would be at the expense of the security of Central and Eastern European states.

Looking ahead

How Russia positions itself within the new Europe is perhaps the most important single factor that will determine European security in the years to come. We see the most promising future for a Russia that is prosperous and open; a partner who shares our interest in trade and stability; a partner in helping to solve potential regional conflicts; a neighbour who pursues its policies in a confident but transparent and peaceful manner; a trusting negotiator in arms control matters; and a country working together with other states in the Euro-Atlantic region in facing the risks and challenges of the future.

This task is Russia’s to manage. However, we not only have an opportunity but a responsibility to help. It is a task for all institutions, including NATO and the European Union. And it can be achieved by giving Russia a legitimate voice commensurate with its size and political weight.

We are confident that the NATO-Russia Founding Act will help us meet these goals. While it has already allowed us to raise the NATO-Russia relationship to a qualitatively new level, our task for the future will be to perfect the cooperative mechanisms that we have created. In this regard — as its name suggests — the Permanent Joint Council is more than a consultative forum. Its very nature as a permanent body will help provide for continuity in our relationship. I am convinced that we are heading in the right direction. Over time, these relations will grow in substance and depth, anchoring shared security and stability in the entire continent. ◆
Getting on board the moving train of NATO

András Simonyi
Head of the Mission of the Republic of Hungary to NATO

As the ratification process nears completion in the 16 NATO member states and the three invitees, Hungary, along with the Czech Republic and Poland, is stepping up its final preparations for accession to the Alliance. Ambassador Simonyi offers his impressions from the vantage point of the “special status” enjoyed by Hungary and the two other invitee nations as they ready themselves for Alliance membership — a process he likens to clambering aboard a moving train.

Since that historic day at last year’s Madrid Summit, when Hungary, along with the Czech Republic and Poland, was invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we have been working tirelessly to prepare for membership. We want to ensure that when the moment comes, Hungary will be a full contributor to the Alliance in both political and military terms.

Hungary has gone through its third democratic elections since the systemic changes in 1989. But the institution of democracy only grows stronger with each change of government. And, I should stress, there will be clear continuity in the foreign policy goals of the new government, including the Euro-Atlantic integration efforts and the priority of building good-neighbourly relations with our immediate neighbours.

The commitment to Hungarian membership in NATO is shared not only by the government and political parties in Parliament, but by society at large. This was clearly demonstrated by the resounding 85 per cent vote in favour in last autumn’s referendum on Hungary’s accession to the Alliance. This is indicative of the strong support of the Hungarian people for the Euro-Atlantic integration process.

Since the Accession Protocols for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were signed by the 16 NATO Foreign Ministers last December, the three “invitee” nations have enjoyed a special, informal status at NATO, akin to an “observer” status. This has involved us gradually in more and more Alliance structures, including the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies, as well as the Major NATO Commands, as
we work diligently on the practical aspects of accession. The objective is clearly that by the time our nations become members, we are able to make a full contribution and exercise our full rights of membership.

As for other aspiring nations, including some of our neighbours who were not invited in the first wave, Hungary has made very clear that it is in favour of leaving the door open for further rounds of enlargement, for countries able and willing to become members of the Alliance in future. As US President Bill Clinton said to the leaders of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at last year’s NATO summit in Madrid, “The possibility of future enlargements will depend to a large extent on how the first wave of enlargement goes. If we succeed in making this Alliance not only bigger, but also stronger, and it remains cohesive, then we will have created a firm basis for further enlargements.”

We are fully aware of our responsibility in making the accession process a total and unqualified success. As we proceed, both the invitee nations and NATO will gain a tremendous amount of experience in the practical aspects of integration as well as a clearer picture of the necessary reforms. And, importantly, we will be more than happy to share this valuable experience with other countries that join the Alliance after us. While we cannot guarantee that the processes of reform and accession will be made any less painful, future applicants can surely benefit by learning from our experience and avoid having to “reinvent the wheel”.

A look back
at the beginning

I can clearly remember our disappointment in Hungary in 1992, when no announcement came of early membership for the newly emerging democracies. This was painful because we had been excluded from this “family” for such a long time. When I look back now, I understand better: in the early 1990s, the traditional threat was fast fading away and, from the Alliance’s perspective, there was no immediate, compelling logic for enlargement. NATO and Europe at large were not ready and, let’s face it, nor was Hungary. We still needed to develop a firm basis for our evolving democratic institutions and economic and financial structures, as well as for reform of our armed forces. Becoming a member obviously reinforces these institutions but it must never be forgotten that each and every member shares a responsibility for the maintenance of the strength of the Alliance. The Alliance must not be weakened or its cohesiveness diluted as it enlarges.

The process leading to our membership in NATO began when we joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991. This was followed by Partnership for Peace a little more than two years later, and was further strengthened by the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced NACC in May 1997. These cooperative institutions have helped to create a broader Atlantic family, while at the same time being useful instruments for preparing for membership in the Alliance. As one allied diplomat once remarked, “In the end, you will grow into NATO in a natural way”, and that is what is happening.

Despite its shortcomings, NACC was an important instrument for getting acquainted with the way NATO works, including understanding the depth of transatlantic relationships, the political decision-making process and the relationship between the political and military structures of the Alliance. Early, personal contacts with members of the North Atlantic Council, the International Staff and NATO military authorities have given us a better appreciation of the work of these bod-
ies. This has been an important part of building a working relationship based on confidence.

Participation in the NACC, and later, in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, has also given us insight into what I now experience regularly: how NATO member nations work together building consensus. To remain cohesive and effective requires a good balance between national and common Alliance interests.

As for Partnership for Peace, though we were at first suspicious that it might derail the enlargement process, Hungary was among the first countries to join the partnership programme. A broad spectrum of political and military institutions in Hungary has embraced PfP, which has established itself as a lasting feature in the European security architecture. It has provided the opportunity for our generals, officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as civilian defence experts, to become more familiar with the Alliance and its procedures through practical military cooperation and joint exercises. It has also helped us to gain a better appreciation of how to adapt the Hungarian military fully to democratic civilian control.

I have always been convinced that the success of the NATO-led operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to a large extent thanks to Partnership for Peace. It would have been much more difficult to build such a broad international coalition without the experience gained through PfP. The necessary confidence and trust in each other’s abilities was established through many months of intensive practical cooperation, before NATO’s decision to form the IFOR/SFOR coalition in Bosnia.

Military cooperation and reforms

I am a sergeant in the reserves, with limited direct military experience. But over the last five years I have come to enjoy immensely working with the military leaders of the Alliance as well as Hungarian commanders. Hungary has gone through a painful reform process of its armed forces in the years between 1993 and 1998. By the end of 1997, we had finished the first, quantitative, phase, reducing our armed forces personnel strength from 160,000 to close to 55,000. A new, simplified command structure was also created, with a view to making it more effective and compatible with NATO nations.

In the second phase, which started at the end of 1997, the goal is to introduce qualitative changes. This includes the total overhaul of our defence strategy and the technological modernisation of the armed forces. This is being done in a manner fully compatible with NATO’s defence planning process through the establishment of Target Force Goals.

Interoperability figures high on our agenda and, in this respect, our participation in IFOR and SFOR has provided invaluable experience. One of the most basic requirements of interoperability, however, is the ability to communicate in one of the two official languages of the Alliance — English or French — and it will be a challenging task to achieve this in the majority of the armed forces. All of this adds up to a formidable endeavour which will continue far beyond the point of accession.

An element that stands out among my personal experiences relates to procurement of equipment. An effective military depends on proper equipment, whether to undertake future Article 5 (collective defence) or non-Article 5 (peace support) operations. But in the face of scarce resources, it is important that only the right equipment is procured and in the right order of priority. NATO’s advice and support in respect to procurement practices has been invaluable to us. I would like to stress that never, throughout the process of Hungary’s accession, have we come under any pressure from NATO on the question of procurement of military equipment. On the contrary, NATO’s message has been that buying new equipment should be secondary to structural reform, education and training. Hungary is not at the mercy of salesmen!
The moving train of NATO

Preparing for NATO membership is like trying to clamber aboard a moving train. While we have been introducing our own reforms the Alliance itself keeps changing. In Hungary, the process of reform, modernisation and adaptation is dynamic and will never stop, even after we have joined the Alliance.

One of the essential criteria of membership, on which Hungary has been working diligently over the past years, is good-neighbourly relations. My country has successfully mended historic ties with most of its neighbours. This is in the interest of the countries and peoples involved, of the entire region, as well as that of Europe as a whole. But it is not because NATO or the European Union says so that good-neighbourly relations should be pursued; they must be strengthened because they are a precondition of nation-building and of European peace and stability.

Another key element of adaptation in my country has been a strong effort to establish full-fledged democratic and civilian control over the armed forces. From our early contacts with NATO to the process leading to our invitation to join, the establishment of democratic control over the military has been an important part of our cooperation. NATO has made clear, at times in a friendly manner, at other times more bluntly, that this is one of the most important criteria to be fulfilled. The Alliance is keenly interested to ensure that the military will never endanger the democratic institutions of its member states. At the same time, democratic control through parliamentary oversight is the best way to ensure that the taxpayers’ money is used properly.

Establishing full-fledged democratic and civilian control is a long process; you cannot do it from one day to the next. It is not just a question of establishing structures. We have learned by working with the Alliance that the civilian and military sides must work hand in hand, and that the civilian political leaders, as represented by the NATO Council, have the final word. The military will give its advice, but it must accept the final political decision.

At times during this process of preparation we have received well-intentioned but tough messages from the Alliance and our discussions have not always been exempt of emotions either. But the results are plain to see. We have also learned in the process that we must always seek Hungarian solutions which are responsive to our traditions, views and interests. In general terms, there is no need to copy. It is not the full conformity of the solution but the cohesion of the principles that is important. There is no one solution, but there are many useful models that we can draw from.

On the home stretch

The first six months of our “special status” has been a process with a very steep learning curve. We have established a full, integrated mission at NATO Headquarters and are making every effort to take up the opportunities that are being offered at a fast pace. Some lessons which we can already draw are: quality before quantity, precision before speed. As I and my colleagues are assimilated into the daily life of the Alliance it is a continuous and tough challenge. We are however neither left on our own nor treated like children.

What we have learned is that you need the right political, military, cultural and human attitudes. You also need the right structures manned by the right people. They must be professionals and have the right outlook towards the world, the ability to communicate with the appropriate mind set and in one of the two official languages of the Alliance. And finally you must be tireless in your demands of NATO and of yourself at all times.

Reform is a long process which is far from concluded. But with the proper balance of stability and change, persistence and flexibility, my country will without a doubt become a net contributor to the new NATO. This is how we intend to continue our preparation in the months ahead leading to full membership.
A true “Copernican revolution” in the Alliance lies behind the establishment of the new Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) in Brussels last June, according to Dr. Palmeri. This new capability, built on almost 50 years of experience in allied civil emergency planning and a well-established programme of cooperation with non-NATO partners in this field, exemplifies the far-reaching changes underway in the Alliance. This innovative development, which enhances the international community’s capacity to respond to disasters of great magnitude, illustrates the shifting emphasis at NATO towards non-military aspects of security.

The long list of NATO acronyms just got a little longer with the addition of EADRCC to the lexicon. Its unwieldy acronym, however, is virtually the only aspect of the new Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre that reminds one of the NATO of the past. This is in fact an entirely new concept which puts to practical use NATO’s cooperation mechanisms and long experience in civil emergency planning (CEP).

The Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability will enhance the ability of the international community to respond to disasters of great magnitude anywhere within the vast Euro-Atlantic region, stretching from Vancouver, Canada to Sakhalin, Russia. This region, which comprises six out of the seven most industrialized countries in the world, bears the largest potential for serious natural and technological disasters, while also possessing the greatest response capability.

Although the ultimate beneficiaries of this international cooperation will be the countries stricken by disasters which overwhelm their own response capabilities, the primary recipient of the contribution this new mechanism provides is in fact the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA), the leading international agency in the field. The EADRCC’s task is to coordinate the response capabilities of the 44 member countries of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in order to ensure a prompt and effective offer of disaster assistance to the United Nations. The EADRCC thus institutionalises a third link between NATO and the United Nations, adding to the two existing working links in the political and security areas.

The EADRCC builds upon almost 50 years of experience in international cooperation in civil emergency planning at NATO — including a network of civil experts accustomed to working together, as well as standardised and interoperable plans, procedures, services and equipment, civil-military cooperation, communications, and so on — and the well-established cooperative relationship between NATO and its Central and Eastern European partners in the Partnership for Peace (PiP)-Civil Emergency Planning programme of cooperation.

However, the genesis of this innovation can be traced back to 1992, predating PiP itself, when the late NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner had the foresight to host an innovative conference on international disaster relief at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This event, organised by the United Nations and the International Federation of the Red Cross and including the participation of more than 40 countries and 20 international organisations, launched a project to make military assets available for tackling civil disasters. The Military Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) Project creates a mechanism for both systematic stocktaking of civil and military assets available in the event of a disaster and arrangements for ensuring the feasibility of this new form of international cooperation.

Secretary General Wörner, who even during the Cold War attached a special importance to the non-military activities of the Alliance, had in fact appreciated that this particular dimension would provide the most conducive environment for dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building between former foes. Moreover, this was an opportunity to fulfil the widespread expectation in the aftermath of the Cold War of defence resources being freed up for civil purposes. It is thus not by chance that the building in which the EADRCC is located, adjacent to NATO’s present Brussels Headquarters, has been named the Manfred Wörner Building.

The Alliance first developed a mechanism back in 1953 for mutual assistance among the allies in case of disasters of a particular magnitude. Soon after cooperation with partners in the area of CEP began in 1994, the Alliance took a significant decision in May 1995 to extend to partner nations the same provisions of mutual assistance enjoyed by the allies. These provisions have been implemented on several occasions since that decision, including in Ukraine that same year, and most recently during the severe flooding which hit Central Europe in the summer of 1997.
On the basis of experience on the ground, and in line with the decisions taken by Alliance leaders in Madrid in July 1997 to further enhance practical cooperation with partner countries, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) in EAPC format (i.e., meeting with cooperation partners) came up with the idea to upgrade existing disaster response policies. Building on a far-reaching proposal put forward by Russia in Moscow in April 1997, on the occasion of the first SCEPC meeting ever held in a PfP country, a new mechanism was developed which ultimately led to the creation of the EADRCC.

Enhancing effectiveness

The goal of enhancing the effectiveness of international disaster relief is fully shared by the United Nations, the major contributing nations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In tackling this challenge, the starting point has been the acknowledgement that the resources to be employed by the United Nations always belong to nations. Consequently, resources being limited, the only way to enhance the effectiveness of the relief at international level is by:

(a) speeding up the process through which the provision of assistance is actually carried out;

(b) avoiding duplication of efforts;

(c) avoiding waste of resources.

Moreover, as the United Nations itself is regularly pursuing the enhancement of international disaster relief, any initiative aiming at the same objective should necessarily:

(a) not conflict with the new arrangements which are being worked out by the United Nations (i.e., the MCDA Project);

(b) result in “added value” to the United Nations.

Against this background, EAPC Foreign Ministers took the decision last December to establish a Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability. The SCEPC in EAPC format was tasked to prepare a detailed report establishing the policy guidelines and procedures necessary to make this political decision a functioning reality. The report, entitled “Enhanced Practical Cooperation in the Field of International Disaster Relief”, will serve as the basic Charter for the EADRCC. The informal association of the UN OCHA in the development of this report helped to dispel any concerns that this initiative might somehow cut across the mandate of other international organisations set up specifically to deal with international disaster assis-
tance, such as the UN OCHA, thus facilitating the consensus achieved among the 44 nations of the EAPC.

For its part, the UN OCHA put forward the following recommendations on the occasion of a PfP seminar held in Switzerland last April, and based on an in-depth study on the trends and challenges for relief coordination in Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

“The International Relief Community must make every effort to:
- coordinate investments in disaster response capacity;
- improve coordination and mobilisation procedures;
- improve communication within regional relief coordination networks;
- define specific projects to systematically improve relief processes and;
- work collectively to mobilise resources to meet the challenge.”

This is precisely what the PfP CEP programme of cooperation has sought to achieve since its inception, and the new Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability will pursue these objectives. But this improved efficiency in the Euro-Atlantic area will also benefit the United Nations by freeing up more resources for other regions of the world.

Structure of the Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability

There are two major components of the new disaster response capability:

- A Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), a non-standing (i.e., not permanent) mix of national elements, comprising rescue, medical, transport, and others, which have been volunteered by EAPC countries. The EADRU can be deployed to the scene of a major disaster at the request of the stricken EAPC nation. EAPC members contributing national elements to the EADRU will decide on their deployment and will be responsible for their costs.

- A Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters, composed of personnel from NATO’s International Staff and a limited number of personnel from interested NATO and partner countries. In the event of a disaster, the EADRCC could provide the core of a disaster assessment team which, in close cooperation with the local emergency management agency of the stricken nation and the UN resident coordinator, would identify requirements for international disaster assistance.

The EADRCC will coordinate offers of international assistance from EAPC countries with the UN. In preparation for intervention in case of disaster, the Centre will develop appropriate plans and procedures for the use of the EADRU, taking into account national risk assessment, existing multi- and bilateral agreements, and response capabilities. It will also maintain a list of national civil and military elements available and will promote and contribute to interoperability through joint training and exercises.
The overall concept is developed in a manner allowing for decision-making authority to remain with individual nations while at the same time providing an EAPC identity for participating NATO and partner countries.

A Copernican revolution

The institutionalised cooperation with the United Nations in the area of international disaster relief which the EADRC represents, epitomises the most far-reaching vision of Alliance strategy in the post-Cold War era, namely the broad approach to security emphasised by the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept. This broad approach, which will likely be confirmed and possibly reinforced as a result of the ongoing examination with a view to updating the 1991 Strategic Concept, shifts the emphasis in NATO from military means to political means, coupled with cooperation with non-member states to respond to new risks in the changed security environment. In particular, “...with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension.” (2)

This “Copernican revolution” in NATO’s Strategic Concept, where the defence dimension to security is mentioned after the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions, inevitably brings to the fore the one area of NATO’s activities which encompasses all of these dimensions: civil emergency planning. Indeed, the extraordinary success of the programme of cooperation in the area of civil emergency planning should be regarded as an important testimony to the farsightedness of this broad approach to security.

What is at stake

It was no surprise then, that with the backing of the United Nations, EAPC Foreign Ministers enthusiastically endorsed the creation of the EADRCC at their meeting in Luxembourg on 29 May. Five days later, in the presence of EAPC ambassadors, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Restonse Coordination Centre at NATO Headquarters. The very day of the inauguration, the wave of refugees fleeing the crisis in Kosovo precipitated the immediate commencement of operations in the brand new structure. By the end of June, the EADRCC had arranged 16 flights transporting 165 tonnes of urgent relief items to neighbouring Albania in support of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the lead agency in the refugee relief operation.

Needless to say, the launch of the EADRCC is not just the result of a benevolent desire to enhance international disaster relief. What is at stake here above all else is the objective of fostering stability, security and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area, the overarching goal of Partnership for Peace. Perhaps the mission of the EADRCC is best summed up in an eloquent statement by Andrei Piontkovsky, Head of the Strategic Studies Institute in Moscow, written when the discussions between Russia and NATO on the creation of a Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability were still ongoing:

“Seven years have passed since the reunification of Germany. All these years, a wall of bitterness and resentment has stood between the so-called Ossies and Wessies that was more difficult to destroy than the Berlin Wall. It took a destructive flood for the Ossies and Wessies to finally understand that they are just the same Germans. Maybe after some future joint disaster relief operation we will all realize that we are just the same human beings.”

PfP crisis management activities:
Enhancing capabilities and cooperation

John Kiendler
Head, Council Operations Section of NATO’s Crisis Management and Operations Directorate

The increase in partner participation in NATO crisis management activities is a reflection of both the emphasis on crisis management in the Alliance and the enhancement of partnership activities with non-NATO countries. One example of this was the CMX 98 exercise which, according to the author, took partner involvement in crisis management activities a giant step forward. The improvements to both capabilities and cooperation resulting from these activities are of benefit to the Alliance and partners alike.

Thursday, 12 February 1998 was a day more complex than usual at NATO: the theatre reconnaissance party was running into trouble; intelligence reports revealed “LD” army chemical weapons experts serving in the Free State Army; NATO maritime forces were tracking “WT” merchant ships, submarines and frigates suspected of carrying multiple launch rocket systems in the Eastern Atlantic; and the town of Chop was just beginning to dig itself out of a level-7 earthquake.

These matters were the focus of intense consideration and active consultations among allies and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners participating in CMX 98 at NATO’s Brussels Headquarters, the annual NATO-wide crisis management exercise. Fortunately these ominous developments were fictitious and there was no real threat to the security of allies or partners. But the crisis management organisation, procedures, consultation mechanisms and communications used to deal with these simulated developments were real, as were the benefits for allies and partners participating in the exercise.

Like other exercises in the annual series, CMX 98 was designed to practise NATO crisis management procedures, measures and arrangements, including civil-military cooperation, in order to improve and maintain the Alliance’s ability to manage crises. A key additional objective was to enhance cooperation with interested PfP partners by involving them in the procedures for the generation of a NATO-led peace support
operation in response to a UN Security Council mandate. But before considering the benefits gained from CMX 98, it is useful to put it in context.

Crisis management cooperation

The rationale and mandate for cooperation in crisis management are clear. The Washington Treaty reflects the Alliance’s crisis management vocation in its focus on promoting stability and well-being and the safeguarding of freedom, peace and security. While NATO has always been in the crisis management business, the kinds of crises it faced and the tools available to manage crises have evolved dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Reflecting these changes, the 1991 Strategic Concept extended the focus of Alliance strategy from defence and deterrence to include crisis management based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. Allies have committed themselves to cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the 1991 CSCE Charter of Paris principles.

In addition, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) partners have focused on cooperation in crisis management virtually since the inception of NATO’s programme of outreach and cooperation. Partners perceived that enhancing crisis management capabilities and cooperation was an important way to help deal with the challenges of the new security environment. Moreover, the importance of partner contributions to the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including political support, provision of forces and host country facilities, and the success of these operations, gave further impetus to PfP crisis management activities. The importance attached to this cooperative approach to crisis management is further underlined by the explicit references to crisis management in the EAPC Action Plan, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine.¹

PfP crisis management activities

For its part, the PfP Work Programme responded to the interest in crisis management by establishing among its objectives cooperation in crisis management and the enhancement of crisis management capabilities under democratic control. To implement these objectives, allies and partners developed a variety of activities, including: crisis management exercises with partners, associating partners with NATO crisis management exercises (such as CMX 98), meetings of the Council Operations and Exercise Committee (COEC) with partners, expert team visits to partner countries, briefings at NATO Headquarters, visits to the NATO Situation Centre and support for partner-organised crisis management exercises and seminars.

¹ For the EAPC Action Plan, see page D6 of the Documentation section, NATO Review No. 1, Spring 1998; for the other two documents, see Documentation section in NATO Review No. 4, 1997; or consult the NATO Web site for all three documents at http://www.nato.int.
In addition, SHAPE organises exercise *Cooperative Aura*, an annual staff procedural exercise designed to help prepare partners for CMX participation. And the NATO School (SHAPE) runs a series of specialised crisis management courses for partners and includes detailed briefings on crisis management in other partnership courses.

A recent new activity is the exchange of information on national crisis management organisation and procedures in meetings of the COEC — the committee which deals with the Alliance’s crisis management organisation, procedures, measures and exercises — in the EAPC format of allies and partners.

We have also sought to enhance crisis management cooperation and capabilities by providing partners with a set of generic crisis management documents including: the Generic Crisis Management Handbook, the Generic Inventory of Preventive Measures, the Generic Catalogue of Military Response Options and the Generic Manual of Precautionary Measures. One of the key aspects of NATO’s approach to crisis management is to have a large variety of measures ready so that they can be drawn on in real crises and in exercises as required. Three of the generic documents are based closely on the Alliance’s own crisis management measures and can immediately be used for crisis management.

The Generic Inventory of Preventive Measures, for example, contains an illustrative list of preventive measures in the diplomatic, economic and military fields which can be applied selectively in a crisis by individual governments or collectively with other nations. The Generic Catalogue of Military Response Options and the Generic Manual of Precautionary Measures can be used in a similar way. All three can be used directly to deal with real crises that partners may face, and to help develop additional national crisis management measures tailored to individual partner needs.

The fourth document is different. The Generic Crisis Management Handbook contains generic information on national as well as NATO crisis management organisation and procedures. Although not an authoritative Alliance document, it is based on information provided by individual allies which could be useful in helping partners to develop their own crisis management organisations and procedures. Among other topics, it contains a framework for crisis management and examples of national crisis management guidance, committee systems and a decision-making organisation, as well as information on crisis management measures, the NATO Precautionary System (used to assure civil and military preparedness and a coordinated response to any crisis the Alliance might face), exercises and the NATO Situation Centre. The response by partners to these generic documents has been enthusiastic and they are now being translated into a number of partner languages.

It is also important to note that a wide range of other PfP activities, particularly, in the field of military cooperation and peacekeeping, contribute directly to the capacity for crisis management.

### CMX 98

Of all the PfP crisis management activities, the one that partners say they find the most useful is participation in CMXs. Building on a small exercise designed specially for partners in 1995 (PCM 95), partner participation in a NATO-wide CMX began in earnest with CMX 97, where they were associated with the natural disaster aspects of the exercise and were briefed on the potential Article 5 threat to which allies were responding. CMX 98, however, took partner involvement a giant step forward, with active partner participation in both the response to an earthquake and consultations on political and military developments and the planning and force generation process for a NATO-led peace support operation.

One indication of the importance that partners attached to CMX 98 was the level of participation: 21 partner delegations took part or observed the exercise, with more than 100 partner officials, most from capitals, both at NATO Headquarters and at Mons (Belgium), where the force generation consultations took place. More substantively, in their comments in the post exercise analysis, partners indicated the following benefits derived from CMX 98:

1. **the insight it provided into NATO crisis management and its consultation and decision-making process, including the role of different NATO committees in crisis management;**
2. **experience gained in exercising crisis management procedures and mechanisms, including civil-military cooperation;**
3. **experience in interaction between crisis management organisations (CMOs) in capitals and CMX 98 delegations, including identifying bottlenecks in national CMOs;**
4. **the opportunity to re-examine national force generation and force balancing procedures;**
5. **information on procedures for partner participation in NATO-led peace support operations and help in developing national procedures for such participation;**
6. **information on planning and conduct of crisis management exercises;**
7. **testing communications between national delegations and capitals and between NATO delegations and the exercise coordination cell at Mons;**
(h) developing contacts with NATO and partner officials involved in crisis management;

(i) enhancement of cooperation between allies and partners and among partners.

The bottom line is that partner participation was mutually beneficial for allies and partners alike and should be continued where appropriate in future exercises. In addition, partner views and suggestions are being taken into account in planning CMX 99.

CMX 99

In CMX 99, scheduled for next February, an important role is foreseen for interested PfP partners in focusing on a different kind of peace support operation than that exercised in CMX 98 — a preventive deployment in response to a UN Security Council mandate. One of the explicit objectives of CMX 99 will be to enhance cooperation with interested partners by conducting appropriate consultations to provide political guidance and oversight during the planning and execution of the peace support operation.

Interested partners will be involved in relevant aspects of CMX 99 through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with staffs in capitals, at NATO Headquarters and the Major NATO Commands. Although the scenario, as is usual for CMXs, will be generic, it will contain sufficient imaginary political background information to provide a context for political and military assessments and interpretation of exercise events, a sometimes heated process in which partners will also participate. As planning continues, we will ensure that CMX 99 will provide an effective vehicle for further improving cooperation in crisis management.

A common response

We have already come a long way in enhancing cooperation and capabilities in crisis management. The 28 May meeting of EAPC Foreign Ministers, who expressed serious concern about developments in Kosovo and called for a resolution of the crisis (see EAPC Statement on page D8 of the accompanying Documentation Supplement), is just one example of a common response to a real world problem and of the culture of cooperative security that NATO has fostered. But there is clearly more that can and should be done, and allies and partners will be considering other ways to enhance our common efforts to manage crises effectively. The direct relationship between the security of allies and that of all of Europe, which Alliance leaders emphasised in July 1997 in their Madrid Declaration, underlines the utility of our continuing common efforts to enhance crisis management cooperation and capabilities.
Force planning in the new NATO

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As the Alliance has adapted to meet the new demands of European security, so has force planning adapted to the requirements of NATO’s new missions. As the author explains, this includes developing capabilities for peacekeeping, supporting possible WEU requirements, preparing invitee nations for NATO membership as well as providing a means for assessing non-member partner capabilities and encouraging interoperability of partner forces with allies. Thus, force planning, which ensures that the best use is made of our defence resources, provides both the conceptual and practical tools the Alliance needs to meet the security challenges of the future.

Force planning is the “glue” that holds the Alliance together. It plays a central role in ensuring that NATO develops the forces and capabilities needed for its differing missions as well as providing a central focus for the integration of the work of other planning disciplines. Force planning is now also playing a key role in enabling Partnership for Peace partners to develop a closer relationship with the Alliance.

NATO force planning began in 1952 in order to maximise the defence capabilities of the allies to meet the challenges of that era. It aimed to provide a coherent framework of Alliance forces for collective defence; to encourage equitable contributions to the common defence effort by European allies; and to link together the defence planning systems of NATO nations, including through an integrated military structure, in order to promote stability in the NATO area.

With the end of the Cold War and the virtual disappearance of an external threat to the Alliance, many doubted whether these complex and demanding arrangements could survive. Inevitably, the argument went, in the absence of a clear external threat, collective defence would become an irrelevance. In its place, an altogether looser system would emerge in which nations felt less of a need to give a high priority to collective defence efforts in the face of urgent domestic political and economic demands.

But as we approach the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, force planning in the Alliance is in good health. It has been adapted to meet new requirements — developing capabilities for crisis management and peacekeeping, bolstering the development of multinationality, addressing the challenges of proliferation, supporting...
Western European Union (WEU) requirements, preparing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the responsibilities of Alliance membership, and providing a model for the Planning and Review Process (PARP) with Partnership for Peace nations — while maintaining the essential functions it has always performed.

The essentials of force planning

The main elements of NATO force planning involve target-setting (through “NATO Force Goals”, based on detailed “Ministerial Guidance” by Defence Ministers every two years setting out the priorities and areas of concern) and monitoring performance against those targets (through an “Annual Defence Review” by allied Defence Ministers). Both involve military expertise, provided by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and the Military Committee, but the planning process is firmly under political control with major decisions being taken by allied Defence Ministers.

Force planning must take account of two basic requirements. Firstly, it must respect the sovereignty of allies who choose to participate in collective planning because they recognise its benefits; and secondly it must be realistic. Our planners, military and civilian, and the allies who participate, understand that they cannot make unachievable demands. NATO nations have differing economic resources, different national priorities and different force structures. The general framework for planning reflected in Ministerial Guidance and the detailed objectives agreed for each nation in the NATO Force Goals must reflect these differences.

This does not mean that planning cannot change the way in which nations contribute to Alliance missions. Rather, it implies that changes will happen incrementally. This is partly for technical reasons. The business of changing nations’ force structures or developing new capabilities cannot happen overnight since it involves a complex reallocation of resources and significant work to implement new organisational structures. From the political perspective too, nations need to be persuaded that changes are necessary for them. National governments may then have to begin a process of explaining the reasons for change to their publics.

Meeting new challenges

The work that began, following adoption of the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept, to adapt Alliance force structures to the more likely challenges they would face, has also expanded, in parallel with NATO’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia, to prepare the Alliance for the demands of peacekeeping missions.

The Alliance force structure now has greater flexibility including the ability to deploy reaction forces rapidly through, for example, arrangements to make use of civil air and maritime transport assets and development of a NATO pool of transport aircraft to move reaction forces. It must also be able to sustain forces logistically for extended periods, providing a greater volume of supplies than had been planned for during the Cold War and with adequate levels of maintenance, fuel, intra-theatre transportation and medical support to ensure self-sufficiency. The speed with which we were able to mount, deploy and sustain the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an impressive example of the system at work.

Drawing on our experience in Bosnia, we have also responded to a political requirement to conduct peace support operations, either in support of the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or led by NATO, as in IFOR/SFOR. The needs of these operations present particular problems. For example, we have learned that such operations are never purely military. As we have found in Bosnia, the military force also has to support the activities of civil agencies which play an important role. This increases the need for resources such as transport, signallers and engineers. We are now asking allies to be prepared to make such units available for peace support operations even if their own, combat formations are not required.

Since the early 1990s force planning has also had to deal with the complexity of developing multinational units, particularly the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps and the Multinational Division (Central). This involved a complex analysis of the number of sub-units required to construct a coherent whole and detailed negotiations with nations to ensure that the burden of providing them is shared equitably. Arrangements for logistic support of deployed Alliance forces are also taking on an increasingly multinational character and force planning must also accommodate this.

In addition, force plans need to take account of the national division of labour arising from the substantial

(1) Fifteen allies take part in NATO force planning. France does not participate since it does not belong to the integrated military structure of the Alliance.
increase in the number of binational and multinational units in the Alliance force structure since the early 1990s. Next year a further multinational unit is planned when Denmark, Germany and Poland will create a trilateral Army Corps, following Poland’s accession to the Alliance. The increased importance of multinationality in the Alliance has also been a catalyst for the formation of multinational units among Partnership for Peace nations which are increasingly cooperating to create multinational forces for peacekeeping.

We are also giving high priority to the development of military capabilities to counter the risks posed by biological and chemical weapons to NATO forces. Most allies have some capabilities to deal with chemical weapons but, for many, the potential use of biological weapons poses new problems. The Alliance has been giving special attention to this area and we have now addressed Force Goals to nations, seeking the capabilities that will be required in future, including for example intelligence gathering, chemical and biological agent detection systems, and protective equipment.

The European dimension

The effectiveness of our defence planning tools is now being applied to development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Last spring the WEU Council provided input to Guidance defining the likely scope of WEU missions. During the NATO Defence Review last autumn an initial assessment was made of the capabilities of European allies to meet the requirements of WEU illustrative missions, which had been drawn up in the WEU and assessed by NATO’s Military Authorities. This was a first analysis of European capabilities and it will be refined in succeeding Defence Reviews.

The NATO Force Goals, agreed by Defence Ministers in June, now indicate, for European allies, which capabilities are particularly applicable to the needs of WEU missions. These cover a range of forces and capabilities appropriate to the WEU’s tasks. The WEU Planning Cell was directly involved in this work on Force Goals. The Planning Cell is also involved in defining the information requirements of NATO’s Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ), which forms the basis for the Annual Defence Review and has now been structured so that European allies can use it to provide information on forces and capabilities to the WEU.

Our planning tools are also being used to define the capabilities that nations could provide for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations. CJTFs will provide NATO with a flexible command capability for operations both in and outside the NATO area and will be a valuable instrument for the conduct of possible WEU-led operations.

Preparing the Invitees

Our experience over the years has demonstrated the effectiveness of the disciplines of Alliance force planning. Allies therefore agreed last year to use them to help prepare the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for the future obligations of Alliance membership. Consequently, after the Madrid Summit, all three nations were invited to complete a DPQ. For nations that had not previously done so, this was a daunting task. However the three invitees returned completed DPQs at the beginning of October which were comprehensive
and generally well up to the standard of reply we receive from allies, a tribute to their own efforts and assistance they received from NATO staffs and some allies.

The invitees are currently in the process of restructuring and modernising their forces. They plan significant real increases in defence expenditure to underpin their responsibilities as Alliance members and have already made substantial progress towards developing interoperability with NATO through their involvement in Partnership for Peace and bilateral assistance programmes, although more remains to be done.

On the basis of our assessments of the capabilities of the invitees, Target Force Goals, similar to NATO Force Goals, were negotiated with each nation. These indicate the contribution allies expect of the three new members following accession. The Target Force Goals ask them to commit the bulk of their force structures to NATO for Article 5 (collective defence) operations in their own defence. Additionally they identify forces for possible operations to assist in the defence of other allies through contributions to NATO’s reaction forces. The Target Force Goals also identify priorities for the further development of interoperability with NATO, focusing particularly on the areas of command and control, doctrine and procedures, training (including language training), air defence, reinforcement reception facilities and, in the longer term, equipment modernisation.

The enlargement of NATO will clearly affect the defence plans of current allies. The Article 5 collective defence guarantee of the Washington Treaty will be applicable to a wider area and more nations. However, the conclusion we drew in examining the consequences of enlargement last autumn is that the Alliance’s current and planned capabilities are sufficient to enable it to honour the Article 5 guarantee for the three new members. Moreover the new members would themselves be able to make a significant contribution to their own defence in the framework of an Alliance operation.

**Force planning in PfP**

The mechanisms of NATO Force Planning have also been successfully applied to Partnership for Peace (PfP). In 1994 we developed the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) to encourage transparency in defence planning between partner nations and the Alliance and to develop interoperability of partner forces with those of allies. We drew on the NATO DPQ in designing a Survey of PfP Interoperability for partners. Detailed Interoperability Objectives, modeled on NATO Force Goals, were addressed to partners, covering communications interoperability, command and control procedures, logistic support, interoperability of aircraft and airfield equipment and other areas. And we produce detailed assessments of the plans of partner participants similar to the assessments produced for NATO nations.

Our experience, including feedback we receive from partners, is that PARP is a major success. Its detailed and structured approach provides the 18 partners who currently participate with a clear focus for the development of forces better prepared to take part in multinational operations with allies.

Allies and participating partners have agreed to make PARP even more like NATO defence planning. The 16 allies and 18 PARP participants will develop in future a Ministerial Guidance to be agreed by the Defence Ministers of the 34. Planning targets, which will be called Partnership Goals, will address not only interoperability but also seek forces and capabilities from partners for potential peace support operations. And we shall seek to increase further the transparency that is one of PARP’s objectives.

**Vision and implementation**

The measures needed to meet the security challenges of the future require broad vision but also the capacity for detailed implementation. The Alliance’s force planning processes provide both. The next century is unlikely to see a reduction in the growing complexity of the planning tasks facing the Alliance but our force planning processes have demonstrated their adaptability to meet new demands.