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Fifty years ago, in the aftermath of the Second World War, a group of European nations signed the Brussels Treaty and paved the way for the creation of the Western European Union.

Shortly afterwards, NATO came into being. Through NATO, Europeans became partners of the United States and Canada in safeguarding the stability and security of the West from the Soviet threat.

Today, the Cold War belongs to the past. The very principles of integration and cooperation now span across all of Europe. We have adapted our institutions accordingly, defining new missions and reaching out to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. But most importantly, the new realities have allowed NATO and the WEU together to turn the vision of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) into reality.

The newly gained momentum towards developing a European Security and Defence Identity should not come as a surprise. First, an enhanced ESDI complements the wider process of European integration. It responds to the legitimate aspirations of European nations to expand their countries' political and economic integration to the field of security and defence.

Second, ESDI is not just a matter of European self-assertion. It has also become the prerequisite for a more mature transatlantic relationship with the North American allies. The end of the East-West conflict has underscored the need for Europe to become a full-fledged strategic partner of the United States in managing today's and tomorrow's security challenges.

Building ESDI within the Alliance is a practical, workable answer to both requirements. The steps taken by NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1996 set the stage in this regard. In Berlin, the decision was taken to build ESDI within NATO and with the WEU, as fundamental elements of a transformed Alliance.

Where do we stand with ESDI today? At the political level, regular NATO-WEU Joint Council meetings have already become a permanent feature of our institutional relationship. In practical terms, the WEU itself has increased its ability to conduct peacekeeping and crisis management operations. NATO has enhanced its support for ESDI by taking a number of measures, aimed at:

- taking account of WEU requirements in NATO-force planning arrangements;
- offering NATO assets and capabilities case by case in support of WEU-led operations;
- developing arrangements to support the planning and conduct of such operations.

Work is also well in hand to prepare for joint exercises to test and develop further the concept of WEU-led operations with NATO support.

We are thus well on track in developing practical ways by which the Alliance can help build a European Security and Defence Identity. This achievement underscores a fundamental truth. In today's security environment, both organisations — NATO and the WEU — share the same strategic interest: enhancing security and stability throughout Europe.

In the months to come, we will see the promises made at the 1994 Brussels Summit come to fruition in political and practical terms. The arrangements for supporting potential WEU-led operations will be in place. I am looking forward to the Alliance's 50th anniversary celebration next year. It will also be a time to celebrate how close our two organisations — NATO and the WEU — have become, on the basis of a new, redefined relationship.

Javier Solana
The signing of the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 by five European states — Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — led to the founding of the Western European Union (WEU). The treaty initially provided for extensive cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields, as well as for collective defence. Six years later in Paris, with the addition of new members Germany and Italy, the initial treaty was amended to become the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954, reflecting the European nations’ hopes for peace, cooperation and security combined with social and economic development. Portugal and Spain subsequently joined WEU in 1988, and in 1995, the accession of my own country, Greece, brought the number of WEU members to ten.

At the outset, the Brussels Treaty granted vast competences to WEU, reflecting the European will for cooperation, security and prosperity. During much of the Cold War period, however, WEU remained dormant and these powers were transferred to other organisations which had been created in the meantime. Thus, Western Europe’s defence activities were placed under the umbrella of NATO, while competences related to social and cultural questions were handled by the Council of Europe and economic matters became the domain of the European Economic Community (now the European Union).

### WEU’s reactivation

At the peak of the Cold War, WEU was reactivated, reflecting the growing desire to strengthen the Alliance’s European pillar. In October 1984, during the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Modified Brussels Treaty, European Foreign and Defence Ministers adopted the Rome Declaration which lays down the organisation’s new political objectives and structural changes. These included the definition of a European security identity and the gradual harmonisation of WEU member states’ defence policies. WEU’s evolution was further reinforced in June 1992 with the adoption of the “Petersberg tasks”, its peace support missions, in addition to the core collective defence function.

For its part, NATO has substantially reorganised itself since the end of the Cold War, adding new missions and opening its membership to new democracies in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. An important aspect of this internal and external restructuring is the development of a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, in cooperation with WEU. This ever-closer association between the two organisations is manifest in regular joint committee and Council sessions, exchange of information, practical and material support for possible WEU-led operations and involvement of WEU in NATO’s defence planning processes.
At the same time, WEU is an essential and inherent aspect of the European Union’s developing common foreign and security policy.

These institutional developments are taking place in the context of the changed security situation in Europe, which is no longer characterised by a single clear external threat, but by multifaceted and often unforeseen risks and crises, arising to a large extent from the difficult transition processes which the societies in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are going through.

New crises

In South-Eastern Europe crisis situations are arising with growing regularity. First the crisis in Bosnia, then the crisis in Albania and now, even before these have been overcome, we are witnessing a third crisis developing in Kosovo. In the first two cases, EU and WEU were not able to play a role commensurate with expectations. They could neither prevent these crises nor put an early end to them through appropriate political initiatives.

What will happen with the third crisis which potentially threatens peace and security throughout the South-Eastern part of Europe? Will Europe seize the moment and act decisively? Will it manage to speak with one voice and convince Serbia and the Kosovars to resolve the problem peacefully, through the establishment of a new balance that would recognise the Kosovo Albanians’ human rights in the framework of the New Yugoslavia?

The EU’s ability or failure to rise to the occasion in Kosovo, and in the Balkans in general, will have a lasting impact on its and WEU’s future credibility in the field of security.

WEU, the EU and NATO

Fifty years after the signature of its founding Treaty, WEU has developed a clear and pivotal role as a linchpin between the EU and NATO, with a political-military character that affords unique flexibility of action at both political and military levels. It provides the institutional context for the development of a collective European crisis management capability through the interoperability and transparency which govern its relations with the EU and NATO, as well as through its multilevel cooperation with other international organisations.

Progress achieved so far on the development of WEU’s military structure, including the establishment of its Planning Cell and Military Committee, provide it the structure which can be activated to undertake “Petersberg tasks”, within the framework of a European security policy, thus giving concrete form to the Europeans’ contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.

Similar progress has also been achieved at the political level, thus creating the necessary conditions for the organisation’s unity of action by enabling the participation of associate members, observers and associate partners in the WEU’s activities. Through this membership structure, WEU brings together 28 European countries in one broad forum for the exchange of ideas or concerns on defence and security issues.

This process is developing in parallel and as a complement to the processes...
of integrating new members from Central and Eastern Europe into both NATO and the EU. It simultaneously helps strengthen the transatlantic link and contributes to the construction of a stable and secure environment in Europe.

A new era

The success of our common efforts to integrate WEU into the developing new European security structure will depend on decisions taken in the immediate future and solutions we might bring to the critical and complex issues related to the development and full utilisation of Europe’s defence capabilities. But most of all, it will depend on the determination of the peoples of Europe to accept their share of responsibility on the political, economic and military levels for our collective defence and security.

Such issues involve the ways and means of implementing the WEU’s cooperation with the EU and NATO, as well as the promotion of the aim, principles and content of a Common European Defence Policy, within which all European nations will find their common defence denominator.

I firmly believe that, as we celebrate WEU’s 50 years, we are about to enter a new era of European unity in the field of security and defence. I hope that the coming years will confirm this most propitious forecast for the future of European security and of WEU and pledge to do my part to ensure we do not let this opportunity slip our grasp.

The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO

Lluis Maria de Puig
Chairman of the WEU Assembly

In Berlin and again in Madrid, the Alliance recognised the benefits of building a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO and endorsed the practical steps to achieve this aim. WEU, in close cooperation with NATO, is playing a central role in making ESDI a reality. However, for this endeavour to succeed, argues the Chairman of the WEU Assembly, the Europeans will have to demonstrate their commitment by devoting adequate resources, while the Americans will have to cede a greater role to Europe in NATO as part of a rebalancing in transatlantic relations.

The formula of building a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims to reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link. This formula, adopted by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Berlin in June 1996 and given further impetus by Heads of State and Government at NATO’s Madrid Summit last July, gives the Europeans more clout in Alliance decision-making and provides the WEU the tools it needs to carry out its own missions.

The essential elements of the ESDI formula endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid include:

- NATO’s full support for the development of ESDI within NATO by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations;
Providing for the support of WEU-led operations as an element of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept;

Provision within the future new command structure for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operations;

Creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU;

Arrangements for the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations;

Commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including through joint consultations;

Strengthening of the institutional cooperation between the two organisations;

Involving WEU in NATO’s defence planning processes;

**NATO’s role**

The primary role of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War era is still to guarantee peace in Europe, but this is no longer achieved so much by military deterrence as by the political cohesion of its members. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in the Western security system largely because the stability it provides allows them to pursue their internal reforms. At the same time, the prospect of NATO, EU and WEU membership has provided the incentive to resolve regional problems peacefully.

Thus, the political role of the Alliance has to some extent taken precedence over the military role, which may explain why some European countries seek even further institutional reforms of the Alliance in this direction. However, American influence and stature in NATO does not result from institutional design; rather, it reflects the reality of overwhelming United States power and capabilities in all defence-related areas. The US has unparalleled means for satellite and remote observation, intelligence-gathering, communications, transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence and effective air-land action, all of which have ensured the Alliance’s effectiveness in the past and are essential to action on any scale today. This was evident in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Europe was unable to stop the fighting before the American decision to play a full part in the operations to restore peace.

However, Europe will not be able to achieve parity with the US in defence capabilities without substantial effort, which it is does not yet seem to be prepared to make. While European states have shown an increasing desire to combine their defence resources over the last few years, this has been motivated more by budget constraints than a wish to equip Europe with the means necessary for an active policy.

Some countries have sought a rebalancing in transatlantic relations, trying to achieve this either by providing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with military capabilities, by encouraging the development of such capabilities within the
WEU framework or even by bold new approaches such as a European satellite observation system. However, the future of the more ambitious programmes is in doubt due to budgetary shortfalls.

These realities cannot be ignored. They explain the difficulties encountered by the Europeans in obtaining a better sharing of responsibilities within NATO, as well as a measure of independence in military action through the CJTF concept. However much goodwill may exist on both sides, there will be no real sharing of responsibilities between Europe and the United States as long as the inequality in the means to act continues to increase.

There is another factor which makes creation of a European defence identity within NATO uncertain. This is simply the fact that the European states are finding it extremely difficult to agree on a definition of their common objectives. Threat perceptions and priorities vary a great deal, depending upon one’s situation in Europe. There would be no point in giving an institutional structure to a European defence identity within NATO if there were no common “European” view of defence and security issues.

The EU’s role

Most of the European members of the Alliance are seeking to work out a common policy in the context of the European Union’s CFSP. While the EU has achieved undeniable results in the fields within its competence — essentially in the economic realm along with some elements of a common external policy — security and defence policy remain above all a national prerogative. The fact that four countries among the Fifteen have not joined the Atlantic Alliance and are pursuing varying policies of neutrality, while three European members of the Alliance are not in the European Union, prevents any wholesale integration of the European identity into the Alliance. The decision taken at the European Summit in Amsterdam in June 1997 not to give the EU responsibilities in defence matters further emphasises this fact.

The WEU’s role

The WEU is the only organisation which can fulfil this role because all of its members are members of the Atlantic Alliance, because the Modified Brussels Treaty which founded it establishes a legal relationship with NATO and because the Treaty respects state sovereignty in the area of its competence. Moreover, the WEU’s European dimension is further strengthened through its close association with the European Union and the CFSP, as set out in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.

Whether in future WEU will be integrated into the European Union and whether the Modified Brussels Treaty will have to be revised to meet the requirements of an enlarged Europe are questions that may not be answered for many years. The development of a European security and defence identity is not a prerequisite for this. However, the point at issue is what can we do today within the WEU framework to give substance to this identity and enable it to better reflect the collective interests of Europe in the context of NATO.

The first precondition for progress along these lines is for the European states to maintain, at least collectively, a sufficient level of forces and assets to enable them to justify a reasonable international profile. Defence spending levels below three per cent of GDP are not adequate for Europe to play an important role in a system of collective defence. A professional army, armaments modernisation and access to new technologies require this level of spending. Failing this, Europe will be incapable of carrying out any independent military operations.

Europe must also equip itself with decision-making machinery that does not paralyse all action at the outset. The decision-making procedures presently sketched out by the European Union and the WEU for common undertakings are excessively complex in this respect. In today’s world quick and firm decisions are needed.

In the operational area, there have been encouraging developments in the WEU over the last five years, with the recent creation of a Military Committee, the increase in the capabilities of the Planning Cell and of the Satellite Centre and the establishment of a logistics programme. The WEU is still far from being able to take responsibility for the management of large-scale operations, particularly due to
Europe’s lack of strategic transport capabilities. However, it can rely on a number of multinational forces which can direct operations on the ground by contingents made available to them by member states if necessary.

In addition, the Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure (OCCAR), created in 1996, provides the framework for a European armaments agency intended to promote European policy in this area. At the moment, it only has freedom of action in the field of research, but current negotiations to bring the OCCAR within the WEU should lead to a considerable increase in its scope and efficiency.

The more WEU’s capacity for independent action grows and enables it to respond to security challenges and protect the vital interests of Europe, the more clearly this identity will be recognised in the world. The creation of the multinational naval force EURO-MARFOR has shown that the military reality of Europe is beginning to take form. At the same time, we must take care that institutional developments, in particular the enlargement of NATO, the European Union and the WEU, should not increase the distances between these three organisations.

For its part, the WEU has consistently applied the principle that only countries that were already members of the European Union and NATO could be accepted for accession to the Modified Brussels Treaty, while granting special status to European countries that did not meet these two conditions. “Associate Members”, that is, members of NATO but not of the European Union, can also participate in WEU military activities in which NATO is involved. This status should be granted to the future NATO members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, until their admission to the European Union allows their full and complete accession to the WEU.

However, the key will be in the degree of independence and support that NATO will actually grant to units under the WEU in a CJTF operation. An understanding on this point has not been easy to reach. The Americans are wary of letting themselves be committed by their European partners to matters outside their control. But if a conclusion is not reached soon, there will hardly be any room left for a European identity within NATO.

It is also important for the WEU Council to make effective use of the independence in decision-making conferred upon it by the Modified Brussels Treaty which frees it from having to refer systematically to the CFSP in order to define its missions. Insofar as five member countries of the European Union have declined joining the WEU and NATO, they must not be allowed to exert too much influence on the decisions of an organisation to which they have chosen not to commit themselves. Moreover, the prospect of the WEU merging into the European Union can be contemplated only insofar as all members of the Union demonstrate their readiness to accede to the objectives and obligations imposed on the signatories of the Modified Brussels Treaty.

The realities of tomorrow

The concept of a European security and defence identity within NATO can certainly be developed further. No one can predict NATO’s fate in the coming decades or at what rate a united Europe will develop a real foreign policy or a common security and defence policy. Neither do we know how the enlargement of each institution will turn out or what the consequences will be. However, the ESDI concept may give way to other formulas in future which will hopefully have a better grasp of the realities of tomorrow.

Nevertheless the ESDI concept, as it currently exists, is most useful as it calls for a realistic approach to the European vocation in defence. Certainly there can be no European defence without close cooperation with the United States, for which NATO is the only conceivable framework. But this cooperation calls for a rebalancing in the Alliance, which can only be done if the Europeans give themselves the military and political assets necessary for independent action.
No one could have imagined a decade ago the magnitude of change that would affect NATO following the epic fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent disintegration of a communist system built up over the previous 40 years. These and associated events since can be compared to a great political earthquake that shook the world and set in motion a series of aftershocks that have dramatically altered the security landscape of Europe. The effects of these lingering tremors and those we could yet experience provide ample incentive to ensure the NATO house is in order for a hopeful but still uncertain future.

The Alliance has responded vigorously to the post-Cold War challenge. The ongoing NATO-led operation to establish a concrete, self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a vivid example. Bosnia represents many “firsts” for the Alliance and has paid big dividends on our long-term investment in standardisation, interoperability and partnership. Notably, our efforts there reflect key elements of most of the initiatives NATO has undertaken as it adapts to a new and evolving European security environment with increased confidence and certainty.

Internal and external adaptation

The focus of NATO’s current work, of course, extends far beyond operations in Bosnia. Internally, we are well along the way to adapting the NATO command structure to better meet new demands. After successful completion of two trials, we are ready to implement a Combined Joint Task Force concept which will embed a deployable contingency command and control capability into our command structure. And, we have made much progress in establishing a European security and defence identity that will enable the Western European Union to draw on NATO capabilities for a European-led operation.

Sustaining a vibrant Alliance

Lt. General Nicholas Kehoe
Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

A little less than one year from now, NATO will celebrate its 50th anniversary. If all goes as planned, we will see the formal inauguration of an updated strategic concept, the accession of three new Alliance members, and the implementation of a more flexible, streamlined command structure. According to General Kehoe, this celebration of our “Pride in the Past, Faith in the Future” will cap nearly a decade of transition and momentous change in the Alliance and launch a transformed NATO into the new millennium.
Our work on adapting the Alliance externally through the projection of stability has been particularly significant. We are working hard to prepare the three invited countries to assume their responsibilities as full and productive Alliance members, pending completion of the parliamentary ratification process. Meanwhile, we have implemented an enormously successful enhanced Partnership for Peace programme which is involving partner nations more directly in Alliance business, from “inside the fence”. And rounding off our interrelated outreach initiatives are an extensive engagement programme with Russia, a distinctive relationship with Ukraine and an active dialogue with selected Mediterranean nations. All are aimed at increasing trust and confidence.

Work on these internal and external adaptation initiatives has proceeded throughout the NATO structure at an accelerated pace. While some would say we have spent the decade of the 1990s reacting to the end of the Cold War, I would suggest that we have spent that time looking forward, posturing an Alliance that will persevere through its next 50 years.

In any case, NATO will enter the next millennium on a successful and exciting note. To guide it into the future, we will be able to draw upon an updated strategic concept that provides an overarching sense of direction and focus. It will provide the strategic vector that defines our purpose and provides the framework for a spectrum of activities the Alliance could be involved in, from existing core functions to the so-called new missions. We should not be complacent that the road ahead will be free of barriers. From a practical standpoint, there are a number of fundamental conditions that will be instrumental to NATO’s continued success.

**Spirit of consensus**

Firstly, and perhaps foremost, is the need to sustain a “spirit” of consensus. This means a willingness to compromise, to give and take for the overall best interest. It does not mean every nation will agree with every aspect of the rationale for every decision, but that they are willing to join a consensus so that the Alliance can act and demonstrate resolve and solidarity. The alternative would be gridlock, accompanied by a commensurate loss of the credibility and stature NATO enjoys today.
It should go without saying that NATO can only be as effective as the willingness of its members to achieve consensus. That can be a real challenge when one considers the great diversity of languages, cultures and historical backgrounds of the nations which make up the Alliance. Although NATO’s diversity will increase as it expands from 16 to 19, its decision-making ability should not be diluted as long as it retains a spirit of consensus when the time comes for tough decisions.

**Military effectiveness**

Secondly, military effectiveness is essential. It is a fundamental prerequisite for a security alliance whose credibility relies, not only on the political will to act, but on the capabilities of its military structure. Military effectiveness means having a clear-cut, accountable chain of command with unambiguous responsibilities. In this regard, it is important that nations have respect for the integrity of the NATO military command structure and trust in its ability to protect their vital interests as well as the forces they provide for mission taskings. Unity of command is an essential ingredient; we learned that lesson during NATO’s early air operations over Bosnia under the so-called “dual key” arrangement with the United Nations. Essentially, we handed to another organisation a decisive vote affecting NATO’s expression of will and capability.

Military effectiveness also means continued emphasis on standardisation and interoperability so that several nations’ forces can act more effectively as one under NATO. Furthermore, it includes the modernisation of capabilities to keep pace with technological advances. This is particularly critical in the area of Consultation, Command and Control (C3) since the essence of NATO’s military capability in peacetime revolves around its military command structure. We must have effective C3 to operate with credibility. And finally, military effectiveness means being able to provide clear military advice in order to get clear political guidance and direction.

**Multinationality**

Thirdly, we must continue to promote multinationality. We need to operate as an Alliance, all nations, all services, reading from the same sheet of music. Again, different languages, cultures and professional or historical backgrounds make it a daunting challenge to meld together the efforts of the NATO structure from top to bottom into a coherent, clearly focused capability. Everyone needs to contribute in some way to the output, bringing a valuable perspective to the table. This is how we project cohesion and solidarity.
Individuals assigned by their nation to multinational staffs, wherever that may be in the NATO hierarchy, serve in an international capacity and must see through “NATO eyes”. Although we certainly draw from our national experiences and benefit from knowing how our respective nations view the broad range of issues on NATO’s plate, we need to respect organisational integrity and the established chain of command. There is nothing more divisive to a staff than an individual serving in an international capacity who pushes a national agenda. That must be left to national representatives.

In this regard, we all could benefit from a little bit of sensitivity awareness. In a multinational environment, how we interact together makes a big difference. There’s a right way and a wrong way to put the difficult message across and, like a doctor at a patient’s bedside, we must watch our “bedside manner”. Moreover, the importance of consultation, both between nations and the Alliance and within the Alliance structure, takes on a new dimension.

**Transatlantic link**

Fourthly, we need to preserve the transatlantic link. The relationship between Europe and North America is based on a long heritage but the landscape is changing. We need to balance this crucial linkage with aspirations for a European security and defence identity. They both can and must co-exist. In a nutshell, NATO needs North America, and North America needs NATO. Europe is inextricably linked to North America’s vital interests, both economic and security. The logic goes something like this: peace and stability in Europe create the conditions for economic growth and economic growth is what creates the opportunity for prosperity. Peace and stability are fundamental prerequisites for prosperity.

So, the transatlantic link equates to mutual interests.

**Structure and resources**

Fifthly, we need to look at NATO’s structure. As has been pointed out, we have taken on an enormous amount of challenging and interrelated work. What was previously focused in one body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), now takes place in four bodies: the NAC, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, all supported by one sub-structure of military and politico-military committees and working groups. Harmonising the work of all these bodies into a coherent and consistent output will certainly test our mettle in the years to come.

Finally, I must mention resources. As the saying goes, security is not free. We need to do a better job of matching resources to requirements and we need to do a better job of explaining and justifying requirements. Over a number of years now, the spending power of the NATO budget has been reduced significantly. We have lived with zero growth in absolute terms and a decline in terms of not adjusting for inflation while, at the same time, dramatically expanding our activities. Logic tells us there is a train wreck looming ahead — we just don’t know when.

The bottom line is we will continue to be successful only if nations remain committed to paying their share for the requirements that make NATO credible. Current trends raise concern, particularly in light of costly mobility requirements, modern C3 capabilities, enlargement, etc.

**A vibrant Alliance**

In summary, we are well along the way to meeting the challenges of the 21st century. The updated strategic concept will provide an overall sense of direction and continued refinement of our adaptation work will help us avoid the bumps in the road. Moreover, continued attention to the prerequisites enumerated above, which have brought NATO to the stature it currently enjoys as the world’s preeminent security organisation, will cement a successful future for subsequent generations and ensure vibrancy that will carry us to a centennial celebration of peace, stability and prosperity in another 50 years. ♦
Towards a new political strategy for NATO

Rob de Wijk
Netherlands Institute for International Relations “Clingendael”

Meeting in Madrid in July 1997, NATO leaders announced that the Alliance Strategic Concept would be reviewed in line with “Europe’s new security situation and challenges”. In this article, Dr. de Wijk argues that, in revising its strategy, the Alliance should not be bound by traditional thinking. Not only must the Alliance’s strategy be adapted to reflect the reality of NATO’s new missions of crisis management and conflict prevention, but a bold step should be taken to link these new missions to an initiative to give greater substance to the concept of cooperative security within the OSCE. The alternative, he suggests, may be obsolescence of the Alliance.

The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept

The formal initiative for NATO’s present political strategy, the Alliance Strategic Concept, came at the July 1990 London Summit of heads of state and government. Although there was much optimism and talk about a “new world order” following the “European revolution” of 1989, the preparation of the new strategy took place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. The fundamental changes taking place in security as “multifaceted in nature, which makes them hard to predict and assess”. At the same time, the document concluded that “even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe”. It then listed “preserving the strategic balance within Europe” as one of the four fundamental security tasks of the Alliance.

Central and Eastern Europe — the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the independence of the Baltic states, the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the unsuccessful coup in Moscow — as well as the Gulf War, had a profound impact on the development of this document, which was approved at NATO’s Rome Summit in November 1991.

The Alliance Strategic Concept recognised the new strategic environment, describing the risks to Allied

Nevertheless, with the dramatic changes in the security situation the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means were greater than ever. The new strategy introduced a broad approach to security with three mutually reinforcing elements of Alliance security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. The new guidelines for collective defence were based on premises such as longer warning times, reduced and adapted forces, multifaceted security risks
and the residual Soviet threat. Consequently, key elements of NATO’s new defence posture were enhanced mobility and flexibility and an assured capability of augmentation, so that its forces would be in a better position to be deployed in an uncertain environment, possibly a long way from home.

The eroding basis of the strategy

Soon, two developments undermined much of the argument which had formed the basis of the political strategy. First, only weeks after the Rome Summit the demise of the Soviet Union marked a new revolution in the security situation. It was now unclear how to implement the fundamental security task of preserving the strategic balance in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union had indisputably left NATO forces the strongest military power on earth. A strict interpretation of this security task might require further reductions in the armed forces of NATO members. Closely connected with the demise of the Soviet Union was the consequences the removal of the red reductions in the armed forces of NATO members. The Alliance is now familiar faces at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels and at the SHAPE military headquarters.

Against the background of the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Council decided on 5 June 1992 in Oslo “to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise”. In December 1992, in order to strengthen its relationship with the United Nations, the Council made a similar declaration of its readiness to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. Thus, a new mission for NATO was born.

This development shed new light on the Strategic Concept’s chapter on crisis management and conflict prevention. Until then, crisis management had been focused on aggression against NATO and the role of the armed forces was defined purely in the context of collective defence: “The role of the Alliance’s military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.” Moreover, the document stated that “The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.”

However, due to NATO’s increasing involvement in crises outside the treaty area, crisis management could no longer be seen only in the context of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This would have a profound impact on NATO’s defence posture. The use of weapons could no longer be restricted purely to self-defence and further changes in NATO’s command and force structures were required.

In the spirit of its broad approach to security, NATO’s new missions would also be carried out in cooperation with non-NATO countries. There is no doubt that cooperation with Russia and other partners in the former Yugoslavia was an enormous breakthrough that contributed immensely to the transformation of the Alliance. Representatives of the former Warsaw Pact countries became familiar faces at NATO’s headquarters in Brussels and at the SHAPE military headquarters.

Towards a new Alliance

NATO’s successful adaptation has no precedents. History shows that traditional military alliances disappear once victory has been won. But NATO did not disappear. Over almost five decades, the Alliance has evolved from a traditional military alliance for collective defence into a political-military organisation for security cooperation, with an extensive bureaucracy and complex decision-making processes. Rather than dying off, large organisations usually go through a process of functional transformation. During the 1990s, NATO has evolved to the extent that crisis management and conflict prevention are now its primary missions.
However, the Alliance Strategic Concept has been left behind by the reality of this transformation. As a result, the Strategic Concept no longer serves its political purpose, namely expressing what the Alliance stands for at the present time. Alliance leaders and planners have recognised this and launched a review of the Strategic Concept at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, the terms of reference of which were endorsed by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers last December.

In addition to bringing its strategy into line with reality, a new political strategy could help to clarify NATO’s transformation in the eyes of the Russian Federation, thus making the accession of its former satellites more palatable. In this context, the fundamental security task of “preserving the strategic balance” needs to be replaced. A new fundamental security task could emphasise NATO’s shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. NATO could express its willingness to preserve sufficient military capabilities for conflict prevention and conflict control, that is for regional collective defence, carrying out peace support operations under the authority of the UN security council or the responsibility of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and supporting Western European Union (WEU) operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. Consequently, a new political strategy should contain new guidelines for the development of the defence posture of NATO member states. To this end, it is important that a distinction no longer be made between capabilities and structures for regional collective defence and those for all other operations.

The cohesion of the Alliance

The review of the Alliance Strategic Concept should not only reflect NATO’s successful transformation, but should especially deal with the future cohesion of the Alliance. During the Cold War it was the magnitude of the threat that kept NATO together. In the future NATO will have to deal with limited risks which will require limited responses. These limited risks will be a continuous test of unity within NATO because the question is whether all the allies would be prepared to make a contribution to regional collective defence and crisis management or peace support operations outside the treaty area.

There is also a danger that some member states might become “free riders” by not maintaining adequate force projection capabilities, undermining the political cohesion of the Alliance. This could pose a grave threat to an alliance which is based on mutual solidarity. NATO’s dilemma is that the greatest political commitment exists for the least probable threat.

New partnership wing opens — 24 partners establish diplomatic missions to NATO

The Manfred Wörner building, a new annex to NATO headquarters, was officially inaugurated on 7 April by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Elfie Wörner, widow of the late Secretary General Manfred Wörner. The building will house diplomatic delegations of non-NATO partner countries — members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

In addition, 24 out of a total of 28 EAPC partner countries have now named ambassadors and established diplomatic missions to NATO under the 1994 Brussels Agreement. These include:

Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1), Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Azerbaijan has announced its intention to establish a mission to NATO but no date has been set.

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(1) Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

Ambassador Anatol Arapu of Moldova presents his credentials to the North Atlantic Council on 18 March 1998. (NATO photo)
To this end, NATO should expressly link its new missions of crisis management and conflict prevention to an initiative to give greater substance to the concept of cooperative security within the OSCE. NATO should strive to carry out all military operations within the OSCE area under its own command. The IFOR/SFOR coalition in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a worthy precedent in this regard. Thus NATO enlargement to include other OSCE countries, possibly even the Russian Federation in the long run, would be advantageous. The new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
Rethinking NATO

This concept of NATO requires a radical rethink by traditionalists who consider the Alliance only in terms of deterring external threats and the need for collective defence. If NATO is to avoid obsolescence in the future, forward-looking ideas such as those presented here should be incorporated in a new version of the Alliance Strategic Concept. Failing this, in the long run, without a large-scale threat, the Alliance will have no raison d’être.

NATO’s next strategic concept

Jan Petersen
Chairman of the Conservative Party of Norway and Head of Delegation and Chairman of the Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly

NATO has begun the process of reviewing its 1991 Strategic Concept which presents an excellent opportunity to clearly articulate to the public its new missions as they have evolved. But in this exercise it will have to address a question of fundamental importance and on which no allied consensus yet exists, according to the author: Should the fundamental strategy document of the Alliance recognise common interests beyond collective defence and the geographic boundaries of the NATO area, or should it merely re-emphasise its core mission?

With a mandate from Alliance Heads of State and Government and in accordance with the terms of reference endorsed by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in December 1997, NATO’s Policy Coordination Group (PCG) is currently examining the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept with a view to updating it “as necessary”. This is an exercise with potentially far-reaching repercussions on the Alliance and which must therefore be handled with great care. But I believe that a fresh look at its strategy and future direction will boost support for NATO in both its current and future member states, and confirm, as the then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner predicted earlier this decade, that NATO “will become the core security organisation of a future Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all states, irrespective of their size or geographic location, must enjoy the same freedom, cooperation, and security”.

Some critics have charged that NATO’s role is to hedge against a large-scale threat and that it has no business in “building democracy”. But this simply misreads history. The Alliance has always been far more than an insurance policy against a threat from the East. It provided the indispensable counterpart to the Marshall Plan in reconstructing and reconciling Western Europe and in linking the United States to Europe in a historic — and wise — departure in US foreign policy. The Alliance has sought, through political means, to spread those values to the East, notably through the 1967 Harmel Report’s fundamental commitment to defence plus détente and through its role in the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

It is not surprising, therefore, that NATO emerged as such an intense pole of attraction to the new democracies after the end of the Cold War, seeking the same benefits of full participation in the political and security transatlantic community. Through enlargement and enhanced partnership, NATO can do for Central and Eastern Europe what it has done and continues to do for Western Europe. Such an extension of security and stability is in the direct national security interests of all NATO member states.

The question now is whether there are any limits to enlarging that “indispensable foundation”. Last year at Madrid, when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were invited to join NATO, Alliance leaders

Foundation for stability and security

The first of the four fundamental security tasks listed in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept is to provide “one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.”

reaffirmed that NATO’s door would remain open to other qualified European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Yet, some have urged a prolonged “pause” after the first round of accession, perhaps because they maintain an outdated view of NATO as a threat-based organisation, as if its destiny should be inexorably linked to the ebb and flow of events in Russia. Some even seem to believe in the legitimacy of spheres of influence into which NATO should not stray, instead of working towards an undivided Europe.

Such thinking is short-sighted. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty has always foreseen the possibility of a wider Alliance, and this must apply to any European nation that meets our criteria and is able to strengthen the Alliance without sacrificing NATO cohesiveness. All candidates, regardless of geography, must be judged along the same lines. Otherwise, we do indeed risk recreating barriers the Alliance has striven for so long to overcome.

**Consultation and coordination**

The second task of the Alliance, as defined in the Strategic Concept, is to serve as a “transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern”.

This builds on the provision in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty for Alliance members to consult on security matters in the event of a perceived threat, and is now complemented by paragraph 8 of the PfP Framework Document which provides for similar consultations with partners. The task put forward by the Strategic Concept adds the possibility of “coordination” to that of consultation and no longer talks of “threats” but “risks”.

As we have seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no reason why NATO, with its unique integrated military structure, cannot also perform collective security tasks while maintaining a robust collective defence capability. Rather than diluting NATO into a “nebulous collective security arrangement,” as some critics have charged, pursuing peace support exercises and operations with Russia and all other partners can help shape a cooperative European security order that would reduce the need to undertake large-scale crisis management — or even collective defence operations — in the first place. Moreover, such cooperation provides a wider basis for responsibility-sharing. As NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana stated in Washington last year, “No longer will the Alliance be caught in a false choice between US engagement or no engagement in a crisis.”(3)

Yet, the precise guidelines for NATO peace support operations have not been clarified. For example, the NATO-Russia Founding Act speaks in general terms whereby “Any actions undertaken by NATO or Russia, together or separately, must be consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE’s governing principles.”(4) In contrast, the “basic elements” document of July 1997 in the CFE Treaty adaptation negotiations states that equipment thresholds in Europe can be temporarily exceeded by “missions in support of peace under a mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE,” suggesting a stricter interpretation and a veto by non-NATO members over Alliance action. This should be clarified if we are to avoid an UNPROFOR-type debate among nations and their parliaments. Hence, it would be desirable for a revised Strategic Concept to clearly address NATO’s need for a mandate as well as the rationale and requirements for new missions.

Another area concerns risks beyond traditional notions of security. For example, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the EAPC Basic Document mention terrorism as an area for consultation or cooperation. How prepared is NATO for this challenge? And what about illegal arms trading, drug trafficking, or ecological security? Should NATO only exchange counter-intelligence in its Special Committee(5) or take countermeasures? All of these areas are important, but NATO’s resources are limited and priorities will have to be assigned.

Collective defence

The third task restates Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, “to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state”. Although Russia routinely urges NATO to de-emphasise this core function, this would amount to saying that national security is no longer important. To the contrary, Article 5 is the glue of our common security. From it flow all the benefits of joint planning, transparency, non-renationalisation of defence and cooperative behaviour. However, there are at least three areas where action is imperative and on which a revised Strategic Concept should provide some guidance.

The first is maintaining adequate capabilities. NATO has reduced its air, land and naval forces by an average of 37 per cent and its defence expenditures by 22 per cent in recent years, but simultaneously, it has taken on new responsibilities in the operational field and must finance enlargement. The IFOR/SFOR oper-
Moreover, non-US allies should ask themselves: What would happen if a CJTF is not authorised in a situation of perceived security importance to one or more of them?

The second area concerns the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO addressed this issue in the 1991 Strategic Concept, but operational results remain to be seen. It is obviously insufficient simply to urge compliance by rogue states with arms control agreements, or adopt only passive measures. NATO’s efforts against proliferation are a key test of its relevance to emerging security challenges, and should be implemented on a common NATO basis.

The third area concerns “responsibility-sharing”. This can be measured in many ways: NATO bases in Europe support non-NATO US missions; Norway, Belgium, Portugal, Canada and Denmark provide disproportionately large shares of support in peacekeeping personnel and funding; and the US percentage of foreign assistance is in the bottom third of NATO allies. Nevertheless, a key indicator for the US Congress is that collectively Europe spends on average 60 per cent of what the United States does on defence with, again, a wider gap in weapons research, development and acquisition.

While the issue of burden-sharing and the relative costs of enlargement to be borne threatened to be an issue during the enlargement ratification process, fortunately this did not become a show-stopper in the US Senate.

Strategic balance

The fourth fundamental task of the Alliance listed in the 1991 Strategic Concept is “to preserve the strategic balance within Europe”. Clearly, NATO needs no strategic threat to endure or indeed to flourish. For the same reason, we have not plunged into general and complete disarmament because the Warsaw Pact disappeared. NATO will remain an insurance policy should the stability of Europe be put at risk.

At the same time, the Concept’s reference to “Soviet military capability and build-up potential”, constituting the “most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe,” is obviously anachronistic. Given the Alliance’s cooperative relationship with Russia, the continued existence of this paragraph in NATO’s operative strategy statement is understandably highly surprising to Russians. Moreover, the argument has been made that maintaining a “strategic balance” should no longer serve as a fundamental task because NATO is stronger than any potential aggressor and “balance” might imply that Alliance forces should be substantially reduced to obtain a one-to-one ratio with Russia. (6)

But those searching for a threat to justify NATO and its enlargement display a rather alarming lack of understanding of our original political purpose: to link the United States to Europe in a transatlantic community of shared values and cooperation. They also risk, for no reason, disrupting all that we have been trying to achieve with Russia. Our planning should be based on
a vision of security integration for all of Europe and should replace the notion of “strategic balance” in a revised concept, or be added to NATO’s first task of providing a foundation for a stable security environment in Europe.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act represents a hope for the future. Russia already has a “special” partnership with NATO, linking our destinies and bringing us closer to our ultimate political purpose: a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees, based on democratic values, as indispensable for the whole of Europe as it has been for Western Europe.

Towards 2000

Alliance governments, parliamentarians, and policymakers must highlight more effectively several issues which are not receiving the attention they deserve if we are to pursue NATO’s internal and external adaptation coherently. I welcome the challenge of a new Strategic Concept that must clearly set out NATO’s missions as they have evolved. For in the final analysis, it is the citizens of the Alliance nations who will determine its fate. We must, as before, maintain their confidence as we approach the next millennium in search of a better peace.(7)◆

Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for Peace

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Last year, a series of protests led to armed rebellion, plunging Albania into internal turmoil. While the crisis was overcome with the help of a multinational force and the holding of democratic elections, its effects will nevertheless be felt for years to come. This article focuses on the impact of the crisis on the armed forces of Albania and the contribution that NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) are making to help the country recover. According to the author, the case of Albania has broken new ground in the evolution of PfP and has confirmed its position as a key element in the new European security structure.

In the years of isolation under the post-war Communist dictatorship, Albania had subscribed to a system of “total defence” with many thousands of pillboxes sprinkled all over the country, a large proportion of the population equipped with arms, and disproportionately large armed forces for the size of the population and the resource capabilities of the country.

The post-Communist government of Albania committed itself to democratic reform and began immediately to orient itself towards Western institutions, including joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992.(1) Albania was one of the first countries to join Partnership for Peace (PfP), in February 1994, stating that its ultimate strategic goal was membership of the Alliance. It undertook a radical restructuring and reorganisation of its armed forces and sent many officers to Western military institutions. Albania also made facilities available to support UN and then NATO-led operations in former Yugoslavia.

NATO Review Summer 1998
The crisis

In early 1997, Albania underwent a profound crisis, sparked off by the frustration of hundreds of thousands of people who lost their life’s savings by investing in “pyramid” investment schemes. The violent outbursts in many parts of the country gradually led, especially in the south, to the collapse of state authority and the establishment of revolutionary committees in local communities. Many criminal elements also took advantage of the chaotic situation.

A large part of the population was equipped with arms as part of the total defence concept and open confrontation with the armed forces, often themselves victims of the collapse of the pyramid schemes, gradually increased. In many cases military units were abandoned by conscripts who simply went back home, leaving most military installations prey to the theft of arms and ammunition.

In April 1997, Italy led a multinational protection force to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to Albania. With a mandate from the UN Security Council, Operation Alba included troops from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Spain and Turkey, in addition to Italy.

This cleared the way for elections to be called in May and a new government took office in July. One of the first steps of the new government was to seek all possible forms of assistance to pull the country out of the crisis and rebuild state institutions, including the armed forces. At the end of July, a conference was held in Rome with a number of NATO and non-NATO nations and international organisations, setting the stage for a wide-ranging international assistance programme covering economic aid and help in restructuring various state functions, including the military.

Developing a programme of assistance

An official request from the Defence Minister, Sabit Brokaj, for NATO support in rebuilding the armed forces was received on 1 August 1997. NATO had already been monitoring developments and was able to respond immediately, having previously decided to make use of PfP as the framework to provide the much-needed assistance should Albania make such a
request. Preliminary work started at once on a specially tailored assistance programme focused on the immediate requirements for rebuilding the Albanian armed forces. Following the practice of PfP, this was called an Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) though it was an altogether unique case and should probably be more accurately called an “Action Plan”.

As a first step, the Council agreed to send an expert-level Fact-Finding Team (FFT) to Tirana, which arrived on 18 August. Its immediate objective was to identify the requirements for assistance and prioritise them on the basis of information received from the Albanian side. The findings of the FFT indicated the scope and urgency of the assistance required and NATO was quick in responding with a programme of assistance that was the first of its kind. The Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace (PMSC) — the Alliance body which coordinates PfP on behalf of the Council — worked closely with Albanian representatives throughout the summer to ensure that the draft IPP reflected the findings of the FFT and the priorities that NATO and Albania attached to the various forms of assistance to be provided. The new IPP was finalised and approved at a special session of the North Atlantic Council on 10 September 1997 with the participation of the Albanian Prime Minister, Fatos Nano.

The first pillar: NATO

The IPP consisted of two pillars, the first of which referred to the forms of assistance that NATO, as an organisation, was to provide. This included an intensive programme of 12 expert teams that would visit Albania over a period of four months, from October 1997 to the end of January 1998. These expert teams were tasked to discuss the whole range of priority issues involving the reconstruction of the Albanian armed forces and to provide expert advice on what could be done to remedy the situation. Led by NATO personnel, the teams also included experts provided by NATO nations and, in some cases, partner nations, thus broadening the scope of assistance and directly involving the nations in this effort. Their aim was not to provide a single model for Albania to adopt, but rather to offer a range of expertise which Albania could use or adapt according to its own requirements. Their work was concentrated in three areas:

- **Conceptual issues**: National security concept, national defence concept, military doctrine, constitutional issues, legal framework for the armed forces, democratic control of forces and civil military relations;

- **Structural issues**: Reorganisation and functioning of the MoD, general staff and senior command structures of the armed forces, restructuring of armed services down to the lowest echelon with priority given to structures with immediate positive impact, advice and training in military medicine, leadership, functional and language training, development of basic logistics structures, development of an essential Command, Control, Communications and Information (C3I) system, movement and transport structures; and

- **Technical issues**: Storage and handling of ammunition and ordnance disposal, security of military depots, assessment of the state of existing basic military infrastructure, defence planning and budgeting.

Another important element of the Albanian programme of assistance was the inclusion of a modest set of military cooperation activities, specially selected from the Partnership Work Programme, to assist the Albanians in maintaining their contact with activities such as PfP exercises and training. Other activities entailing participation in major committee meetings and other PfP events were also included as a means of keeping Albania in touch with the mainstream PfP programme.
The second pillar: nations

The second pillar of the assistance programme was aimed at channelling bilateral assistance from allies and partner nations to Albania in a coordinated way. Several nations had active assistance programmes before the crisis which were then suspended. The initiation of the NATO assistance programme enabled these programmes to be resumed within a cooperative framework. The first step was to identify areas where assistance from nations might be required. Secondly, it was necessary to prioritise these requirements and, thirdly, to encourage coordination of these efforts by nations. A special forum for the coordination of their assistance activities, the Clearing House on Albania (CHA), was agreed by nations.

Clearing House on Albania

The PfP Clearing House is a well-established forum where allies meet twice a year to discuss their national cooperation programmes, in the context of PfP. They exchange information on each other’s programmes, thus increasing transparency and enabling nations to better prioritise their cooperation activities vis-à-vis the programmes of other allied nations.

In the case of the CHA, the aim was to focus discussion specifically on Albania in order to assist nations in coordinating their efforts and to avoid unnecessary duplication and waste of resources. This proved to be a great success, keeping participants focused on the priority requirements and helping Albania get most value added from the programme. Albania of course participated in this forum and offered valuable feedback. Partners were also involved in the work of the Clearing House, including Switzerland which restarted a previously suspended programme of assistance in the field of transport equipment. Other partner nations offered experts to take part in the various expert teams alongside their colleagues from NATO nations.

The contribution of nations to the programme was of crucial importance. Not only did they provide experts for the various teams but also teams of their own on specific issues where advice and transfer of expertise was required, thus complementing the work of the NATO-led teams. They also provided material assistance, technical assistance, specialised training and other forms of assistance not necessarily directly related to the effort for the reconstruction of the Albanian armed forces.

The results

The programme for 1997 has now essentially been completed and most of the major activities foreseen in it have been implemented, even if some extended well into 1998. Based on an assessment of the work done under the 1997 programme, the main achievements to which the IPP has contributed could be summarised as follows:

- The new constitution will explicitly refer to the role of the armed forces and will define the role of the commander in chief.
- A range of laws concerning the defence structure, military personnel and other related issues are in preparation and the Parliament intends to consider them as priority items on its spring 1998 agenda.
- A national security concept and a national defence concept, the first ever for Albania, are in an advanced stage of preparation.
- A new structure for the senior command of the armed forces has been endorsed. The next step will be to secure legal confirmation.
- Military units are being re-established in step with the gradual repair and reconstitution of support facilities.

There are many other improvements in the fields of ammunition storage, repair of basic infrastructure and
training of personnel to deal with the multitude of problems the Albanian military is facing. Most important, however, is that the process of rebuilding is under way and the morale of the forces has improved considerably. Conscripts and NCOs that had left their units at the height of the crisis are now rejoining them. The effects of the generous bilateral assistance offered by nations are already visible.

The way ahead

While the situation in Albania was improving, an additional complication appeared in early 1998, when the Kosovo crisis erupted. If not settled peacefully, this could have grave consequences for the whole Balkan region. It has added a new dimension to the problems faced by Albania since 90 per cent of the inhabitants of Kosovo, which borders Albania, are ethnic Albanians. This has also given increased urgency to the task of rebuilding the Albanian armed forces.

At the same time, although significant progress has been made, other critical problems still remain which will take several years to resolve. These new challenges have led to the preparation of a new IPP for Albania for 1998, which retains a similar structure to that of 1997. It is again targeted to meet the urgent requirements of getting the Albanian forces up and running in the relatively short term. There is once again an intense programme of NATO expert teams, focused bilateral assistance and an increased set of cooperation activities for Albania.

An additional requirement is to improve the coordination of the programme-related activities both in Albania and at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and various options are being considered to help Albanians in the effective implementation of the new and demanding programme.

In the longer term the aim is to gradually move from a “first aid” programme to one of consolidation, laying the foundation for the development of the Albanian armed forces while gradually engaging the country more in the mainstream PfP programme.

Through this trial by fire in Albania, PfP has proved itself to be an effective vehicle for focused and specialised assistance to a partner nation in crisis. The operational capabilities of PfP were put to the test and have emerged with flying colours. In rising to the challenge, PfP has reinforced its position as a permanent feature of the new European security architecture. 

Ammunition storage and disposal: “Hot spots” remain

A NATO Expert Team, undertaking a follow-up visit to Albania in April, found some evidence of improvement in Albania’s ammunition storage situation since its last visit in October 1997 (see “NATO and partner experts assist Albanian Ministry of Defence with ammunition storage and disposal problem”, box on p. 29 of NATO Review, No. 1, Spring 1998). However, a critical problem remains to be resolved urgently: a number of so-called “hot spots” dotted around the country where unstable ammunition and other explosives lie exposed.

The presence of thousands of tonnes of unexploded munitions in the open at various unprotected sites poses a serious threat to people living nearby. Many people have already been killed and scores more injured as result of these “hot spots”. Due to a critical lack of resources and expertise, Albania will need further assistance from nations, other organisations such as the UN, and non-governmental organisations if it is to resolve its ammunition storage and disposal problems, including eliminating these “hot spots”.

Source: Defense Support, NATO International Staff
The Alliance’s determined commitment to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reconfirmed by last February’s decision to continue SFOR’s mission beyond its initial mandate which ends in June. However, while SFOR’s presence is still necessary in the short term, the author argues that long-term peace and stability depend on substantial progress in a number of areas, including democratization and public security. Eventually, with NATO’s assistance, the goal is to bring Bosnia into the community of Euro-Atlantic nations.

At last July’s Summit in Madrid, NATO Heads of State and Government met privately, without advisors or notetakers, for a frank discussion about the state of the 1995 Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The peace was intact, but there were still major hurdles to be overcome: hardliners including indicted war criminals were obstructing progress, Bosnian institutions could not agree on such basic issues as flags and currency, and refugees and displaced persons were not returning to their homes. Some observers were beginning to suggest that abandoning the Peace Agreement and partitioning Bosnia was the only way to prevent further fighting.

However, those advocating partition failed to assess the real costs and risks. In their declaration following the Madrid Summit, Alliance leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the establishment of Bosnia as a single, democratic and multi-ethnic state and to the Peace Agreement’s full implementation. They agreed that the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) should carry out its mandate to its fullest in order to help accelerate implementation of the Peace Agreement.

**SFOR’s contribution**

Just one day after the Summit, SFOR demonstrated its resolve to carry out its mandate “to its fullest” by acting to detain in Prijedor two individuals indicted of war crimes. One was killed as SFOR soldiers sought to detain him, but the other was successfully transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. Subsequently,
SFOR has detained or accepted the voluntary surrender of a series of additional indictees, bringing to 13 the number that SFOR and its predecessor IFOR have helped bring to justice.

Following the Summit, SFOR also took control of paramilitary police, some of whom had been protecting indicted war criminals, and stepped up its support for UN efforts to reform and restructure the civil police. SFOR assisted the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) in inspecting hundreds of police stations and confiscating thousands of unauthorised weapons. Moreover, SFOR’s close cooperation with the IPTF in removing unauthorised police checkpoints has substantially enhanced freedom of movement throughout Bosnia.

At the request of Carlos Westendorp, the High Representative, SFOR took control of the transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television (SRT) to propagate messages aimed at undermining the Peace Agreement. Thanks to its action, SRT has now been put under international supervision and is being reoriented and restructured to conform to democratic standards of broadcasting. SFOR has also assisted the Office of the High Representative (OHR) with creating alternate sources of news and information for the local population.

SFOR played an important supporting role in September’s municipal elections and November’s Republika Srpska assembly elections, both supervised by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It helped the OSCE with communications and logistics and brought in additional troops to ensure a safe environment. It has also assisted with the installation of officials elected in those elections.

In addition to these activities, SFOR has continued its primary tasks associated with implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. In a typical month, SFOR inspects 300-400 weapon storage sites and monitors up to 900 training and movement activities by the armed forces of the two Bosnian entities (the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska). Through the provision of training and the threat of sanctions, SFOR has also encouraged the entity armed forces to step up their clearance of mines; over the last year, over 23,000 mines and unexploded ordnance have been cleared under SFOR supervision. Since March, SFOR assisted in organising an amnesty for mines, explosives and war-like material which has led to the voluntary surrender of over 6,000 mines, 4,500 artillery and mortar shells, over 2,000 assorted weapons and over 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

SFOR’s active engagement, closely coordinated with the activities of the High Representative and other international organisations, has helped to re-energise the peace process and to isolate those hardliners who had obstructed progress toward the realisation of the Dayton agreement. A major breakthrough came in January with the swearing in of a new government in Republika Srpska committed to cooperation with the international community. Other signs of progress include the introduction of a common currency, passports and licence plates, the resumption of train traffic across the inter-Entity boundary on railroads repaired by SFOR and continued progress in restructuring the civil police.

In February, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) reviewed the status of the Peace Agreement. While there were distinct signs of renewed progress, the peace remained fragile. It was clear that withdrawing SFOR in June, when its initial 18-month mandate is scheduled to end, would reverse the peace process and even create the risk of renewed hostilities. NATO political and military authorities were concerned in particular about the “public security gap” caused by the inability or unwillingness of many local police, not yet fully reformed and restructured, to act effectively in
such fields as supporting the return of refugees and installing elected local officials.

Based on this assessment, as well as on options developed by the NATO Military Authorities, the NAC agreed that NATO would continue to organise and lead a multinational force in Bosnia after June, subject to the necessary mandate from the UN Security Council. The NAC agreed that the force would retain the well-established name “SFOR” and have a similar mission: to deter renewed hostilities and to contribute to a secure environment for implementing the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement, thereby helping to stabilise and consolidate the peace.

Specialised unit

In order to help close the public security gap, the Council agreed that SFOR should incorporate a multinational specialised unit trained and equipped to respond to civil unrest and thereby to help prevent it in the first instance. This specialised unit will allow SFOR to help promote public security, but without undertaking civil police tasks. The unit will operate under SFOR’s command and rules of engagement and derive its authority from the military annex to the Peace Agreement which allows the force to prevent interference with refugee movements and to respond to deliberate violence.

Of course SFOR alone cannot guarantee public security. Thus the incorporation into SFOR of a specialised unit must be part of a wider approach that also includes continued IPTF-led training of the local police and pressure on local authorities to ensure that the local police and judiciary assume their responsibilities.

No permanent presence

Whereas SFOR was initially planned as an 18-month mission, its continuation is not connected to a specific end-date. Instead, it will be complemented by a transition strategy linked to developments in the political and security situation and to progress in civil implementation. The North Atlantic Council, in consultation with non-NATO contributing countries, will review SFOR’s force levels and tasks at regular intervals beginning later this year, with the aim of achieving progressive reductions in the size, role and profile of the force against the background of developments in the political and security situation. Progress in the implementation of the civil elements of the Peace Agreement and the elections in September will also be important considerations. The desired end-state for this transition strategy is a secure environment adequate for the consolidation of the peace without the further need for a NATO-led military force in Bosnia. NATO, the allies and its partners have no interest in or desire for a permanent military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In overseeing SFOR operations and considering follow-on options, the NAC has consulted with the 20 non-NATO countries contributing to SFOR through the mechanism of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in a special “SFOR format.” The non-NATO participants have expressed their support for SFOR’s continuation as well as widespread willingness to continue to contribute to the force.

Priorities for 1998

The continuation of SFOR is a necessary but not sufficient condition for creating an enduring peace in Bosnia. Progress is required in four main areas, as NATO Secretary General Javier Solana clearly spelled out to Bosnia’s collective Presidency last January.

First, there must be progress toward democratisation, leading to and resulting from next September’s elections. The politics of war and ethnic division must be replaced by the politics of peace and reconciliation.
SOFR will assist through its support for the elections, by helping the OHR and OSCE to ensure that Bosnian media coverage meets democratic standards, and by its continued actions against indicted war criminals and those who stand in the way of the Dayton agreement. The Secretary General has used his regular visits to Bosnia to meet with the leaders of various political parties in order to demonstrate that political opposition and pluralism have a legitimate and healthy role in any democracy.

Second, there must be greater progress in the return of refugees and displaced persons, particularly to areas in which they will be in the minority. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has presented an ambitious plan to NATO for this year, aimed at doubling the number of refugees returning compared to last year and making 1998 “the year of minority returns”. A major tool of the UNHCR in promoting minority returns is its “open cities” initiative, designed to reward those local communities that encourage the return of refugees and displaced persons. SFOR will help to provide the secure environment necessary for the success of the “open cities” initiative and is also active in collecting information on local conditions to facilitate returns.

Third, there must be major improvement in public security at the local level. The reform and restructuring of the civil police is crucial to the return of refugees, the protection of human rights, and the success of Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state. This must be complemented by a reform of the judiciary and penal systems in Bosnia. SFOR will continue to support the UN’s IPTF in restructuring civil police and will improve the level and character of that support through the introduction of the specialised unit described above.

Fourth, the foundation must be laid for long-term military stability. In the short-term, the continuation of SFOR will help to ensure this stability, but ultimately the responsibility for maintaining peace must shift to local institutions as well as regional arms control and security regimes. As its contribution to this transition, NATO has established an initial set of Security Cooperation Activities with Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of promoting confidence and cooperation among the Bosnian armed forces and encouraging the development of democratic practices and central defence mechanisms such as the Bosnian government’s Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Making progress

Making strides in all of these areas is essential to making the peace endure and to making the Peace Agreement succeed. And progress in areas of public security and long-term military stability is particularly important to creating the conditions that will allow NATO to draw down and ultimately withdraw its military presence.

Implementation of the Peace Agreement, while sometimes painstakingly slow, is advancing. NATO’s task is to continue to assist in consolidating the peace, in the short term by SFOR’s continued engagement and in the longer-term by helping to bring Bosnia into the Euro-Atlantic community, including its security structures.
Accordingly, they endorsed an initial set of Security Cooperation Activities between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to involve representation from both Entities and all three ethnic groups.\(^{(1)}\)

Building on the trial Security Cooperation Course conducted by NATO in June 1997, these activities will include additional such courses, seminars, visits and an assessment of how NATO can assist the Bosnian government’s central defence institution, the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), in becoming fully effective.

The aim of the Security Cooperation Activities is to contribute to regional stability by:

- promoting confidence and cooperation among the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- encouraging the development of democratic practices and central defence structures such as the SCMM.

\(^{(1)}\) The two Bosnian Entities are the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The three principal ethnic groups are the Bosnics, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
It should be emphasised that these activities are not part of Partnership for Peace (PIP). While they may appear conceptually similar in approach, they are managed apart from the PIP programme and are clearly geared to Bosnia’s unique political and military circumstances.

The initial set of Security Cooperation Activities

- Security Cooperation Courses
- Senior Officers Security Cooperation Course
- Participation in other NATO Courses
- NATO Information Seminars
- Seminars on specific issues
- Visits to NATO and SHAPE
- Support for development of the Standing Committee on Military Matters

The Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM)

In agreeing to the set of security cooperation initiatives, a principal requirement of NATO Ministers was that the programme be coordinated through the SCMM, making clear to the Bosnian government the importance the Alliance attaches to this institution. The SCMM is one of the common institutions set up by the Peace Agreement to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina and, since the Peace Agreement leaves responsibility for defence to the two Entities, the SCMM is designed to coordinate the activities of armed forces in the country. In addition to the Bosniac, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb Presidents, the SCMM consists of the Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence of the two Entities, a Secretariat comprising the military advisors to each of the three Presidents, and a number of national and international observers.

The SCMM’s agreed rules of procedure set out three purposes for the committee: to coordinate the activities of the armed forces of the two Entities; to consider and coordinate the military response of the Entities in the event of an attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina; and, to enhance stability and mutual confidence and trust between the Entities by serving as a forum for the discussion of military issues and the resolution of disputes arising from military issues. The Committee has also agreed on a strategy for its future work.

The SCMM has begun to address issues of substance; for example it is considering the matter of military representation abroad and the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty banning land mines. The SCMM is also working closely with SFOR to ensure the success of “Operation Harvest”, the weapons amnesty whereby private citizens are encouraged to turn-in weapons, ammunition and explosives left over from the conflict.

Such progress notwithstanding, the SCMM is not yet on a solid footing. It lacks its own staff support, regular meeting facilities, and working-level sub-structures. It depends heavily on staff support from the Office of the High Representative to arrange meetings and to conduct any type of business.

Based on the report of the NATO assessment team which visited Bosnia last January, the North Atlantic Council has agreed on an approach for strengthening the SCMM, initially with NATO officials working closely with the SCMM secretariat and other members of the Committee, as well as with the Office of the High Representative and others. A first step will be a visit to NATO and SHAPE by the SCMM Secretariat for discussions with key NATO officials and representatives of NATO nations. Eventually, once the SCMM has agreed on its military representation in Brussels, NATO will be able to use that representative to facilitate contact with the SCMM and day-to-day business associated with conduct of the Security Cooperation Activities.

The Security Cooperation Course

The most prominent of the initial set of Security Cooperation Activities is the Security Cooperation Course. To date NATO has conducted three such courses (June and December 1997, and January 1998) at the NATO School (SHAPE) in Oberammergau, Germany. A further four courses are planned for 1998, including a senior officers’ version in June. Each regular course has included 45 Bosnian participants: 15 from each ethnic group, including both military and civilian defence officials from each of the two Entities. In the first three courses, the ages ranged from the late 20s to mid-50s, and the ranks from Captain through Major-General, all participants having directly experienced the conflict in their country.

The course introduces the participants to NATO — its structure, political agenda, crisis management concept and Partnership for Peace. It also covers topics such as democratisation, reconciliation, the Peace Agreement and the role of SFOR, and an introduction to key international organisations. More than half of the six day programme is devoted to discussion of the
range of current issues in Bosnia, through presentations and working group discussions. Such issues include refugees, public security, the economy, police reform, the SCMM, the media, de-mining, reconstruction, democratic control of the military and regional stabilisation. In addition, Bavarian State officials and local Oberammergau officials address the course on the manner in which a state fits into a federal system and how a small democratic community functions.

In the classroom there is a mix of ranks and military and civilian officials, and each course member is flanked on either side by colleagues from the other two ethnic groups. Working groups also include representation from each ethnic group. Accommodation is arranged in a similar fashion and an active social programme is another key feature of the course, designed to further dialogue beyond the classroom, to build confidence and to promote personal reconciliation.

All of these aspects have proven to be particularly successful in breaking down barriers and inhibitions straight away, on day one of the course, and allowing course members to experience a taste of life in a democratic society in the relatively short time available. Discussion in the classroom between colleagues of the other ethnic groups comes alive on the very first morning. At social events many course members actively seek to sit beside someone from a different background. Towards the end of the course business cards, addresses and telephone numbers, photographs and other memorabilia are exchanged between individuals and between the three ethnic groups.

The rewards from this initiative to date have surpassed our expectations. By way of illustration, after a long flight from Bosnia, the course members had a two-hour bus ride from Munich airport during which one could literally hear a pin drop, such was the silence and uncertainty. This was contrasted by a similar journey just three days later to hold discussions with Bavarian State officials, where one could barely hold a normal conversation due to the sounds of the singing of traditional folk songs, animated discussions and general fine camaraderie. It has also been heartening to see old friends rediscovering colleagues they had not seen for years, from days in the former Yugoslav army, or military college in Belgrade. It has also become clear from the many interventions and discussions during each of the courses that these military professionals hold both a healthy respect for the professionalism of the IFOR and SFOR, as well as a clear understanding of what the NATO-led forces must do in order to bring peace and lasting stability to the country. A common conclusion and request from all three courses has been that more such courses and activities should be held to better inform politicians and others in Bosnia.

Perhaps the most significant measure of success is reflected in the public and heart-warming remarks of the senior representatives of each group made towards the end of each course, in front of both their peers and the members of the other two ethnic groups.

At the close of the January course, one representative stated that “the only way to repay NATO, for providing such a valuable opportunity and for showing such friendship and professionalism, was to demonstrate it with actions once back in Bosnia”. Another, representing a different ethnic group, noted that “NATO was a healthy, growing family. Perhaps at this early juncture, Bosnia could be considered as an orphan in the family, eager to gain respect and to join.” The representative of the third ethnic group recounted a personal story, the bottom line of which was to express hope on behalf of the children of Bosnia for long-lasting peace. Each of these public pronouncements was widely and loudly applauded and, perhaps, offers some indication of the value of the NATO initiative to a small cross-section of those who in the past had to prosecute the conflict.

Participants to date have included both the Bosniac and Croat members of the SCMM Secretariat, the Defence Adviser to RS President
In the classroom each Bosnian participant is seated between members of the other two ethnic groups to encourage interaction and discussion.

Biljana Plavsic, and many other high-ranking military and civilian defence officials. There are now 135 Bosnian defence and military personnel with whom NATO, SFOR and other international officials can communicate on a more solid footing; people who better understand the efforts of the international community in their country and who better appreciate the need for Bosnia to develop democratic traditions for eventual integration into Europe.

Other activities

Looking ahead and building on the concept of the Security Cooperation Course, a number of diverse activities are planned. A two-day NATO information seminar is scheduled for Sarajevo in July this year, aimed at bringing together local politicians, media, academics, defence and other officials from each of the three ethnic groups and from both Entities. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana will open the seminar which will provide information on NATO with a view to explaining that there is more to the Alliance than SFOR. It will also indicate what Bosnia must do in order to become closer to NATO and to become a democratic state within Europe.

Planning is also under way for seminars this year and next on such topics as “democratic control of the military” and “civil disaster assistance”, where it is hoped to involve the OSCE, a number of NGOs and other organisations and agencies. In addition, beginning later this year, two other regular courses conducted at the NATO School in Oberammergau will be opened to Bosnian candidates — the European Security Cooperation Course and the NATO Peacekeeping Course. In each case participation must be in multiples of three, i.e., one from each ethnic group, and will be organised through the SCMM. Visits by a variety of Bosnian groups to NATO and SHAPE will also be arranged this year.

To assist the programme, the NATO-led SFOR may be called upon to provide selected support. It should be emphasised however that the Security Cooperation Activities are quite distinct from SFOR operations. NATO’s interaction with the SCMM in no way diminishes SFOR’s mission or authority or the function of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) chaired by SFOR to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.

A contribution to sustainable peace

Experience to date has been promising. Much remains to be done to return the country to normality and to achieve a sustainable peace. NATO, together with others in the international community, can contribute to the security dimension of Bosnia’s future. The initial set of Security Cooperation Activities, if successful, could evolve as part of a strategy for bringing Bosnia into Euro-Atlantic security structures and creating a self-sustaining peace in which the presence of international military forces will no longer be necessary. This will require not only continued dedication on the part of NATO and others but, more importantly, Bosnians themselves.
While initial planning did not foresee extensive deployment of civilians as part of a NATO operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the combined civilian element for NATO and other troop contributing nations has grown to some 6,000 men and women. Among these are civilians from NATO and non-NATO national administrations, as well as NATO international civilian staff members from a number of NATO Agencies and Commands — the first time NATO international civilian staff have been deployed in significant numbers outside the borders of the Alliance. As testimony to the scale of their contribution to the success of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR), a total of more than 1,400 civilians have been awarded the NATO Medal.

The NATO Medal, the first of its kind, was instituted by the North Atlantic Council in December 1994 and it was decided to award it to military and civilian personnel active in operations, or in direct support of operations, relating to the former Yugoslavia. In May 1996 eligibility was extended to personnel from non-NATO member troop contributing nations.

Many of the civilian recipients of the medal have been international civilian staff members from NATO Commands and Agencies, such as SHAPE, AFSOUTH, NC3A and NAMSA, who have served in and around the theatre of operations.

There have been 25 NATO civilians from Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) who have served in theatre, including the AFSOUTH Chief of Civilian Personnel, who put in 169 days as Civilian Personnel Officer for IFOR, and four of his colleagues who served in the area for over 80 days. Another 40 NATO civilians from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) have been deployed for periods ranging from a few days to several months. They include engineers, technicians, lawyers, financial advisors and personnel administrators. Of the nine NATO civilians from Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (APCENT) and Headquarters Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) who have served in theatre, three spent more than 120 days in the area. NATO civilians have also been deployed from Headquarters Allied Forces North West (AFNORTHWEST) in High Wycombe.

The NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), based in Luxembourg, has been present in theatre since 4 December 1995, when 14 civilian staff members were deployed as part of the enabling forces for Operation Joint Endeavour. Contracting/Liaison Officers were deployed to Zagreb, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Ploce, and a contracting cell of nine was established in Split. NAMSA’s initial task was to perform NATO contracting for the set-up and sustainment of NATO headquarters (e.g., accommodation rental, food and fuel), coordinate contracting for scarce in-theatre resources and provide assistance to individual nations upon request. Subsequently NAMSA personnel became heavily involved with the NATO Security Investment Programme, including contributing to railways and bridge repairs. By the end of 1997, 41 NATO Medals had been awarded to NAMSA personnel, 38 of which were for tours of three months’ duration.

The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) is providing a broad range of scientific and acquisition support for the SFOR in former Yugoslavia. This support is provided both on site through the Agency’s field office located at SFOR headquarters in Ilidza, manned by civilian scientific staff volunteers, and remotely from the Agency’s scientific laboratories in The Hague and the acquisition division in Brussels. The primary on-site technical support is in the Operations Research area (modelling/data analysis of compliance with Peace Accords; balance of power assessments) and information system development and support. In addition, ad hoc specialist support is provided in the areas of communications, electronic warfare, recognised air picture, and information security. The SFOR Command and Control network has been built on use of NATO owned and operated systems provided by the NATO C3 Agency. Twenty-six NC3A staff members have already earned the NATO Medal.

The NATO Airborne Early Warning E-3A Component, based in Germany, flies aircraft in direct support of NATO operations in areas adjacent to the former Yugoslavia and has many staff, particularly in the maintenance area, who are constantly deployed to its forward operating bases in Italy and Greece. Since July 1996, 213 NATO civilian staff from the Component have been awarded the NATO Medal.

There are strong arguments for the use of civilians in such operations, which range from pure economics, through needs for non-military skills, to the requirement for continuity. The contribution of NATO international civilian staff has been recognised as an essential element in the success of IFOR/SFOR, as they have played a critical role in many important areas in support of the force. In doing so they have accepted the same conditions, made the same sacrifices and enjoyed the same successes as their military colleagues.

Source: NATO Office of Management