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Cover: NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (2nd from right) congratulating the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (left to right), Bronislaw Geremek, László Kovács and Jaroslav Šedivý, after the signature of their Accession Protocols in the NATO Council. (NATO photo)

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NATO has taken a decisive step towards building the new Europe, united, secure and free, that we have been striving to achieve for many years. In the presence of their Czech, Hungarian and Polish colleagues, Alliance Foreign Ministers signed individual “Protocols of Accession” last December for each of these three future allies, closing the curtain on a remarkable year for the Alliance and for the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole. Among the many historic steps in 1997: we reconfirmed our openness to countries able and willing to join, intensified cooperative relationships with our partners, opened new chapters in NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations, enhanced our Mediterranean dialogue and made substantial progress on NATO’s internal adaptation, including agreement on a new command structure.

The signing of the Protocols of Accession opens a new chapter on the way towards formally welcoming our Czech, Hungarian and Polish friends into the NATO fold in time for NATO’s 50th anniversary next year. Of course, between now and 1999 a lot of work still remains to be done, both in the Alliance and in the three candidate countries, before the accession process is finalised.

First of all, the Accession Protocols must be ratified in all 16 of the present member states. Secondly, while the three future allies have made great strides to qualify for NATO membership, they must step up their reform efforts to bring their militaries up to NATO standards. Finally, we need to involve our future allies as closely as possible in Alliance activities over the coming months to help them take in the processes and procedures that turn the wheels of this Alliance.

Preparing the ground

In my own meetings with the leaders and officials of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over the past months, I have been impressed by the serious commitment they have demonstrated to the ideals and common values underpinning our Alliance. They have also shown a keen understanding of the serious responsibilities that membership in a defensive Alliance entails. During last autumn’s accession talks, the dedication and preparedness of the three countries demonstrated that they indeed meet the requirements of membership. All three have confirmed their intention to participate fully in NATO’s military structures and col-
collective defence planning as well as to commit the bulk of their armed forces to the Alliance. And, importantly, they have also pledged themselves to the continued openness of NATO for other qualified candidate countries to join in future. In sum, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have proven beyond a doubt that, as future allies, they will not only be consumers, but providers of security.

**Good value for money**

Bringing the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO will not be cost-free, either for current allies, or for the three invitees. But these costs need to be put into perspective. The costs that the three future allies will face for modernising their armed forces are not part of this calculation, because they would be incurred anyway. At the same time, NATO’s military planners have underscored that — in the current favourable security environment — available and planned military forces and capabilities of the current allies and the invited countries are sufficient to ensure fully the collective defence of all in an Alliance of 19 countries.

The costs of enlargement lie in NATO’s common budgets — the costs of upgrading air defence, airfields and communications systems, and achieving interoperability, to the standard required by the Alliance. According to our initial assessments, the costs of opening NATO will amount to some US$1.5 billion over the course of the next ten years — far less than the sort of figures that have been quoted over the past months. This is a fraction of current allied defence spending of US$440 billion. Moreover, these costs will be shared among 19 members with the invitees paying their fair share.

Of course, the three countries have confirmed their plans to increase considerably their own defence expenditures over the next few years in order to modernise their armed forces and better meet the requirements of NATO membership. But these costs would almost certainly be higher if these countries were building independent defence capabilities outside of a collective defence Alliance.

Taken together, given the dividend of strengthening peace and stability in Europe, this is indeed good value for money.

**The next phase: ratification**

The next phase in the process of opening NATO is ratification of the Accession Protocols in all present 16 member states, according to their own national procedures. This is already off to a strong start, with Canada and Denmark having completed their ratification procedures in early February and other countries are expected to follow in the coming months.

Nevertheless, this is no mere formality, and in order to ensure a smooth ratification process in all 16 national parliaments, allies, together with the three new invitees, will need to increase the level of public diplomacy with regard to the new NATO and the rationale behind enlargement.
This rationale, unanimously accepted by all allies, is quite simple: NATO enlargement will reinforce peace and stability in the new Europe. By joining the Alliance, new members will become more secure and hence contribute to security throughout Europe. As Secretary General and principal spokesman for the Alliance, I will continue to spell out this message clearly and work towards successful ratification.

**Taking part in the Alliance**

All NATO nations agree that, even as we await the outcome of the ratification process, we should begin now to prepare the prospective new members for Alliance membership. To this end, we are involving the three to the greatest extent feasible in Alliance activities. They now attend selected North Atlantic Council meetings as well as selected meetings of NATO committees, though without taking part in the decision-making process.

This immersion in “NATO culture” will expose the three candidates to the everyday practice of working together and taking decisions by consensus that has been developed over the years by the current allies. These arrangements serve to keep the three invitees up-to-date on major Alliance policy issues, help them to gain an in-depth understanding of the functioning of the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies and give them the possibility to express their views on important issues on the NATO agenda. I do not think there could be a better way for these three countries to prepare themselves for the responsibilities and obligations of NATO membership.

At the same time, we are developing a special cooperation programme for the invitees, making use of Partnership for Peace tools and mechanisms to advance their efforts of gaining interoperability with NATO forces. We are also jointly developing “Target Force Goals” for the three invitees, with the aim of defining more clearly the military contributions they will be expected to provide as NATO allies.

**Our wider objectives**

Of course, enlargement is not an end in itself, but is part of a wider objective of building a new European security architecture. We have established close working relations of cooperation and partnership with nearly every country in the Euro-Atlantic area. We are building on the successes of the Partnership for Peace programme and involving all our partners ever more closely in Alliance activities. We are enhancing our new partnerships with Russia and Ukraine and are working closely with other institutions such as the OSCE and the WEU. And we are reforming our own military structures to make NATO an organisation that can respond quickly to the requirements of building cooperative security in Europe — a Europe in which we have moved from preventing war to preserving peace and from confrontation to cooperation.

Similarly, as we said in Madrid last July, enlargement is not a “one-off” process. NATO’s door will remain open to other aspirants who are willing to take on the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

We will continue our intensified dialogues with those countries that have expressed an interest in Alliance membership and Alliance Heads of State and Government will review the accession process at the next NATO Summit in 1999.

The incentive remains, therefore, for aspiring members to continue down the road of democracy and economic reform. The possibility of NATO membership has already provided the motivation for many nations in Central and Eastern Europe to settle peacefully old disputes and to further develop cooperative ties with their neighbours.

By signing Protocols of Accession with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland we have taken a decisive step forward in the process of opening NATO, a process which is part and parcel of building an undivided, cooperative Europe. The new NATO, with three additional countries sharing our values and commitments, will be better equipped to meet the challenges of the future, ensuring peace and stability for all in the Euro-Atlantic community.
The profound changes in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 have provided the countries of that part of the continent a unique opportunity to reintegrate into the community of free and democratic nations. In striving to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions, the new European democracies are seeking both to put the legacy of the communist past behind them for good and to contribute — of their own free will — to the building of a new, united Europe. This integration strategy is also motivated by justifiable security concerns, as demonstrated by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The formula of security through integration and cooperation has gained growing support as the most promising tool for enhanced regional stabilisation and security.

In Bulgaria, we see membership in the Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the Western European Union not only as a reliable source of security guarantees but also as a natural expression of our foreign policy orientation. The very prospect of membership has provided an incentive for reform in our country, acting as a stimulus for modernisation and as one of the main influences on Bulgaria’s constructive and peaceful foreign policy over the last seven years.

Bulgaria has no territorial, border, ethnic or religious disputes with any of its neighbours. We are committed to overcoming any bilateral differences in the spirit of partnership and cooperation represented by the new Europe. My country shares common borders and security space with two NATO member states, enjoying excellent ties with Greece and Turkey, including in the field of security and defence.

Preparing for NATO membership

A year ago, on the basis of the landslide support of Bulgarian voters for the foreign policy agenda of President Petar Stoyanov, the Bulgarian government stated clearly the nation’s desire to become a member...
of the Atlantic Alliance and its readiness to be invited to start accession negotiations. After years of uncertainty, Bulgaria had returned to the path leading to integration into NATO.

This clear and irreversible policy to seek the earliest possible integration into NATO and other Euro-Atlantic institutions was reinforced by the establishment of an absolute pro-reform majority in parliament and a strong reform-minded government. This policy is backed by a significant proportion of the public, who share the values, principles and objectives that the Alliance represents. It reflects Bulgaria’s readiness to make its contribution to ensuring Euro-Atlantic and regional security.

NATO’s opening to the new European democracies marked a profound new stage in the political and strategic evolution of Europe. The decisions taken in Madrid will consign to history the artificial lines of division imposed by the Cold War. We hope that this ongoing process will eliminate all vestiges of the Yalta legacy.

It came as no surprise that the countries which had made the most substantial progress in democratic and market reforms were the first to be invited to join NATO. We applaud this achievement which resulted from hard work and sustained efforts. For our part, we were particularly heartened by the reassuring message which came out of Madrid: the doors of the Alliance remain open to any European democracy willing and able to assume the responsibilities of membership.

The Bulgarian government has developed a clear-cut national strategy to meet the criteria for membership, based on a comprehensive national programme of preparation. A key aspect of this strategy is to demonstrate Bulgaria’s commitment to being a responsible partner and dependable future ally able to undertake the obligations of membership.

The intensified dialogue with the Alliance on political, military, financial and security issues relating to future NATO membership is an integral part of our comprehensive pre-accession strategy. Regular review of the progress achieved will help to identify any areas where more work is needed and to formulate joint recommendations for the way ahead.

Reform of the armed forces, strengthening of civilian control of the military and achieving interoperability with NATO forces are major priorities in this process. To this end, the Bulgarian parliament has introduced significant changes in national legislation concerning defence and the armed forces. The objective of this reform is to develop a highly mobile, more professional and well-equipped force which is significantly reduced in size, in order to meet NATO standards. The force structure will include main defence, rapid reaction and territorial defence forces, as well as reserves.

Active participation in the EAPC and enhanced PfP

Bulgaria’s strategy for joining the Alliance includes active and committed participation in the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the enhanced Partnership for Peace. We see the EAPC not as a static forum, but as a concept in development both in terms of substance and institutional arrangements. This process should take account of the different needs and interests of the EAPC members in accordance with the principles of inclusiveness and self-differentiation.

While strengthening and deepening relations between the Alliance and all partners is an important aim of the enhanced Partnership, particular attention should be devoted to accommodating the specific interests and needs of applicant countries. The challenges deriving from the integration of new members will have to be addressed at an early stage and the enhanced Partnership could facilitate this important task.
Increasing regional cooperation and integration

We were pleased that in Madrid the Alliance recognised the necessity of building greater stability, security and regional cooperation in the countries of south-eastern Europe, and of promoting their increased integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. We were also encouraged by the acknowledgement of the progress achieved towards democratic reforms and the rule of the law in countries from the region seeking membership. In our opinion, the aims and objectives of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council should be actively pursued on a regional level as well.

An important step was taken in regional Euro-Atlantic defence cooperation last October when Defence Ministers from south-eastern European PfP participating states and NATO member states Greece, Italy, Turkey and the US, met in Sofia. Ministers reafirmed their determination to promote good-neigh-

bourly relations and constructive defence and security cooperation in the region. They agreed that the strong and dynamic transatlantic link will remain the bedrock of European security and stability and the main guarantee of a free and prosperous Europe and declared that NATO will continue to be the major driving force in the progress towards the elaboration of joint peacekeeping arrangements with neighbouring allied and partner countries.

In parallel to the Sofia Defence Ministerial follow-up activities, Bulgaria has initiated — together with

construction of an inclusive European security architecture in close cooperation with the WEU.

Ministers welcomed the commitment of NATO leaders to extend further invitations in coming years to democratic countries willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and voiced their belief that the integration of south-eastern European states into Euro-Atlantic security organisations, including NATO, would be facilitated by the expansion of regional defence cooperation and confidence-building measures.

We are particularly pleased that the Sofia Defence Ministerial endorsed a number of specific activities and measures to provide a strong impetus to the process of integration into Western institutions, promoting confidence and security-building measures, and regional defence cooperation. The Chiefs of Defence of these countries will meet on a regular basis to develop further steps for more dynamic and practical military cooperation.

In line with this new concept of regional military cooperation, we have made marked

The objective of military reform in Bulgaria is to develop a highly mobile, more professional and well-equipped force which meets NATO standards. (Reuters)
other partners in the region in the framework of EAPC — a process of wider consultation and security cooperation in south-eastern Europe and, possibly, the Black Sea region. This is designed to make full use of the merits of EAPC and enhanced PIP arrangements to the benefit of increased regional cooperation on political, security and defence matters. Enhanced Euro-Atlantic cooperation, building on initiatives already underway among the states of the region, and between the region and Western nations, should include political consultations on issues of regional security and regional cooperative initiatives in areas such as confidence and security-building measures, arms control issues, democratic civilian control of the military, defence planning and policies, force restructuring, multinational peacekeeping operations, and infrastructure projects.

We have completed an initial round of focused discussions on regional security cooperation in south-eastern Europe in the framework of EAPC and our assessment of the results achieved so far is positive. There seems to be a common commitment in the EAPC to support building greater stability and security in south-eastern Europe, and recognition that regional cooperation can enhance the Partnership objectives. A number of considerations expressed during the discussion are equally relevant to any regional cooperation initiative within the EAPC.

Regional cooperation should not lead to the creation of “regional clubs” but rather reinforce the broadening and deepening of the Partnership itself. Nor should this cooperation be seen as an alternative to early membership in NATO for qualified countries but rather as an instrument to better engage their efforts to the benefit of regional security. We are confident that further steps will be considered to enhance the regional dimension of the Partnership.

Enhanced regional cooperation in the security and defence area, however important it may be, is only part of the broader approach to security and stability in south-eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region. The Bulgarian government attaches paramount importance to consultations and cooperation on a regional level with regard to new challenges and threats of a wider nature such as organised crime, illegal arms trade, drug-trafficking and international terrorism. The radical measures we have undertaken against corruption and organised crime in Bulgaria provide a catalyst for our key role in regional cooperation in this field, in close interaction with our future allies. This has been strengthened by our intensive regional bilateral, trilateral and multilateral dialogues.

**SFOR and beyond**

The SFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is vitally important to security in south-eastern Europe and concerns the whole of the Euro-Atlantic community. Bulgaria shares this commitment in the pursuit of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement to safeguard peace in the area. We have provided our support in various areas and stand ready to increase our contribution in future. In this respect, we were encouraged by allied statements of support for a post-June 1998 military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria will lend whatever assistance it can in this endeavour.

Non-governmental organisations and civil society also have an important role to play in the process of integrating new democracies into the Euro-Atlantic community. In this regard, Bulgaria was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to host the General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association last October. This important event provided a new impetus to the advancement of the Atlantic spirit in Bulgaria.

My country has made an irreversible break with the past. We have become a reliable producer of regional security and our eventual accession to the Washington Treaty will fulfil our natural destiny as an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community.
Aft er 20 months of intense work, NATO’s Military Committee (MC) proposed a new military command structure to Defence Ministers on 2 December 1997. Ministers agreed to this new command structure as a whole and, in particular, on the type, number and location of headquarters. All told, this restructuring will entail a reduction from the present 65 headquarters to 20 in the new command structure. It will consist of two overarching Strategic Commands (SC), one for the Atlantic and one for Europe, with three Regional Commands under SC Atlantic and two under SC Europe. Reporting to the Regional Commands in Europe will be Component Commands and Joint Sub-Regional Commands.

The new structure will enable the Alliance to perform the whole range of its roles and missions more effectively and flexibly, while providing suitable roles for participating allies. It will provide appropriate involvement of partner countries and facilitate the integration of the future new members into the Alliance’s military structures. Defence Ministers have tasked NATO Military Authorities to develop a detailed plan for the transition to the new command structure, for consideration by Ministers in autumn 1998.

The process of internal adaptation

The development of the Alliance’s new command structure is one of the three main inter-linked areas of NATO’s internal adaptation, the other two being the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. Building on the reductions and restructuring of the Alliance’s military forces undertaken in recent years, this internal adaptation will provide the Alliance the capabilities to meet the full range of challenges in the future.

This process can be traced back to the London Declaration of July 1990, when Heads of State and Government of NATO nations called for a process of adaptation commensurate with the changes that were reshaping Europe. This was a decisive turning point in the history of the Alliance and led to the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991, reflecting a broad approach to security. In January 1994, Heads of State and Government called for further examination of how the Alliance’s political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance’s missions, including peacekeeping.

Accordingly, in September 1994, the Military Committee launched a NATO Long Term Study (LTS)
to examine the Integrated Military Structure and put forward “proposals for change to the Alliance’s Force Structures, Command Structures and Common Infrastructure”. As work continued apace on the Study, Foreign Ministers provided further crucial guidance at their meeting in Berlin in June 1996, defining the scope of missions for NATO with which the new command structure has to cope.

In Berlin, Foreign Ministers declared that an essential part of the Alliance’s adaptation is to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, to enable all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership. They also called for the further development of the Alliance’s ability to carry out new roles and missions relating to conflict prevention and crisis management and efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, while maintaining the capability for collective defence.

This was to be complemented by enhancing the Alliance’s contribution to security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by broadening and deepening cooperation with partners.

The fact that this essential impetus for the MC’s work on Internal Adaptation was decided at 16 gave every reason to hope that France and Spain would decide to join the new military structure and in December 1997, Spain announced its intention to do so as soon as possible. France, which participates fully in the Military Committee’s work on Internal Adaptation, has indicated that it is not in a position to participate fully in NATO’s integrated structures, but has expressed its continued positive attitude towards the ongoing process of internal adaptation.

### The new NATO military command structure

As part of the Alliance’s adaptation efforts to improve its capability to fulfil its roles and missions, three fundamental objectives had to be achieved: the Alliance’s military effectiveness had to be ensured; the transatlantic link preserved; and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) developed within the Alliance. Furthermore, all of these missions had to be conducted from a single platform, capable of performing multiple functions.

The overriding imperative in developing a new structure was that it be mission oriented. It needed to provide NATO the capability to cope with the full range of Alliance roles and missions, from its traditional mission of collective defence to new roles in changing circumstances, including non-Article 5 missions such as peace support operations. Furthermore, flexibility, force effectiveness, Alliance cohesion, multinationality and affordability had to be taken into account.

The new structure also had to incorporate ESDI and Combined Joint Task Force requirements. The minimum baseline for Alliance planning was the principle that at least two CJTF Headquarters (HQs) be able to undertake large-scale operations. This should be complemented by the ability to form a number of land-based and sea-based smaller-scale CJTF HQs, able to command land forces of brigade or division size with comparably sized maritime and air force components. Recognising that the CJTF trials are not yet complete, the proposed structure had to be able to meet CJTF HQ nuclei requirements and provide the requisite CJTF HQ staff generation for both NATO and WEU-led operations.

The new structure also had to have growth potential and the flexibility to accommodate new member nations on a case-by-case basis, without the need for major restructuring, as well as providing for appropriate partner involvement. In this context, it was determined that the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would not require any additional NATO headquarters.

### The new Headquarters

The number and location of the Headquarters of the Strategic Commands (SC), Regional Commands (RC), Component Commands (CC) and Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) in the new military command structure are shown in the accompanying diagram.

**Strategic Command Atlantic** in Norfolk, Virginia (US), is responsible for overall planning, direction and conduct of all Alliance military activities/matters within its command area, and beyond as mandated. Within SC Atlantic, the Regional Commands are directly
responsible for the planning and execution of all Alliance military activities/matters, including delegated responsibilities in the SC Atlantic Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond as applicable. The following constitute the subordinate SC Atlantic commands:

- **RC West** in Norfolk, focuses on the western part of the Atlantic AOR.
- **RC East** in Northwood, UK, focuses on the northeastern and eastern part of the Atlantic, including Iceland, and is double-hatted with CC Nav North of SC Europe.
- **RC SouthEast** in Lisbon, Portugal, focuses on the south-eastern part of the Atlantic and includes mainland Portugal.
- **HQ STRIKFLTLANT**, directly subordinate to SC Atlantic, provides a readily available sea-based strike and CJTF HQ capability Alliance-wide and beyond.
- **HQ SUBACLANT** provides a coordination capability for SC Atlantic and direct liaison with SC Europe for management of Alliance submarine policy and doctrine. It is essentially a coordinating authority and principal source of submarine operational and tactical doctrine to both SCs.

**Strategic Command Europe** in Mons, Belgium, is responsible for overall planning, direction and conduct of all Alliance military activities/matters within its command area and beyond as mandated. There are two Regional Commands subordinate to it:

- **RC North** in Brunssum, Netherlands, commands the northern region of SC Europe. It is directly responsible to SC Europe for the planning and execution of all Alliance military activities/matters, including delegated responsibilities, in the northern region and beyond as applicable. The following subordinate commands report directly to Commander RC North: **Component Command Air North** in Ramstein, Germany and **Component Command Nav North** in Northwood, UK and three Joint Sub-Regional Commands — **Centre** in Heidelberg, Germany, **NorthEast** in Karup, Denmark and **North** in Stavanger, Norway.
- **RC South** in Naples, Italy, commands the southern region of SC Europe. It assumes similar responsibilities to RC North, and includes the following subordinate commands: two Component Commands, **Air** and **Naval**, in Naples, Italy, as well as four Joint Sub-Regional Commands: **SouthCentre** in Larissa, Greece; **SouthEast** in Izmir, Turkey; **SouthWest** in Madrid, Spain and **South** in Verona, Italy.

*RC East/CC Nav North is a double-hatted HQ.*

**New command and control concepts**

In addition, NATO has developed new concepts of interrelationships to articulate the dynamics of how the different levels of command within the new military structure will coordinate in undertaking all Alliance roles and missions. These new con-
Note:
- The formal titles of the headquarters are yet to be determined, pending a decision on MC 324, “The NATO Military Command Structure”.
- Each nation is depicted in only one region, but may participate in multiple regions.

**COMMAND STRUCTURE**

Concepts represent a more flexible approach for the conduct of Alliance mission requirements with a leaner, multifunctional command structure in the new security environment. These new concepts include, *inter alia*:

- The supported-supporting command relationship, which is one of the mainstays of interrelationship concepts, allowing the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, as well as commanders at all levels, greater flexibility in transferring the weight of effort in consonance with the decisive points and sequencing of all Alliance military activities. Furthermore, this characteristic of the new command structure links the two Strategic Commands to a much greater degree than ever before. This increases NATO’s flexibility and, above all, its sustainability.
- The conduct of Alliance activities/operations at the regional level, which will also take into account...
interdependency among regions. Work on the new command structure has accentuated the need for regionally-based HQs to be able both to receive forces and support inter/intra-regional reinforcement; and

- The flexible approach taken with respect to command and control (C2) measures, such as boundaries, coordination lines and phasing, which will greatly facilitate the conduct of exercises and operations. For example, in SC Europe, in peacetime, only those C2 measures necessary for the conduct of SC-level and RC-wide daily, peacetime operations will need to be permanently employed and/or established. Consequently, there is no requirement for permanently established boundaries below RC level in SC Europe. Similarly, and since SC Atlantic has no Sub-Regional command level, there are no RC-level Areas of Responsibility within SC Atlantic.

- An increased focus on multinationality with regard to the Manning of the new headquarters. This may lead to representation of all member nations at the Strategic level, to cross representation of nations adjacent to RCs which will enhance the initial reinforcement capability, and to wider participation at the JSRC level which will allow equitable representation of nations neighbouring a JSRC HQ host nation.

CJTF and ESDI

Based on existing CJTF work to date, and pending the outcome of CJTF HQ trials, the new military command structure is deemed to be able to support anticipated CJTF requirements. Present work in planning for WEU Illustrative Mission Profiles, European Command Arrangements and provision of assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations can also be accommodated. This can be provided through the rapid CJTF HQ generation and the permanent planning and C2 capabilities within the new command structure, both of which can, following an ad hoc Council decision, support on a case-by-case basis possible WEU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities. Work on the CJTF concept is ongoing with a CJTF trial within Exercise Strong Resolve planned for March 1998.

The next phase

The new command structure constitutes a major overhaul of the integrated military structure, giving the Alliance the means to perform the whole range of its roles and missions. There is no doubt that the new structure will be operationally effective and viable from a political-military perspective. It will also facilitate the integration of the new members and will accommodate the requirements of the enhanced Partnership for Peace. Much remains to be done, however. The Implementation Phase will have to address such aspects as manpower, infrastructure, communications and resources. The Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session will consider an Outline Plan in spring 1998, leading to a detailed Implementation Plan which should aim at the activation of all HQs foreseen in the new command structure around the time of NATO’s 50th anniversary in April 1999.

Given what we have achieved so far in this endeavour, I can confidently say that NATO’s new Military Command structure will live up to its promise of equipping NATO to meet the demands of the next century. ◆
In evaluating the geostrategic situation in the world, and particularly in Europe, we can conclude that, on the threshold of the 21st century, we have rid the world community of a heavy burden — the global confrontation between two opposing political systems.

In its place, a new process has begun, one of transition to a multipolar world order in which there is a growing variety of political, economic and cultural developments in states and nations. This process leads to a closer interweaving of interests and consequently to the realisation that partnership in interstate relations is essential.

These changes have affected the military sphere too. Today it is an established fact that Russia and NATO no longer regard each other as adversaries. This in turn has reduced to practically zero the probability of large-scale military conflict in Europe. Moreover, a partnership in maintaining peace and security on the continent has begun to take shape in our relations.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act is an example of this. This is a document of great international significance and will no doubt play an important part in European relations. We sketched out concrete proposals for implementing the Founding Act in the course of
our exchange of views at the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council at the level of Defence Ministers in December 1997. Of course, it is premature to speak of total unanimity on all issues and we should not be so naive as to expect startling results. But it is now obvious that we have a mutual interest in open dialogue and the first steps have been taken on the way to an equal and fair partnership.

We should not forget, however, that the situation in Europe, and in the world at large, is still far from stable. While the simplistic stereotypes of the Cold War era are receding further and further into the past, the number of risks and threats in the world is unfortunately not diminishing.

In spite of the fact that the line of military confrontation between the two blocs has been erased from the map of Europe, there are still forces striving to create new dividing lines on the continent. Regional hostilities based on ethnic, national or religious differences still exist as dangerous breeding-grounds of tension. We must also take account of the threats posed by the rise of religious fundamentalism and by the spread of international terrorism and drug-trafficking.

Devising effective responses to these new challenges and threats to the security of the country is therefore one of the priorities of the Russian Defence Ministry today.

**Military reform**

In May 1997 we began the practical implementation of reforms in the Russian armed forces. This is a two-stage effort, aimed at creating a rational and effective military structure capable of guaranteeing the defence and security of the nation, within the limits imposed by present social and economic conditions and the country’s means.

The aim of this reform is to improve the readiness and operational efficiency of the armed forces by optimising their structure, composition and numerical strength, enhancing the standard of equipment, training and logistics, as well as improving the well-being of military personnel.

We are meeting our targets and solving problems as they arise by introducing this reform in stages, thoroughly preparing each successive step. Each of the two stages has clearly designated objectives and time-limits.

**1997-2000**

In the first stage (1997 - 2000) the personnel strength of the armed forces will be reduced to 1,200,000 by 1 January 1999. This will amount to a reduction of more than 600,000 personnel in the Russian army and navy since the start of the reform effort. Moreover, in accordance with President Boris Yeltsin’s initiatives announced in Stockholm on 3 December 1997, Russia will unilaterally reduce its land-based and naval groupings in the north-west of the country by 40 per cent. Particularly deep cuts are planned in the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Leningrad Military District and the Northern and Baltic Fleets.

We are also redefining the tasks and adapting the structure and composition of the Armed Forces, abolishing parallel and redundant command echelons. A number of measures in this area were put into effect in 1997. Work on merging the Strategic Rocket Forces, Space Forces and Missile and Space Defence Forces has been completed. The result is a fundamentally new force structure, the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), consisting of missile army formations, launcher units and installations, space equipment management, and missile and space defence force formations.

Important changes have also been made in the land forces, with fully manned and equipped battle-ready formations and units being created in strategic sectors.

In the reform of the navy the intention is to retain the present structure of four fleets and one flotilla as a whole, as well as the
fleet groupings in all strategically vital sectors. However, their range of tasks will be considerably more limited than before.

The air force and air defence forces will be combined during 1998 resulting in a four-element structure of the armed forces, consisting of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Force, Land Forces and Navy.

During the same period we will introduce the territorial principle of command within the area of responsibility of the military districts. This will allow operational control of the groups of armed forces within those districts, as well as of other forces, military formations and bodies with responsibility for national defence issues.

We will also introduce advanced technologies to develop the basic types of arms and equipment in this first stage.

2001-2005

In the course of the second stage of reform (2001-2005), there will be a transition to a three-element armed forces structure, according to the area of application (land, air and space, sea). There will also be improvements to the command system and substantial enhancements in the level of combat and operational training for troops and naval forces during this period, providing them with the latest 21st century technology in arms and equipment.

Of course, the reform of the Russian armed forces will be carried out taking into account the present geopolitical situation in which the country finds itself, as well as any changes we can foresee, and will be within the framework of existing and future international arms control arrangements.

By carrying out radical reforms in the Russian armed forces, we are making a deliberate contribution to reducing the role of the military factor in international relations. This is a sign of the times. Russia’s military potential is exclusively aimed at maintaining its own security and poses no threat to other states and nations. Russia is therefore justified in expecting corresponding moves from the other major military powers, and above all from NATO.

The political changes that have become apparent in this respect give rise to hopes, provided that these are implemented in practice. This is true above all of the arrangements embodied in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which give Russia the fullest possible guarantees that the existing military balance parameters in Europe will not change in the immediate future.

Relations with NATO

The understanding that has been reached on permanent consultations and cooperation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council may provide a favourable basis for extending cooperation and for arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to existing problems between Russia and NATO.

However, there are fears that these arrangements may not be implemented in full. These fears would prove to be justified if Russia’s role in the Permanent Joint Council was arbitrarily restricted.

Russia cannot remain passive in response to NATO’s eastward expansion. Our negative attitude to these plans is well known. The implementation of these plans, in their present form, could be a destabilising factor in contemporary international relations.

The issue of reforming the NATO military-political bloc is coming to the fore in the context of the new political situation in Europe. In our view, NATO must be transformed into a political organisation which would comprise one of the components of European security in the 21st century. This security architecture
should be based on the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only international organisation on the continent that fully reflects the interests of all participating states in its activities and ensures that all have equal rights, irrespective of their membership of various unions and alliances.

It is my profound conviction that, in spite of the problems that exist, the NATO-Russia Founding Act provides extensive opportunities for creating an atmosphere of trust. This can facilitate settling existing differences in our relations as well as establishing efficient and productive machinery for cooperation between the military establishments of Russia and NATO member states. Only in this way can we complete our common task of creating a community of free and democratic states from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

WEU celebrates 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty

On 17 March 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed, opening the way for the creation of Western European Union and, a year later, of the Atlantic Alliance. Western Europe’s efforts to provide for its own defence following the end of the Second World War, embodied in the Brussels Treaty, encouraged the United States to commit itself to the defence of the Old World with the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April of the following year. This event was followed on 23 May 1954 by the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty, the act that gave birth to WEU. The Organisation has come a long way since then. It has proved capable of seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges of a Europe that has radically changed. It now plays its full part in the new European security architecture. WEU is a politico-military organisation, bringing together around the same table 18 nations that are also members of the European Union and/or NATO and 10 Central European nations that participate very closely in the work of the Organisation. WEU’s principal task now is to enable the Europeans to undertake the politico-military management of crises in which the Americans would not wish to become directly involved. It will in most cases act on a political decision by the European Union and with political and military support from NATO. Working together is therefore of the essence in day-to-day actions conducted by WEU.

On 17 March 1998, WEU will commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty. The event will be marked by a high-level conference on the general theme of WEU on the eve of the 21st century. Looking resolutely to the future, WEU will also have occasion to remember on that day the extraordinary journey undertaken by Europeans in the second half of this century.

José Cutileiro
Secretary-General of WEU
Building a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

General Wesley Clark
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers reviewed the SFOR operation in December 1997, 12 months into its 18-month mission. They confirmed that SFOR would continue at its present force levels, until otherwise directed, to allow it to continue its firm and even-handed approach to implementing its mandate and supporting civil implementation. In this article, SACEUR, who has overall military authority of SFOR, reviews the contribution made by IFOR and SFOR to the peace process over the last two years, and outlines some of the challenges that lie ahead in the remaining months of the SFOR mission.

Two years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the middle of profound change. The fighting has been stopped and the armed forces of the two Bosnian Entities — the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS) — have been brought under control. Some of the damage has been repaired, refugees are returning, and successful elections have been held. SFOR, like IFOR before it, has played a key role in making this change possible.

SFOR’s mission

Implementation of Annex 1A — the military annex — of the Dayton Peace Agreement is still the heart of the SFOR mission. But support to the civilian implementation agencies has emerged as an increasingly important part of SFOR’s work. Acting on the basis of the guidance provided by the North Atlantic Council, SFOR cooperates closely with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), headed by Ambassador Carlos Westendorp, and also works with many other agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). This cooperation is not confined to the respective headquarters in Sarajevo, but is reflected in activities and initiatives across the country.

Let me highlight a few of the practical contributions SFOR has made to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in the military sphere and through its support to civilian organisations:

Under IFOR, the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) were separated, their heavy weapons were put into cantonment sites, and their training was brought under IFOR control. SFOR continues to ensure that the EAF remain in compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. SFOR patrols a 1,400 km-long Zone of Separation, all year in all weather conditions, and SFOR troops carry out regular inspections of cantonment sites — almost 450 inspections per month. Where unauthorised weapons are discovered, they are confiscated and destroyed. Movements and training require prior SFOR approval. These activities all help to ensure that no one Party can feel threatened by any other, and so lay the foundation for peace.

The conflict left millions of mines scattered across the country, posing a very real danger to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including children. SFOR is requiring the EAF to carry out their responsibilities for de-mining. Failure to carry out these de-mining activities can result in unit training bans. With SFOR encouragement, the entities produced detailed plans for counter-mining operations in 1997, and more than...
20,000 mines and 1,100 other unexploded objects have been removed. There is still a long way to go, but these efforts mark an important step forward. SFOR will be encouraging the Entities to make even more progress in 1998 and is offering assistance in this effort by providing training courses.

SFOR is taking practical steps to promote free movement throughout the country. SFOR engineers have assisted in the reopening of the railway network. They are maintaining over 2,500 km of roads, and have installed or repaired 64 bridges.

SFOR has also supported the IPTF in its checkpoint policy, which has led to a dramatic reduction in the number of checkpoints on Bosnian roads. SFOR and the IPTF have both actively dismantled unauthorised checkpoints. Over the last six months of 1997, the number of checkpoint requests submitted by the Entities dropped from over 1,000 a week to under 100. All in all, this represents a dramatic contribution to freedom of movement, and to a life without fear for the ordinary people.

Just as IFOR assisted the OSCE in the September 1996 national elections, SFOR actively supported the OSCE during the recent municipal elections and the elections to the Republika Srpska Assembly. In addition to providing a secure environment for the elections, SFOR provided a range of practical and logistical support which contributed directly to the success of the election process. SFOR is now liaising very closely with the OSCE and the OHR during the sensitive installation process of the municipal councils.

Over the past two years, many people have criticised the slow pace of civilian implementation. From my close involvement and my many visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I see the problems the civilian agencies face and admire their dogged persistence which is inching the peace process forward. The tragic deaths of the Deputy
High Representative Ambassador Wagner and key members of the OHR and IPTF team in a helicopter crash on 17 September show that they are taking their full share of the risks as we all, civilians and military, work together to build a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Looking ahead to the next six months of the SFOR mission, I am confident that we will be able to continue to carry out our military tasks successfully and to support the civilian effort. In the light of recent events, and the discussions by Ministers in Brussels and at the Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn last December, some clear priorities have emerged:

**Public security**

SFOR actively supports the IPTF’s police restructuring programme. This has had considerable success in the Federation, but was initially blocked in the Republika Srpska by the uncooperative attitude of the RS authorities in Pale. SFOR has direct responsibility under Annex 1A of the Dayton Peace Agreement for the so-called “Specialist Police” — paramilitary forces. The SFOR Commander made clear he would exercise tight control over such forces until they too had gone through the IPTF restructuring process. On the Federation side there has been compliance and restructuring has now begun on the RS side too. Establishing a reliable, democratically-controlled police force is one of the keys to restoring stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is a prerequisite for returns by refugees and displaced persons to areas where they will be in the ethnic minority — an important goal for 1998.

**Tackling organised crime and corruption**

This is closely linked to the problem of policing. Particularly in the RS, smuggling and other corrupt practices have provided funds to pay the policemen. Those policemen have come to see themselves as the servants of those who controlled the money, and not the public. The result has been more corruption and the intimidation of opposition forces. The international community has committed itself to breaking this cycle of corruption, which will create a freer society and also help ensure that legitimate state organs get the funds to which they are entitled, which they can then use for the good of their entire population. Other examples of organised crime, such as in Mostar, are also being tackled with increasing vigour by the international community. SFOR stands ready to assist, within its mandate.

**Promoting balanced media**

Without balanced media and accurate reporting, it will be hard to consolidate peace. Unfortunately, much of the state-controlled media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not balanced, and in a few cases some broadcasters have been actively hostile to SFOR and to the peace process. The media controlled by the RS authorities in Pale have a particularly bad record. At the request of the High Representative, Ambassador Westendorp, and acting within the mandate given to it by the North Atlantic Council, SFOR took control of five transmission towers in the RS, in response to continued hostile reporting by the RS state media despite clear warnings from the High Representative. Following an act of deliberate sabotage, which would have blacked out part of the country altogether, SFOR efforts were vital in establishing satellite and microwave links that allowed the continued transmission of non-inflammatory reporting from the RS Banja Luka studio. The OHR has established a media restructuring plan that aims to remove direct party political influence from RS TV and to instil behaviour that reflects generally accepted international norms of
media conduct. SFOR will continue to support this important initiative, and is also directly supporting the expansion of alternative media such as the Open Broadcast Network.

A commitment to peace

As recent Ministerial statements have made clear, the international community remains resolved to ensure that all those persons who have been indicted for war crimes are transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. SFOR personnel will continue to act in accordance with their guidance and detain any indicted persons they encounter in the course of their duties.

I look forward to the challenges of the next few months with confidence. The soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of SFOR — of the NATO Alliance and its partners and friends, working together in a way unprecedented in history — have proved time and again that they deserve our trust and respect. Their commitment has had a high price, including 76 deaths. We will not forget this sacrifice, as we continue our firm, even-handed efforts to build a lasting peace.

Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia

Colonel William R. Phillips
Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE

NATO’s programme of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) reflects the Alliance’s broad approach to security coupled with the recognition that there are civil ramifications to a military operation. According to the author, CIMIC has proved an essential aspect of the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in view of this, has become an integral part of NATO commanders’ training, planning and operations.

The effects of conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia have become all too familiar in recent years: degraded or total absence of civil authority, ruined economies, ethnic rivalry and hatred, large numbers of displaced persons and refugees, and widespread human rights abuses. This type of complex emergency draws numerous civil international and non-governmental organisations seeking to assist in a wide range of political, humanitarian, economic and social tasks. When military forces are also deployed, political authorities and military commanders must work in parallel with and take into consideration civil efforts when planning or conducting operations. This is the concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Since December 1995, both NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) have found CIMIC to be an essential element for military-civilian interaction.

IFOR/SFOR CIMIC

Within the SFOR, the task of CIMIC is to establish and maintain relations between SFOR commanders and civil organisations and the population. The CIMIC function generally comprises two types of actions: those in support of the military force and those in support of the civil environment. Actions in support of the force prepared the way for IFOR deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, established and maintained the conditions for civil-military trust and partnership at all local, regional and national levels, and supports SFOR commanders’ operational activities. In supporting the civil environment, CIMIC assesses the situation and, consistent with the SFOR mission and resource constraints, contributes to restoring essential public services and economic reconstruction. CIMIC has evolved throughout the history of IFOR and SFOR, adapting to the changing needs on the ground.

Since the beginning of their respective missions, both IFOR and SFOR have considered civil conditions and civil activities in their plans and operations. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) — the so-called Dayton Peace Agreement — established a comprehensive settlement composed of parallel civil and military aspects to implement peace in the former Yugoslavia. During the winter of 1995-1996, the focus of the IFOR was on the implementation of the military aspects of the GFAP. Early relations with civil implementation organisations and efforts were reactive and oriented upon continuation of humanitarian activities in support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), prisoner release in support of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and short-term, immediate projects.
In the spring and fall of 1996, IFOR interaction with civil implementation organisations evolved to include humanitarian support, national elections, longer-term projects, and infrastructure reconstruction. This shift reflected the increasing presence and experience on the ground of key civil implementation organisations such as the Office of the High Representative’s Joint Civilian Commissions, the World Bank, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina International Police Task Force (IPTF). In 1997, SFOR began supporting the efforts of civil organisations in repatriation, reconstruction, capital investment projects, municipal elections and civil institution building.

From the early orientation on purely military aspects of the GFAP, the IFOR and SFOR focus gradually widened to encompass significant support to many aspects of civil implementation. Today, the major SFOR focus continues the shift to support of civil implementation tasks.

**Adaptation of SFOR CIMIC**

The CIMIC structure is based on the understanding that operations like SFOR require strong linkages between political, strategic, operational (theatre) and tactical levels of activity. The essence of CIMIC is support of NATO commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. Strategic military guidance for SFOR is provided by the SACEUR at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SACEUR is supported by a provisional CIMIC section and CIMIC augmentation to the SHAPE Joint Operations Centre at Mons, Belgium.

Within SFOR, the CIMIC structure consists of operational and tactical levels. Approximately 180 CIMIC personnel support the tactical activities of the three multinational divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The remaining CIMIC personnel provide the theatre-level staff (CJ-9) in support of the SFOR Commander and, until December 1997, constituted a theatre-wide oriented Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF). The CMTF contained specialists with a wide range of civil-
ian skills ranging from agronomists to economists to civil infrastructure engineers. Prudently applied to support civil efforts, CMTF civilian skills, commercial experience, and military organisational expertise enhanced reconstruction, encouraged repatriation, and advanced democratisation within the theatre.

IFOR/SFOR lessons learned and national experiences such as the pre-IFOR UN missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia, and the 1997 coalition operation in Albania have clearly demonstrated that allied commanders need a dedicated CIMIC capability. The evolution over the past two years of NATO CIMIC political guidance, military policy and doctrine are first steps in the establishment of such a capability and have highlighted the desirability of establishing a wider base of nations with CIMIC expertise within the Alliance. SFOR, which requires a substantial CIMIC capability, provides the opportunity to develop multinational CIMIC personnel in the context of ongoing operations.

Many SFOR troop-contributing nations have deployed CIMIC personnel, but the United States — through its regular and reserve Civil Affairs units — has provided the majority of CIMIC capability available to IFOR and SFOR commanders. Over the past two years this commitment has amounted to some 1400 civil affairs officers and non-commissioned officers. The majority of these soldiers are reservists and are mobilised for 270 days then placed under the operational control of the IFOR/SFOR for six months. Until December 1997, approximately 320 United States Army Civil Affairs personnel were under SFOR control at any given time.

The process of adapting the CMTF from an essentially United States-contributed force to a true allied multinational force began in August 1997. The CMTF was restructured into a new multinational CIMIC Task Force (CIMIC TF) by increasing the ratio of non-US CIMIC personnel to that of the United States’ contribution. The immediate goal was a CIMIC TF where approximately 50 per cent of personnel represented national contributions other than the United States. While many nations were willing to contribute, CIMIC is a new military function and most nations do not have trained CIMIC personnel. As a consequence, during the force generation process, several nations requested SHAPE to conduct a basic CIMIC course prior to deployment of their personnel to SFOR.

**Pre-employment CIMIC training**

SHAPE responded rapidly by establishing a training and support organisation consisting of 26 instructors representing five nations assembled from SHAPE, HQ Land Forces Central Europe, HQ SFOR, the SFOR CMTF, the three SFOR multinational divisions, the German CIMIC Unit, the United Kingdom Civil Affairs Group and United States Civil Affairs personnel from the US European Command (Stuttgart), the US Army Europe (Heidelberg) and the US Army Reserve 353rd Civil Affairs Command. The United States’ 7th Army Training Center provided classrooms, accommodation and explosive range facilities at Vilsec, Germany.

The aim of the “NATO Pre-Employment CIMIC Course” was to provide students with a basic understanding of NATO CIMIC as it applies in SFOR. Upon completion, the students should be prepared to deploy to SFOR, engage in practical, on-the-job training, and assume CIMIC duties in SFOR headquarters and formations.

The SFOR-specific course programme of instruction was developed from IFOR/SFOR and national lessons learned and advice from SFOR CIMIC personnel. It includes courses covering Area Orientation and Civil Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina; CIMIC Procedures; Relations with Civil Organisations;
Personal Force Protection Measures; IFOR/SFOR Lessons Learned; and open discussions with representatives from HQ SFOR CJ-9, the SFOR CMTF, and the three multinational divisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the first course, held from 24-29 November 1997, there were 104 students from 10 NATO member nations and 5 NATO partner nations. To facilitate team building and information exchange, students were formed into groups depending upon their eventual duty destination within the SFOR. Operational or theatre-level personnel formed two groups while three groups contained tactical or multinational division-level personnel. A CIMIC officer from the corresponding SFOR organisation was permanently associated with each group as mentor and team-builder. Training consisted of a combination of 40 per cent plenary sessions and 60 per cent individual group instruction with group and individual practical exercises in areas such as negotiations, media interview, and civil-military meetings. Throughout the week of intense education, the students challenged instructors, developed personal techniques, gained an appreciation of how to foster civil-military partnership, acquired experience with those they will work with in SFOR, and brought their own extensive expertise into each class. Based upon student responses and instructor assessment, the objective of the course was achieved.

After the course

On 30 November and 1 December 1997, 80 students were deployed from the training site to SFOR to begin a period of in-theatre practical and on-the-job training. Others followed shortly thereafter. From 15-29 December, the CMTF underwent the transition to the new multinational CIMIC TF with the departure of 320 United States’ CIMIC personnel and the integration of 170 new United States CIMIC officers and non-commissioned officers with the previous student body of NATO’s first “Pre-Employment CIMIC Course”. Further courses are envisaged to take place in 1998.

Clearly, no single training course can address all the aspects of military-civil interface in complex situations such as the former Yugoslavia. The significance of this course is not the personal education of 104 CIMIC officers and non-commissioned officers; it is the continuing recognition of NATO’s vision and willingness to address how military forces will deal with complex changes to civil conditions within actual and potential areas of operation and the necessity to provide a dedicated, multinational CIMIC capability to Alliance commanders.

New Permanent Representative of the Netherlands

Ambassador Nicolaas Hendrik Biegman has succeeded Ambassador L.W. Veenendaal as Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the North Atlantic Council.

Mr. Biegman (61) began his diplomatic career in 1963 and his postings abroad included Cairo, Canberra and Dar es Salaam. In 1977 he was appointed counsellor to the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to NATO, then returned to the Hague in 1980 to serve as Head of the International Organisations Department at the Foreign Ministry. In 1984 Mr. Biegman was designated Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Cairo and in 1988 he returned to the Foreign Ministry as Director-General for International Development Cooperation. Mr. Biegman was named Permanent Representative to the UN in 1992, a post he held for five years.
Last October, for the first time, a General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association was held in the capital of a NATO partner country. This was more than a symbolic gesture; it was a concrete manifestation of the “new” Atlantic Treaty Association. The 43rd annual session of the ATA, which took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, signalled the launching of a new era for the Association. This renaissance of the ATA is in tandem with the fundamental transformation of Euro-Atlantic security structures — most notably NATO — in response to the new security environment.

Under the leadership of the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Haluk Bayulkan, the ATA made remarkable progress in realising this rejuvenation, in particular by implementing its own enlargement process — ahead of the enlargement of NATO and the EU. As a result, we were able to welcome in Sofia national Atlantic Committees of many partner countries as full participants, with the same rights and responsibilities as those of NATO member states. While not all partner countries have yet established their own national Atlantic Committees, we are encouraging them to do so and to join us in our common efforts.

Another important innovation reflecting this renaissance was the establishment of an ATA Youth Committee in Sofia, which was well attended and proved to be very energetic. Today’s youth will be tomorrow’s leaders and this new Committee’s work can therefore be expected to play a crucial role in the ATA’s mission.

And what is the ATA’s mission?

The Atlantic Treaty Association has been serving the cause of peace and freedom for many years through its educational activities and programmes of support for the Alliance. We have worked relentlessly to inform the public of the crucial role played by NATO in maintaining peace and stability in Europe, and to explain the significance of the challenging security agenda we face. Without strong public support NATO’s future would be at risk — not for want of a role or tasks, but because public recognition and support are essential to the long-term survival of any such organisation in a democratic society.

How does the ATA and its national Committees and Associations implement this challenging task?

Above all, we seek to educate public opinion at home and abroad, increasing public awareness and bringing people together. To that end, we organise civic activities such as seminars, lectures and debates to orient public opinion, as well as various publishing activities.

The exchange of information and ideas between the national Committees is essential to achieving a better understanding of the economic, social and political factors that influence nations’ policies and actions. This improved awareness of each country’s concerns and priorities is what enables allies and partners to cooperate effectively and take decisions and actions based on consensus.

Moreover, the Atlantic Treaty Associations and Committees are ideal conduits for transmitting the public’s perceptions to the nation’s leaders, on the one hand, and helping the government to better explain its policies to the public, on the other. As non-governmental organisations that promote the values of democracy and solidarity between people, these Associations can also influence the policy-making process both nationally and internationally.

Our goal is clear: we have to defend the peace and freedom that we enjoy today so that democracy will be secure across the Euro-Atlantic community tomorrow. At the same time, in developing future generations with a stable, secure and peaceful environment, we must maintain the right balance between the preservation of our different national or cultural identities and the accelerating integration process which is taking place in today’s global village.

To this end, our Association will do everything possible to promote cooperation and confidence between the nations and peoples of the Euro-Atlantic area. If we succeed in our mission, our children and grandchildren will be able to enjoy life in a secure environment free from the threats and risks which led to the conflicts and wars of the past. ◆
Taking partnership to a new level in NATO’s Defence Support community

Norman Ray
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support

Taking up the challenge issued by Alliance Foreign Ministers at Sintra last May to further enhance Partnership for Peace, the NATO Defence Support community is putting that mandate into action by associating partners to its activities across a broad network of expert and working-level bodies. That network has formed the axis of technical cooperation upon which NATO has relied in the fields of armaments, air defence, airspace management and communications and information systems for many years. Partner participation is expanding through information exchange as well as programmatic initiatives under the aegis of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the NATO Air Defence Committee, the Committee for European Airspace Coordination, and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board. This involvement in the day-to-day business of armaments and other technical cooperation provides an essential means for partners to achieve greater equipment interoperability and compatibility with the Alliance.

Since the launch of Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, NATO’s Defence Support committees have taken a series of steps to involve partner nations in their activities and those of their many subordinate expert groups, thereby providing one of the more practical dimensions of PfP. Those activities, when combined with the new initiatives of enhanced PfP launched at Sintra last year, are designed to bring cooperation to a significantly higher level by involving partners progressively in the mainstream work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC), the Committee for European Airspace Coordination (CEAC) and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B).

In the short term, partner involvement in this work will facilitate interoperability between Alliance and partner forces, which is a key objective of PfP. In the longer term, partners will be afforded the opportunity to contribute substantively to the activities of these four senior NATO committees, in ways which will have a lasting impact on the operational capability of partner forces to operate together with NATO forces within the framework of the Alliance’s new missions.

In this context, these Defence Support bodies, like all other senior NATO committees, now meet at plenary level with partners at least once a year. These high-level meetings allow senior representatives from partner nations to exchange views on policy and programmatic matters with their NATO counterparts. The heart of Defence Support’s PfP cooperation, however, is the contact which takes place at the expert and working levels, with over 60 activities conducted with partners in 1997, including workshops, seminars, technical information exchanges and projected joint studies. A closer look at some of these practical initiatives yields several insights into the expanding scope of this cooperation.

Conference of National Armaments Directors

The CNAD and its more than 100 subordinate groups (including those which deal with Research and Technology issues) focus on the planning, organisation and management of the cooperative development of defence equipment in the Alliance. Until the decisions taken at the meetings in Sintra and Madrid last year, the CNAD’s role in PfP was essentially guided by the Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) and the overall Partnership Work Plan (PWP). However, even before the enhanced PfP was launched at Sintra in May 1997, consideration was being given to several initiatives which anticipated its aims and which would fulfill the objective of rendering PfP “more operational” and of associating partner nations much more closely to mainstream NATO business.

In November 1996, CNAD opened one of its Main Groups — AC/313 on Acquisition Practices — and all five of its Cadre Groups to the permanent participation of partner countries. These six groups, the first
NATO bodies to incorporate partner participation on such a basis, have been accordingly labelled CNAD Partnership Groups. These bodies address technical issues which are essential to successful armaments cooperation and materiel standardisation, such as codification of spare parts, quality assurance and ammunition design and safety. The two principal features of partner participation in the CNAD’s Partnership Groups are that partner nations are now able to associate themselves with decisions taken by the allies, as well as to participate in the development of future NATO technical standards affecting allies and partners alike, involving them in the truly substantive work of armaments cooperation in NATO.

The next important step has begun with the CNAD decision to expand partner participation in the regular work of the NATO Army, Navy and Air Force Armaments Groups and, as far as possible, in their subordinate committees starting this year. This measure will allow partners to get exposed to the routine technical cooperation which takes place among the armies, navies and air forces of the Alliance and will increase considerably the involvement of partners in the information exchange activities which are the core of CNAD business.

Another key CNAD initiative giving substance to the enhanced PIP and which will be implemented this year is the launching of “Partnership Armaments Cooperation Projects”. This programme will offer NATO defence industry an incentive and a vehicle to assist partners and their defence industries in the development of realistic proposals for small scale armaments cooperation projects aimed at finding solutions to near-term NATO-partner equipment interoperability requirements. The results of these joint efforts may represent the equivalent of an initial architecture or systems integration study, with the added benefit of enhancing partner participants’ understanding of and contribution to the process of requirements formulation and validation practised by NATO allies.

A complementary initiative, led by the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), a subordinate body

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**Key PIP enhancement initiatives in armaments cooperation**

- **Establishment of “CNAD Partnership Groups”**  
  Implemented in 1997

- **Expansion of partner participation in Main Armaments Groups and subordinate bodies**  
  Endorsed in principle by the CNAD; implementation could start in 1998

- **Launching of CNAD “Partnership Armaments Cooperation Projects”**  
  Endorsed by the CNAD and the Political Military Steering Committee; implementation should start in 1998

- **“NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Action Plan for Joint Pre-feasibility Studies”**  
  Endorsed by the CNAD; implementation should begin in 1998 with the first study
of the CNAD, aims at further developing the dialogue between representatives of the defence industry from NATO and partner nations. A NIAG Action Plan for Joint Pre-Feasibility Studies will identify technical subjects to be addressed and the NATO Naval Armaments Group has already identified one such topic concerning Naval ship survivability design related to fire resistance. This project is intended to be the first of several envisaged by the CNAD as a mechanism to gradually involve partner nations in the NATO process by which two or more allies develop together a defence equipment item.

**NATO and partner experts assist Albanian Ministry of Defence with ammunition storage & disposal problem**

A recent operational example of enhanced PfP in action was the urgent NATO-PfP mission organised under the auspices of one of the CNAD Partnership Groups, AC/258.

To re-establish stability following its crisis of March 1997, Albania requested and is receiving NATO Expert Team assistance in implementing its Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) as well as on a broad range of urgent problems for which its military has responsibility. Among its most pressing challenges is the restoration of control and consolidation of military ammunition stocks which were heavily looted during the crisis. Additionally, a significant amount of excess, obsolete and unstable ammunition requires classification and safe destruction to limit the danger to the Albanian people and the environment.

The task of assessing Albania’s ammunition storage and disposal problem and developing an action plan to resolve it with the Albanian Ministry of Defence was carried out by a NATO team of highly qualified experts from Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United States. The team was augmented by additional skilled ammunition experts from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania whose special expertise concerning Russian and Chinese manufactured arms and munitions was particularly valuable.

Through the assistance from NATO and partner nations in training Albanians in necessary skills and providing certain critical equipment needs, the Albanian Ministry of Defence intends to devote its own personnel resources to tackling this huge problem in the future.

As a whole, these various initiatives will bring partners into the core of NATO’s long-standing armaments structures and procedures. Partners’ defence establishments, military service staffs and defence industries will be able to interact at virtually every level of the CNAD committee structure with their NATO counterparts, addressing together materiel interoperability shortfalls and objectives, exchanging views and technical information on future operational requirements, and engaging in common development of selected equipment items. In time, this evolutionary process will bring revolutionary change, by making NATO and partner forces increasingly compatible operationally, functional and technical topics which are intended to improve understanding of air defence matters and increase transparency, trust and confidence among the participating nations through cooperation in air defence.

On the basis of agreed Individual Partnership Programmes (IPPs), the NADC implemented a new project in 1996 to foster practical air defence cooperative activities, the basis of which is a “16+1” Fact Finding Meeting (FFM) with a partner. The FFM further amplifies the IPP as it relates to air defence topics, providing clarification on areas where assistance and expertise are required. The FFM is the first step in the
development of the Cooperative Air Defence Programme (CADP) to respond to those needs that surface during the partners’ FFM. Eight partners have already conducted FFMs and a collective CADP has now been developed for use by all partners. With enhanced PIP, the NADC has intensified contacts at all levels, particularly by focusing activities within its Air Defence Representatives (ADREPS) forum which is envisaged to include partner representatives for special sessions.

Since 1960, air defence has been a core area of collective Alliance endeavour and, through the NADC’s PIP activities, allies are now sharing with partners the benefits which accrue from close cooperation in this field.

**Committee for European Airspace Coordination**

The CEAC ensures the coordination of civil and military airspace requirements among the allies, as well as the improvement of air traffic management with partners. The CEAC first began cooperating with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1991, even before NATO established formal cooperation mechanisms with partner nations. Following the decision by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Oslo in June 1992, the CEAC invited partners to attend plenary sessions on a regular basis.

CEAC has implemented several measures that enhance the practical dimension of PIP. Recently, workshops have been conducted to exchange views and provide advice on civil and military coordination in Air Traffic Management (ATM) as well as technical issues such as Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) and ATM aspects in the planning and conduct of major air exercises. A workshop on SSR “Mode S” was co-sponsored with EUROCONTROL, consistent with its interest in NATO initiatives toward partner nations in ATM.

The Cooperative Airspace Management Programme, an ongoing CEAC initiative, invites partners to participate in CEAC plenary sessions and, more importantly, in working group meetings and their dealings with communications, navigation, identification and surveillance issues associated with airspace management. Further, the CEAC sponsors Fact-Finding Meetings with individual partners, similar in nature to those conducted by the NADC, with the aim of assessing their airspace management needs. Given the continuing growth of civil air traffic in European airspace and the continued need for proper coordination and cooperation between civil and military airspace users, CEAC’s work with partners has been at the forefront of PIP and will continue to be an area of primary importance for allies and partners alike.

**NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board**

The NC3B is responsible for the policy, planning and coordination of NATO’s civil and military communications and information systems. The NC3B’s PIP enhancement initiatives are critically important to achieving true interoperability between NATO and partner forces and they fall into three distinct categories: inclusion in projects and programmes, input to databases and participation in planning and decision making.

In the projects/programmes category, the NATO C3 Agency has already begun work to enhance necessary consultation connectivity with partners. To this end, a satellite communication (SATCOM) trial is being conducted with partner nations over a period of six months. For the short term, a secure voice network for consultation purposes is being implemented, based on the US loan of NATO-compatible secure telephones to partners.

In the database category, the Expert Group on Communications (EGC) of the PIP Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping has studied the feasibility and potential development of a PIP database containing entries on communications and information systems equipment which partner nations are, in principle, prepared to make available for NATO-led peacekeeping operations. The Joint Operations Tactical Interoperability Database (JOTID) was recommended for this purpose and a complementary initiative has been proposed to add a PIP chapter to the JOTID. A number of partners have already provided data and others have indicated they would follow suit in due course. Further, to realise its goal of significantly improving communication and information systems capabilities with partners, the NATO C3 Organisation is identifying and developing new interoperability support tools to create a viable communications infrastructure.

Recognising that Alliance and partner forces cannot cooperate effectively in exercises or real-world operations if they are not able to communicate, the NATO C3 Board’s efforts to achieve progress in communications and information systems have been at the centre of PIP’s focus on interoperability, an example of which would include the success of the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Prospects and opportunities**

Though individual partner countries’ military requirements and capacity to participate in NATO bodies will continue to vary widely, most share the NATO nations’ need for defence industrial restructuring and
force modernisation despite diminishing resources to carry out these efforts. Such challenges serve as a strong incentive for partner nations to look upon the Alliance not only as a valuable channel for technical information exchange and common planning, but also as an entry point for cooperative projects which provide leverage to defence establishments through the sharing of costs, benefits and risks of an acquisition process.

The response to those needs begins with the full implementation of the many initiatives described above, which will result in a significant enhancement of PfP and its value to our partners in the areas of armaments, air defence, airspace management and consultation, command and control. As these activities gradually take root, the Partnership’s Planning and Review Process (PARP), or an adaptation of it to the particular purposes of the Defence Support community, should increasingly become the axis around which our PfP activities revolve. This is illustrated in the accompanying diagram.

With the enhancement of PfP, cooperation between the Alliance and partners in the Defence Support sphere of responsibility has assumed a new quality. This enhanced partnership is underpinned by an increasingly dense network of relationships between NATO and the military forces and defence establishments of partner nations. Looking to the future, this accelerating process will result in an unprecedented level of defence cooperation among virtually all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area, thereby making a lasting contribution to international peace and security.
The future of NATO's Mediterranean initiative

Nicola de Santis
NATO Office of Information and Press

The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative was the subject of a thought-provoking study presented by RAND to the Alliance’s top political and military authorities and opinion leaders, as well as to representatives of the six Mediterranean dialogue partner countries, at a high-level conference in Rome last November. Co-sponsored by NATO and the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici in Rome, the conference was opened by Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana gave the keynote address, with Italian Defence Minister Beniamino Andreatta, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Sergio Balanzino and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley Clark among other eminent participants. In this article, Nicola de Santis, Liaison Officer Italy and Officer for Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries at NATO, and coordinator of the conference, highlights the issues raised and some of the proposals put forward in Rome.

NATO has concentrated much of its efforts over the last decade on projecting stability in Central and Eastern Europe. As the new democracies in the east become increasingly stable and begin to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO will need to shift its attention to where its most pressing security challenges are likely to lie, on its southern periphery. This is the premise of an authoritative study by four senior analysts at RAND, the American think-tank, commissioned by the Italian Ministry of Defence and presented to NATO’s top political and military authorities, as well as to representatives of the Mediterranean dialogue countries, the European Union, Western European Union and the North Atlantic Assembly, in November 1997.¹

According to this study, the Mediterranean region has acquired increasing strategic importance in recent years, and in the context of growing instability in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, NATO’s vital security interests may be affected. A number of policy proposals and prescriptions are therefore offered to bolster NATO’s budding Mediterranean initiative with the six non-NATO Mediterranean dialogue partner countries — Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Underlying factors of Mediterranean security

The RAND analysts have rightly moved away from the common tendency to treat the Mediterranean region as an “arc of conflict” and a hot bed of tension. Indeed such a simplistic characterisation does not accurately describe the problems of the region and puts too much emphasis on the “hard” military aspects of security in the area. On the contrary, they point out that problems in the region are shaped more by political upheaval and socio-economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension.

The political turmoil in these societies can be attributed to the difficulty in reconciling, on the one hand, the development of religious, cultural and economic pluralism and the emergence of a more active civil society, with, on the other hand, the demands that this poses in terms of civil rights, accountability, transparency and questions of political succession. Consequently, even considering the growth of violent radical movements, for the majority of the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, security is more of a question of...
internal stability than a military matter. Moreover, the instability deriving from socio-economic imbalances can have a direct impact, in the form of “soft” security problems, on the vital interests and well-being of the European member countries of NATO.

The problem threatens to become urgent in the face of a North African population expected to grow from about 63 million today to some 142 million by 2025, and the enormous implications that this will have on employment, housing, sanitation, food, water, transportation and communication systems in the region. What is more, some 30 per cent of the area’s population will be under 15 years of age. In the same period, the population of the southern European members of NATO is only expected to grow by five million. It was pointed out at the conference that this demographic imbalance is likely to result in mass flows of migration towards southern Europe in the 21st century. This has social and domestic security ramifications for the countries of Europe which are ill-prepared to absorb large influxes of immigrants. Moreover, despite efforts to restrict illegal immigration, it is becoming increasingly difficult to stop desperate migrants seeking better opportunities abroad as recent events in Italy have shown.

Developments in the south-eastern Mediterranean can also directly affect the stability and well-being of European members of the Alliance through disruption of energy imports and trade. Much of Europe’s energy supplies are imported from the region: 65 per cent of its oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean on approximately 3,000 ships daily; 30 per cent of Italy’s oil is imported from Libya and 32 per cent of its natural gas from Algeria; France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom all import oil from Libya, while Algerian natural gas is exported to Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain; 74 per cent of Spain’s natural gas needs, 50 per cent of Italy’s and 29 per cent of France’s were imported from the Maghreb states in 1996. Trade in the other direction amounted to US$6 billion in European exports to Algeria in 1996, or 67 per cent of its imports; with 69 percent of Tunisia’s imports, 66 percent of Libya’s and 57 percent of Morocco’s also coming from Europe in 1996.

While not posing a military threat, this interdependence has clear security implications for the Alliance. NATO has already adopted a broad approach to security, defining it in terms more comprehensive than merely military risks. Yet the socio-economic developments referred to above may lead to the Alliance’s definition of security being subject to further refinement for some years to come. This is the logic behind the approach taken by RAND’s research which calls on NATO to improve cooperation with its Mediterranean dialogue partner countries, starting with “soft” security issues.

This is not to say that “hard” security issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are not significant. On the contrary, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean will not only have direct implications on the security of NATO member countries in the coming years, but could also have destabilising effects in the region itself by altering the strategic balance. There is common interest, therefore, in eventual cooperation in this field between NATO and its Mediterranean dialogue partners, consistent with NATO’s objective of preventing through diplomatic means the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

**New Permanent Representative of Norway**

Ambassador Hans Jacob Biørn Lian has succeeded Ambassador Leif Mevik as Permanent Representative of Norway to the North Atlantic Council.

Mr. Biørn Lian (55) joined the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 1967. In his diplomatic career he has served abroad at the Norwegian Permanent Delegation to NATO, at the Delegation to the C Shea and at the Mission to the UN in Geneva. Mr. Biørn Lian also served as Minister-Counsellor to the Norwegian Delegation to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, and to the CSCE follow-up in Vienna.

In 1988 Mr. Biørn Lian was named Ambassador and Head of the Norwegian Delegation to the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, and later to the CSBM negotiations in Vienna. He also served as Ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and as Political Director of the Foreign Ministry. In 1994 Mr. Biørn Lian was named Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN in New York, a post he held until his appointment to NATO in January 1998.

**A coherent Mediterranean policy**

The RAND team argues that the issue is not whether NATO should have a Mediterranean strategy, but what the goals and content of that strategy should be and how it can be most effectively implemented. Broad consensus emerged at the Rome conference that NATO needs to engage in a proactive policy in the Mediterranean, since growing instability in the south will inevitably affect its interests in the future, as the distinction between Mediterranean and European security becomes increasingly vague.

The emerging challenges accompanying change in the Mediterranean region require a concerted approach on the part of the myriad European initiatives aimed at the area. Better coordination between them, particularly between the two main initiatives, those of the European Union and of NATO, is essential to ensure that their approaches are complementary and mutually
reinforcing. The RAND research suggests that in order to minimise the potential for overlap and duplication, each institution should concentrate on what it does best. Problems in the region of a socio-economic nature, for example, would be better handled in the EU forum.

The study points out that the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched in Barcelona in November 1995, and NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue, are complementary since they address different aspects of the same issues. The research proposes the establishment of institutional ties between NATO and the European Union, in order to better develop synergy and cooperation between the initiatives of the two organisations. These ties might begin with a periodical exchange of views between the Secretary General of NATO and the President of the EU Commission and the Commissioners concerned with the Mediterranean, enabling the two institutions to keep abreast of their respective activities. Working-level ties between the secretariats of the two institutions should also be enhanced to ensure the success of this endeavour.

Public perceptions and policy options

Attitudes towards NATO in the southern and eastern Mediterranean are quite different from those in Central and Eastern Europe, where there is strong support for NATO. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, where little is known about the Alliance’s adaptation over the past several years, NATO is perceived widely as a Cold War institution searching for a new enemy. That is why the best course to change the perception of NATO in these countries is to focus more on “soft” security, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in “hard” military cooperation. Measures should be developed with the aim of promoting transparency and defusing threat perceptions, and promoting a better understanding of NATO’s policies and objectives.

Three priority areas identified by RAND to this end include:

New NATO Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has appointed Yves Sillard as Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs.

After studying at the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Supérieure d’Aérotechnique, Mr. Sillard joined the Colomb Béchar Flight Test Centre in 1960 and then the Cazaux Flight Test Centre in 1963. The following year, he took charge of France’s Concorde programme, and in 1965 he oversaw construction of the Guyana Space Centre and served as its first Director. In 1973 he became Director in charge of Launch Vehicles at the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) and in 1976 he was named General Manager of CNES. While at CNES he headed the ARIANE launcher programme and the corresponding European industrial organisation. In 1982, Mr. Sillard was appointed Chairman and Manager of the Institut Français pour l’Exploitation de la Mer and from 1989 to 1993 he was France’s Delegate General for Armaments.

After serving as Chairman and General Manager of “Défense Conseil International”, Mr. Sillard became the adviser for space policy attached to the Ministry of Defence in April 1997, a post he held until his appointment to NATO in January 1998.

Mr. Sillard (62) is a licensed Air Force pilot with 1200 hours flight time.
Public information

NATO information activities can represent an important tool for promoting dialogue, understanding and confidence-building. This implies organising more international conferences and seminars discussing NATO’s agenda and Mediterranean security issues, and increasing and strengthening ties with research and defence institutions in Mediterranean dialogue countries. The number of visits to NATO by key opinion leaders from dialogue countries should also be increased, targeting journalists, parliamentarians, academics and emerging leaders in key sectors of these countries. Other recommendations include publishing some NATO materials in Arabic, granting fellowships to researchers from dialogue states, and increasing port calls in dialogue countries by STANAVFORMED ships, as well as developing a coordinated public information effort for these visits.

Civil emergency planning

Increasing the participation of dialogue states in Alliance civil emergency planning (CEP) activities and related courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau is also recommended. Cooperation in CEP can serve as a confidence-building measure and lay the groundwork for cooperation in other areas.

Crisis management and peacekeeping

Cooperation in peacekeeping, crisis management and peace support activities should also be increased, building on the participation of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco in SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while expanding opportunities to take part in peacekeeping courses at Oberammergau. Dialogue countries could also be invited to send observers to peacekeeping and other NATO exercises as well as to send officers to special briefings at SHAPE on crisis management, peacekeeping and peace support.

These activities could be the first steps toward developing, in the future, some degree of military cooperation in the fields of crisis management, peace support, or military exercises. This cooperation should be tailored to the specific needs of each dialogue partner.

The broader agenda

Before any of this can happen, however, the conference concluded that NATO must recognise the importance of Mediterranean security in its broader agenda and undertake measures to increase the level of cooperation with the Mediterranean dialogue countries. This will demand increased resources. While the formula of self-funding could apply to a limited number of activities, to ensure broad participation and the success of the wide array of activities described above, NATO has to allocate increased financial resources for this purpose.

To this end it is encouraging to see that the Rome conference was not only instrumental in widening understanding of the Mediterranean dimension as an integral part of the European security architecture, but also in increasing awareness of the need to allocate increased resources in 1998 to conduct activities in the fields of information, civil emergency planning and scientific and environmental affairs, in order to reach out more effectively to dialogue countries. The conference also stimulated ideas for a coherent, future-oriented Mediterranean policy. It highlighted how NATO information activities can support the Alliance’s policy making process, bringing important opinion leaders together from Alliance and dialogue countries, and sharing knowledge and expertise.

The work to be undertaken by NATO’s Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) in 1998 is particularly important in this regard. With overall responsibility for the initiative, the MCG is now moving the dialogue forward into actual cooperation. The Mediterranean dialogue is already contributing to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, while complementing other international efforts. Its enhancement is a logical response to the changing security landscape in Europe. ◆